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This thesis examines the role of bishops in political reform and rebellion in England, 
beginning with the return from exile in 1213 of Stephen Langton (archbishop of Canterbury 
1207-26) and ending with the suspension in 1266 of five bishops for their involvement with 
the Montfortian revolution. Langton and his successor Edmund of Abingdon (archbishop of 
Canterbury 1233-40) created a model for episcopal involvement in the affairs of the realm, 
especially during times of discord between king and barons. Prioritising the peace of the 
kingdom, they maintained their loyalty to the king as well as his subjects so that they were 
empowered and incentivised to act as peacemakers. This obligation was developed by 
Langton’s biblical understanding of the clerical duty to ensure good government. When illegal 
or destructive royal policies caused baronial discontent that threatened civil peace, the 
bishops could step in to reform the king’s behaviour. Although they threatened ecclesiastical 
censure, Langton and Edmund never attacked the foundations of royal power. In contrast, the 
Montfortian bishops renounced their loyalty to the king. As partisan Montfortians, they were 
no longer qualified to act as peacemakers. Members of a regime that appropriated the bases of 
royal power and ruled in the king’s name, they advocated measures that their predecessors 
would have considered illicit and dangerous. The intellectual conflict created by this rupture 
is reflected in the actions and justificatory arguments of the Montfortian bishops, who had to 
construct their case from scratch in the crucible of political crisis. Their story provides an 
ideal-type for the study of political thought: exothermic ideology. Not the cause but the 
consequence of events on the ground, their arguments are not coherent as political theory but 
reveal the effect on the production of ideas exerted by external pressures and the internal 
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On 12 May 1264, with Henry III and the royalist army gathered in Lewes and his heavily 
outnumbered forces mustered ten miles north at Fletching, Simon de Montfort earl of 
Leicester dispatched his supporter and ally Stephen Berksted, bishop of Chichester, to the 
royal camp offering terms of peace. Montfort, although ever faithful to his oath to uphold the 
Provisions of Oxford, was prepared to offer the king a compromise: 
‘Choose the best men, whose faith is lively, who have read canon law, or have 
becomingly taught theology, and sacred philosophy, and who know how to rule the 
Christian faith; and whatever such men shall not fear through wholesome doctrine to 
counsel, or whatever they shall not fear to decide, what they shall say, that shall they 
find us ready to adopt; in such manner that we may not know the brand of perjury, but 
as sons of God may hold faith.’ 1 
Montfort’s offer encapsulates much of the ideal and reality of the role of the bishops in the 
political community of thirteenth-century England. His suggestion of asking churchmen to 
arbitrate on the political constitution to decide how royal power should operate appealed to 
aspects of episcopal identity that were by this point deeply engrained: the duty to oversee 
royal government for the good of the realm epitomised by the bishops’ enforcement of Magna 
Carta and the Charter of the Forests by sentence of excommunication.  It also alluded to the 
role of peacemaker played by English bishops in the past, incentivised and authorised by the 
division of their loyalties between the king, on the one hand, and baronial demands for fair 
government, on the other, to broker settlements. Fundamentally, though, this purportedly 
pious offer concealed a scandalous truth that rendered it unpalatable to the royal party. The 
earl felt able to make the offer because the very churchmen he had in mind, like Stephen 
Berksted, were supporting him against the king. He presented them as peacemakers in the 
form of their predecessors but, having become Montfortian partisans, they were no longer 
qualified to act in that capacity. 
 
 There were five English bishops who in 1266 were suspended from office by 
Clement IV for for ‘supplying aid, counsel and favour to the earl Simon against the king and 
                                                          




honour of the kingdom’ in the rebellion against Henry III: John Gervase of Winchester, 
Stephen Berksted of Chichester, Walter de Cantilupe of Worcester, Richard Gravesend of 
Lincoln and Henry of Sandwich of London.2 The motivations and actions of these bishops has 
never before been considered at length, yet they were central figures in the reforming regime. 
The following section is not a comprehensive summary of their activities but provides an 
indication of the depth and breadth of their support for earl Simon. 
 
 Walter de Cantilupe, a committed member of the reform movement since its 
inception at Oxford in 1258, brought to the regime years of experience as a diplomat and 
member of the king’s council. From 1258 to 1261 he busied himself in the operation of 
government on behalf of the reformers and colluded in the suppression of Henry III’s power. 
As a leading member of the council, and one of those charged with staying in England and 
operating government whilst the king was abroad in France in 1259,3 he stood accused of 
holding ‘discussions and meetings at various places without the king’s knowledge, not asking 
the king to attend them, nor summoning him to the council any more than the least person of 
his kingdom’, as well as taking ‘away from the king his power and royal dignity, so that no one 
carries out his orders’ also of ‘[obeying] his command less than that of the lowest member of 
his council.’4 De Cantilupe was a steadfast member of the new regime and appealed publicly, 
on behalf of himself and the barons, against the papal absolution of the oath to uphold the 
Provisions of Oxford that Henry proclaimed at Whitsun 1261.5 Along with Simon de Montfort 
and the earl of Gloucester, he attempted to forestall the king’s recovery of power and the 
dissolution of the Provisions by summoning three knights from each county to meet for a 
parliament at St Alban’s in September of the same year.6 Welcoming the return of the earl in 
the spring of 1263, de Cantilupe retook his place on the council for the few months that the 
Montfortians were able to re-impose the Provisions. During that time he leant £400 to 
buttress the Montfortian regime.7 He also put his seal to the case submitted by the reformers 
to Louis IX for arbitration in December.8 Acting as an envoy for the barons, he offered peace to 
                                                          
2 Osney 180-81. 
3 DBM 156-7. 
4 DBM, 214-15. 
5 Gervase, 210. 
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7 CPR 1258-66, 279; E 372/113 (wardrobe roll 1261-64): ‘Et de .xL. li. de prestito Walteri Wigorn’ 
episcopi anno .xLixº’; English Episcopal Acta 13, Worcester 1218-1268, ed. P. M. Hoskin (Oxford, 1997), 
62-3. 
8 CPR 1258-66, 275, 276, 279; Gervase, 224; DBM, 284-5. 
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the king on baronial terms in March 1264 and again before the battle of Lewes in May,9 before 
absolving the Montfortian army and helping them don the white cross of the crusader on the 
morning of the battle.10 He is likely to have been one of the prime movers in soliciting an aid of 
a tenth of ecclesiastical goods from ‘the council of the bishops and prelates of the kingdom’ 
gathered at London in August 1264, when the queen’s army threatened to invade and restore 
the king to power, for along with the bishop of London he was appointed to collect the aid.11 
De Cantilupe was one of those who, at this time, wrote to the papal legate in France defending 
the new Form of Peace that set up three electors and nine councillors to rule in the king’s 
name.12 He was also one of the envoys chosen to represent the reformers in meetings with the 
legate in France. The envoys bravely admitted to the legate when questioned that yes, they 
agreed with the barons that the king should be bound to having certain councillors and to 
follow their counsel precisely.13 On his return, although he was not one of the nine councillors 
named in the Form of Peace, he continued to play a part in the operation of government.14 He 
is likely to have been one of those bishops who, in March 1265, pronounced sentence of 
excommunication against ‘all those who dared to do anything against the Charters of liberties 
and forest or against the [reformers’] statutes that were provided the previous year.’15 On the 
morning of 4 August, the bishop of Worcester sat in counsel with Montfort at Evesham. As the 
earl stood to take his leave and ready himself for battle, de Cantilupe embraced the earl and 
blessed him before departing in tears for his manor at Blockley.16 
  
 Other bishops demonstrated similar commitment. Richard Gravesend, elected to the 
see of Lincoln in November 1258, immediately set off for France with Simon de Montfort and 
the earl of Gloucester to negotiate the French peace.17 It is likely that he was involved in the 
attacks made against alien clergy in the summer of 1263, for he was suspended from office by 
the pope on 2 June 1264 for contumacy, having failed to appear at the papal court to  answer 
                                                          
9 Annales Londoniensis, 61; Walter Cantilupe’s embassy on 13 May followed the king’s rejection of the 
terms proposed on 12 May by Stephen Berksted (J. R. Maddicott, ‘The Mise of Lewes 1264’, EHR 98 
(1983), 588-603, at 589-90). 
10 J. R. Maddicott, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge, 1994), 271.  
11 C&S, 698-99; CR 1264-68, 82. 
12 Heidemann, 225-8.  
13 CPR 1258-66, 370; Heidemann, 235 n. 1, 238. 
14 RCWL, 144-8.  
15 Foedera, 449; Cronica Maiorum, 71; Dunstable, 238; DBM, 308-15. 
16 O. de Laborderie, J. R. Maddicott, D. A. Carpenter, ‘The Last Hours of Simon de Montfort: A New 
Account’,  EHR 115 (2000), 378-412, at 410. 
17 Dunstable, 211; CPR 1258-66,  46. 
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accusations about alleged offences committed against clerks provided by the papacy.18  
Although to the pope he was persona non grata, with England cut off from papal authority 
after the battle of Lewes and the barring of the papal legate from English territory, Gravesend 
was an important supporter of the new regime. He probably surrendered to Montfort his 
castles of Newark and Sleaford in the critical period immediately following Lewes.19 He 
certainly witnessed the Form of Peace that set up the new Montfortian council.20 Like Walter 
de Cantilupe, Gravesend dug into his own pocket to support the new regime. In the dangerous 
summer months of 1264 he provided £100 for the king’s (or rather Montfort’s) ‘urgent 
affairs.’21 He is likely, like de Cantilupe, to have been one of those who pronounced sentence of 
excommunication against infringers of the Charters and Provisions at the Hilary parliament in 
1265.22 His commitment to the Montfortian cause endured even after Evesham. The contrition 
he displayed to the papal legate and king was apparently a ruse to cloak his activities in 
France, where he went in December 1266 to meet, in all likelihood, with Montfortian exiles. 
He was reproved by Clement IV for ‘disclosing to them his [the king of England’s] secrets, and 
allowing them to use his servants to communicate with England.’23    
 
 The bishops of Winchester, London and Chichester apparently joined the reform 
movement after their elections (or in the bishop of Winchester’s case, his provision) in 1262,24 
probably following Montfort’s return to England at the end of April 1263. The bishop of 
London put his seal to the reformers’ case handed to Louis IX at Amiens in December 1264. 
The following March, the bishops of Winchester and Chichester joined him in  proclaiming 
their allegiance to the earl when all three approached the king, along with the bishop of 
Worcester, on behalf of the barons offering to abide by the Mise of Amiens as long as the king 
agreed to govern by natives.25 Around the same time, like the bishops of Worcester and 
Lincoln, the bishop of Winchester provided financial support to the regime (to the tune of 120 
marks) and likewise the bishop of London, in conjunction with Richard of Mepham 
                                                          
18 CPL, 400–01. 
19 CPR 1258-66, 314. 
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23 CPL, 421. 
24 John Gervase, bishop of Winchester, prov. 22 June, cons. 10 Sept 1262, d. 20 Jan 1268; Henry of 
Sandwich, bishop of London, el. 13 Nov 1262, cons. 27 May 1263, d. 15 Sept 1273; Stephen Berksted, 
bishop of Chichester, el. 26 May-20 June, cons. 24 Sept 1262, d. 21 Oct 1287. 
25 DBM, 284-5; Annales Londoniensis, 61.  
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archdeacon of Oxford, leant 200 marks.26 The bishop of Chichester was Montfort’s chosen 
envoy before the battle of Lewes and, following the earl’s victory, was set up as one of the 
three ‘electors’ to choose the new council of nine.27 The bishop of London was one of the nine 
councillors chosen, whose task was to govern the realm. The bishops of London and 
Winchester travelled with Walter de Cantilupe to meet the papal legate in France in 
September 1264 where, like the bishop of Worcester, they affirmed their commitment to the 
Montfortian constitution.28 Like de Cantilupe and Gravesend, they are likely to have 
pronounced the sentence of excommunication against those contravening the Charters and 
Provisions at the Hilary Parliament of 1265.29 
 
 These bishops, therefore, provided vital support for Montfort’s regime. They gave 
counsel, helped to operate government, supplied financial aid, constructed arguments to 
justify the regime to its critiques and, overall, invested the movement with a degree of 
authority that it would otherwise have lacked. We might imagine, too, that their support 
provided Montfort with a vital line of communication into the localities. In the battle for 
‘hearts and minds’, preaching was an important weapon and one that the bishops offered 
through the encouragement of friars and parish clergy in their dioceses. The power of 
Montfortian preaching was a serious cause for concern for the royalists. Writing in August 
1260, John Mansel lamented that ‘if only the lord king would have preachers working for him 
of the sort the opposition party have, it would be better for him.’30 That many were preaching 
in support of Montfort is confirmed by the Flores Historiarum, whose author complained that 
‘certain people’ were ‘plastering the wall built by the rebels... with the blandishments of their 
preaching and approbation’.31 Henry III certainly anticipated that his return to power in May 
1262 would be met by Montfortian preaching, as he ordered the sheriffs to arrest anyone in 
their counties who ‘presumes to persuade the people or preaches against us and our 
honour’.32 The sheer volume of people of all ranks to whom these bishops, as rulers of their 
dioceses, potentially had access was immense. The dioceses of Chichester, Winchester, 
London, Worcester and Lincoln covered vast swathes of central and south-east England, 
                                                          
26 CPR 1258-66, 342, 345. 
27 Song of Lewes, ll. 193-7; DBM, 295 n. 4. 
28 Heidemann, 235 n. 1, 238. 
29 Foedera, 449. 
30 Royal Letters, ii, 158. 
31 Flores Historiarum, III, 266, 
32 CR 1261-64, 123. 
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including the city of London. The diocese of Lincoln alone covered the best part of nine 
counties, including the Montfortian heartlands; Gravesend commanded eight archdeacons and 
seventy-seven deans; he presided over sixteen hundred parishes and ministered to the souls 
of about one-fifth of the entire population of England.33 The English bishops were also 
experienced in communicating political programmes to their flocks. As discussed further in 
chapter five, they had made extensive efforts in 1253 to publicise the sentence of 
excommunication enforcing Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests.34 In 1255, Richard 
Gravesend, then dean of Lincoln, was appointed to publish the papal confirmation of the 
sentence and showed a keen awareness of the most efficacious methods of disseminating the 
Charters as well as the papal confirmation of the sentence throughout England.35 In winning 
the support of these bishops, Montfort had secured a formidable alliance.  
 
 This support was utterly different in nature and scale to anything given by bishops to 
earlier rebellions. Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury 1207-1228,  had been 
suspected by King John of conniving with the rebels towards the end of John’s reign and was 
suspended for refusing to pronounce the papal sentence of excommunication against the 
king’s opponents in the summer of 1215.36 Yet Langton never unambiguously allied himself 
with the rebels and, in fact, might well have had grave doubts about the morality of the 
rebellion.37 Roger of Wendover’s account of his collusion with baronial opposition at St Paul’s 
in 1213 was based on rumour.38 John’s later suspicions of the archbishop were probably 
unjustified and Langton was arguably well within his rights not to execute a papal mandate 
issued without knowledge of Magna Carta and the current situation.39 Langton might not have 
been an enthusiastic supporter of John but (as will be argued in chapters One, Four and 
                                                          
33 R.W. Southern, Robert Grosseteste: the Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford, 1986), 
235, 237. 
34 Chronicle of John of Wallingford, given in C&S, 477; D. A. Carpenter, ‘Magna Carta 1253: new light on 
the negotiations and the ambitions of the church’, Fine of the Month (August, 2011), available online at 
http://www.finerollshenry3.org.uk/content/month/fm-08-2011.html, paras. 2-4. 
35 Burton, 320-2; M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307 (2nd edn., Oxford, 
1993), 266; N. C. Vincent, ‘The Thirteenth Century Bishops’, in Ely: Bishops and Diocese 1109-2009, ed. P. 
Meadows (Woodbridge, 2010), 26-69, at 43-4. 
36 The king interpreted Langton’s refusal to surrender Rochester castle as treacherous and later 
suspected the archbishop of plotting with the rebels: J.C. Holt, Magna Carta (Cambridge, 1992), 282, 
362. 
37 D. A. Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton and Magna Carta: His Contribution, His Doubts and His 
Hypocrisy’, EHR 126 (2011), 1041-65, at 1052-3. 
38 Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1047-8.   
39 Holt, Magna Carta, 282; C. Holdsworth, ‘Langton, Stephen (c.1150–1228)’, ODNB (2004), available 
online at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16044. 
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Seven) he did not advocate taking aggressive action against kings, preferring the role of 
peacemaker. When John’s son Henry came to the throne in the midst of a rebellion that saw 
one third of the country controlled by the son of the French king, he was able to rely on 
widespread episcopal support. At least seven bishops attended his coronation in 1216 and 
eleven joined the council called at Bristol a month later.40 In contrast, during the 1260s, at the 
very time when Henry confronted the greatest attack on royal power that had ever been seen 
in England, he faced an unprecedented erosion of ecclesiastical support. How and why this 
state of affairs came to be and what it meant for the bishops that deserted the king is the 
subject of this thesis. 
 
Historiography  
This study brings together what have traditionally been separate specialities in the study of 
thirteenth-century English history: ‘the politics of kings and barons’, ‘scholasticism’ and ‘the 
Church’.41 One objective of the current work is to show how rigid adherence to these 
categories can sometimes be problematic. The bishops, perhaps more than any other senior 
members of the community of the realm, had multiple selves that combined and sometimes 
conflicted, a point that is central to the argument of the thesis. In order to accommodate the  
scope of the topic, I have had to absorb a range of influences –from administrative history to 
anthropological theory – and examine a variety of records – from exchequer rolls to 
Aristotelian commentary. Rather than going in to great detail on any one aspect, I instead pick 
out some of the broad themes of episcopal culture and activity in thirteenth-century England, 
themes that also cut across the history of the Barons War. 
 
Having claimed that the scope of the thesis will be broad, it is perhaps useful to make 
clear at this point what it does not do. Strictly speaking, it does not deal with ‘scholasticism’ in 
the pure sense of university debate since the works examined were not penned in the 
schoolroom. Those of Robert Grosseteste (bishop of Lincoln 1235-53) with which I will be 
concerned below were written by an active pastor and politician keen to make Aristotle 
relevant, and should be read as such, whilst those of the Montfortian bishops were written in 
the heat of civil war. The thesis addresses ‘Church history’ in the sense that it pursues the 
activities of the English bishops as a group,  their identity, interests and ideas, though only in 
                                                          
40 D.A. Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (London, 1990), 19. 
41 M. T. Clanchy, ‘Inventing Thirteenth-Century England: Stubbs, Tout, Powicke – Now What?’, TCE v 
(1993), 1-20, at 15-16. 
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as far as they relate to the bishops’ participation in politics. The current work is not concerned 
with other topics particularly germane to the thirteenth-century Church, such as ecclesiastical 
administration, jurisdictional conflicts with royal administration or the impact of the Fourth 
Lateran Council on pastoral care. It might be more accurate instead to say that topic in hand is 
‘the role of bishops qua bishops in the politics of kings, bishops and barons’; how the identity 
of thirteenth-century bishops affected or was related to their role in politics in times of 
political crisis. The result is not a narrative of episcopal involvement in the events 
surrounding Magna Carta, ‘Henry III’s Lesson in Kingship’ in 1234 or the period of reform and 
rebellion 1258-65.42 For the earlier period, this is provided in works on Stephen Langton and 
Edmund of Abingdon by Nicholas Vincent and Hugh Lawrence.43 Debate surrounding 
Langton’s activities between 1213 and 1215 and his involvement in the creation of Magna 
Carta remains lively,44 though that is not a subject addressed here. Rather than weighing up 
what Langton might or might not have done, a task that in any case might never have taken 
the discussion beyond what has already been written, I have fixed on those moments of 
relative certainty that might contribute to a broader discussion of episcopal political action in 
the thirteenth century, particularly Langton’s meeting with King John  on his return to 
England in 1213 and his enforcement of Magna Carta by sentence of excommunication in 
1225. For the period covering the reform movement and the rule of Simon de Montfort, an 
account of much of  the bishops’ activity can be found interwoven into the narrative contained 
in John Maddicott’s biography of the earl.45 I have gone into narrative detail in those areas 
where it was particularly important to gain a precise understanding of episcopal activity, 
namely for the reform parliaments of 1258 and the period surrounding the outbreak of civil 
war in 1264. Otherwise, a more thematic approach is taken to analyse the bishops’ actions 
and the arguments they produced. 
 
                                                          
42 The heading ‘Henry III’s Lesson in Kingship’ is taken from the chapter 4 in F. M. Powicke, Henry III 
and the Lord Edward: the community of the realm in the thirteenth century (Oxford, 1947), 123-55. 
43 N. C. Vincent, ‘‘Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury’, in L.-J. Bataillon, N. Bériou, G. Dahan, R. 
Quinto (eds.), Etienne Langton, prédicateur, bibliste, théologien (Turnhout, 2010). 51-123; N. C. Vincent, 
Peter des Roches: An alien in English politics, 1205-1238 (Cambridge, 1996); The Life of St Edmund by 
Matthew Paris, ed. and trans. C. H. Lawrence (Oxford, 1996). 
44 J. Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton, Future Archbishop of Canterbury: The Paris Schools and Magna 
Carta’, EHR 123 (2008), 811-46,; Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1041-55. 
45 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort.  
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Overall, the thesis is inspired by the research of David d’Avray and John Baldwin that 
asks how, or how far, the ideas of scholarly churchmen inspired their actions on the ground.46 
Much of this work has concentrated on Langton but has looked forward to the bishops that 
followed him in the thirteenth century.47 The question of what inspired ecclesiastical support 
for Montfort has been raised both by David Carpenter and John Maddicott, both of whom 
suggested the influence of Robert Grosseteste,48 though the question has not been addressed 
in its own right on any scale. Prompted by the questions and conclusions of these works, the 
research for this thesis was begun with the following hypothesis in mind: Stephen Langton’s 
study of the Bible encouraged him to extend and promote the bishops’ role as overseer of 
government through the enforcement of Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests by 
sentence of excommunication. His work was continued by Edmund of Abingdon and then by 
Robert Grosseteste, both of whom sought to enforce the Charters. Meanwhile, these same 
bishops continued in the tradition of Anselm and particularly Thomas Becket in challenging 
royal policy when it transgressed the limits of good government, a characteristic that earned 
English bishops a reputation for sanctity.49 Grosseteste was a great friend and mentor to 
Simon de Montfort and at least one of his episcopal supporters, Richard Gravesend, with 
whom he shared his work on Aristotle, particularly that concerned with kingship.50 The 
Montfortian bishops, therefore, in supporting the movement of reform and rebellion, would 
likely be following in the path of their predecessors. It might be thought that one would be 
able to trace, in the arguments put forward by the Montfortian ecclesiastical milieu in favour 
of the reform constitution, the development of ideas on kingship and government espoused by 
Langton and, particularly, Grosseteste.  
  
However, having examined the actions of Langton and Edmund of Abingdon, as well as 
the writings of Grosseteste, on the one hand, and the actions and writings of the Montfortians, 
                                                          
46 D.L. d’Avray, ‘«Magna Carta»: its Background in Stephen Langton’s Academic Biblical Exegesis and its 
Episcopal Reception’, Studi Medievali ser.3, 38:1 (1998), 423-38; Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’. 
47 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 432-4.  
48 D.A. Carpenter, ‘St Thomas Cantilupe: his political career’, in his The Reign of Henry III (London, 
1996), 293-307, at 295-8; D. A. Carpenter, ‘Simon de Montfort: The First Leader of a Political Movement 
in English History’, in his Reign of Henry III, 219-39, at 229-30; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 77-105, 
167-9. 
49 A. Vauchez, Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, trans. J. Burrell (Cambridge, 1997). 167-70. 
50 Gravesend accompanied Grosseteste to the papal court in 1250, where Grosseteste made his case 
against the Archbishop of Canterbury based on Aristotelian principles. Gravesend drew up the 
‘memorandum’ reciting Grosseteste’s case (J. Goering, ‘Robert Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’, in J. 
Brown and W. P. Stoneman (eds.), A Distinct Voice: Medieval Studies in Honor of Leonard E. Boyle, O.P. 
(Notre Dame, IN, 1997), 253-76, at 254-5). 
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on the other, it soon became clear that this hypothesis was false, at least in the form stated in 
the previous paragraph. Langton as theologian and bishop began to extend episcopal 
involvement in politics beyond questions concerning the freedom of the Church into the area 
of the good governance of the realm, an interest that Grosseteste pursued. Without this 
background, the Montfortian bishops could never have acted as they did. However,  Langton, 
Edmund and Grosseteste were far more supportive of royal power – in Grosseteste’s case one 
might even say enthusiastic – than had hitherto been thought and so their actions and 
arguments did not justify the steps taken by the Montfortians, which hamstrung royal power. 
Therefore, having far surpassed the limits of acceptable action set out by their predecessors, 
the Montfortians did not have a foundation from which to build their arguments. The task of 
the thesis was, then, to look instead at how, given that actions of both bishops and barons on 
the ground radically breached the limits set out in the ecclesiastical discourse of royal power, 
those bishops involved were forced to produce new arguments in the crucible of political 
crisis. These new arguments were, to coin a term, exothermic: they were a sort of energy 
produced as a result of an event, rather than serving to fuel the event in the first place. 
 
The first half of this thesis, therefore, seeks to put the actions of the Montfortian 
bishops in context but setting out something of the culture of their milieu. By ‘culture’, I follow 
the conception of Clifford Geertz: ‘Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the 
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive 
one in search of meaning.’51 The first four chapters, therefore, identify and explain a few 
strands of these webs: how episcopal identity was constructed and perpetuated, how 
profoundly self-conscious ideas of historical place and current purpose were shared through 
rituals, writing and regular meeting. The second half of the thesis examines how the 
Montfortian bishops relate to this cultural context and how the ambivalence and discomfort 
caused by their radicalism marks their actions and arguments. 
 
 This approach demonstrates two fundamental points: firstly, how far the 
Montfortian bishops were dislocated from the place in the political community to which their 
upbringing had conditioned them and, secondly, how their acts and writing reflect a resulting 
                                                          
51 C. Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in his The Interpretation of 
Cultures (New York, 1973), 3-30, at 5. 
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disquiet. This conclusion contradicts a general sense that the Montfortians were simply 
continuators of a linear tradition in which English bishops challenged kings whose policy 
breached the limits of the acceptable use of royal power.  This tradition is described by Björn 
Weiler: ‘one of their [the bishops’] most basic functions [was] to admonish, chastise and 
correct the king. Standing up to the king was, in fact, the sign of a saintly prelate... This is not 
to say that bishops always and willingly challenged their kings, but that... the English prelates 
who did so acted within an established tradition of providing moral and political oversight 
over the king and his officials.’52 This tradition was important but only one part of a more 
complex picture; one strand, if you will, in the episcopal web of significance. By examining 
how exactly bishops went about this task of correcting royal behaviour, how they did so as 
members of the broader political community and how the measures they took expressed 
concepts of royal power described in their scholarship, their actions seem less confrontational 
and more constructive. More generally, this thesis seeks to show how episcopal corrections of 
the king were not simple iterations, unaltered and unalterable, but part of a complex, 
mutating, expanding episcopal culture fed by the creative agency of its protagonists. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, the first four considering episcopal involvement in 
politics before 1258 and the final four considering the period of reform and rebellion. 
Chapter One considers the role of archbishops of Canterbury and their suffragans as 
peacemakers. Focusing on two key moments, in 1213 and 1234, it examines accounts by 
Roger of Wendover (and the additions made by Matthew Paris) describing approaches made 
to the king by Stephen Langton and Edmund of Abingdon, in which the archbishops sought to 
correct unacceptable royal behaviour. Analysing these events as rituals, with reference both 
to the processual approach and ethnographic case studies of Victor Turner and to the reading 
of a ritual’s performance advocated by Edward Schieffelin,53 it is argued that they should not 
be viewed as aggressive or confrontational acts. Rather they should be viewed as references 
to the coronation ritual, constructive attempts to re-make the king symbolically, transforming 
him from a deviant king to a pious one. This is placed within a broader framework of 
episcopal peacemaking, casting the bishops as ‘hinge-persons’ according to the classic model 
                                                          
52 B. Weiler, Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture: England and Germany, c.1215-c.1250 (Basingstoke, 
2007), 160-61. 
53 V. W. Turner, ‘Liminality and Communitas’, in his The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 
(London, 2008 [1969]), 94-130; E. L. Schieffelin, ‘Performance and the Cultural Construction of Reality’, 
American Ethnologist 12 (1985), 707-24. 
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of Max Gluckman and looking to the conception of peacemaking as an ongoing creative 
process put forward by Laura Ring.54 The conclusion reached is that, far from offering support 
for rebellion, English bishops sought to maintain their loyalty to both sides and particularly 
the king, making them authorised and incentivised to act as peacemakers, and used their 
special place and powers in the political community to effect change in the king for the sake of 
peace. The role of peacemaker with divided loyalties was an important component of 
episcopal identity. 
 
Chapter Two examines the meetings of the English prelates during the reign of Henry 
III. It takes inspiration from the work of Janet Nelson on the role of national ecclesiastical 
assemblies in forging a corporate solidarity among senior churchmen, gathered to consider 
‘national’ interests, in early medieval Europe (although, following the lead of Susan Reynolds, 
the adjective ‘regnal’ is preferred here to ‘national’).55 Through regular meetings held on a 
regnal basis, many called in response to the king’s demands for financial aid, English bishops 
in the thirteenth century increasingly were forged, and through their own endeavours forged 
themselves, into a self-conscious unified body. The ecclesiastical meetings of these years also 
reveal the modus operandi of the English bishops when faced with royal demands for 
taxation. They sought to pursue a process of negotiation, bargaining their way into a stronger 
position by counter-demanding redress for their grievances when confronted with requests 
for aid. This sort of strategy, aligned with the mechanism by which lay taxation was granted in 
return for Magna Carta, did not compare in means or ends with the sort of action taken by the 
reformers in 1258. 
 
Chapter Three applies the themes of the first two chapters to a comparison of 
England and the kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula. Iberia was chosen for this comparison 
since it was an alternative to the more usual choice of France and it was hoped that looking 
beyond the realm of Louis IX, a king who never experienced the financial difficulties that 
brought his brother-in-law into regular contact with his bishops, might provide some 
interesting areas for discussion. The Iberian peninsula, meanwhile, like England saw in the 
thirteenth century one of the rare and remarkable instances of barons and bishops uniting to 
                                                          
54 M. Gluckman, ‘The Peace in the Feud’, Past and Present 8 (1955), 1-14; L. A. Ring, Zenana: Everyday 
Peace in a Karachi Apartment Building (Bloomington, IN, 2006). 
55 J. L. Nelson, ‘National Synods, Kingship as Office, and Royal Anointing: an Early Medieval Syndrome’, 
Studies in Church History 7, ed. G.J. Cuming and D. Baker (Cambridge, 1971), 41-59; S. Reynolds, 
Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300 (2nd edition, Oxford, 1997), 250-56. 
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displace a king from power. This was in Portugal when Sancho II was pronounced rex inutilis 
in 1245. The comparison has been a fruitful one. In contrast to England, the episcopates of the 
Iberian peninsula were generally disunited and possessed little power in relation to the king, 
since  they rarely gathered in assemblies (in Castile because they were forbidden by the king) 
and so had little sense of corporate solidarity and collective strength. They also played no real 
role in regnal rituals like king-making and so had little symbolic capital to intervene in royal 
policy. This meant that, unlike the English, the Iberian bishops had little motivation or power 
to intervene in regnal politics and reform the king. They were, consequently, sometimes 
driven to unite and take drastic action against kings who overstepped the mark but, 
importantly, they did so in the safe space of the papal court under papal direction. When 
viewed alongside their counterparts in the Iberian peninsula, the scope of the English 
episcopate to effect change in the king and the operation of royal power is quite astounding 
and, therefore, the choices of the Montfortian bishops – who operated outside of a sanctioned 
framework – all the more controversial. Importantly too, this comparison shows how unusual 
were the motivations and objectives of English bishops, namely in enforcing good government 
for the kingdom at large. Whilst the Iberian bishops moved against kings because they 
infringed ecclesiastical liberties, English bishops from Langton onwards took responsibility 
for questioning royal policy not only towards the Church but also towards the king’s lay 
subjects.  
 
Chapter Four examines Robert Grosseteste’s writing on kingship. It brings together a 
variety of his works, including his commentary on Book Eight of Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics, a source that has received little attention and has not been examined by historians for 
its insights into the bishop’s ‘political thought’.56 The commentary provides important context 
for the case made by Grosseteste at the papal court in 1250, an extract from which (entitled 
‘On kingship and tyranny’) was sent to Simon de Montfort. Whilst several historians, including 
William Pantin, Reginald Treharne and John Maddicott,57 have looked at this ‘memorandum’ 
to see what relation it bore to the actions of the Montfortian reformers, the arguments it 
                                                          
56 J. McEvoy, ‘Grosseteste's Reflections on Aristotelian Friendship: A 'New' Commentary on 
Nicomachean Ethics VIII.8-14’ in J. McEvoy (ed.), Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on his Thought 
and Scholarship (Belgium, 1995), 149-68, introduces the commentary and picks out some of its themes.  
57 W.A. Pantin, ‘Grosseteste's Relations with the Papacy and Crown’ in Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and 
Bishop. Essays in Commemoration of the Seventh Centenary of His Death. ed. D.A. Callus (Oxford, 1955), 
178-215, at 205; R. F. Treharne, ‘The Personal Role of Simon de Montfort in the period of baronial 
reform and rebellion, 1258-65’, Proceedings of the British Academy 40 (1954), 75-102, at 80-81; 
Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 94-5, 355. 
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contained have never been fully appreciated. When looking at the memorandum in 
conjunction with Grosseteste’s Aristotelian scholarship and his letters, the bishop’s thoughts 
on kingship can be viewed in the round. Such an analysis shows how Grosseteste was 
remarkably supportive of royal power, since its operation was integrated into his entire world 
view. Far from providing grounds for Montfortian-style action, he argued against any sort of 
conciliar constraint on kings and the diversion of royal power towards subordinates. 
However, his Aristotelian scholarship argued that kings needed vast amounts of money to 
operate government without burdening their subjects financially. He thus made royal finances  
a moral issue of the highest import. It is suggested, therefore, that whilst Grosseteste’s 
writings do not condone let alone encourage the baronial seizure of power, the bishops’ 
arguments might well have influenced efforts to reform the exchequer and royal finance in 
1258 and 1259. The scope and determination of the barons’ financial reforms has become 
clear only quite recently as a result of the research of Richard Cassidy in editing the 1258-9 
pipe roll.58 When Grosseteste’s arguments are viewed in conjunction with this research, the 
suggestion of John Maddicott and Adrian Jobson that the baronial treasurer, John Crakehall, 
was chosen because of his connections with Grosseteste can be taken much further.59 Since 
Crakehall accompanied Grosseteste to Lyons and therefore was well acquainted with his 
Aristotelian arguments on kingship and the morality of sound royal finance, he was the 
perfect candidate to spearhead the reforms that would restore Henry III’s finances and 
prevent him from placing financial burdens on his subjects. 
 
Chapter Five constructs a narrative of episcopal activity at the reforming parliaments 
of 1258, building on that laid out for baronial activity by David Carpenter and Huw 
Ridgeway.60 An analysis of the bishops’ role in the reforming parliaments has not previously 
been undertaken; both Daniel Williams’ thesis on Boniface of Savoy (archbishop of 
Canterbury 1241-70) and Clive Knowles’ entry for the archbishop in the Oxford Dictionary of 
                                                          
58 See, for instance: R. Cassidy, ‘The Reforming council takes control of fines of gold, 1258-59’, Fine of 
the Month (October, 2011), available online at http://www.finerollshenry3.org.uk/content/month/fm-
10-2011.html. 
59Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 171; A. Jobson, ‘John of Crakehall: the ‘Forgotten’ Baronial Treasurer, 
1258-60’, TCE xiii (2009), 83-99, at 88. 
60 D. A. Carpenter, ‘What happened in 1258?’, in his Reign of Henry III, 183–97; H. W. Ridgeway, ‘The 
Lord Edward and the Provisions of Oxford (1258): A Study in Faction’, TCE i (1986). 89-99. 
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National Biography gloss over the subject.61 Important here is the possibility, mentioned by 
Knowles  and integrated by John Maddicott into his account of 1258, that Boniface of Savoy 
and his suffragans pronounced sentence of excommunication in support of the oath to the 
reform programme made at Oxford.62 It is argued here that this was unlikely and that, in any 
case, the bishops certainly did not deploy such a sentence when news of reform was 
promulgated in the counties, in October. Whilst Boniface might initially have lent support to 
the reform programme and joined the reforming council of fifteen in order, in line with his 
Savoyard loyalties, to oust the Lusignans from court, only one bishop, Walter de Cantilupe of 
Worcester, supported the reform programme wholeheartedly in these initial stages. This was 
because the baronial seizure of royal power was incongruent with the ecclesiastical discourse 
on royal power. Events might, however, have progressed very differently had Boniface 
followed the example of his predecessors, Stephen Langton and Edmund of Abingdon, in 
stepping forward to remake the erring king for the sake of peace. The archbishop did not do 
so, however, partly because he recognised in the reformers’ plans an opportunity to expel the 
Lusignans, and partly because he interpreted his role as archbishop of Canterbury as defender 
of ecclesiastical liberty to the exclusion of most other concerns and was engrossed with 
discussions of ecclesiastical grievances.  
 
Chapter Six considers how those bishops suspended in 1266 came to join Montfort in 
his cause. It examines a significant moment in their story, the king’s muster at Oxford in Lent  
1264, when the bishops of Lincoln and Winchester publicly declared their loyalty to Montfort 
by refusing the king military service. In the following months, along with the bishops of 
London and Worcester, they went on to provide financial support for the Montfortian regime. 
In renouncing their loyalty to the king, these bishops strayed from the path of their 
predecessors, who had carefully maintained loyalty to both king and barons when tensions 
threatened the stability of the realm in order to act as peacemakers. In choosing sides in 
1263-5, these bishops became partisans. This elemental change is largely explained by the 
charisma, in the Weberian sense of the word, of Simon de Montfort. The bishops shared a 
powerful belief that the earl was divinely inspired and sanctioned, a belief that resounds in 
the Song of Lewes. The chapter then considers the approach made to the king by these bishops 
                                                          
61 D. Williams, ‘Aspects of the Career of Boniface of Savoy, Archbishop of Canterbury 1241-70’ 
(University College of Wales D. Phil thesis, 1970); C.H. Knowles‘Savoy, Boniface of (1206/7–1270)’, 
ODNB (2004), available online at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2844. 
62Knowles, ‘Savoy, Boniface’; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 162. 
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at Oxford in Lent 1264 in the light of those made by Langton and Edmund in earlier times. 
Presenting themselves as peacemakers in the Langtonian mould, the Montfortian bishops 
were rejected by the royal party because in fact they were displaying disloyalty to the king. 
Their disjointed actions reflect the ambivalence and discomfort caused by the shift from 
peacemakers to partisans that was incongruent with the world-view of their milieu. The final 
part of the chapter examines the role of the bishops in the Montfortian regime between 1263 
and the battle of Evesham.  
 
Chapter Seven examines the arguments put forward by the Montfortian bishops and 
their associates in support of conciliar government. These are contained in three documents: 
the Mise of Amiens; the letters contained in the register of the papal legate, Gui Foulquois, and 
the Song of Lewes.  The Mise and the Song, though well known, have not been analysed in this 
context before, while the legatine register has received little attention. Brought together, these 
documents demonstrate how the bishops formed their arguments and how, in contrast to the 
shaping of ideas that influenced ecclesiastical support for Magna Carta, those arguments were 
developed not in the ivory tower of the schoolroom but in their immediate political context 
and marked fundamentally by considerations of the audience at which they were directed. 
The bishops were attempting to rationalize and justify what was in reality highly subversive 
action and the intellectual conflict that this created left its trace in their arguments. While 
their justifications are not coherent as a political theory, they articulate fluently the effect on 
the production of ideas exerted by external pressures and the internal conflicts of those who 
created them. 
 
Chapter Eight looks at the aftermath of the battle of Evesham. With the Montfortian 
regime destroyed and its leader killed, the Montfortian bishops sought absolution from king 
and pope. The chapter first records the restitution they were forced to proffer the king before 
turning to the view from the papal court. Central to the latter is a memorial sermon preached 
at the curia by Eudes de Châteauroux for John Gervase of Winchester. The sermon has been 
transcribed in a thesis by Alexis Charansonnet, who provides a brief analysis of it, but it has 
not been examined in depth before or in relation to the broader story of Gervase and his 
confederates. The sermon shows how those at the papal court regarded the bishops’ activities 
as a deviation from the ‘path of life leading to life’ (Jer. 21: 8). Recognising sympathetically 
that Gervase had believed he was doing the right thing, those at the curia also felt he had been 
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led astray by an infatuation with learning and a misguided zeal for justice. The bishop’s fall, 
Eudes suggests, should be understood ultimately as a demonstration of divine mercy, since it 
provided Gervase with an opportunity to redeem himself and so prove himself worthy of 
salvation. The sermon thus provides an invaluable opportunity to understand how the 










On Tuesday 16 July 1213, Stephen Langton, the exiled archbishop of Canterbury, landed at 
Dover. He was accompanied by the bishops of London, Ely, Lincoln and Hereford as well as 
other clerics who had been in exile during the interdict. They approached the king at 
Winchester on 20 July but the king, having heard of their arrival, came to them instead. Seeing 
the archbishop and bishops, he fell down on the ground at their feet and with profuse tears 
implored them to have mercy on him and the kingdom of England. The archbishop and 
bishops, seeing the humility of the king, tearfully lifted him from the ground and led him from 
both sides to the doorway of the cathedral church and on in to the chapter house where, 
singing the fiftieth psalm, they absolved him, whilst the magnates looked on and wept 
abundantly with joy. According to the terms of the absolution the king swore, touching the 
holy Gospels, that he would hold dear the Church and her clergy, defend them and maintain 
them against all their enemies with all his power. He also swore to revive the good laws of his 
ancestors, and especially the laws of king Edward, to destroy iniquitous laws and to judge all 
his men according to the just judgement of his court, and he would restore his laws for all. He 
also swore that he would restore in their entirety those things seized on account of the 
interdict, before next Easter, agreeing that if he failed to do so the sentence of 
excommunication would be brought once more against him. Moreover, he swore fidelity to 
Pope Innocent and his catholic successors. Langton then led him into the church, where the 
archbishop celebrated Mass. Afterwards, the archbishop, bishops and magnates sat down with 
the king at table and feasted joyfully and agreeably.1 
 
Twenty-one years later, during the Candlemas colloquium at Westminster in 1234, 
several bishops were rebuked for being over-familiar with Richard Marshal, who was then in 
rebellion against Henry III, and were accused of plotting to overthrow the king. The bishop of 
Coventry, full of righteous indignation, was roused to anger and excommunicated all those 
who were genuinely guilty of such crimes. His actions proved the innocence of the bishops to 
                                                          
1 Roger of Wendover in CM, II, 550.   
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all present. At the same assembly, Edmund of Abingdon, the archbishop elect of Canterbury, 
and his suffragans were moved by compassion for king and kingdom to approach the king and 
present an extensive critique of recent royal policy. They complained that the king’s 
counsellors, Peter des Roches bishop of Winchester and his nephew Peter de Rivallis, had 
divided the king from his kingdom. Their counsel had unfairly provoked the exclusion of 
Richard Marshal, the best man in the land, from court and had caused war and civil discord 
both in the reign of King John and during Henry’s minority. Now once again, warned the 
bishops, such dangerous counsel threatened to disturb the kingdom. The situation could be 
saved, however, if Henry would deal justly with his subjects. The bishops were thus obliged, 
they said, to intervene now for the sake of peace. They faithfully advised the  king to remove 
des Roches and de Rivallis from court and govern through faithful native men, warning him 
that should he fail to do so he would be excommunicated, as soon as Edmund was consecrated 
as archbishop. The king responded humbly but asked for a period of respite, since he could 
not dismiss his counsellors until they had rendered account of the royal treasury. The 
colloquium dissolved, with everyone hoping that a resolution could be reached. Not long 
afterwards, on 2 April, Edmund was consecrated as archbishop, as the king and thirteen 
bishops looked on. A few days later, on 9 April, magnates and prelates reconvened with the 
king for another colloquium at Westminster. There, Edmund and his suffragans repeated their 
approach to the king, their critique of his rule and their warnings about the danger looming 
over the land. They also repeated their threat to excommunicate the king together with all 
who threatened the peace and concord of the kingdom. This time, though, Henry was moved 
by a spirit of piety and responded humbly to the bishops that he would comply with all their 
advice. Contrite and appreciative of his errors, Henry sent Peter des Roches back to his 
diocese and expelled Peter de Rivallis acrimoniously from court.2  
 
These two remarkable accounts have much in common. Both were recorded by Roger 
of Wendover, and included by Matthew Paris in his Chronica Majora. More importantly, both 
describe the intervention of the archbishop of Canterbury, supported by his suffragans, when 
the reprehensible behaviour of a king provoked his subjects into rebellion, so that civil unrest 
threatened the peace of the kingdom. These two events were, as this chapter will argue, 
essentially two sides of the same coin: rituals to remake an errant king, transforming him 
from an unworthy ruler into a pious one. Langton created this ritual, drawing on several 
                                                          
2 CM, III, 268-72. 
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resources: the ritual language of the coronation, the role of Old Testament prophets and the 
example of his archiepiscopal predecessors in chastising wayward kings, and his theological 
appreciation both of the necessity of good kingship and his own responsibility for enforcing it. 
Edmund of Abingdon followed his example. These ritual moments are important for what they 
reveal of English episcopal culture and how that culture was enriched by Langton in 
particular. There was far more to the episcopal job description in the thirteenth century than 
throwing criticism at errant kings. Langton set a precedent for his successors in making the 
peace of the kingdom his first priority, even over the liberty of the Church (at least in the short 
term) and, when illicit royal behaviour threatened the success of that objective, created a 
powerful tool to achieve his ends.   
 
 Wendover’s account of Langton’s reunion with king John after years of conflict has 
drawn some comment from historians, although its nature and significance has been 
interpreted differently. For Sir Maurice Powicke it was a significant event, rooting Magna 
Carta in English custom through the iteration of the coronation oath. He alone noted the 
palpable emotion of the scene and the liturgical character introduced by the singing of the 
fiftieth psalm.3 Sir James Holt recognised the importance of the oath sworn by John at 
Winchester in justifying the subsequent actions of the rebels and their appeal to Langton for 
support. Yet, whilst he offered speculations as to the content of the oath and its relationship to 
John’s absolution, he offered no discussion of the remarkable context in which the oath was 
provided.4  For John Baldwin, the inclusion in the oath of a clause binding John to observe the 
laws of King Edward was a link in the chain that bound the Winchester oath to Langton’s 
apparent promotion of Henry I’s coronation charter and, subsequently, to Magna Carta.5 
Langton’s intervention at Winchester was an integral part of Powicke’s portrait of the 
archbishop as a political moderate and peacemaker; Baldwin connects the Winchester oath 
with Wendover’s report of Langton’s appearance a month later at St Paul’s, when the 
archbishop supposedly had Henry I’s coronation charter read out to the assembled magnates 
and prelates and promised them all possible aid in their fight for the liberties contained 
therein, in order to portray Langton as a revolutionary leader.6 The disparity between these 
interpretations is understandable. Viewed from the vantage of hindsight,  knowing that John 
                                                          
3 F. M. Powicke, Stephen Langton (Oxford, 1928), 112-13.  
4 Holt, Magna Carta, 218-20.  
5 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 827-830.  
6 CM, II, 552; Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 827-30. 
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probably repaid less than half of the damages he had promised at Winchester,7 and that the 
relationship between the king and archbishop was ultimately to be marked by mutual 
suspicion,8 the extravagant penitence of John and emotional charge of the reconciliation 
seems incongruous. 
 
 Yet Wendover’s account merits further scrutiny. The chronicler appears to have 
recounted Langton’s movements with a keen grasp of time and place and the narrative is 
generally accepted.9 The account of the assembly at St Paul’s meanwhile, should be viewed 
with caution, not least since Wendover warned that it was based on rumour.10 Arguably, 
Wendover described the meeting  at Winchester as felicitous because it had appeared so at 
the time, when Langton’s return to England and John’s submission encouraged hope in the 
formation of peace. For all that one is inclined to cast aspersions against John’s sincerity, he 
‘was capable of acting with what seemed praiseworthy piety’, as his reconciliation with the 
Cistercians showed.11 Then, in 1200, John had similarly prostrated himself at the feet of his 
clerical adversaries, his face covered in tears, and his repentance had been accepted 
unquestioningly by the monks. To Ralph of Coggeshall, who recorded the reconciliation, John’s 
dramatic repentance was due to nothing less than the intervention of God, who ‘had so 
inclined the mind of the King to mercy and to reverence for the Order.’12 Perhaps John was 
similarly moved, or had seemed to be, in 1213. 
 
  The event was especially significant because wrapped in so many levels of meaning: 
on a grand scale, it marked the reconciliation of the king with his magnates, native Church and 
papacy, including the archbishop who according to tradition should have been the king’s chief 
advisor, as well as the bishops who had pronounced sentence of interdict on the kingdom, 
several of whom (like the bishops of London and Lincoln) had previously been servants of the 
royal court before answering the papal call to censure John.13 Langton had crossed the 
                                                          
7 D. A. Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery in Britain, 1066-1284 (Oxford, 2003), 286. 
8 The king interpreted Langton’s refusal to surrender Rochester castle as treacherous and later 
suspected the archbishop of plotting with the rebels: Holt, Magna Carta, 282, 362; Vincent, ‘Archbishop 
Langton’, 97-8. 
9 Holt, Magna Carta, 218-19; Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1047; Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen 
Langton’, 827. 
10 Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1047-8. 
11 D. A. Carpenter, ‘Abbot Ralph of Coggeshall’s Account of the Last Years of King Richard and the First 
Years of King John’, EHR 113 (1998), 1210-1230, at 1212. 
12 Coggeshall, 107-10, at 109; Carpenter, ‘Ralph of Coggeshall’, 1220. 
13 Vincent, ‘Stephen Langton’, at 81.  
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Channel on a Tuesday, as Thomas Becket had done on his return to England (one of the many 
Tuesdays that famously hosted the most important events of the saint’s life).14 To many 
observers this second archiepiscopal return from exile might have seemed an ultimatum to 
the king, either to write the next chapter in the story of this conflict along very different lines 
to those of his father or else to suffer a similar stain on his memory. John’s effusively positive 
response might well have encouraged the hope that this dispute would have a happier end. 
Most striking of all, though, was that all of this was achieved through the visible 
transformation of a king whom many previously had cause to fear into a ruler who promised 
now to rule in the tradition of St Edward, effected at the historic coronation church of the 
Anglo-Saxons kings.  
 
 Archbishop Edmund’s intervention in 1234 was provoked by some of the same sort 
of illicit royal behaviour that had necessitated Langton’s action in 1213, although the change 
brought about in Henry III appears to have been long-term. Since his return to England from 
crusade in the summer of 1231, Peter des Roches (bishop of Winchester 1205-38), had 
masterminded a takeover of government, which involved the ousting of the justiciar, Hubert 
de Burgh, and the accumulation of royal offices.15 The result was that the bishop’s nephew, 
Peter de Rivallis, came near enough to monopolising the important offices of government.16 
Between 1232 and 1233, under the malign influence of des Roches, Henry III made several 
decisions per voluntatem regis. The most infamous of these occurred when Henry disseised 
Gilbert Basset of the manor of Upavon, even though Basset possessed a royal charter 
guaranteeing his hereditary tenure.17 Henry’s clear contravention of clause 39 of Magna Carta 
(‘No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way 
ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by 
the law of the land’)18 provoked concerted opposition from the magnates and prelates. It 
precipitated the rebellion of Basset’s ally, Richard Marshal, and forced the hand of Edmund 
and his suffragans.  Edmund’s measures were largely effective.19 Although Henry was accused 
                                                          
14 Vincent, ‘Stephen Langton’, 82.  
15 N. C. Vincent, Peter des Roches: An alien in English politics, 1205-1238 (Cambridge, 1996), chp. 8.  
16 Vincent, Peter des Roches, chps. 8-10; Carpenter, ‘Hubert de Burgh’, 49-58.  
17 D.A. Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction under King John and Henry III’, in his Reign of Henry III, 17-
44, at 38-39.  
18 Holt, Magna Carta, 461. 
19 For the alternative view, see: M. T. Clanchy, ‘Did Henry III have a policy?’, History 53 (1968), 203-16. 
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of many things by the reformers between 1258 and 1265, he was not accused of breaking 
clause 39 of Magna Carta.20 
 
 Langton’s actions in 1213 provided the model for Edmund. As this chapter will 
argue, Langton’s role at Winchester, in combination with his legislative activities and as part 
of a broader narrative of peacemaking, was to carve a course for his successors and introduce 
a powerful component into English episcopal identity. As the symbolic crescendo of his 
activities as archiepiscopal peacemaker, the events at Winchester in 1213 were imbued with a 
ritual potency from which his successors were to draw. Edmund of Abingdon based his 
intervention with Henry III on Langton’s example. Edmund might actually have studied under 
Langton in Paris and so was probably familiar with much of his thinking,21 a connection that 
might well have encouraged him to follow in Langton’s footsteps. Chapter five will examine 
how, in 1258, Boniface of Savoy did not follow the example of his predecessors when, in 
similar circumstances to those faced by Edmund in 1234, the king’s misguided policies and 
collusion with unpopular counsellors caused discord with other curiales and threatened to 
provoke civil unrest. Unlike Langton and Edmund, Boniface did not rate the peace of the 
kingdom as his first priority, partly because he gave preference to his animosity with the 
Lusignans and partly because he interpreted his role as archbishop as the defender of 
ecclesiastical liberties almost to the exclusion of all else. Chapter six will consider how in 1264 
the Montfortian bishops, although their role in the Montfortian programme far overstepped 
the measures Langton sanctioned, put aside Boniface’s ideas of episcopal duty and drew from 
the example of Langton and Edmund in an attempt to legitimise their actions. These were 
conscious emulations, re-enactments of Langton’s activities in 1213: the ritualised 
transformation of a wayward king, the re-making of the errant ruler into one who would be fit 






                                                          
20 D. A. Carpenter, ‘King, Magnates and Society: the Personal Rule of King Henry III, 1234–58’, in his The 
Reign of Henry III (London, 1996), 75–106, at 76-85. 
21 It is possible that Edmund actually studied under Langton in Paris, although in any case he had 
‘shown himself a fearless critic of government in the Langtonian tradition’ (C. H. Lawrence, St Edmund 
of Abingdon: A Study in Hagiography and History (Oxford, 1960), 122, 158; d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 433). 
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The place of ‘ritual’ in medieval history  
Since approaches to the analysis of ritual in medieval history have aroused animated debate,22 
the identification of these events as rituals and the approach used to analyse them perhaps 
requires explanation. What constitutes a ‘ritual’? The answer is made difficult by the fact that 
the term ‘ritual’, in its broadest sense, is ‘notoriously vague and incapable of precise 
definition’.23  Various attempts have ‘proposed delimiting features [that] range from biological 
bases... to functional values... to linguistic, symbolic, or semiotic forms... to rejection of the 
category altogether.’24 Each proposition creates its own difficulties. Whilst some would argue, 
for instance, that only to categorise as rituals those events marked by ‘repetitiveness or... 
reference to transcendent values’ is to risk excluding ‘the formalized and symbolic behaviour 
of unique events and everyday life,’25 others would characterise ritual explicitly as those 
events involving a ‘break with the “ongoing” structures of everyday life’ through the 
inversions of liminality.26 The study of ritual by medieval historians has been undertaken with 
a catholic version of the concept in mind. Numerous events analysed under the umbrella of 
ritual – from anointing, crown-wearing, adventus, occursus, supplication, to homage – could 
take place in various settings and spaces, liturgical and secular, and serve various purposes 
and agendas.27 All these events could be categorised as ‘ritual’ using a broad definition of 
repeated or planned action not adequately explained by an obvious need. Whilst this inclusive 
approach has been criticised, notably by Philippe Buc,28 individual instances of all of these 
rituals described in medieval texts can be matched to one definition or another. The fact that 
those definitions differ is perhaps more reflective of the variety of human experience than of 
woolly thinking on the part of the historian. The events of 1213 and 1234 discussed in this 
chapter defy any clear categorisation according to the forms of ritual previously identified and 
                                                          
22 P. Buc, The Dangers of Ritual: Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory (Princeton, 
2001); G. Koziol, ‘The Dangers of Polemic: is ritual still an interesting topic of historical study?’, Early 
Medieval Europe 11 (2002), 367-88; P. Buc, ‘,‘The monster and the critics: a ritual reply’, Early Medieval 
Europe 15 (2007), 441-52. 
23 G. Koziol, Begging Pardon and Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France (Ithaca, NY, 
1992), 289.  
24 J. D. Kelly and M. Kaplan, ‘History, Structure, and Ritual’, Annual Review of Anthropology 19 (1990), 
119-150, at 120. 
25 Koziol, Begging Pardon, 289.  
26  W. O. Beeman, ‘The Anthropology of Theater and Spectacle’, Annual Review of Anthropology 22 
(1993), 369-93, at 379; V. W. Turner, ‘Liminality and Communitas’, in his The Ritual Process: Structure 
and Anti-Structure (London, 2008 [1969]), 94-130. 
27 G. Koziol, Begging Pardon, 289-91; G. Koziol, ‘England, France and the Problem of Sacrality in 
Twelfth-Century Ritual’, in T.N. Bisson (ed.), Cultures of Power: Lordship, Status, and Process in Twelfth-
Century Europe(Philadelphia, 1995), 124-48.  
28 Buc, Dangers of Ritual, 5-7, 161-2.   
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analysed by medievalists, since they draw from the language of several (as will be argued, 
from coronation, anointing and supplication). Both, though, contain patterns of actions and 
words whose repetition cannot be explained by practical efficacy alone. They also constituted 
a ‘break from the “ongoing” structures of everyday life’.  
 
In broad terms, they can be characterised as a rite of passage, of the sort described by 
Arnold van Gennep and made famous by Victor Turner. These are ‘rites which accompany 
every change of place, state, social position and age’ and are characterised by three phases: 
‘separation, margin (or limen...), and aggregation.’29 The essential feature of this sort of ritual 
(and perhaps others) is that they are transformative; somehow the process of the ritual 
effects an important change in the subject that invests him with ‘rights and obligations vis-à-
vis others of a clearly defined and “structural” type; he is expected to behave in accordance 
with certain customary norms and ethical standards binding on incumbents of social position 
in a system of such positions.’30 The events discussed in this chapter belong to, or might be 
identified with, a particular genus of the ritual family – the inauguration. The English medieval 
inauguration ritual – the coronation accompanied by anointing – transformed essentially an 
‘ordinary’ man with only the rights and responsibilities shared by many others of his status 
group into a king, elevated above his people and with unique powers over them and 
obligations towards them. The rituals of 1213 and 1234 took an unfit king, who had exceeded 
his rights and forgotten his responsibilities, and transformed him into a fitting king mindful of 
his rights and obligations and newly worthy of  his elevated status. In common with the 
coronation, the re-inauguration ritual depended for its success on a felicitous performance 
that evoked and celebrated the values of medieval kingship, particularly those that bound the 
king to the community of the realm. 
 
However, as much as these rituals proclaimed their commonality with others 
performed across space and time, the particular context in which these rituals were enacted 
(thirteenth-century England, the royal court) as well as their particular subject (the 
thirteenth-century English king) are important. Whilst studies by Björn Weiler show how 
‘Symbolic communication’ – symbolically charged objects and gestures deployed before an 
                                                          
29 Turner, ‘Liminality’, 94. 
30 Turner, ‘Liminality’, 95.  
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audience – were important to thirteenth-century political culture,31 the role of ritual has 
proved problematic. Karl Leyser and Geoffrey Koziol have both argued for the loss of sacrality 
amongst England’s twelfth and thirteenth century monarchs.32 With the rise of bureaucratic 
government, English kings were no longer seen as charismatic, as possessing some special 
channel to the divine. They clung to the holy through associations with holy men, or else 
sought to promote a chivalric model of kingship instead. These sorts of arguments tie in to 
assumptions about the dichotomy between bureaucracy and charisma and explain the sort of 
intense criticism of the king seen in thirteenth-century parliaments that does not seem to 
have been a feature of the assemblies of charismatic kings in early medieval Europe.33 In a 
world of exchequers and pipe rolls, parliaments and eyres, what place for sacral kingship? 
Bureaucratic kings would be able to sustain their power through the machinery of 
government, the reliable, mundane institutions of chancery and exchequer, without recourse 
to the numinous, transient performances of ritual. This, though, is a view that sits 
uncomfortably alongside a wealth of evidence suggesting that thirteenth-century kings held 
royal sacrality and ritual close to their hearts.34 The work of Nicholas Vincent on royal  
pilgrimages has in fact shown that ‘there was ritual in plenty at the Plantagenet court’.35 The 
king was constantly engaged in public acts of devotion as he travelled across his realm as ‘a 
near-perpetual pilgrim’, so that ‘the daily round of royal devotions, carried out in many 
different places across the realm, can be regarded as yet another means, and a significant one, 
by which the royal itinerary served to impose the king’s authority on realm and subjects 
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alike.’ Whilst, in a post-Gregorian world, no king could claim priestly status, ‘there is a point at 
which royal piety and religious ritual come close to a convergence with the sacred. The 
Plantagenets – anointed with chrism, ruling by the grace of God, and buttressed by their 
devotions to their own particular saints... – may well have been considered to have dwelt 
somewhat closer to the frontier with the sacred than English historians have been inclined to 
suppose.’36 These sorts of royal actions were not adrift in a vast sea of bureaucratic 
government, for the written machinery of the state was as much a part of charismatic kingship 
as ritual. The chancery and exchequer were mediums through which royal charisma could be 
made routine, could be ‘made replicable through logical ordering and definition.’37 In the 
thirteenth century, as Magna Carta came to ‘routinize the charisma of the “community of the 
realm”’, issued and reissued several times and published in the counties, the self-
consciousness of the political community arguably came to interact with ideas of sacral 
kingship. Stephen Langton’s ideas on the importance of the community of the realm in 
relation to royal power, as will be argued below, were important in this process. The role 
Langton established for the English bishops as the enforcers of the Charters through sentence 
of excommunication, and the activities of the bishops in publishing these sentences, place the 
prelates at the heart of these developments. The rituals described in this chapter show the 
importance of the sacred, the oath and anointing, in the construction and reconstruction of 
royal power and the integral role of ritual at the heart of the political community in shaping 
the relationship between king and kingdom.  Importantly, they also reveal the essential role of 
the English bishops in constructing and sustaining that relationship. 
  
What approach should be taken, then, to analysing these rituals? That adopted in this 
chapter is slightly different from the one promoted by certain influential scholars of early 
medieval ritual and political culture such as Gerd Althoff and Timothy Reuter, which focused 
on an analysis of symbols.38 Reuter, for instance, set out to read the  ‘meta-language’ of 
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‘Symbolic’,39 which consists ‘of elements of natural language (written and spoken), of visual 
representations, of guidelines for staging in the form of ‘scripts’ or ‘scenarios’ for scenes and 
action-sequences, and finally ‘props’, that is, symbolically charged objects and places.’40 Whilst 
this approach might have some value in the analysis of discrete gestures, it has less value in 
the reading of rituals – performative activities, events that have the power not just to 
communicate a message but to effect change. Whether or not the heart of ritual power can be 
discovered primarily through a decoding of the symbols they contain is open to question. 
Since the 1970s, ethnographers have moved away from a symbol-centred approach to ritual. 
The observation of a symbol is not enough, it has been argued, to discover how the ritual was 
effected ‘as if the participants somehow undergo the ritual transformations automatically as 
they are exposed to the symbolic meanings and that an understanding of how symbols are 
effective is simply a matter of understanding the logic of thought that underlies them.’41  
 
Moreover, the symbols used in ritual can often be ambiguous or, rather, open to 
multiple readings by the participants. Far from undermining the efficacy of the ritual, though, 
this ambiguity can be exploited as a source of ritual power. This has become clear since 
ethnographers, from the 1970s onwards, began to analyse the ‘performance’ of ritual.42 This 
shift in emphasis has relocated the source of ritual power and efficacy in the interaction 
between the participants of the ritual and between the participants and their audience: ‘what 
renders the performance compelling is not primarily the meanings embodied in symbolic 
materials themselves... but the way the symbolic material emerges in the interaction.’43 The 
leader of the ritual must engage the participants and audience both cognitively and 
emotionally, drawing them into the performance. Ambiguities in ritual symbols are exploited 
by the performers, as members of the audience, in order to make sense of what is going on, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
only via a specific symbolic sentence – for instance, by taking off your shoes, putting on sackcloth and 
ashes, and throwing yourself at the feet of ruler or opponent.’ (Reuter, ‘Symbolic Acts’, 169-70). The 
meaning of this definition is not entirely clear to me, since whilst it is quite true that ‘rituals’ are 
culturally specific forms of symbolic behaviour, it seems strange to argue that an event can only be 
classified as ritual if it is the ‘only’ form available to the actors. This would deny the actors any capacity 
for creativity in the use of ritual language (an important component of the events described in this 
chapter) and would also exclude the possibility that the meaning of many ritual symbols could be 
ambiguous and open to multiple readings.  
39 ‘Symbolic’ is used to name the language spoken by medieval actors (as in, ‘the English language’). 
40 Reuter, ‘Symbolic Acts’, 169.  
41 Schieffelin, ‘Performance’, 708. 
42 Beeman, ‘Anthropology of Theatre’, 370.  
43 Schieffelin, ‘Performance’, 721. 
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have to fill in the gaps themselves. In this way, it is the performers and audience who 
‘complete the construction of [the ritual’s] reality.’44  
 
The result of this interactive process is that the ritual might ‘mean’ slightly different 
things to different people, since each is able to interpret the ritual symbols differently. The 
ambiguity of ritual symbols might not necessarily be extensive. Symbols (like words and 
gestures) can only work as the basis of interaction between people if they draw from a 
common frame of reference and their potential meanings are reasonably limited.45 However, 
where differing interpretations of symbols or emphasis in their meaning are possible, these 
can be exploited by the ritual’s actors to engage participants and audience, since each 
participant or observer can understand the ritual in a way that is acceptable to him. It is this 
engagement that helps to ensure the ritual’s efficacy.  The leader of the ritual must evoke and 
sustain a suitable atmosphere (for instance one of solemnity, tension, jubilation or grief) and 
ensure its intensity. The success of the ritual derives from the shared participation in the 
ritual’s ‘action and intensity no matter what each person may individually think about it.’46 In 
this respect, the rituals of 1213 and 1234 were remarkably successful. 
 
Rituals of Peace 
The rituals of remaking the king discussed in this chapter drew from the language of 
coronation but differed in an important respect: their context. Whereas coronations 
represented the zenith of kingship, the remaking of the king took place at the nadir of royal 
rule, periods of civil unrest or war between the king and his barons when his rule was at its 
least stable.47  To over-simplify their purpose, these rituals were a means of dispute 
settlement that served to resolve conflict between the king and the wider community of the 
kingdom. Yet to see them as functional events that aimed simply to restore the status quo ante 
would be to underestimate the complex process of which they were a part.  A great deal of 
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36 
 
focus in medieval history has been placed on conflict and violence,48 a focus common to other 
areas of historical research as well as ethnographic study. This might be partly explained by 
the appeal of a dramatic subject but also, in more serious terms, by the ‘intransigent notion of 
innate human aggressiveness that has deep roots, not just in Hobbesian social theory but in 
the Western Judeo-Christian tradition.’ The result is that with ‘violence cast as innate, peace 
can only be defined negatively as the absence of conflict or the curbing or controlling of 
violence’. 49 Within medieval scholarship, this has meant that even when historians have 
turned determinedly to the study of peacemaking, eirenic acts are depicted as ‘amicable 
conflict resolution’ which took place ‘before – and more important, after – armed conflicts’.50 
In this way, acts of peacemaking are shown merely to be sporadic, reactionary events 
punctuating a narrative of conflict.  
 
Unsatisfied with this understanding of peace and peacemaking, which fails to account 
for the co-operation and co-existence found even in communities made up of different interest 
groups, some ethnographers have turned to thinking of a more positive definition of peace, 
defining it instead ‘as a cultural process’ in and of itself.51 In viewing peace as a positive 
phenomenon, as opposed to merely ‘freedom from’ or ‘absence of’ conflict, they have come to 
recognise that in societies both with and without states ‘peacemaking is not a sporadic 
intersocietal event, it is a continous process going on within society itself’.52 In fact, it is ‘a 
relentless creative process.’53 For instance, the ethnographic analysis of Laura Ring has shown 
how, through the constant, willful and sometimes burdensome participation in exchanges and 
attention to neighbourly duties and obligations, conducted in a manner which demonstrates 
commitment to one’s community, a state of peace is constantly created and recreated, so that 
‘the “everyday life” we posit as the site of the nonextraordinary , the not riot, can be 
reconceptualized in more positive terms as enabling something we may choose to call 
peace.’54  
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To view the rituals of 1213 and 1234 in this perspective requires, at this point, 
something of the eye of faith. The concentration of the secondary literature on aspects of 
conflict means that no broader framework of thinking about creative, ongoing peacemaking 
exists into which these events might be fitted. Whilst the nature of chronicle sources and their 
survival might mean that much of this activity is obscured, further research (particularly on 
gift-giving in the royal, noble and episcopal mileu) from an eirenic perspective might be 
productive. So, too, might be a reconstruction of the principles and practicalities of 
peacemaking from an episcopal point of view. For instance, as Nicholas Vincent has suggested, 
Langton’s approach to peacemaking might well have been informed by his biblical exegisis 
that ‘with its reconciliation of  apparently contradictory passages in Scripture, and its drawing 
of connections between one scriptural passage and another, supplied an almost ideal model of 
how compromise could be achieved between opposing political interests’.55 That ideals of 
Scripture as well as the practice of its study influenced Edmund of Abingdon is suggested by 
the description of the archbishop’s appeal to the king on behalf of Gilbert Basset provided by 
Matthew Paris:  
‘beseeching him that a brother should by no means expiate a brother’s offence nor 
should the guilt of the offender rebound upon the innocent, fortifying his arguments 
with theological authorities, in which he abounded, he persuasively begged him not 
only to put away all his anger, but even to extend his favour to the limit and grant him 
his inheritance along with the dignity of the office.’56 
An understanding of such processes would place the rituals of 1213 and 1234 within a richer 
context that we can, for the time being, only imagine. Viewed in this persepctive, with the 
actors allowed creative agency, such events are no mere ‘mechanisms’ of ‘conflict resolution’ 
employed sporadically when tension threatens to spill over but, rather, the symbolic zenith of 
an eirenic creativity constantly at work. As such, the form and performance of these rituals 
actually have the potential to reveal more of the norms and values of their culture than if they 
were viewed as a formulaic mechanism of ‘resolution’.  
 
The role of bishops as peacemakers.  
The leading role taken by the bishops in this ‘relentless creative process’57 was founded on the 
nexus of social and occupational rights, loyalties, obligations and responsibilities that 
characterised their central position in the community of court and kingdom. An important 
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component was the traditional responsibility taken by the episcopate in enforcing restrictions 
on royal action. This had developed from a pre-Conquest tradition that invested bishops with 
the right, or duty, to reprimand the king for moral transgressions into a more extensive 
expectation of episcopal oversight of the exercise of royal power.58 Langton’s influence on 
English episcopal culture in this respect was instrumental. It was the development of ideas 
among the theologians of Paris towards the end of the twelfth century that had made this 
extension of interest possible. A prominent circle of exegetes, led by Peter the Chanter (d. 
1197), emphasised how the sinful nature of kingship was evident in its Old Testament origins 
and argued for the right of subjects to reprimand kings when they transgressed.59 Langton 
was central to this movement, as a follower of Peter the Chanter and a leading scholar at Paris 
before he became archbishop of Canterbury in 1206. Langton’s biblical exegisis, as David 
d’Avray has shown, ‘betrays a cast of mind which would be receptive to Magna Carta’. In his 
commentary on Deuteronomy 17, Langton argued forcefully that it was the duty of kings to 
keep ‘a book where the law is contained in summary form’. Langton explained that, if a king 
did not have such a volume, it was the duty of priests to provide him with an exemplar.60 In 
this way he invested the clergy with the authority to enforce expectations of lawful kingship. 
Langton was not the first scholar to discuss this idea. John of Salisbury, for instance, had 
argued a similar line in his Policraticus.61 Crucially, though, in 1225 Langton was able to put 
his scholarly thinking into practice when, as archbishop of Canterbury, he played an 
important role in the issue of the definitive version of Magna Carta. Langton’s enforcement of 
the Charter by sentence of excommunication in 1225 provided the authoritative model for the 
role of future English bishops in ensuring just government and henceforward ‘a tradition of 
support by English bishops for an ideal of limited monarchy became established.’62 
 
Moreover, whilst Langton provided theological justifications for the role of bishops in 
limiting royal action, the growing dominance of a model of virtuous episcopal behaviour 
drawn from the life of Thomas Becket provided greater moral authority to bishops who felt it 
necessary to resist royal policy directly. The influence of Becket’s example on expectations of 
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episcopal behaviour can be seen in the canonisation of six English bishops in the thirteenth 
century whose canonisation proceedings, as André Vauchez has revealed, all display a strong 
identification with the Becket model. Although none of these bishops were actually murdered, 
all were presented as having emulated Becket by resisting arbitrary royal actions and 
suffering exile or persecution as a result.63 Whilst Becket had been concerned with protecting 
the interests of the Church, arguably the general example he provided in confronting the king 
came to be applied more widely. This cross-fertilisation of causes came about particularly 
through the agency of Langton, whose ‘self-identification’ with Becket is palpable.64 It was 
central to the archbishop’s ‘deliberate manipulation of the Becket legend’ as a tool for self-
promotion during the struggles with King John that followed his consecration,65 while 
Langton’s attachment to Becket’s cult, his translation of his saintly predecessor and 
accompanying sermons to the English clergy must have gone far in binding the identity of 
Becket with the new archiepiscopal agenda brought by the politics of the thirteenth century.66 
Whilst Becket was associated with the defence of ecclesiastical liberties, Langton  channelled 
the potency of Becket’s sanctity into his defence of  good government. This was arguably one 
of his greatest achievements. 
 
Episcopal oversight of government, however, was less of a linear tradition than one 
element in the rich and complex compound that was English episcopal culture. Far from 
casting the bishops as antagonists, the obligation to oversee government mingled with a keen 
sense of responsibility for preserving the equilibrium of the fractious court community of 
which the bishops were an integral part. The picture of the relationship between chastising 
bishops and erring kings developed here is thus based on a very different understanding of 
the episcopal place in the political community than that developed by Karl Leyser. For Leyser, 
the authority of Hugh of Lincoln (bishop of Lincoln 1186-1200) to correct royal 
misdemeanours was based on the bishop’s special, holy status. This status was ‘achieved... by 
incessant ascetic labours... [that] severed him from the surrounding world and... enabled him 
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40 
 
to be the objective mediator.’67  Whilst Edmund of Abingdon might well have distinguished 
himself through his asceticism since his university days,68 his habits and those of Hugh were 
remarkable because they were unusual. Authoritative oversight of royal policy was not the 
preserve of the saintly few. It cannot be said of Langton that he was known for his ascetic 
labours or that he was perceived as any sort of ‘holy man’, as bishop Hugh had been. Yet 
arguably, primarily through Langton’s agency, oversight of royal government and the duty to 
make and maintain peace became almost institutionalised in the episcopal office. The 
episcopal authority and responsibility to act as mediators came not from the fact that the 
bishops’ perspective was objective but, on the contrary, that it was subjective. They were not 
outside the political world but at its heart. The bishops were the centre of a web of social and 
spiritual loyalties that pervaded the upper reaches of society, as well as the protectors of the 
‘minores’ who would lose most by the disruption of peace.69 As such, they were qualified and 
incentivised to act as ‘hinge-persons’ in the settlement of disputes. The description of ‘hinge-
persons’ first described by Max Gluckman, is summarised by Paul Hyams:  
‘The greater the number of socially influential groups to which an individual belongs, 
the more likely he is to share valued links with people on opposite sides of any 
conflict. The “crosscutting” serves to cast some as “hinge persons” with the special 
opportunity or discomforting obligation to mediate between the adversaries. To put 
the matter starkly, each side may feel that such persons owe them participation in 
their support group. Thus, should matters come to blows, their position might require 
a desperately uncomfortable decision to plump for one side and reject ties to the 
other. Far better, then, to accept the lesser evil and strive to extricate oneself by 
brokering a reconciliation deal.’70 
 
Far from forcing bishops to choose sides at moments of imminent conflict, the duty to 
oversee the exercise of royal power invigorated their position as mediators by encouraging 
the particular form of intervention discussed in this chapter, which involved the questioning 
of royal policy. Whilst accounts of Langton’s political activities by Powicke, David Carpenter 
and Nicholas Vincent have recognised the importance he placed on peacemaking,71 the 
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privileging of certain of his scholarly interests in John Baldwin’s discussion has, perhaps, 
caused the importance of this social responsibility to be lost and encouraged a reading of his 
actions, particularly in 1213, as part of a revolutionary agenda.72 In redrawing Langton’s role, 
however, to that of ‘hinge-person’, in which his commitments to limited monarchy, sympathy 
for the baronial grievances, cautious approach to resisting royal power outright73 and sense of 
obligation to ensure the creation and maintenance of peace are seen as cross-cutting loyalties 
in the complex web that was Langton’s conscience,  his exploits at Winchester in 1213 look 
less like the prelude to the belligerent instigation of revolution and more like the ritualised 
manifestation of his sense of duty. 
 
Langton’s actions in 1213 were an early example of the determination to settle conflict 
and maintain peace that was to be ‘a theme in his career’.74 During Henry III’s minority, he 
was time and again to assume the responsibility of mediation in conflict between king and 
barons, combining impassioned pleas for peaceful negotiation with threats of ecclesiastical 
censure.75 His actions in 1213 and afterwards were a seminal demonstration of the episcopal 
obligation, both as God’s ordained and a leading member of the community of the realm, to 
preserve the peace of the kingdom. Significantly, in January 1222 Langton responded to 
rumours of plots to break the peace of the kingdom and the prospect of the justiciar’s armed 
response by summoning a great council. He was moved to act, so one chronicler records, by 
his pity for the youth and weakness of the king. At the council, acting in concert with his 
suffragans, he threatened excommunication against those disturbing the peace of the kingdom 
or going against the king.76 Three months later, Langton held a provincial council at Oxford, 
where he proclaimed his commitment to the episcopal duty of peacemaking and invested this 
role of peacemaker and, indeed, peace enforcer with legal as well as moral weight by granting 
the English bishops power to excommunicate breakers of the peace :  
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‘We bind by sentence of excommunication all those who wrongfully presume to 
perturb the peace and tranquillity of the lord king and kingdom, and those who 
unjustly strive to obstruct  the laws of the lord king.’77 
In so doing, Langton not only amplified the authority of his successors in the role of 
peacemaker but instructed them to fulfil it. The Statutes of Oxford ‘served as one of the 
cornerstones of English ecclesiastical law for the remainder of the Middle Ages.’78 Langton’s 
inclusion of this clause in his archiepiscopal statutes arguably acted in a similar way to his 
actions in 1225. Langton’s initiative to pronounce sentence of excommunication against 
infringers of Magna Carta had given power to episcopal oversight of government by providing 
his successors not only with the means of enforcing the Charter but also the impetus provided 
by his precedent.79 Just as Langton’s influence was palpable in episcopal enforcement of 
subsequent reissue of the Charter in 1237 and 1253,80 so too does it resound in the eirenic 
actions of Edmund of Abingdon and his suffragens in 1234.  
 
The integrity of the episcopal role of peacemaker depended on the careful balancing of 
positions and maintenance of dual loyalty to the king and community. This, it seems, was 
something of a badge of office. The embellishments made by Matthew Paris to Roger of 
Wendover’s account of 1234 demonstrates how keen Paris was to emphasise this. Wendover’s 
account describes how grave accusations had been made against the bishops about their 
‘excessive familiarity’ (‘de nimia familiaritate’) with the earl Marshal and their plan to depose 
the king (‘ipsum a regni solio depellere nitebantur’) and how the bishop of Coventry, 
understanding these accusations, had excommunicated all those contemplating such schemes 
against the king. Although Wendover provides grounds for Paris’s additions, his account does 
not contain the degree of consternation developed by Paris. The bishop of Coventry, Paris 
writes, on hearing the accusations, ‘irritated by those who suggested to the king that the 
bishops, favouring the part of the Marshal, wished to make another king, was exceedingly 
agitated’ (‘necnon quosdam qui regi suggesserunt exasperando, episcopos foventes partes 
Marescalli velle alium regem creare, commotus est vehementer’)81 For Wendover, the bishop of 
Coventry’s public pronouncement of sentence of excommunication, with the support of his 
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fellow bishops, against anybody who was guilty of the crimes of which he and his colleagues 
had been accused was a way of securing his peace with the king (‘cum rege pacificatus est’).82 
For Paris, the pronouncement was a demonstrative act of loyalty; the excommunication was 
not only directed against those wanting to depose the king but also those who ‘wickedly 
established such thing about the bishops, who were concerned entirely with the safety and 
honour of the king’ (‘super episcopos, qui omnino de salute et honore regis sollicitabantur, 
malitiose talia imponebant’). Only when ‘the innocence of the bishops was made clear and 
proved’ (‘manifestata episcoporum ac probata innocentia’) could he be pacified (‘pacificatus 
est’) and his spirit quieted (‘quievit spiritus illius’) – a twist of Wendover’s words on Paris’s 
part that turned the ‘peace’ made between the bishop and the king into the ‘peace’ that ended 
the bishop’s indignation.83  
 
Paris’s interpolations proclaim the integrity of the bishops’ ‘hinge’ status, rejecting any 
possibility of their ‘excessive familiarity’ with the barons and demonstrating the maintenance 
of their loyalty to the king.  Paris’s additions serve to foreshadow, and so emphasise, the 
approach made to the king at the same colloquium by Edmund of Abingdon, archbishop elect 
of Canterbury, and his suffragans. Although they offered  critical counsel, the bishops were 
sure to emphasise that they were the king’s faithful men (‘fideles vestri’) and were obliged to 
speak out by the faith by which they were bound to him (‘in fide dicimus qua vobis astringimur 
obligati... Haec autem fideliter vobis dicimus, et coram Deo et hominibus consulimus’).84 Paris 
reproduces Wendover’s account of Edmund’s speech almost entirely verbatim. He did not 
fabricate the importance of this carefully-maintained loyalty; he recognised the importance it 
played in the culture of Edmund’s episcopate and determinedly emphasised it.  
 
The social authority to settle and impose peace, affirmed by Edmund and his 
suffragans and stressed by Paris, was supported by the legal authority they had inherited 
from Langton. Edmund and his suffragans warned the king85  that unless he would renounce 
the error quickly and settle peacefully with the faithful men of his kingdom, Edmund would 
immediately, together with all the prelates who were present, bring sentence of 
excommunication against the king himself and against all other opponents of the peace and 
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subvertors of concord.86 As well as warning the king of the practical consequences of 
threatening the peace of the realm, this threat of excommunication was a vocalisation of 
episcopal authority. It was also the proud declaration that their eirenic duties had been 
fulfilled in the Langtonian mould.  
 
In this responsibility so keenly felt, Langton bequeathed an episcopal badge of office, 
the exhibition of which was vital to the bishops’ sense of occupational integrity. It resounds in 
the conduct of Edmund of Abingdon, whose ‘tireless activity in restoring peace’ throughout 
the crisis of 1233-34 arguably owed more to his scholarly background and Langton’s 
influence than any awareness of the world of court politics that was ‘largely incomprehensible 
to him’.87 Composing his Life of St Edmund at some point between 1247 and 1253, Matthew 
Paris described how, from the time of his consecration, Edmund ‘endeavoured to apply 
himself more earnestly than usual and with greater effectiveness to works of charity, 
especially those that concerned the kingdom and the magnates. He tried in a friendly way to 
get dissidents to make peace, anxiously having in mind that hatred and strife among magnates 
imperil subordinates.’88 Paris’s characterisation of Edmund, disseminated through his Life, 
was one way by which the image of the episcopal peacemaker could be amplified.89 The 
possible reading of extracts of his chronicle to the magnates and prelates who passed through 
St Albans was another. Given the popularity of Edmund’s cult (and perhaps the added interest 
aroused by Paris’s Life), it is not beyond the realms of possibility that passages from the 
Chronica Majora involving Edmund, as well as the Life, would have been favourites among 
visitors. This model of episcopal behaviour – the attempt to reform the king through a 
representation of baronial grievances, made as an act of fidelity out of affection for king and 
kingdom, for the sake of peace between king and barons – now drew its potency not only from 
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The re-inauguration ritual 
Neither the incident of 1213 nor that of 1234 has attracted attention as a ‘ritual’, yet their 
qualification for such analysis is clear. Both involved the transformation of the subject from 
one state to another (the unfit king to the pious king fit for office), effected through a staged 
public performance shot through with symbolic meaning. Although both events have the whiff 
of the traditional submissions involved in dispute settlement (that of 1213 more obviously so) 
they share the language of a different genus, that of inauguration rituals. Although clearly 
these were not actual coronations, both episodes share a strong structural affinity with this 
quintessential rite of passage. This is not so surprising given that their purpose was 
essentially the same: to transform someone who was not fit to be king into someone who was. 
This categorisation explains why Langton and Edmund chose the particular form of ritual to 
effect their intervention and make peace. 
 
The events of 1213 and 1234 emulated a widely known ritual type. As such, elements 
of their structure, symbolism and performance can be identified not only in the familial rite of 
medieval coronation but foreign rites that, although far away in time and place, are worth 
exploring in hermeneutical terms. In particular, this will help to demonstrate the function of 
certain elements of the ritual, particularly the criticism offered to the king before his status 
could be renewed. This appears as a prominent feature of an ethnographic description of an 
installation rite of the Ndembu by Victor Turner. The installation rite of the chief, the 
Kanongesha, was performed by Kafwana, the headman of a people that had long ago made 
submission to the Ndembu, who was vested with the right to confer ‘the supreme symbol of 
chiefly status’, the lukanu bracelet. After being led to the location where the installation rite 
was to take place and posed ‘in a posture of shame or modesty’, Kafwana began the rite which 
Turner names ‘The Reviling of the Chief-Elect’. Kafwana ordered the would-be chief silent and 
began to chastise him for his ‘selfishness, meanness, theft, anger... and greed.’ These were 
‘vices [that] represent the desire to possess for oneself what ought to be shared for the 
common good’. The ‘Reviling’ recognised that rulers might be tempted to use the privileges of 
their office to satisfy their private will and reminded the would-be ruler that ‘he should regard 
his privileges as gifts of the whole community’. It was the community from which he drew his 
authority and ‘which in the final issue has an overrright over all his actions’.90 It was the 
authority of the community that the would-be ruler was made to recognise in the ritual when 
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he accepted the chastisement presented by Kafwana, the representative of the community, 
during the ‘Reviling’ when he sat ‘silently with downcast head, “the pattern of all patience” 
and humility’. The would-be ruler’s quiet submission to Kafwana demonstrated that he was  ‘a 
blank slate, on which is inscribed the knowledge and wisdom of the group.’91  
 
Mutatis mutandis, the essential similarities between the Ndembu rite and the events in 
1213 and 1234 are clear. The rite in general and ‘Reviling’ in particular is conducted by a 
figure who holds a traditional and special status in the form of the right to convey the symbols 
of office (the lukana bracelet in the case of Kafwana, the coronation regalia in the case of the 
archbishop of Canterbury). The would-be ruler, or unfit-ruler, is chastised and berated for 
offences privileging his private will over the common good. The would-be ruler, or unfit-ruler, 
demonstrates his humility and submission to the authority of the instructor who acts on 
behalf of the community. Finally, the subject emerges from the liminal phase transformed into 
the chief, or else pious,  worthy king ready to rule for the good of the kingdom. The purpose of 
a classic inauguration was to make a king; the purpose of the Langtonian ritual was to re-
make one. The king’s ‘selfish’ and unworthy behaviour had rendered him unfit to rule and 
provoked the anger of his subjects, who threatened to reject him as their ruler. By re-making 
the king symbolically, Langton and Edmund could purge the stains that had sullied his rule 
and restore him to full communion with his people.  
 
What this comparison shows, moreover, is how the chastisement of the king by 
Langton, and then Edmund, was essentially constructive. Unlike the Ndembu installation rite, 
the English coronation did not include any ‘Reviling’ of the would-be king but there were 
other precedents from which Langton could draw. The Old Testament prophets, Samuel, 
Nathan, Ahijah and Elijah in the Books of Kings had all chastised their respective kings when 
they transgressed.92 English bishops of the past, like Anselm or Becket, might well have been 
inspired by these figures when offering criticism to their kings, so in one sense Langton and 
Edmund were also referencing the actions of their archiepiscopal predecessors when they 
criticised John and Henry here in 1213 and 1234. However, Langton and Edmund did not 
chastise the king simply because it was part of the episcopal job description, or because they 
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were continuing a linear ‘tradition’.  Their actions were focused on a particular end, the re-
making of the king. Importantly, their criticism was not intended to undermine or weaken 
royal power but rather to rebuild it on proper foundations. It was a necessary part of what 
was, essentially, a re-inauguration ritual that was intended to help elevate the king from an 
unfit, self-serving ruler to a pious, worthy king, ultimately for the sake of the kingdom’s peace. 
 
The archbishop of Canterbury was uniquely qualified to act in this role, not only 
because he drew inspiration from the Old Testament prophets, nor because as hinge-person 
and community leader par excellence he was a leading peacemaker, but because of the 
traditional role of English bishops in making the king through anointing at the coronation. 
Langton’s choice to speak in this particular ritual language therefore augmented his authority 
exponentially by allowing him to draw on vast funds of symbolic capital. The role of bishops in 
royal inauguration rites was long established, its roots lying in Old Testament descriptions of 
priests’ anointing of the kings of Israel.93 In practice the episcopal part in the rite had been 
substantial since at least the mid-tenth century in much of western-Europe, when the clerical 
elite ‘liturgified’ the ritual with the anointing of the subject and, over time, the development of 
the coronation Ordo.94 In England, the right to perform the coronation came to be jealously 
fought over by the archbishops of York and Canterbury, the point being felt so keenly that 
during the reign of Henry I the archbishop of Canterbury had no problem disrupting royal 
ceremonies in order to make the point of his own archiepiscopal monopoly.95  By the 
thirteenth century, the right to perform the coronation lay unambiguously with the 
archbishop of Canterbury. The lack of traditional form at Henry III’s coronation in 1216, when 
he was crowned by the papal legate, was necessitated by the absence of Stephen Langton at 
the papal court and the urgency of the military situation.96 Although it had at least been a 
visibly episcopal affair, including at least seven bishops,97 a second coronation performed by 
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the archbishop of Canterbury himself was thought necessary to ‘enhance the king’s prestige’, 
increase his authority and satisfy the archbishop.98  
 
By situating his actions within this symbolic framework in 1213, Langton 
demonstrated that he was not merely qualified to act as a ‘go-between’, mediating a 
settlement between the two parties, but was uniquely qualified to effect a fundamental change 
in the behaviour of the king himself: it was the archbishop of Canterbury who had made the 
king, it would be him who would remake him. In this respect, Langton’s actions spoke fluently 
of his liturgical authority. The royal anointing from its beginnings was associated with 
baptism, intended ‘to “make a new man” of the unworthy candidate, and to qualify him for the 
burdensome tasks inseparable from the dignity conferred.’99 The anointing, though, from the 
early middle ages had also imbued the consecrator with the right to correct the anointed.100 
This paralleled the relationship between a bishop and his consecrator.101 It also spoke of the 
responsibilities of Samuel in the first Book of Kings. Samuel’s right to reprimand Saul did not 
derive solely from his role as Saul’s consecrator but more broadly from the general authority 
over kingship with which God had invested him from the beginning.102 Both the right to anoint 
kings and correct them on behalf of God were bound up in his person. The rights and 
responsibilities of the office of the archbishop of Canterbury were thus rooted in the deepest 
of Christian traditions, a potent charisma from which individual archbishops like Langton 
were able to draw in ‘remaking’ the king.103 The charisma of the archiepiscopal office was in 
fact  essential to the success of remaking the king, as demonstrated by events of 1234. 
Edmund had led the episcopal approach to the king at the Candelmas parliament whilst still 
archbishop-elect. The bishops threatened the king and his counsellors with ecclesiastical 
censure yet admitted that they felt unable to act, immediately qualifying the threat with the 
statement that they were ‘awaiting nothing except the consecration of our venerable father 
the elect of Canterbury’ (‘nihil nisi consecrationem venerabilis patris nostri electi Cantuariensis 
expectantes’).104 The lack of this essential immediately caused the ritual to stall, with Henry, 
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though responding ‘humbly’ (‘humiliter’) to their admonitions, postponing his response to the 
bishops’ speech by claiming that he could not take any action against his counsellors till they 
had rendered their accounts of the treasury.105 Edmund was consecrated at Canterbury on the 
Sunday of Laetare Jerusalem, 2 April, ‘in the presence of King Henry, thirteen bishops and a 
great multitude of magnates.’106 Seven days later he was able to re-enact the same ritual at 
Westminster. There, he once again approached the king together with his suffragans offering 
his counsel and that of the bishops and repeated the speech he had delivered at Candelmas. 
This time, though, the ritual was effective; Henry was immediately transformed into the pious 
king, humbly absorbing their counsel and acting upon it.107 
 
It was the role of the archbishop of Canterbury to lead the coronation rite but also the 
duty of his suffragans to assist him. This is shown in the description of Richard I’s coronation 
given by Roger of Howden. Although it was Baldwin, archbishop of Canterbury, who was 
allotted the central place as the one who anointed and crowned the king, he was assisted in 
the office by sixteen others, archbishops and bishops.108 That the felicitous performance of the 
‘remaking’ ritual should require a similar show of episcopal unity in echo of the coronation is 
shown in 1213. Stephen Langton led the rite but is described as acting in concert with the 
bishops of London, Ely, Lincoln and Hereford. The repatriated bishops appear to be 
participating in an emphatic visual imitation of their role in the coronation, lifting the king 
from the ground and leading him ‘from the right and from the left to the doorway of the 
cathedral church.’109 The account of Richard I’s coronation similarly describes the English 
bishops leading Richard from his chamber to the church of Westminster for the rite; the 
bishop of Durham and the bishop of Bath conduct the crown in the procession from the right 
and from the left while, after Richard’s crowning by the archbishop, the same bishops led him 
from the right and left to his throne.110 Although the 1234 episode lacks such specific 
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similitude, it was still set round with the deliberate display of episcopal unity, the visual 
impact of which on observers was strong. At the Candelmas parliament Edmund, elect of 
Canterbury, is said to have acted ‘with many suffragan bishops’ (‘cum multis episcopis 
suffraganeis’),111 while, in the renewed efforts that followed his enthronement, he is described 
as approaching the king ‘with the bishops and other prelates who were present’ (‘conjunctis 
sibi episcopis ac caeteris qui aderant prelatis’).112 Together, they were said to speak ‘as if with 
one heart, soul and mouth’ (‘quasi uno corde, animo, et ore’).113 
 
As in the coronation, the archbishop and bishops officiating in the 1213 and 1234 
rituals assumed roles as representatives of the wider community. From the beginning of 
episcopal involvement in royal inauguration ritual, the bishops had not only acted on their 
own behalf or that of the Church but ‘as guarantors of the law and justice of all the king’s 
subjects, as guardians of the christian people and thus as representatives, in some sense, of 
the realm as a whole.’114 Langton himself explained this situation in his quaestiones when 
addressing the question of the two swords: 
‘if the word church is taken broadly for the congregation of the faithful (congregatione 
fidelium), the proposition [that both swords belong to the church] is true because the 
prince of the world accepts his sword from the church and because the faithful thus 
ordain that the king presides over the people for their government. If the church is 
narrowly taken for prelate, then the proposition is false. He [the king] receives it from 
no prelate, Roman bishop or any other. The material sword, however, is handed down 
by the church, that is by the prelate of the church, by the authority of the church not 
understood narrowly but broadly. Just as the clergy elect a bishop, so all the faithful of 
the kingdom, both clerics and laity, place the emperor at their head who defends the 
uncontaminated laws of the laity and the peace of the church. But because the primate 
or the metropolitan is the most dignified person in the kingdom, it is established that 
he himself with the authority conceded to him performs this in the name of all the 
faithful of the kingdom.’115 
 
This representative role of the archbishop on behalf of ‘all the faithful of the kingdom’ 
in the coronation was continued in the ritual of remaking the king. The criticism of the unfit 
king presented by the archbishop echoes Turner’s account of the Ndembu rite, in which it was 
Kefwana’s role as representative of the community that underlay the crucial phase of the 
inauguration ritual, the ‘Reviling of the Chief-Elect’. On behalf of the community, Kefwana 
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chastised the would-be ruler for his tendencies to act against the common good. In so doing, 
Kefwana forced the would-be ruler to dismiss selfish interests, unfitting for a chief, and to act 
in future only in the interest of his people. The reprimand offered by the archbishop and his 
suffragans in 1213 and 1234 could be voiced by nobody more fitting than those who 
historically represented the community at inaugurations. The reprimand itself served the 
same purpose as the ‘Reviling’, since the unfit-king in both cases was guilty of just such crimes 
of self-interest at the expense of the common good and would need to distance himself from 
any such offences in order to be transformed into the proper king and rejoin the community 
as its ruler. In 1213, this ‘Reviling’ took a liturgical form in the fiftieth psalm, which was sung 
before John’s absolution:  
Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy great mercy. And according to the 
multitude of thy mercies blot out my iniquity. Wash me yet more from my iniquity, 
and cleanse me from my sin. For I know my iniquity, and my sin is always before me. 
To thee only have I sinned, and have done evil before thee: that thou may be justified 
in thy words, and may overcome when thou art judged. For behold I was conceived in 
iniquities; and in sins did my mother conceive me. For behold thou has loved truth: 
the uncertain and hidden things of thy wisdom thou has made manifest to me. Thou 
shall sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed: thou shall wash me, and I shall 
be made whiter than snow. To my hearing thou shall give joy and gladness: and the 
bones that have been humbled shall rejoice. Turn away thy face from my sins, and blot 
out all my iniquities. Create a clean heart in me, O God: and renew a right spirit within 
my bowels. Cast me not away from thy face; and take not thy holy spirit from me. 
Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with a perfect spirit. I will 
teach the unjust thy ways: and the wicked shall be converted to thee. Deliver me from 
blood, O God, thou God of my salvation: and my tongue shall extol thy justice. O Lord, 
thou will open my lips: and my mouth shall declare thy praise. For if thou had desired 
sacrifice, I would indeed have given it: with burnt offerings thou will not be delighted. 
A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou will 
not despise. Deal favourably, O Lord, in thy good will with Sion; that the walls of 
Jerusalem may be built up. Then shall thou accept the sacrifice of justice, oblations and 
whole burnt offerings: then shall they lay calves upon thy altar.’116  
 
The delivering of the chastisement in the form of the psalm served to create a 
liturgical atmosphere that, in conjunction with the content of the psalm, reminded the erring 
ruler that his offences were not only crimes but sins, committed not only against his people 
but against God, and that he would need to abandon them in order to be restored to full 
communion with the Church. This was the Church both in the sense of the institution with 
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which John had quarrelled and the wider congregation of the faithful that was ultimately, as 
Langton set down in his quaestiones,117 the origin of his authority and, as such, had ‘an over-
right over all his [the king’s] actions.’118  
 
In the same way, Edmund, as ‘the most dignified person in the kingdom... with the 
authority conceded to him’ performed the 1234 ritual ‘in the name of all the faithful of the 
kingdom’.119 Moved to act because ‘feeling great pain for the desolation of the king and 
kingdom’,120 Edmund and his suffragans advised the king on behalf of his people that the 
counsel of Peter des Roches was ‘cruel and dangerous’ to him and ‘the kingdom of England’ 
and turned ‘the soul of the king from the love of his people’. The mendacity of his counsellors 
had deprived the king and kingdom of the ‘best man of the land’ (Richard Marshal), and their 
warmongering had caused the loss of Angevin territory and threatened to destroy the 
kingdom’s peace.  The bishops spoke on behalf of the ‘natural born men of the kingdom’ 
whom the Poitevins had excluded from court, and of noble girls and women whom the 
Poitevins had caused to be disparaged.  The final request, or rather warning, of the bishops, 
that the king expel his counsellors and ‘just as the custom is in other kingdoms’ govern his 
realm through native men, faithful and sworn, resounded with the interests of the curial 
community.   
 
In the coronation ceremony, the bishops’ representation of the community was 
epitomised by their requirement of the coronation oath from the would-be king.121 The oath 
represented a contract between king and kingdom, an acknowledgement of obligation on the 
future king’s part to ‘all the faithful of the kingdom, both clerics and laity’ who had placed him 
‘at their head’ in order to defend ‘the uncontaminated laws of the laity and the peace of the 
church’.122 Facing an unfit king who had failed to uphold his side of the agreement, Langton 
ensured that the same process would form an integral part of the re-inauguration in 1213. 
This becomes clear through a comparison of the oath sworn by John in 1213, the twelfth-
century coronation ordo and the oath recorded by Roger of Howden from Richard’s 
coronation in 1189:  
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Twelfth century coronation 
ordo 
Richard I’s coronation oath Oath sworn by John at 
Winchester 1213 
‘Imprimis se esse 
praecepturum et pro viribus 
opem impensuram, ut 
ecclesiae Dei et omni populo 
Christiano vera pax omni suo 
tempore observetur.’123  
‘quod pacem et honorem et 
reverentiam omnibus diebus 
vitae suae portabit Deo et 
Sanctae Ecclesiae et eius 
ordinatis.’124 
‘quod sanctam ecclesiam 
eiusque ordinatos diligeret, 
defenderet, et manuteneret 
contra omnes adversarios 
suos pro posse suo.’125 
‘Secundo, ut rapacitates et 
omnes iniquitates omnibus 
gradibus interdicat.’ 126 
‘quod rectam justitiam 
exercebit in populo sibi 
commisso.’127 
‘quodque bonas leges 
antecessorum suorum et 
praecipue leges Eadwardi 
regis revocaret, et iniquas 
destrueret, et omnes 
homines suos secundum 
justa curiae suae judicia 
judicaret; quodque singulis 
redderet jura sua.’128 
‘Tertio, ut in omnibus iudiciis 
aequitatem praecipiat et 
misericordiam’129 
‘quod leges malas et 
consuetudines perversas, si 
aliquae sunt in regno suo, 
delebit, et bonas custodiet.’130 
 
Although Sir James Holt had suggested that the Winchester oath was some sort of 
renewal of the coronation oath, for John Baldwin the clause demanding ‘judgement by court’ 
in the 1213 oath was a manifestation of  ‘Master Stephen’s personal signature’.131 The promise 
to recall the good laws of king Edward and destroy iniquitous ones is also subsumed by 
Baldwin into Langton’s personal world-view, a prelude to his public vaunting of Henry I’s 
coronation charter.132 That the tenets of the oath sworn by John in 1213 were congruent with 
Langton’s personal scholarship is not in question. Yet, extracted in the context of this 
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particular ritual, they represented a reaffirmation of the contract formed between the king 
and his people at his coronation, mediated by the archbishop of Canterbury acting in his 
traditional role. The opening clause of John’s oath in 1213, in which the king swore to protect 
the Church and her clergy, could not have been a more audible echo of the first clause of the 
coronation oath. Similarly, the second part of the 1213 oath appears to be a combination of 
the promise to provide right and equitable justice common to both the ordo and the oath 
recorded by Roger of Howden, updated with reference to the essential principals of the 
common law,133 and the third part of Richard’s coronation oath that held the king to abolish 
bad laws and customs and uphold good ones.  For Holt, the only possible confirmation of the 
suggestion that the oath was prompted by Langton was the fact that the first clause referred 
to the protection of the Church’s peace. The idea that Langton might have seen the remaining 
clauses as a ‘constitutional check on the king’ was dismissed.134 These surmises, though, are 
based on a belief in Langton’s views on the separation of Church and state that have been 
disproven.135 The particular tenets of John’s oath at Winchester, then, seem to be Langton’s 
conscious appeal to the deepest and oldest traditions of the contract between king and people 
represented in the coronation oath.136  The purpose of the oath, for Holt, was ‘obscure’; 
perhaps John ‘intended this as an ultimate concession to the malcontents or as a sign that he 
reigned once more as a communicant king.’137 Viewed, however, in the context of a ritual that 
emulated the coronation, and granting Langton the agency made possible by the world-view 
discussed above, the oath was much more than a ‘sign’. Like that offered by John at his 
coronation it was performative, committing him wholly to his kingly duties, as well as 
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The king’s submission 
Through John’s offer of this oath in response to Langton’s demand, and the acceptance of 
chastisements supplied by archbishop and bishops to both John and his son, both kings 
performed a demonstrable submission to their metropolitans. John’s submission, set round 
with overt displays of humility, was particularly emphatic. His prostration accompanied by 
profuse weeping at the feet of the bishops, like his submission to the Cistercians in 1200,138 
was perhaps a visual echo of ancient forms of dispute settlement, a public admission of guilt 
that would form ‘the centrepiece of atonement’, rendered as a form of satisfaction for the 
victim.139 Such demonstratively humiliating acts would, of course, usually be performed by a 
subject in recompense of an offence against his king.140 The self-abasement of someone of 
royal status could sometimes prove problematic and the symbolism and performance of any 
such act had to be managed carefully. Henry II, on his barefooted pilgrimage to Canterbury in 
1174 made in atonement for the murder of Thomas Becket, had to forbid the monks of 
Canterbury from welcoming him in the splendid fashion customary for the reception of kings 
in order to achieve the required impression of humility.141 Even in the act of penance, royal 
status was still recognised and respected. Objections were raised in 1217, in fact, when royal 
status was not granted the appropriate respect. The original requirement for prince Louis’s 
absolution following his invasion of England was that he appear before the papal legate, King 
Henry and his mother to admit his guilt publicly wearing nothing but his underwear. Since the 
prince deemed this requirement unacceptable, it was agreed that he could submit wearing a 
mantle over the top.142  
 
It was the focus of the king’s submission, perhaps, that was particularly significant. For 
prince Louis, the degree of humiliation originally required of him might have been particularly 
unpalatable because his submission was to be made to fellow royalty or, perhaps, because it 
was to be made to a boy. There is precedent to suggest that the submission of a king to an 
ecclesiastic alone might have been more acceptable. The submission of the emperor Henry IV 
to Gregory VII at Canossa in 1077 was marked by many of the same characteristics as John’s 
submission to Langton: Henry IV travelled to meet the pope, appeared before him (barefoot in 
sackcloth, unlike John) and prostrated himself at Gregory’s feet entreating the pope’s ‘help 
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and comfort’ with profuse tears. Just as Langton and the bishops were to do in 1213, the pope 
lifted the king to his feet, absolved him and offered him the Eucharist.143 John, indeed, had felt 
able to prostrate himself before the Cistercians in 1200.144 In all three cases, the emphatic 
form of submission was perhaps aided by the fact that the recipient, as a cleric, was a member 
of an unarmed status group, unable to use force or shed blood. The submission to a clerical 
figure thus protected the king’s machismo in a way that would not be possible if he were 
required to submit to a leading member of the community of lay, or particularly baronial, 
status. 
 
Like Henry IV’s appearance barefoot in sackcloth, John’s demonstrative submission to 
Langton (as well as Henry III’s to Edmund of Abingdon), was ‘a polysemic piece of 
symbolism’.145 In the Ndembu ritual described by Turner, the initiand was to accept the 
insults heaped upon him with humility and without retort.146 In one sense this recognised the 
authority of the community that had ‘over-right over all his actions’, though there was also a 
clear parallel with Christian penance. In the sacrament of confession, the confessor might 
judge the humility and contrition of the penitent by his quiet acceptance of the confessor’s 
criticism.147 Profuse tears, too, of the sort demonstrated by John in 1200148 and 1213 (and by 
Henry IV at Canossa)149 were another proof of the contrition of the penitent as well as one of 
the ‘demonstrative acts’ of submission in dispute settlements.150 Whilst Henry III might not 
have wept at Westminster in 1234, his unreserved acceptance of the bishops’ counsel was 
proof of his contrition.151 As the pious king, he responded ‘humiliter’ to the bishops ‘quod 
consiliis eorum in omnibus optemperaret.’ His response demonstrated that he had understood 
‘proprium errorem’ and was ‘poenitentia ductus’ to act on episcopal counsel.152 
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That the focus of the submission was the archbishop of Canterbury, accompanied by 
his suffragans, therefore rendered the act polysemic, open to varying interpretations by actors 
and observers alike. The king prostrated himself in a visible act of penitence before his 
confessor, acknowledging his sins, begging for the mercy of the archbishop but also for the 
mercy of God, on whose behalf the archbishop would act in forgiving the king’s sins. The 
archbishop as confessor mediated between the penitent and God but also, at the same time, in 
his traditional role between the king and the community of his kingdom, the overriding 
authority of which the king acknowledged in his submission. Far from detracting from the 
validity of this ritual, the ambiguity of this symbolism could be a power in itself. From the 
point of view of the audience – the large assemblage of magnates and prelates present at both 
Winchester in 1213 and Westminster in 1234 – the gaps in certainty provided room for its 
members’ various individual ‘moves of creative imagination’ in order to arrive at meaningful 
interpretation of what was going on.153 The symbols had only limited power in and of 
themselves to make the ritual effective; it was the act of interpretation by the audience 
members which ‘complete[d] the construction of its reality’.154  
 
That various members of the audience might arrive at different interpretations of the 
ritual was not problematic, but allowed the ritual to be accepted more widely than it would 
have been had the meaning been less malleable, since each participant and audience member 
would able to incorporate it comfortably in to their understanding of the situation.155 The 
success of the ritual was not dependent on the unanimous interpretation of its symbols but 
upon whether the audience was drawn in, sharing with the participants in the ‘action and 
intensity’ of the goings on. It was vital, then, that the participants create through the 
performance of each symbol and action the suitable emotional charge in which the audience 
could share. Here a marked success of the Langtonian ritual was John’s prostration 
accompanied by  ‘profuse tears’ (‘lacrimis profusis’).  This act was sufficiently powerful for the 
bishops to recognise the king’s humility (‘tantam regis humilitatem’) and respond with their 
own tears and lift him from the ground.156 The mood of the scene was so affecting that it 
immediately engaged the empathetic response of the audience, who wept abundantly with joy 
(videntes magnatibus cunctis et ubertim prae gaudio flentibus). The king, archbishop, prelates 
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and magnates were similarly united in the joy and amiability of the feast that followed (ad 
mensam cum rege residentes, archiepiscopus cum episcopis et magnatibus universis epulabantur 
in laetitia et jocunditate).  
 
The events at Westminster in 1234 were not awash with such palpable emotion, yet 
clearly the appropriate mood was created by the participants and shared by the audience. In 
this case, the charge evoked was a mutually respectful spirit of concord, with the bishops 
emphasising that they were the king’s faithful men, directing their accusations of misconduct 
only against the king’s ministers and assuring him that they spoke only out of concern for the 
king and his kingdom.157 Although the ritual was incomplete, the king still responded 
‘humiliter’ and the result was that the assembly was closed ‘recedentibus cunctis cum fiducia 
concordiae celeriter optinendae.’158 Although no measure is given of the response of the 
audience to the completed ritual at Westminster, the description of Henry’s demeanour 
suggests that the mood was similarly effective.159 It was not enough for the ritual to be 
performed; it needed to be performed committedly and convincingly in order to be effective. 
 
The remade king 
The success of both rituals, in 1213 and 1234, was signalled by the transformation of the 
subject, the  remade king, as he emerged from the liminal phase ‘inscribed [with] the 
knowledge and wisdom of the group’ with his ‘form impressed upon [him] by society’.160 The 
transformation of the subject was signalled immediately in John’s case by the celebration of 
Mass,161 both an echo of the coronation ritual and, with his reception of the Eucharist, 
recognition that he once again resided in communion with the Church.162 This was an 
emphatic statement by Langton of John’s reintegration with the community, since it exceeded 
the papal mandate issued by Innocent III that only authorised the archbishop to absolve the 
king, not to lift the interdict.163 The most vivid demonstration of the ritual’s success was 
perhaps, though, the archetypal display of unity and solidarity between the king and his 
subjects – the feast. The convivial feast, shared by formerly disputing parties, was a traditional 
                                                          
157 CM, III, 269-70. 
158 CM, III, 271. 
159 CM, III, 272. 
160 Turner, ‘Liminality’, 103. 
161 CM, II, 550.  
162 GRHS, II, 83; c.f. Dunstable, 57; Reuter, ‘Contextualising Canossa’, 156-7.  
163 As Innocent himself pointed out (Selected Letters of Pope Innocent III concerning England (1198-
1216), ed. C.R. Cheney and W.H. Semple (London, 1953), 155-6; 171-2). 
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signal of the successful resolution of a dispute.164 It could also, once again, be interpreted as an 
allusion to the coronation ritual.165 The important point demonstrated in both cases was the 
unity between the king and his magnates and prelates.  
 
The demonstration that the king had indeed been ‘inscribed’ with an appreciation for 
the community’s customs and his obligation to uphold them also required swift, assertive 
action on his part. In John’s case, his transformation was underlined by his actions the next 
morning, when he sent letters to all the sheriffs of England ordering them to convene four 
law-worthy men from every vill of their dominion in order to make inquiries about the losses 
incurred by the bishoprics during the interdict and what each was owed.166 In Roger of 
Wendover’s account of  1234, Henry III’s transformation was signalled by his immediate and 
humble promise to obey episcopal counsel. Henry ordered the withdrawal of Peter des Roches 
to his bishopric and issued the irrevocable banishment of Peter de Rivallis from court, 
demonstrating the force of his renouncement by swearing that, had de Rivallis not been 
protected by his clerical status, the king would have had his eyes plucked out.167 In reality, 
Henry’s transformation was not instantaneous. Henry had been fearful of the prospect of 
excommunication at the hand of the bishops before the initial chastisement offered by 
Edmund at Westminster in February.168 The period of time before the repetition of the 
archbishop’s protest in April also gave the king plenty of opportunity to contemplate his 
actions. Certainly Henry embarked on an extended pilgrimage across East Anglia after the 
Westminster council and also made a number of concessions  as part of a ‘display of royal 
clemency’, including an ordinance on attorneys that, in referring to Magna Carta, ‘signalled his 
detachment from des Roches, and his conversion to the programme expounded by the 
                                                          
164 Reuter, ‘Contextualising Canossa’, 156, 162.  
165 The festive meal described by Roger of Wendover and retold by Matthew Paris (‘Et post missam ad 
mensam cum rege redisentes, archiepiscopus cum episcopis et magnatibus universis epulabantur in 
laetitia et jocunditate’) is similar to Roger of Howden’s description of the close of Richard’s coronation 
in1189 (‘Et archiepiscopi, et episcopi, et abbates, et alii clerici sedebant cum eo in mensa sua, unusquisque 
secundum ordinem et dignitatem suam. Comites vero et barones et milites sedebant ad alias mensas et 
epulabantur splendide’) (CM, II, 550; GHRS, II, 83). Accounts of the feast that followed Richard’s 
coronation give an indication of what a lavish spectacle such an event might be (Gillingham, Richard I, 
107). See also the feast held after Henry III’s coronation in 1216: ‘Tandem, expletis missarum solemniis, 
duxerunt regem cum processione solemni episcopi et comites saepedicti regalibus indutum ad mensam, 
ubi omnes in ordine suo considentes epulabantur in laetitia et exultatione’ (Wendover, IV, 2). 
166 CM, II, 550. 
167 CM, III, 272. 
168 Vincent, Peter des Roches, 429.  
60 
 
bishops.’169 Although there is no record that his symbolic transformation was the result of 
negotiation with archbishop Edmund during this period, this does not have to mean, as Björn 
Weiler suggests, that the ritual was spontaneous.170 Henry’s apparent preparations for  a 
break from the des Roches regime make it possible that some discussions between the king 
and archbishop had taken place, or at least that Edmund believed that Henry was open to the 
possibility of a public renunciation of des Roches and his associates. Just as preparation for a 
parting of the ways had taken some time, the Westminster parliament in April did not 
represent a clean break from the des Roches regime. The personnel changes made to the royal 
administration were gradual at first, until Richard Marshal’s death allowed for a wholesale 
review.171  The assembly at Gloucester between 16 May and 4 June, in which the king was 
reconciled with the rebels and Gilbert Basset was confirmed in possession of Upavon, 
provided a closure of the conflict.172 Henry’s satisfaction was completed over the next two 
years by the restitution of thirteen properties of which he had disseised his subjects ‘de 
voluntate sua’ and his public appearance on several occasions to acknowledge his guilt.173 
Henry’s embracing of the cult of Edward the Confessor over the course of the following years, 
as he sought a patron who would provide a better example than des Roches, was another 
demonstration that he had been remade as king, as one who would govern lawfully in concert 
with the magnates of the realm.174 Whilst Henry and his government were transformed over 
time, what the ritual at Westminster in April provided was a public transformation of the king; 
a chance for all gathered to witness that he had been remade.  
 
Conclusion 
What this analysis shows is, firstly, the central role of the episcopate in the political 
community. Bound by an array of loyalties to seek the peace and security of the kingdom and 
its subjects, and in possession of extraordinary powers to effect serious change in royal policy, 
they were the cornerstone of the regnal community. Secondly, particular actions of particular 
bishops cannot be plucked from their context, joined up to form a narrative of episcopal 
suspicion of royal power, as if the likes of Langton or Edmund emerged sporadically from 
scholarly seclusion to intervene in worldly affairs. Combined with a broader assessment of 
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their activities and set amidst the complex web of episcopal culture, the actions of the English 
bishops articulate a profound commitment to their eirenic obligations continually displayed. 
Wary of the scriptural precedents for kingly transgressions and witness to the injudicious 
policies of their own rulers, of course they were well placed to recognise royal sin. Yet far 
from demonstrating an aggressive attitude to royal power, this awareness prompted a 
constructive approach to dealings with individual kings. Erring monarchs need not be robbed 
of power; ritually washed of the stain of sin, they could be reformed and remade, fit to rule 
their kingdom once again. In this way, peace could be remade and it was peace that was 
always the ultimate objective. Langton and Edmund had made the right and obligation to act 










In 1252, Henry III ordered the senior clergy of the province of York to assemble. Although 
armed with a papal mandate ordering England’s bishops to assist their king, Henry, in his 
attempts to secure an aid for his expedition to the Holy Land, had so far been frustrated by  
the episcopate’s stubborn refusal to comply. Now, Henry attempted to play ‘divide and 
conquer’ by summoning the two provinces separately. His move was parried, however, by the 
archbishop of York, who advised the king in resolute fashion that such tactics would not be 
tolerated by the clergy of his province:  
‘since the aforesaid business touches the whole English Church, and in such shared 
enterprises it is customary to hold discussion between the clergy of both provinces, 
namely  of York and Canterbury, before a certain response is given, they do not believe 
that it is right or fitting to cease doing things in this way; and therefore with such a 
discussion omitted they delay their response; when such a discussion has been held, 
they will answer, as they assert, according to what God has given to them, with the 
utility of the Church, yourself, and our kingdom having been considered communally.’1 
This was a proud declaration of supra-provincial unity. Perhaps it concealed some latent 
friction still lingering from the primatial contests of the previous century; yet if any tension 
remained it  was clearly unequal to the force of the English episcopate’s corporate identity.  
 
This identity had been forged through many years of regular meetings, as 
representatives of the higher clergy were repeatedly summoned to consider royal demands 
for taxation. This was a similar process to the one identified by Janet Nelson as a feature of 
episcopal activity across early medieval Europe,  in which the holding of regular ‘national’ 
ecclesiastical councils forged a collective episcopal identity, since: ‘by their very existence, 
they provided a definite organization for the whole episcopal group... Repeated meetings over 
time, collective action, and the articulation of common concerns fostered a conscious 
                                                          
1 ‘cum dictum negotium totam tangat ecclesiam Anglicanam, ac in talibus communis inter clerum 
utriusque provincie, Eboracensis videlicet et Cantuariensis, consueverit tractatus haberi antequam certum 
daretur responsum, a modo illo recedere non credunt esse congruum vel honestum; et ideo pretermisso 
tali tractatu differunt respondere, quo habito, respondebunt, ut asserunt, secundum quod dederit eis deus, 
ecclesie, vestris, et regni nostri utilitatibus communiter ponderatis’ (C&S, 450). 
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solidarity on the part of the bishops.’2 Indeed, a strong collective identity framed by regnal 
identification had been a feature of the English Church through the tenth, eleventh and twelfth 
centuries.3 Episcopal unity had not always, however, remained intact. In 1197, for instance, 
the episcopate had fractured in response to Richard I’s demands that they supply him with 
either 300 knights, to serve throughout the year in Normandy, or the equivalent scutage. The 
archbishop of Canterbury, Hubert Walter, was responsible for presenting the request to the 
assembled bishops and was adamant that his see would contribute; in this he received 
support from the bishop of London. Hugh of Lincoln, however, refused the request, inspiring 
the bishop of Salisbury to follow him. The archbishop angrily dissolved the assembly and the 
two disobedient bishops faced the royal rancour. Whilst Hugh remained unscathed, since 
nobody would dare move against him, the bishop of Salisbury suffered the consequences of 
the king’s wrath as his estates were seized and he was forced to proffer large sums for the 
king’s favour.4 In contrast, the thirteenth century, particularly the 1250s, saw royal requests 
for aid met by remarkable displays of episcopal unity, led by the archbishop of Canterbury, 
and this afforded the bishops a significant degree of protection from royal rancour.  
 
It was the circumstances of ecclesiastical meetings in the thirteenth century and the 
issues they considered that re-forged and re-shaped this solidarity. In thirteenth-century 
England, bishops (sometimes along with representatives of the wider clergy) were assembled 
regularly to consider royal requests for financial aid. They were thus drawn to consider the 
king’s financial management and the direction of royal policy. In addition, several schedules of 
complaints were drawn up and discussed at these meetings, in which the king’s infringements 
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and attacks on Church rights were bemoaned. Viewed in isolation, 
these gravamina  create an impression of the episcopate as an embattled victim of Angevin 
oppression. Such an impression would essentially be misleading or, at least, belie a more 
complex episcopal corporate identity. Elements of this identity have been discussed in the 
                                                          
2 Nelson, ‘National Synods’, 43-44. 
3 For the earlier history of English ecclesiastical assemblies and their unifying effect on the senior 
clergy, see: Nelson, ‘National Synods’, 48-49; G. Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe from the 
Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century, trans. T. Reuter (Cambridge, 1993), 60-64, especially his remarks 
that the ‘synod or council with the king present were characteristic expressions of the consciousness of 
a national church which saw itself as being simultaneously a particular and the universal church’ 
(Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe, 64). As Zachary Brooke showed, this did not imply a sense 
of separatism from the universal Church: Z.N. Brooke, The English Church and the Papacy: from the 
Conquest to the Reign of John (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1989), 1-21. 
4 Leyser, ‘Angevin Kings’, 166-8. 
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previous chapter. The following will address another important feature: solidarity, shaped in 
a large part by Henrician demands. Whilst the content of the gravamina reflect part of the 
landscape of episcopal opinion, this chapter will focus less on the gravamina themselves than 
the circumstances of their creation, and their status as a bargaining tool intended to 
strengthen the position of the bishops when faced with royal demands for taxation. It was the 
fundamental weakness of the English Church in this regard – its vulnerability to royal 
demands in comparison to the lay magnates – that drove its leading members to unite as 
never before and formulate a codified response. This was one mutation of a complex, 
sophisticated episcopal culture and identity, other aspects of which will be explored further in 
the following chapters. This culture did not encourage an aggressive attitude to kings. 
Although the episcopate was concerned to negotiate a strong position in relation to royal 
power, it sought to do so either through customary or historically legitimised mechanisms or 
else, as this chapter will suggest, through mechanisms symbiotic with the exchange of lay 
taxation in return for Magna Carta. This was the sanctioned path by which the episcopate 
sought to improve its position. In 1258, the bishops did not seek redress for their gravamina 
by attaching their cause to the baronial programme, largely because the measures imposed by 
the reformers strayed a long way from the established episcopal path.  
 
Consent to clerical taxation: a long-standing ambiguity 
Given the climate of theological opinion, senior churchmen in the thirteenth-century were not 
predisposed to sympathy for the financial demands of rulers. As Elizabeth Brown has argued, 
there was an increasing interest in the morality of taxation among the scholars of Paris in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, at a time when European rulers were increasingly forced to 
look to their subjects for aid.5 Peter the Chanter, for instance, working in Paris at the end of 
the twelfth century, emphasised ‘necessity’ as a criterion for taxation, declaring that all funds 
extracted except in emergencies were rapine.6 In his biblical exegisis, the Chanter’s colleague 
Stephen Langton displayed a similar insistence on ‘necessity’ when discussing both the 
levying of tax and the amount extracted. He was clearly suspicious of royal motives: 
‘immense weights (Deut. 17: 17): here avarice is attacked. This is, plainly, against modern kings, 
who collect treasure not in order they may sustain their necessity, but to satiate their cupidity. 
And note that the temporal possession of riches is well called a weight... because they are 
                                                          
5 E. A. R. Brown, ‘Taxation and Morality in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: Conscience and 
Political Power and the Kings of France’, French Historical Studies 8 (1973), 1-28. 
6 Brown, ‘Taxation and Morality’, 4.  
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heavy, and drag down the man who carries them... to the lowest point of hell... And note that he 
says: immense, that is, beyond the measure of necessity: therefore, whatever goes further, that 
is, beyond necessity, is from evil, that is, it is evil and a sin.’7 
‘Necessity’ was certainly a criterion applied to debates in English assemblies concerning the 
granting of taxation.8 It was also a moral issue of which theologians were acutely sensitive.9 
Given Langton’s subsequent leading role on the political stage during Henry III’s minority, his 
strong feelings on the subject could only have served to fine tune the moral senses of the 
English episcopate. So too did the influence of Robert Grosseteste in the 1240s and early 
1250s. Although Grosseteste’s views on royal fiscality will be discussed in depth in a later 
chapter, it is worth noting at this point how his reading of Book Eight of Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics amplified Langtonian-type views, making it a fundamental requirement 
for kingship that monarchs not overburden their subjects. Grosseteste argued that those who 
could truly be called kings had immense personal resources, meaning that they had no need to 
place financial burdens on their subjects. Those rulers whose income was insufficient to 
support the exercise of their office, who were thus driven to extract funds from their subjects 
in order to rule, could not rightly be called kings.10 It is worth considering the influence of 
Langton and Grosseteste as well as the wider academic community  in the debates 
surrounding Henry’s demands for financial aid, both in those cases where ‘necessity’ could be 
readily demonstrated (as in 1225 and 1226, when England was thought to be under threat of 
invasion) and those,  such as the funding of Henry’s crusade to the Holy Land and expedition 
to Sicily, where it was felt to be absent. Ecclesiastical resistance to unnecessary taxation was 
not only a matter of protecting Church resources; it was a moral obligation.  
 
Papal legislation, in the form of canon 46 of the Fourth Lateran Council, supported the 
requirement of ‘necessity’ if an aid was to be given to the lay ruler, making it clear that local 
clergy should be able to decide whether this criterion was satisfied. It was for the local church, 
therefore, to decide freely whether to provide consent to taxation of its resources: 
‘If... the bishop and his clergy together foresee a necessity or advantage so great that without 
any coercion, for the common good or the common need when the resources of laymen do not 
suffice, they consider churches should give subsidies, the aforesaid laymen shall humbly and 
devoutly receive them and give thanks.’11  
                                                          
7 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 427.  
8 J. R. Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament 924-1327 (Oxford, 2010), 122-3, 176-7. 
9 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 427. 
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What is less clear, however, was the form this consent should take. No formula is provided 
here for the mechanism by which the local church would grant its consent, whether by a 
provincial or national council or a more informal agreement. This is in contrast to the 
protection provided for secular taxation in clauses 12 and 14 of Magna Carta 1215, which set 
out that ‘no scutage or aid is to be levied in our realm except by the common counsel of our 
realm...’ (12) and ‘to obtain the common counsel of the realm for the assessment of an aid... or 
a scutage, we will have archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and greater barons summoned 
individually by our letters, and... all those who hold of us in chief, for a fixed date, with at least 
forty days’ notice ... and in all letters of summons we will state the reason for the summons...’ 
(14).12 Apart from the claim that scutages required common consent, these clauses 
represented customs that had grown out of Richard’s reign and quickly become entrenched in 
the baronial mentality.13 Although they were omitted from subsequent reissues of Magna 
Carta, the king remained aware of practical need for consent.14 The barons, moreover, still 
associated these customs with the Charter and were confident in the 1250s of appealing to its 
protection. When two councils, of the magnates and prelates, were summoned to meet 
concurrently in October 1255 to consider the king’s request for an aid (for the king’s Sicilian 
expedition), the magnates were able to respond  ‘that all at that time were not called 
according to the tenor of Magna Carta and, therefore, without their peers, who were then 
absent, they did not wish to give a response nor to concede or provide an aid’.15 The prelates, 
in contrast, could apparently see no alternative but to meet as requested.16 Although senior 
ecclesiastics. as tenants-in-chief, received the protection of these customs for their baronies, 
their ecclesiastical incomes were neither explicitly nor implicitly protected.  
 
Furthermore,  it was less than clear whether or not the clergy of a local church had the 
right to refuse consent, if the king could produce a papal mandate ordering the payment of a 
clerical tax. The Fourth Lateran Council, although asserting that the local clergy should 
provide consent to any tax, had also insisted that ‘as some are imprudent’ the pope ‘whose 
                                                          
12 Holt, Magna Carta, 455. 
13 Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 119-26. 
14 Carpenter, Minority of Henry III, 61; D. A. Carpenter, ‘The Beginnings of Parliament’, in his The Reign 
of Henry III (London, 1996),381-408, at 386. 
15 ‘quod omnes tunc temporis non fuerunt iuxta tenorem magne carte sue vocati, et ideo sine paribus suis 
tunc absentibus nullum voluerunt tunc responsum dare vel auxilium concedere vel prestare’ (CM, V, 520-
21); Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 198-99. 
16 CM, V, 524-6. 
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business it is to see to the common good, [should] be consulted beforehand.’17 There was 
some disagreement in England as to whether papal assent to a tax constituted a 
recommendation or an order to the local clergy. The ambiguity is apparent in discussions 
surrounding taxes both for ‘secular’ causes (as in 1226, when the proposed tax was for the 
defence of the kingdom) and ‘pious’ ones (as during Henry’s campaign to raise funds for his 
projected crusade in the early 1250s). What follows is a description of how senior English 
churchmen sought to negotiate a stronger position for the English Church in response to royal 
and papal demands. This course was pursued through a series of performative assertions of 
corporate rights and ecclesiastical unity. Time and again senior ecclesiastics insisted that ‘the 
common consent of the prelates and the whole clergy’ was necessary for taxation on their 
resources.18 Such statements did not describe broadly accepted customary rights but, instead, 
sought to establish them. Similarly, statements like that of the archbishop of York with which 
this chapter began did not always describe the current situation but attempted to create a 
state of unimpeachable ecclesiastical unity by ensuring that the king would treat the two 
provinces as an undivided whole. This process of negotiation was arduous, ongoing and in one 
sense largely unproductive in that it failed to secure a strong position for the English Church 
in relation to royal demands. It did, however, contribute to the continued recreation of 
episcopal identity and forged an even stronger sense of ecclesiastical unity.  
 
The lay fifteenth of 1225 and the clerical sixteenth of 1226 
A watershed moment in this process came in 1226, when the clergy sought to establish the 
same right to consent to taxation in an assembly as that enjoyed by lay magnates. Henry and 
his minority council were confronting the loss of La Rochelle and Poitou to the king of France 
and the subsequent threat to Gascony.19 A substantial amount of money was needed to send a 
force to France and this was obtained by a grant of a fifteenth on movables, conceded by a 
great council in 1225. Crucially, this grant was made in return for a reissue of Magna Carta 
and the Charter of the Forests. The process by which this grant was made demonstrated how 
‘kingship had... accepted the limits imposed by the Charters. The events of 1225, indeed, 
marked the decisive stage in the implantation of the Charters into English political life’.20 This 
was because ‘the new Charters [were] part of a mutual bargain between the king and his 
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20 Carpenter, Minority of Henry III, 376. 
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realm... As the Charters themselves stated, in return for the concession of the liberties, 
everyone in the kingdom had granted the king a fifteenth of their moveable property.’21 The 
Church, principally in the person of Stephen Langton, had played a significant part in this 
process. Langton had shown himself a vigorous supporter of the Charters in 1223 but in 1225 
his ‘intervention took a more official and specifically ecclesiastical form’ when, in support of 
this mutual bargain, he and his suffragans pronounced sentence of excommunication against 
infringers of the charters.22 This was a crucial moment for the Church’s relationship with the 
Charters generally, but also specifically set a precedent for the Church’s support of the 
principal that grants of taxation would be made in return for concessions or confirmations of 
liberties. 23  The Church’s involvement, moreover, voiced implicit support for the process 
whereby tax would be granted by the common consent of the realm in the form of a general 
assembly.  
 
Although in 1225 the process by which lay taxation should proceed was clear, it was 
not so the next year when the lay subsidy proved insufficient and Henry turned to the English 
Church for aid. Playing things by the book (according to canon 46 of the Fourth Lateran 
Council), Henry recognised that he must obtain the consent of the pope. He dutifully wrote to 
the pontiff requesting permission to obtain a grant from the English Church and, once armed 
with papal permission, wrote round to the bishops and heads of religious houses requesting 
that each provide for him a grant, according to the means of their respective churches, setting 
out his necessity along with a copy of the pope’s letter of endorsement.24 His request was 
bolstered by Stephen Langton whose own letter, recommending a twelfth or fourteenth from 
clerical goods as a reasonable amount and reciting the reasons for the king’s request together 
with the papal endorsement, was included in the package sent round to senior ecclesiastics.25  
What is clear from the letters of both Henry and Langton is that neither deemed the 
explicit consent of the clergy necessary for the granting of the tax, as both had for the lay tax 
the previous year. This seems to have been because the tone of the papal mandate, recited by 
Langton, suggested an order rather than a recommendation: ‘we ask your community and 
urge it attentively, and order you through apostolic writings, that you provide a subsidy to the 
                                                          
21 Carpenter, Minority of Henry III, 383.  
22 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 432-33. 
23 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 433; Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1055-6. 
24 RSO, 55-6.  
25 RSO, 57-9.  
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king according to the means of your churches’.26 Both Henry and Langton certainly 
interpreted the pope’s letter as an order. In his letter to the prelates, Henry advised that the 
pope had written to the prelates and all the clergy of the kingdom ‘monens attentius et 
mandans’ that the whole clergy provides a subsidy as far as they were able.27 Langton was 
even clearer as to the tenor of the pope’s letter and the response he expected from every 
church:  ‘Since, therefore, it is necessary to obey the mandates of the lord Pope, and fitting to 
aid the king graciously in his necessity, we impress upon your fraternity in the Lord, that you 
warn and induce all religious of your diocese that, since they have been required, they make a 
suitable aid to the lord king.’28 That the clergy should pay a tax was in no doubt; the only 
matter for negotiation was the amount to be paid. That this was to be decided by each 
diocesan church individually according to its own means, not by the whole English Church in 
assembly, also shows clearly the difference between the lay and ecclesiastical situation. There 
was to be no call to a general assembly of the sort set out in clauses 12 and 14 of Magna Carta 
1215.  
 
The canons of Salisbury cathedral, however, had other ideas and set out to establish 
the necessity of explicit consent and the form that it might take. In a remarkable collection of 
documents, in the Register of St Osmund, the Salisbury chapter preserved a record of the 
process by which it sought to secure the same procedures for clerical taxation as those 
applied for the lay tax the previous year. This was an endeavour in which the Salisbury 
chapter invested a great amount of thought and collective energy.  The canons were 
concerned by the suggestions of the papal, royal and archiepiscopal letters, because ‘seeing 
that this business touches all their brothers, they did not wish to give any response 
concerning this without them which might in any way bring about prejudice to their 
brothers’.29 All canons were summoned to a meeting, at which four questions were laid out for 
discussion. First, whether or not the king should be given a subsidy; second, how such an aid 
could be made at the same level across all churches; third, whether this should be a twelfth or 
                                                          
26 ‘universitatem vestram rogamus et hortamur attentius, ac per apostolica scripta vobis mandamus, 
quatenus juxta facultates ecclesiarum vestrarum competens ei [regi] subsidium impendatis’ (RSO, 57). 
27 RSO, 56.  
28 ‘Cum igitur necesse sit obtemperare mandatis domini Papae, et honestum in suis necessitatibus domino 
regi liberaliter subvenire, fraternitatem vestram in Domino commonemus, quatinus omnes religiosos 
vestrae diocesis... moneatis et inducatis ut, cum fuerint requisiti, competens auxilium faciant domino regi’ 
(RSO, 58). 
29 ‘videns capitulum Sarum hoc negotium omnes fratres suos tangere, noluit absque eis super hoc aliquid 
respondere, quod in aliquo posset fratributs suis prejudicium generare’ (RSO, 59).  
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a fourteenth according to the archbishop’s suggestion; fourth, how the Church could be 
protected lest a precedent be created by such a grant to the prejudice of the Church.30 As a 
result of the ensuing discussion, the chapter wrote to its bishop, Richard Poore:  
‘Truly, since it is difficult for us, concerning such and so general a business, to give a 
certain response, since it would be necessary that uniformity be observed concerning 
this payment through the whole archbishopric of Canterbury, and it would be 
dangerous for a church to establish and provide anything new that would be in 
prejudice of the general English Church... [we ask you] that you induce the lord 
archbishop that he convene before him a proctor from every church where clerics 
abide, at a certain day and place, that by their uniform provision and counsel, such a 
certain and uniform response might proceed that, if they see it to be expedient, might 
comply with the command of the lord Pope and gratitude might be more devoutly 
forthcoming from others both for the honour of the whole English Church and the 
safeguarding of the clergy... Therefore we hold it necessary, holy father, together with 
the whole English Church, that the lord archbishop diligently inquire about the form of 
security to be made by the lord king, so that if the proctors should consent to the 
aforesaid aid this deed should not lead to a harmful consequence in the future.’31 
 
This was a clear assertion by the Salisbury canons that the English Church should be 
entitled to provide or withhold consent to royal requests for taxation. A papal mandate, even 
if interpreted by the archbishop of Canterbury as a clear order to provide the tax, did not 
oblige the English Church to grant its consent; this was merely one element for consideration 
(‘they might obey the mandate of the lord pope... if they [the proctors gathered in a general 
assembly] see it to be expedient’). The Salisbury canons also sought to establish that such 
consent should take the form of  common consent provided by a properly convened assembly, 
whereby proctors were sent from every church. Moreover, the canons presented the English 
Church as a unified body. This was, obviously, not a reflection of how the Church was treated 
at this time by either the king or by archbishop Langton, but an attempt to ensure that it 
would be treated as such in future. These assertions were productive. Langton agreed to the 
request of the Salisbury chapter for a general assembly. There, proctors agreed to grant an aid 
                                                          
30 RSO, 61.  
31 ‘Verum, quia difficile est, nos, super tanto et tam generali negotio certum dare responsum, cum necesse 
esset, quod uniformitas observaretur super hac praestatione, per totum archiepiscopatum Cantuar’, et 
periculum esset ecclesiae, novellae aliquid statuere et providere, quod esset in prejudicium ecclesiae 
Anglicanae generalis; paternitatis vestrae genibus provoluti, devotissime supplicamus, quatinus inducatis 
dominum archiepiscopum ut ipse convocet coram eo, de singulis ecclesiis ubi clerici conversantur, ad 
certam diem et locum, singulos procuratores, ut de uniformi eorum provisione et consilio, tam certa et tam 
uniformis procedat responsio, ut domini P. P., si viderint expedire, obtemperetur mandato et ad honorem 
totius ecclesiae Anglicanae, et ad cleri protectionem, de cetero, devotius assurgat gratitudo.  Propterea, 
sancte pater, necesse habemus, una cum tota ecclesia Anglicana, ut diligenter inquiratur a domino 
archiepiscopo, forma securitatis domino regi facienda, si procuratores in praefatum auxilium 
consenserint, ne hoc factum in dampnosam, in posterum, trahatur consequentiam.’ (RSO, 62). 
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and decided that the tax be levied at a sixteenth in all churches (a lower rate than Langton’s 
suggested twelfth or fourteenth, or the lay fifteenth of the previous year). The proctors also 
ensured that the tax would be collected by their own personnel and secured a guarantee from 
the king on behalf of himself and his heirs that the concession would not be made in prejudice 
to ecclesiastical liberty.32 Thus, the concerted attempts to negotiate a stronger position based 
on ecclesiastical unity were largely successful, in the sense that they brought together 
representatives from all churches to debate shared concerns as a community. The instructions 
provided by the Salisbury chapter to its proctors, if they can be taken as an agenda for the 
meeting, indicate the sort of concerns shared in the assembly: whether or not the king should 
be given the aid; if so, what amount should be given; how such an aid should be assessed; how 
it should be collected and paid to the king; how long should be allowed for its collection; what 
should happen if any one of the proctors should dissent from the opinion of the majority; that 
the aid should not create a precedent dangerous to the English Church.33 The experience of 
discussing these concerns as a group helped to forge a corporate identity.  
 
Ecclesiastical assemblies of the 1250s  
If the clergy believed that this occasion would stand as a precedent in the eyes of the king they 
were mistaken. The English Church was to find itself in a similar situation in the 1250s, this 
time regarding a ‘spiritual’ aid, in support of Henry’s planned crusade. On 6 March 1250, 
Henry had taken the Cross in aid of the Holy Land. The pope granted Henry a clerical tenth in 
aid of his crusade on 11 April 1250, and modified the terms in 1251, allowing for the aid to be 
collected for three years prior to Henry’s departure. The papal letter of 1250 to Henry, in 
which the pope stated his order to the clergy to make the grant, was made in even more 
explicit and authoritative terms than those of 1226: ‘we command that a tenth of all 
ecclesiastical income of your kingdom be conceded to your highness... giving in our letters 
orders to our venerable brothers the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of Herford, that 
they have the said tenth made available to you where you will without difficulty or 
diminution, when it has been collected and you wish to undertake your journey overseas.’ 
                                                          
32 RSO, 66-7. 
33 RSO, 64-5.  
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Importantly, no room was given for dissent from the English clergy, since ‘those objecting 
were to be compelled through ecclesiastical censure, with appeal postponed.’34 
 
Accounts of ecclesiastical meetings between 1250 and 1252 are rather sketchy but 
Henry probably summoned some sort of council in March 1251 and again in April 1252 to 
assent to the aid. 35 A papal letter of 16 February 1251 had ordered the archbishops and 
bishops to allow the aid to be gathered, for three years before the king’s departure for the 
Holy Land, rather than for the original two. As W. E. Lunt suggested, this might well have been 
an attempt by the pope to compel the bishops to pay the tax.36 Despite this, the clergy were 
unwilling to comply. If the account of the Abingdon chronicle is to be trusted, the bishops of 
London, Lincoln and Worcester refused their assent at the 1251 meeting, though their 
motives are not given. When Henry failed again to obtain consent in 1252 (the composition of 
the assembly is not clear), he summoned the two provinces to meet separately, eliciting the 
resolute response from the archbishop of York with which this chapter began. Again, it is clear 
that papal mandates – even when framed in such unambiguous terms applying the threat of 
ecclesiastical censure – were regarded by the English clergy as just one element for 
consideration. The clergy were entitled (indeed, in the view of the suffragans of York, 
accustomed) to decide such matters for themselves in regnal or provincial council. The tenor 
of the papal mandates, combined with Henry’s summoning of the provinces separately, 
underscores the fact that the rights asserted by the archbishop of York were not universally 
accepted.  
 
Although it did not reflect an unambiguous reality, the archbishop’s appeal, made 
through asserting the corporate identity of the English Church, helped to create or renew 
                                                          
34 ‘celsitudini tuae decimam omnium ecclesiasticorum proventuum regni tui... pro dictae terrae succursu, 
duximus usque ad triennium concedendam. Venerabilis fratribus nostris... archiepiscopo Cantuariensi et... 
epsicopo Herefordensi nostris dantes litteris in mandatis, ut decimam ipsam, cum collecta fuerit, et iter 
arripere volueris transmarinum, absque difficultate ac diminutione qualibet tibi faciant exhiberi. 
Contradictores per censuram ecclesiasticam, appelatione postposita, compescendo’ (Foedera, 272). 
35 A later compilation of the Abingdon chronicle recounts a meeting at Reading in March 1251, though it 
does not give any details as to the meeting’s composition and extent. Although no summons is recorded, 
a council must have met shortly before 16 May 1252, when the king wrote to archbishop Boniface (who 
was probably abroad) telling him that the assembled clergy had met and refused to answer concerning 
the papal mandate without their archbishop present. Henry asked Boniface to assent to the aid and 
convince his suffragans to agree to it (C&S, 448-50).  
36 W.E. Lunt, Financial relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (Cambridge, MA, 1939), 255-6. 
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ecclesiastical unity.  A regnal council was indeed held towards the end of 1252, though the 
king had little more luck and had to contend with substantial opposition led by Robert 
Grosseteste. To the doubts of the elect of Winchester, who worried how the English Church 
could refuse its consent in the face of both royal and papal mandates, and considering that the 
French Church had granted an aid to its king for a similar purpose, Grosseteste replied that ‘it 
is to be resisted by the fact that the French contributed: “Indeed a pair of acts leads to 
custom”. 37 The king was greatly angered by this response but agreed to turn his demand into 
a request, setting aside the papal mandate. This, importantly, opened the way for a tirade 
against royal abuses. It is hard to know whether the tone and specifics of the prelates’ speech 
represent the views of all those gathered at the meeting or of Matthew Paris in particular, but 
if it is broadly representative of events then we might take from it the essentials: there were 
complaints to be made against Henry’s financial exactions on the kingdom in general and 
intrusions into ecclesiastical liberty in particular.38 The prelates agreed to grant an aid on 
condition that Henry would keep the Charters, would not assume that the grant was a 
precedent and that its expenditure would be controlled (Paris states that the prelates were 
concerned because Henry had thus far shown himself to be prodigal).  The king refused and 
the prelates declined to give their consent to the aid, citing the absence of their archbishops.39  
 
There are several points to take from this exchange. The bishops (it is not clear that 
representatives of the lower clergy were present) considered themselves well within their 
rights to withhold their consent to an aid despite stringent papal mandates. The king did not 
accept this claim happily, but deemed it expedient to allow it in the circumstances. This 
acknowledgement provided a crucial opener and the clergy leapt on the opportunity to make 
the granting of an aid conditional on royal concessions, hence the preservation of the 
Charters, the guarantee of the preservation of their liberty in regards to the granting of 
taxation and control over the distribution of the collected funds. This attempt failed, but a 
renewed attempt was made shortly afterwards, in January 1253, this time on much more 
ambitious terms.  At a meeting of the Canterbury province at London on 13 January, a long 
discussion was held about the concession of an aid. Eventually, the prelates agreed to offer a 
contribution, though not as much as was asked, and only  ‘if the king wished to cease from his 
                                                          
37 CM, V, 324-26. The only account of this meeting is that of Matthew Paris.  
38 CM, V, 327.  
39 CM, V, 327-8.  
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customary offences and oppressions as he had promised to do many times before now and 
conceded through the Charter, and consent to the pious counsels of his natural subjects.’40  
Grosseteste was apparently responsible for drawing up a significant portion of the schedules 
of complaints: the king dragged clerics before secular courts, compelled bishops through their 
baronies to force their clerks to appear there, impoverished vacant bishoprics, hindered 
episcopal visitations by prohibiting laymen from providing oaths and intruded inadequate 
candidates into benefices imperilling the cure of souls.41  
 
Although Henry was prepared to pass on the list of grievances to the barons of the 
exchequer for advice, the latter probably took a dim view of the Church’s jurisdictional claims, 
as did the magnates who met in the great council in May.42 The bishops were not successful in 
obtaining redress for their grievances in return for the grant of the crusading tenth. Instead, 
the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishops of Carlisle and Salisbury and the elect of 
Winchester, on behalf of the other prelates, sent to the king with the aim of inducing him to 
preserve the liberties of the Church preserved in Magna Carta as he had previously promised, 
especially concerning elections. The king agreed; at an assembly of bishops, earls, barons, 
knights, abbots and priors in May 1253 he promised to abide by Magna Carta, the solemn 
sentence of excommunication against infringers was pronounced and the ecclesiastical tenth 
was granted in return.43  
 
Since the time of his vow in 1250, it had taken Henry more than three years to secure 
the funds he needed for his crusade, and much effort. The bishops had agreed to the aid 
eventually, since ‘it was not their desire that a pious cause be cheated or that the state of the 
Church and kingdom suffer great loss.’44  Their resistance, however, had sent a forceful 
                                                          
40 ‘si rex a suis consuetis iniuriis et oppressionibus quibus ecclesiam oppresserat prout multotiens 
promiserat et per cartam suam concesserat cessare ad huc vellet et piis suorum naturalium consiliis 
consentire.’.The king ‘favorabiliter respondit’, inviting the bishops to draw up a list of their complaints,  
so that ‘ipse omnia emendanda ad plenum emendaret’ (Chronicle of John of Wallingford, given in C&S, 
468). 
41 Burton, 422-5, given in Councils and Synods, 469-72. 
42 Carpenter, ‘Magna Carta 1253’, para. 19. 
43 CM, V, 373-7; C&S, 474-79; Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 469. Further discussion, on the 
circumstances of the schedule’s compilation and its content can be found in Carpenter, ‘Magna Carta 
1253’, paras. 13, 14. 
44 ‘pia non penitus suo desiderio frauderetur nec ecclesiae vel regni status enorme pateretur detrimentum’ 
(CM, V, 374); Carpenter, ‘Magna Carta 1253’, para. 20. 
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message to the king: the financial support of the Church could not be taken for granted, even if 
the cause was a pious one. Moreover, the Church could not be compelled by papal mandate to 
grant an aid and would only do so if general consent could be achieved in an assembly. 
Furthermore, the prelates had demonstrated that their grant of an aid was conditional and 
had been given freely, in the same way that the bishops and magnates had done in 1225 when 
they had granted an aid in return for the issue of Magna Carta. However, the position of the 
Church was still far from secure. The reissue of Magna Carta was an achievement but nowhere 
near on the scale of that for which the bishops had hoped. The clergy had managed to increase 
their bargaining power with the king but not sufficiently to secure the redress of the 
ecclesiastical grievances that had been put forward.45 Moreover, despite the asserted right of 
the clergy to provide or withhold consent to taxation of its resources, the Church’s obligations 
remained ambiguous in the eyes of the king.   
 
It was from this unstable position that the clergy confronted what they considered the 
outrage of the Sicilian Business. Although Henry probably remained firm in his intention to 
depart for the Holy Land, 46 his head was turned by the prospect of winning the throne of 
Sicily for his second son, Edmund, who was granted the throne of Sicily by the pope in 1254 
and formally invested with the kingdom in 1255. In return, the king committed to pay the 
pope 135,541 marks.47 Henry never commuted his crusading vow in favour of the Sicilian 
expedition (despite papal permission for him to do so)48 but this was not how the majority of 
his subjects viewed the situation. This was understandable since, on 15 May 1255, Alexander 
IV, going further than his predecessor Innocent IV, gave permission to Henry to utilise  those 
funds collected for the Holy Land crusade for the Sicilian venture.49 When, in May 1253, the 
English Church had granted Henry a tenth of clerical incomes, it had been for crusade to the 
Holy Land.50 When a council of the English clergy assembled at the New Temple in January 
1256, representatives from the diocese of Coventry and Lichfield complained that ‘they are 
burdened in that they are pressed to pay the tenth against their will, since the reason for the 
payment which seemed pious at first sight now is not pious, as it seems to them, since it has 
                                                          
45 Carpenter, ‘Magna Carta 1253’, para. 15. 
46 S. Lloyd, ‘King Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean’, in M. Jones and M. Vale (eds.), England 
and her Neighbours 1066-1453: Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais (London, 1989), 97-119, at 97-101. 
47 Lunt, Financial Relations, 266.  
48 Lloyd, ‘Henry III, the Crusade’, 113. 
49 Lunt, Financial Relations, 263, 265. 
50 C&S, 474-79. 
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been changed.’51  There were many reasons why the English clergy regarded the Sicilian 
project with disdain. 52  Essentially, of course, they had never consented to it. Moreover, the 
clergy, as stewards of the Church’s inheritance, were bound to channel Church funds for pious 
uses (specifically the support of the poor) and to convert them to such a use as Henry’s 
Sicilian expedition would be illegal and offensive to God.53 If this were not enough, there were 
many practical obstacles:  
‘the whole of the kingdom of England would not suffice for such a burden, even if earth 
would be made into gold, especially since that kingdom of Sicily is unconquerable and 
as good as inaccessible to an army composed of our men. And if we had mercenary 
knights and paid soldiers from that land, the value of their loyalty would be in doubt, 
because of their long familiarity with Frederick and his men.’54  
Moreover, if an English army were to depart for Sicily, England would be left vulnerable to 
attack from her neighbours, especially the Welsh, and both kingdoms would be lost. Clearly, 
‘such a sum of money is spent uselessly and clearly wasted, just as is obviously apparent and 
well known.’55  
 
The situation worsened for the prelates when a papal bull of 9 April 1255 not only 
reinforced the grant of the tenth for three years but also gave permission for the tenth to be 
collected for a further two years.56 When two councils, of the magnates and prelates, were 
summoned to meet concurrently in October 1255 to consider the king’s request for further 
aid, the clergy were not in a strong position to act on their profound misgivings. The magnates 
were able to respond to the summons by saying that they would not be meeting, as all of the 
barons had not been summoned to the council in the proper form according to Magna Carta.57 
As Powicke and Cheney saw it, ‘the prelates, on their part, were powerless to reject the papal 
mandates; but they avoided immediate compliance’.58 As is clear from the earlier instances, 
                                                          
51 ‘gravati sunt in eo quod decimam eandem adhuc nituntur extorquere ab eisdem invitis, cum causa 
solutionis que prima facie pia videbatur iam in non piam, ut eis videtur, sit mutata’ (C&S, 508). 
52 The following reasons for the inadvisability of the Sicilian venture are recorded by the Burton 
annalist as ‘Rationes episcoporum et cleri contra petitionem domini regis’ put forward at a council of the 
English clergy at London in March to May 1257 (Burton, 90-1; C&S, 526-27). 
53 Burton, 391; C&S, 526. 
54 ‘ad tantum onus non sufficit totum regnum Anglie, etiam si de luto fabricaretur aurum, precipue cum 
illud regnum Cicilie sit inexpugnabile et cum exercitu de nostris quasi inaccessibile. Et si milites haberemus 
stipendiarios et conductitios de terra illa, de fide ipsorum posset merito dubitari, propter familiaritatem 
cum Frederico et suis diu contractam’ (Burton, 391; C&S, 526-7). 
55 ‘tanta summa pecunie inutiliter est expensa et expresse perdita, sicut apparet evidenter et notorium est’ 
(Burton, 390-1; C&S, 526). 
56 Lunt, Financial Relations, 266.  
57 CM, V, 520-21; Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 198-99; C&S, 501-02. 
58 C&S, 502.  
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however, the prelates were quite ready to disregard papal mandates, or at least to regard 
them more as recommendations. What was not so clear was whether the king was under any 
obligation to summon the prelates to an assembly according to a specific form, as he was in 
the case of the lay barons, and whether there were any circumstances under which the 
prelates could refuse to respond to the summons. Unlike the magnates, the prelates could not 
escape royal requests so easily.  
 
According to the dramatic account of Matthew Paris, the bishops who met at the 
council, led by the bishops of London and Worcester, on hearing the demands of the papal 
nuncio, Rostand, proclaimed their intention to follow in the footsteps of Thomas Becket, dying 
for the liberty of the Church, before they would allow the Church to be subjected to such great 
burdens.59 In reality, their path was far from clear. As Paris describes it, the English clergy 
were trapped in a pincer movement with the king on one side and the pope on the other.60 
Accounts, though, of the next ecclesiastical council, held in January 1256, show that the 
English clergy were determined to defend themselves against this dual attack.  It seems likely 
that they responded by summoning ‘a more thoroughly representative ecclesiastical council 
than had ever been assembled in England’.61 Not only bishops, abbots and priors were to 
attend but also deans of cathedral churches along with representative canons, as well as 
archdeacons who were to bring with them three or four representatives from their 
archdeaconries who were to be provided with a full mandate from their fellows.62 It seems 
that the purpose of the broad summons was firstly to continue the broad base of discussion 
that had evidently taken place in the localities, from which the grievances discussed at the 
council were drawn.63 Secondly, a display of wide opposition and a united front probably 
                                                          
59 CM, V, 525-6; C&S, 502-03. It might well be that Paris’ account is accurate – the subsequent schedules 
drawn up by the clergy, preserved in various places, testify to the strength of feeling that the Sicilian tax 
aroused – although Paris is the only source to make a direct comparison between Becket and the 
actions of the English prelates in the 1250s. 
60 CM, V, 526; C&S, 503.  
61 C&S, 504.  
62 C&S, 504.  




seemed the best defence against royal demands and provided the greatest chance of 
influencing papal opinion.64  
 
The dual focus of the two schedules of complaints that survive for this council, 
preserved in the Burton annals, are similar to the further schedules that were to be put 
forward over the next two and a half years. The clergy complained firstly about the Sicilian 
business, listing the various reasons why they considered it illegitimate and pointing out that 
the aid necessary for its completion was extremely burdensome. Secondly they put forward 
complaints about royal and general lay infringement on ecclesiastical liberties, particularly 
that innocent clerics were being punished by the king’s forest officials (and received harsher 
penalties even than laymen legitimately convicted), while bishops were compelled through 
their baronies to bring clerks before secular courts.65 The complaints set out at a meeting of 
the province of Canterbury in August 1257 were more extensive.66 These included the wasting 
of ecclesiastical resources during vacancies, the royal interference in elections and 
excommunications, lack of co-operation from the lay power in enforcing excommunications, 
the lay power’s lack of respect for benefit of clergy, the violations of sanctuary by those 
pursuing criminals, the king’s interference in the execution of wills, the king and other 
magnates unreasonably compelling ecclesiastics to do suit at their courts, and the demand 
that churchmen present proof of their liberties made by ‘express mention’ in their charters.67  
 
Only two complaints about royal treatment of the Church related to novel exactions: 
that the king forbade laymen from making oaths to their bishops during diocesan visitations 
(in echo of Grosseteste’s protest)68 and that the king had begun to demand that ecclesiastics 
exhibit ‘express mention’ in charters of liberties to which they laid claim, even if in practice 
they had been enjoying such liberties for many years.69 This latter complaint had indeed hurt 
the Church –more than the lay magnates – and it could justifiably be claimed that the ‘express 
                                                          
64 Representatives were sent to Rome with demands that the king keep Magna Carta and King John’s 
charter for the English Church. It seems likely that they were also charged with putting the English 
Church’s case more generally to the pope (CM, V, 540; C&S, 506).  
65 Burton, 360-3; C&S, 506-09. 
66 CM, VI, 353-65; C&S, 539-48. 
67 CM, VI, 353-65; C&S, 539-48. 
68CM, VI, 355; C&S, 541, no. 9. Grosseteste had complained about this in his schedule of January 1253 
(Burton, 423; C&S, 470, cap. 8). 
69 CM, VI, 363-5; C&S, 547-8, nos. 48, 49.  
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mention’ demands went against custom.70 It is striking, though, that this complaint forms such 
a small proportion of the schedules. Most of the clerical complaints put to the king between 
1255 and 1258, as too those in the earlier 1250s, went back generations. Although Matthew 
Paris, in his analysis of the complaints set out in 1257, asserts that the Church ‘is burdened by 
new oppressions and burdensome and intolerable customs in modern times’71 he also 
believed that the complaints ‘were similar to those for which the blessed martyr Thomas 
archbishop of Canterbury fought.’72  Both the general complaint about royal infringements on 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and specific protests about clerks being brought before secular 
courts did indeed have the air of Becket about them.  If Paris was reflecting a widely-held 
perception, then to some extent this showed how the episcopate in the thirteenth century 
might have channelled the influence of Becket in formulating their grievances. What it 
highlights, however, was how little had changed in royal attitudes to ecclesiastical liberties in 
the past century. There could be little grounds for claiming that Henry III was worse than or 
even as bad as his father and grandfather, or in fact any of his predecessors, in his treatment 
of the Church. Henry’s Sicilian ambitions had potentially given rise to a tax of epic proportions 
and questionable morality but – at least from an objective viewpoint – this paled in 
comparison to the interdict of John’s reign or the murder of an archbishop. In the main, it was 
not the complaints themselves that had changed but the means by which the clergy expressed 
them and the use to which they put them, or at least attempted to put them. They became a 
tool for negotiations with the king, a bargaining chip, whereby the clergy were determined to 
reserve the granting of aid on the condition that their grievances be redressed. This is shown 
most explicitly in the Church’s offer to the king of £52,000 in the spring of 1257. The grant 
was to be conditional on two points: the Church should be rid of all further taxation for the 
Sicilian venture and the king should provide redress for the Church’s complaints.73 The 
                                                          
70 Clanchy, ‘Did Henry III have a policy?’, 209-10; Carpenter, ‘King, Magnates and Society’, 85-6. 
71 ‘novis oppressionibus modernis annis solito gravioribus et intolerabilioribus [opprimitur]’ (CM, V, 632; 
C&S, 529). 
72 ‘similia fuerunt illis pro quibus beatus Thomas archiepiscopus Cantuariensis martir dimicavit’ (CM, V, 
638; C&S, 530). 
73 Between 21 August and 2 September 1256, the pope had responded to the king’s request for license 
to gather further aid from the clergy with new provisions for the collection of the tenth and a raft of 
new taxes, including license to take the fruits of long-vacant benefices,  the fruits of the benefices of 
non-residents and the part of the property of intestates reserved for spiritual purposes (Lunt, Financial 
relations, 274-6); Lunt, Financial Relations, 277.  
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grievances were then being drawn up in the form of the fifty articles preserved in Paris’s Liber 
additamentorum.74  
 
The accounts of the meeting held in August of the same year, in which the senior 
clergy of Canterbury met to decide what was to be done for the best, shows how it was not the 
complaints themselves but the context of their production that was important. As the agenda 
presented by Boniface and the recorded response, possibly by the monastic prelates, shows, 
the prelates discussed together in council what tactics to adopt: how to present the 
grievances, and whether to approach the king and the pope now or later to seek redress. The 
prelates also decided to discuss their grievances in order to decide which could not be ignored 
without danger to souls and, thus, began a collective and concerted effort of whittling-down.75 
Like the earlier schedules, by nature these were the result of discussions held among 
varyingly large numbers of representatives, at times of only the greater, at others of the 
greater and lesser, clergy. Regular meetings in which common concerns were shared had 
forged the senior clergy into a genuine corporate unit.  
 
Conclusions 
The content of the bishops’  gravamina – the royal treatment of the Church – was an 
important part of the bishops’ mental landscape. The fact that complaints about lay 
encroachment on ecclesiastical jurisdiction were discussed regularly at meetings of senior 
prelates helped to fashion the identity of that group. The sense of struggling righteously 
against royal oppression also harmonised with pre-existing aspects of episcopal identity, 
namely the corporate pride taken in the actions of their sainted predecessor, Thomas Becket. 
Yet there is much more to be gleaned about episcopal culture than the sense of grievance 
derived from the gravamina, particularly the degree of ecclesiastical unity and the degree to 
which that unity was self-conscious, contrived and proclaimed by episcopal protagonists. Only 
this sort of corporate identity could produce such schedules of complaint and allow the 
episcopate to organise itself in response to royal demands. The ecclesiastical meetings of 
these years also reveal the modus operandi of the English bishops when threatened by royal 
demands. They sought to pursue a process of negotiation, bargaining their way into a stronger 
                                                          
74 CM, V, 637-8; CM, IV, 353-65; C&S, 529, 539-48. 
75 Burton, 402-05; C&S, 532-39. 
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position by stressing the need for the consent of the lower clergy and the importance of 
assembling the clergy of both provinces, as well as counter-demanding redress for their 
grievances when confronted with requests for aid. This sort of strategy, aligned with the 
mechanism by which lay taxation was granted in return for Magna Carta, compared neither in 
means or ends with the sort of action taken by the reformers in 1258. 
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Chapter three  
 
 





In 1256, Henry III contemplated the marriage of his daughter, Beatrice, to Emmanuel of 
Castile. The match was pooh-poohed, however, by Richard of Cornwall, who deemed the 
marriage ‘most unfitting’, since in Castile Beatrice’s husband could be deprived of his lands ‘by 
the sole will and pleasure of the prince.’1 For a short time, between 1232 and 1234, under the 
malign influence of Peter des Roches, Henry III had himself deprived several subjects of their 
lands per voluntatem regis.2 Henry had not been permitted to pursue this policy for long. His 
actions provoked concerted opposition from the magnates and prelates, precipitating the 
rebellion of Richard Marshal and forcing the hand of Edmund of Abingdon, archbishop of 
Canterbury, and his suffragans. Approaching the king in full view of the assembly at 
Westminster in 1234, Edmund chastised the king for the ill-treatment of his barons, 
prompting a remorseful Henry to renounce his illegal actions and right the wrongs he had 
inflicted on his subjects. Richard of Cornwall’s warning is a comment on the perceived 
differences between royal power in Castile and England. It also, though, reveals much about 
the episcopates of the respective kingdoms. Was there no Edmund of Abingdon in Toledo to 
set Alfonso straight? There was not, nor was there any to be found in the other kingdoms of 
the peninsula. The reasons why illuminate the unusual scope of episcopal power in England 




                                                          
1 ‘De maritagio filie nostre consulit idem comes ut per nuncios eosdem sub omni verborum cautela 
respondeatur, et super hoc dicere poterunt iidem nuncii quod, cum de terris quas dictus rex Castell’ dederit 
vel daturus sit domino Emanueli, fratri suo, nullam noticiam habeamus, et ex altera parte in terra et 
potestate ipsius regis nullus ut dicitur jus sibi vendicare potest in suis tenuris, nisi ad voluntatem dicti 
regis, et indecentissimum haberetur filiam nostram alicui maritare viventi, nisi homini amplas et 
convenientes terras et possessiones habenti, et qui a suis terris et possessionibus pro voluntate sola et 
libito sui principis non posset destitui’ (CR 1254-6, 389-90; Carpenter, ‘King, Magnates and Society’, 80). 
2 Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction’, 38-39.  
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The place of Iberia in Latin Christendom 
It might be thought that the Iberian peninsula would share some broad ideas about kingship 
and episcopal power with England, since both can be incorporated into the ‘Latinisation’ 
model set out by Robert Bartlett in The Making of Europe. Measured by the spread of 
bishoprics, the expansion of Latin Christendom through the ‘reconquest’ of the Iberian 
peninsula is certainly clear. From a point in the tenth century when they could only be found 
in the Christian foothold of the northern regions, bishoprics spread southward in the eleventh 
and twelfth century in the wake of the reconquest. With the victories of Ferdinand III of 
Castile (1217-52) and James the Conqueror of Aragon (1213-76), sees were created in the 
southern and eastern regions of the peninsula, stopping short only at the Muslim kingdom of 
Granada. The result was ‘quite a dense network’ of sees – fifty-one by 1300, on average about 
1.4 times the avergae size of those in England.3 However, these facts obscure a more complex 
picture, and not a happy one for the Iberian churches. In Castile, in particular, the financial 
demands of the reconquering kings had left the Castilian bishops on the edge of bankruptcy.4 
New bishoprics in the south struggled to support themselves due to the dire economic 
situation created by the speed and structural imbalance of the reconquest; between Las 
Navas, in 1212, and the capture of Seville, in 1248, Christian territory had increased by fifty 
per cent but the population by only ten per cent, leaving much of the land with a shortage of 
labour.5 Moreover, the papacy permitted – or at least was unable to prevent – Castilian kings 
taking huge liberties with ecclesiastical rights and property. As leaders of the reconquest, 
kings felt entitled to interfere openly in elections, to use ecclesiastical benefices to endow 
their infantes and to extract the tercias (the third of the tithe reserved for the fabric of 
churches) as if it were a normal part of royal income.6  Moreover, few of those bishops who 
had footed the bill were granted land from the reconquered areas, meaning they could not 
recoup their investment. In short, ‘they had been the victims of an enormous confidence-
trick.’7 The new bishoprics created after the conquest of Seville were awarded to servants of 
the royal court who spent almost no time in their sees.8 The reconquest might have added to 
the glory of the Iberian kings but it only weakened the peninsula’s churches. Although they 
                                                          
3 R. Bartlett, The Making of Europe (1993), 11-13. 
4 P. A. Linehan, ‘The Gravamina of the Castilian Church in 1262-3’, EHR 85 (1970), 730-54. 
5 P. A. Linehan, The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1971), 101-27, 
esp. 106. 
6 Linehan, Spanish Church, 108-112. The tercias had been granted to Fernando III by Innocent IV in 
1247 to aid the Seville campaign.  
7 Linehan, Spanish Church, 113-16.  
8 Linehan, Spanish Church, 113-14, 17.  
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now covered a wider territory, they were largely choked by the grasp of their demanding 
kings.  
 
Even so, contact between the papacy and the peninsula meant that the sharing of ideas 
about royal and episcopal power might be possible. The degree of papal interest in the 
peninsula is demonstrated by the registration of over 400 letters relating to Iberia in Innocent 
III’s registers.9 In return, a substantial contingent of Iberian bishops attended the Fourth 
Lateran Council (six from Braga, six from Compostela, five from Toledo and six from 
Tarragona).10 At the Council of Lyons in 1245, bishops from the peninsula made up the largest 
group. Meanwhile, Alfonso Henriques of Portugal (1128-85) and Pedro II of Aragon had 
looked to the papacy as a source of royal power, offering their kingdoms as papal fiefs in 
return for confirmation of their titles. For Stephen Lay, this appeal for papal approval shows 
how much Portugal was part of the Bartlett model, by which ‘as a result of this increased 
communication there gradually emerged among European and Iberian Christians a sense of 
commonality, of an identity based on shared faith and through it a shared culture.’11  
 
However, there were many variables in the relationship between royal, episcopal and 
papal power that resulted in real differences between England and the Iberian peninsula. 
Firstly, the two regions did not experience as similar a relationship with the thirteenth-
century papacy as first appears. At twenty-two, Iberian episcopal attendance at the IV Lateran 
Council might seem high but in reality this represented only about half of the forty-one sees in 
existence by 1200. Archbishop Sparago of Tarragona (1215-33) did not attend, whilst 
Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo did so only in order to pursue his cherished dream of Toledan 
primacy.12 Neither showed any interest in disseminating the decrees of the council on their 
return.13 The involvement of English bishops in the Fourth Lateran Council began 
inauspiciously following the unrest of 1215. Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, was 
suspended from office on papal orders before he could depart, meaning that his role at the 
council was limited.14  Nine English bishops attended the Council, about half of the total 
                                                          
9 Bartlett, Making of Europe, 249. 
10 Atlas of Medieval Europe, ed. D. Ditchburn, S. Maclean and A. Mackay (2nd ed., London, 2007), 175.  
11 S. Lay, The Reconquest Kings of Portugal: Political and Cultural Reorientation on the Medieval Frontier 
(Basingstoke, 2009), 3-4.  
12P. A. Linehan, History and the Historians of Medieval Spain (Oxford, 1993), 278. 
13 T. N. Bisson, The Medieval Crown of Aragon: A Short History(Oxford, 1986), 73. 
14 Vincent ‘Stephen Langton’, at 65. 
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episcopate, the relatively small number due to the fact that three sees were vacant and four 
bishops remained in England.15 Yet,  the enthusiastic dissemination of the Council’s decrees 
was a marked feature of English episcopal culture in the thirteenth century, as returning 
bishops issued their own diocesan statutes from which their successors borrowed.16 The 
absence of such activity in the Iberian peninsula has obvious implications for clerical reform 
and the promotion of pastoral care, but it also helped to set the Iberian episcopates along a 
very different path to that of their English counterparts in the role they would play in regnal 
politics. The pivotal difference between the two groups was the holding of ecclesiastical 
councils. In England, ecclesiastical assemblies at regnal, provincial and diocesan levels  were a 
common feature and forged an English episcopate with a collective identity and interest. The 
regularity of provincial and regnal assemblies in particular created an episcopate ready and 
willing to take part in regnal affairs. In the Iberian peninsula this was just not the case. 
 
Provincial and regnal organisation: leadership and unity 
There was a fundamental difference between ecclesiastical organisation in England and the 
Iberian peninsula: in the latter, provincial boundaries were not coterminous with regnal ones. 
In England, the clergy of the provinces of York and Canterbury could identify their interests 
with those of the kingdom. In the peninsula matters were far more complicated, a result of the 
reconquest and a deliberate reorganisation by Innocent III. Innocent aimed to create a supra-
regnal episcopate which, unbeholden to regnal divisions, could unite secular leaders in 
pursuit of the crusade.17 The province of Tarragona, resurrected by pope Anastasius IV in 
1154, already reached across the entire north-east corner of the peninsula, bringing the 
bishops of Catalonia and Aragon (regions formally united as the Crown of Aragon in 1137), 
the kingdom of Navarre and (after the conquests of James I in the 1230s) Valencia, under the 
                                                          
15 The bishops who went to Rome were: Stephen Langton (archbishop of Canterbury), Benedict of 
Sawston (Rochester), Hugh of Wells (Lincoln), William of Cornhill (Coventry), Simon of Apulia (Exeter), 
Richard Poore (Chichester), Walter Gray (Worcester), Robert of York (elect of Ely), Pandulf (elect of 
Norwich); the vacant sees were Carlisle, Durham and Hereford; the bishops of Bath, London, Salisbury 
and Winchester did not attend (C&S, 48).  
16 See, for instance, the statutes of Richard Poore of Salisbury issued 1219x1228 (reissued 1228x1236 
after his translation to Durham) (C&S, 57-96); Langton’s provincial statutes of 1222 (C&S, 100-25); 
‘Synodal statutes of an English diocese’ 1222x1225 (C&S, 139-54); Langton’s synodal statutes of 
1222x1228 (C&S, 165-67) and the numerous other diocesan statutes contained in C&S. For discussion, 
see C.R. Cheney, ‘The Earliest English Diocesan Statutes’, EHR 75 (1960), 1-29. 
17 Lay, Reconquest Kings, 190-92. 
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authority of the Catalan archbishopric.18 To the south-west of Tarragona, the extensive 
province of Toledo  dominated the Castilian heartland, incorporating the southern regions 
that had been won from the Muslims at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 and Cordoba in 1236, 
before terminating abruptly at the Muslim kingdom of Granada at its southern borders. To the 
north of Toledo the diocese of Burgos, clinging to the central north coast, resided in the 
territory of the king of Castile but remained exempt from the metropolitan authority of 
Toledo, answering only to Rome. So too did its neighbours to the west, Oviedo and León,  
covering the eastern half of the kingdom of León that had been united with Castile in 1230. 
Santiago de Compostela was, like Toledo, an archiepiscopal see, though fractured by Innocent 
III’s reorganisations; her heartland huddled in the north-west corner of the peninsula, girt by 
the Atlantic to the north and west and the Province of Braga to the east and south, separated 
from the body of her province by hundreds of kilometres. The provinces of Braga and Santiago 
represented the most dramatic results of Innocent’s work; whilst the borders of the 
peninsula’s western kingdoms ran north to south, their boundaries now ran along a south-
west to north-east  axis. The archbishop of Braga retained jurisdiction over a north-western 
shard of Portugal but his authority now reached up through the kingdom of León as far as the 
coast. He had lost, though, vast swathes of the Portuguese kingdom, which Innocent had 
declared part of the province of Santiago. The suffragan sees  of the ‘Leónese’ province of 
Santiago now sprawled across the three kingdoms, at least until the combination of León and 
Castile in 1230. To the south, the archiepiscopal province of Seville curled around the south 
west coast of the peninsula, incorporating the southern tip of Portugal and pushing 
confidently into Andalucia up to the borders of Granada. Finally, the diocese of Cartogena sat 
on the Murcian south-east coast between Granada and the province of Tarragona, exempt 
from metropolitan authority, while the see of Palma on the island of Mallorca, the result of 
James I’s conquest of the island in 1229, also answered directly to Rome.  
 
Innocent’s Iberian policy, combined with the piecemeal extension of the crusading 
kingdoms, had resulted in a configuration of provincial territories that bore not even a passing 
resemblance to a map of the peninsula’s political regions. Before 1199, the kingdom of Castile 
could be identified with the province of Toledo, Tarragona with Aragon, León with 
                                                          
18 The recreation of Tarragona along the lines of the Visigothic province in 1154 did help to give 
coherence to the territories of the count of Barcelona and severed the region from the ecclesiastical 
scope of the Narbonensis, contributing to the formation of the crown of Aragon (P. A. Linehan, Spain, 




Compostela, Portugal with Braga. Now, only Castile retained some semblance of a ‘regnal’ 
episcopate. This had been Innocent’s objective, the hope being that the reorganisation would 
lessen the hold of kings on episcopates and also encourage bishops to act in the interest of the 
peninsula as a whole. The result, however, was that while Iberian kings – particularly the king 
of Castile – kept the bishops within their kingdom under their hand, those bishops were not 
encouraged to meet and consider regnal issues collectively.  The one potential exception was 
the province of Toledo, whose archbishop alone remained capable of convening provincial 
assemblies to consider regnal issues in the manner of his Visigothic forebears and his 
counterparts in England.19  
 
The archbishop of Toledo, however, was not in a strong position to take a leading role 
in the fate of the kingdom or to create a strong position for his episcopate in relation to royal 
power. Firstly, a long-standing wrangle over the primacy of Spain staggered on well in to the 
thirteenth century. Rodrigo of Toledo (1209-47) devoted much of his time and energy to 
cultivating the claims of his province to Iberian primacy, only to be thwarted by Innocent III 
who, as part of his policy of creating a supra-regnal episcopate, was unwilling to allow any 
prelate too much personal authority within the peninsula.20 As Peter Linehan points out, the 
sort of squabbles that had marked the contest between York and Canterbury in the twelfth 
century were still alive in Castile far into the thirteenth, where ‘peripatetic archbishops, 
wherever they went, left a trail of cruz alzada [raised cross] disputes behind them’. This left 
the archbishop of Toledo and his fellow archbishops in a weakened position in relation to the 
king. The long-standing squabble that in 1260 brought the archbishops of Toledo and Seville 
toe to toe before the Cortes of Seville only ‘served to increase ecclesiastical divisions on the 
eve of a great political assembly and thereby assisted the king to divide the bishops and rule 
the Church.’21 By the thirteenth century, the provinces of York and Canterbury had long put 
their differences behind them and moved on to self-confident displays of episcopal unity in 
the face of royal demands. In 1252, as we saw in the previous chapter, Henry III had been 
struggling to obtain consent from the clergy for an aid to support his proposed crusade and 
                                                          
19 For the historic role of the province of Toledo as a ‘regnal’ episcopate, see Nelson, ‘National Synods’, 
46-7. 
20 Linehan, History and the Historians, chapter 9: ‘Aspects of the Twelfth Century, II’, 268-312; Lay, 
Reconquest Kings, 192. 
21 P. A. Linehan, ‘Ecclesiastics and the Cortes of Castile and León’ in Las Cortes de Castilla y León en la 
Edad Media: actas de la primera etapa del Congreso científico sobre la historia de las Cortes de Castilla 
y León (Valladolid, 1988), vol. II, 99-141, reprinted in P. A. Linehan, Past and Present in Medieval Spain 
(Aldershot, 1992), III, 126. 
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so, chancing his hand with a ploy of ‘divide and conquer’, had summoned the provinces to 
meet separately. The archbishop of York and his suffragans were having none of it and made 
clear to the king the reasons why:  
‘since the aforesaid business touches the whole English Church, and in such shared 
enterprises it is customary to hold discussion between the clergy of both provinces, 
namely  of York and Canterbury, before a certain response is given, they do not believe 
that it is right or fitting to cease doing things in this way; and therefore with such a 
discussion omitted they delay their response; when such a discussion has been held, 
they will respond, as they assert, according to what God has given to them, with the 
utility of the Church, yourself, and our kingdom having been considered 
communally.’22 
The contrast between the self-conscious, assertive supra-provincial unity of the English 
bishops and the fractious bickering of the Iberian metropolitans could not be more striking, 
nor could the resulting disparity in the bargaining power of the episcopates with their 
respective kings.  
 
Meetings of Councils and Synods and episcopalis unanimitas 
As the manoeuvres of the archbishop of York in 1252 suggested, English episcopal unity had 
been forged over many years in the meetings of councils and synods.23 This was not a recent 
phenomenon. Janet Nelson has described its importance in the politics of early medieval 
Europe; it was what Hincmar had called ‘episcopalis unanimitas’.24 The holding of regular 
‘regnal’ ecclesiastical councils forged a collective episcopal identity, since: 
‘by their very existence, they provided a definite organization for the whole episcopal 
group... Repeated meetings over time, collective action, and the articulation of 
common concerns fostered a conscious solidarity on the part of the bishops, and a 
sense of responsibility for the leadership of their whole society within the wider 
Church of Christendom.’25  
In the thirteenth century, the holding of regular synods was, in England at least, spurred by 
the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, canon six of which decreed that provincial councils 
should be convened annually by archbishops in order ‘to consider diligently and in the fear of 
God the correction of excesses and the reform of morals, especially in the clergy, reciting the 
canonical rules (particularly those laid down by the present general council) to secure their 
                                                          
22 ‘cum dictum negotium totam tangat ecclesiam Anglicanam, ac in talibus communis inter clerum 
utriusque provincie, Eboracensis videlicet et Cantuariensis, consueverit tractatus haberi antequam certum 
daretur responsum, a modo illo recedere non credunt esse congruum vel honestum; et ideo pretermisso 
tali tractatu differunt respondere, quo habito, respondebunt, ut asserunt, secundum quod dederit eis deus, 
ecclesie, vestris, et regni nostri utilitatibus communiter ponderatis’ (C&S, 450). 
23 See chapter on Meetings of English clergy. 
24 Nelson, ‘National Synods’, 47. 
25 Nelson, ‘National Synods’, 43-44. 
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observance, inflicting on transgressors the punishment due’.26 The councils envisaged by the 
IV Lateran Council might look different from those early medieval regnal assemblies 
described by Nelson, being convened by archbishops rather than kings and in order to 
consider ecclesiastical reform rather than regnal issues. In England, though, regular provincial 
councils functioned in complement to regular regnal assemblies in drawing together 
significant numbers of senior clergy. Moreover, in reality there was often no clear distinction. 
A provincial meeting still had the potential to take on regnal characteristics, especially when 
convened by the primate of the kingdom. In England, for instance, Archbishop Langton 
convened the province of Canterbury in 1222 at a time of regnal unrest; although the canons 
of the Fourth Lateran Council were indeed promulgated, the second canon applied 
ecclesiastical censure to ensure ‘the peace and tranquillity of the lord king and the kingdom’.27 
Conversely, councils of the clergy convened by the king to discuss the granting of tax could 
quickly be turned into discussions about threats to ecclesiastical liberty, as the numerous 
schedules of complaint penned during the English meetings of the 1250s showed. What 
mattered for the forging of episcopal identity was the fact of meeting and meeting regularly on 
a significant scale, under strong archiepiscopal leadership.28  
  
In Toledo, however, the regular assembly of clergy under the leadership of the 
archbishop was totally lacking. The blame for this deficiency, in the opinion of Peter Linehan, 
lay indubitably with archbishop Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada (1208-47). Since his 
archiepiscopate stretched across thirty-nine years, his apparent failure to hold a single 
provincial council set a powerful precedent for archiepiscopal inactivity. Despite the 
haranguing he received from both Honorius III and Gregory IX for his failure to implement the 
Lateran decrees, as well as the concerted efforts of John of Abbeville, sent as legate in 1228 to 
spur Iberian churchmen into action, Rodrigo remained apathetic, consumed by his campaign 
for Toledan primacy and hamstrung by his ‘tendency to kowtow to the King’.29  
 
If a tradition of regular provincial meetings had not been established by the time of 
archbishop Rodrigo’s death in 1247, its genesis was unlikely to come any time in the next 
                                                          
26 EHD, 648. 
27 C&S, 106-07. 
28 Nelson, ‘National Synods’, 45-6. 
29 The failure of archbishop Rodrigo is a theme of Linehan, Spanish Church, chapters 1-3 in extensio; P. 
A. Linehan, ‘Councils and Synods in Thirteenth-Century Castile and Aragon’, Studies in Church History 7, 
ed. G. J. Cuming and D. Baker (Cambridge, 1971), 101-11, at 106-07. 
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thirty years. Alfonso X, who succeeded to the throne of León-Castile in 1252, clearly did not 
intend that any sort of ecclesiastical unity should develop, lest it be turned against him. So 
much became clear in 1279, when pope Nicholas III, free to take action against Alfonso 
following the demise of the king’s imperial claims, dispatched bishop Pietro of Rieti as legate 
to Castile in order to confront the king with the accusations of certain Leónese and Castilian 
prelates.30 The episcopal gravamina criticised the king for various infringements of 
ecclesiastical liberty and complained that: 
‘prelates and chapters of the his land are not free to meet and discuss the aforesaid 
matters or any other grievances which afflict them and other ecclesiastical persons 
and have done for some time, nor are they free to leave the kingdom or to take money 
outside the kingdom for the various necessities that occur’31 
 
The behaviour of the Toledan clergy during the earlier half of Alfonso’s reign would 
seem to support this accusation. Some episcopal meetings were held, although evidence is 
patchy,32 but bishops were careful to tiptoe around royal rights and power. In January 1257, 
Archbishop Sancho I of Toledo convened a council at Alcalá de Henares. Only one decree 
survives, proclaiming an intention to convene councils twice yearly thereafter, yet ‘saving the 
right and dominion of the lord king’. There is no evidence that the aim of holding biannual 
councils was every fulfilled. Royal rights were similarly untouched by the enactments of a 
council held at Burgos in  1261. Some complaint was made against the king’s seizure of 
ecclesiastical property during vacancies, when archbishop Sancho II convened his suffragans 
at Brihuega six years later. No action was taken against the king, however; although sentence 
of excommunication was invoked, the bishops were careful that the king should not feel 
threatened. In any case, Alfonso had received an assurance from Pope Alexander IV in 1259 
                                                          
30 These complaints were not led by the archbishop of Toledo, since the see had been vacant since 1275. 
The complaints were submitted by archbishop Gonzalo García of Compostela (who had been in exile 
since Alfonso had taken a dim view of his appointment by Gregory X in 1272) and bishop Martín 
Fernández of León (also in exile since a dispute with Alfonso): P. Linehan, ‘The Spanish Church 
Revisited: the Episcopal Gravamina of 1279’, in B.Tierney and P. A. Linehan (eds.), Authority and Power. 
Studies on Medieval Law and Government Presented to Walter Ullman on his Seventieth Birthday, 
(Cambridge, 1980), 127-47, at 132; Linehan, Spanish Church, 140. For the complaints of the archbishop 
of Compostela and the bishop of León against the king’s treatment of the Church, see: Linehan, 
‘Episcopal Gravamina 1279’, 141-47. 
31 ‘prelatis et capitulis terre sue non est liberum convenire ut tractarent de premissis at aliis gravaminibus 
quae ipsis et aliis personis ecclesiasticis pro tempore inferuntur, nec exire extra regnum vel extrahere inde 
pecuniam pro necessitatibus variis que occurrunt etiam de bonis ecclesiasticis acquisitam libere 
permittuntur’ (Linehan, ‘Episcopal Gravamina 1279’, 146). 
32 The following evidence of episcopal councils in the early years of Alfonso’s reign is drawn from J. F. 
O’Callaghan, The Learned King: The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile (Philadelphia, 1993), 53.  
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that he and his family could be excommunicated by nobody save the pope himself.33  Three 
meetings –  of the province of Santiago and  the dioceses of Zamora and León respectively – 
were convened in the 1260s for the purpose of implementing ecclesiastical reform, though 
they did not touch on royal rights.34  As Joseph O’Callaghan argues, there was not as 
comprehensive a ‘blackout’ of episcopal activity as Linehan suggests, since ‘at least in the first 
half of the reign a few bishops tried to effect reform by summoning councils.’35 Yet the 
sporadic nature of this activity and the timidity  of episcopal decrees regarding royal policy 
testify that, even in the earlier years of Alfonso’s reign, the bishops  were certainly not a 
united force and acted in fear of royal rancour.  
 
Alfonso’s behaviour in the later years of his reign served to justify episcopal fears and 
confirm the allegation made to the pope in 1279 about the king’s aggressive stance against the 
convening of ecclesiastical assemblies. In 1272, at the Cortes of Burgos, the nobility had 
formed a concerted opposition against the king to complain about his excessive demands for 
taxation. When the prelates present took the opportunity to voice their complaints, Alfonso 
became so angry that he threatened to expel all of the bishops from the kingdom. His hand 
was only stilled by the fear of losing papal support for his imperial ambitions.36 The king’s 
aggressive stance goes a long way to explaining the lack of ecclesiastical assemblies in Toledo 
– and perhaps other regions under Alfonso’s heavy hand – in the generation that followed 
archbishop Rodrigo. After Alfonso’s death the Iberian prelates made little headway in uniting 
to strengthen their position. Archbishop Rodrigo of Compostela and fourteen bishops of León 
and Galicia met at Salamanca in 1310, to form a hermandad in defence of ecclesiastical liberty, 
reaffirmed the next year.37 These, however, were cowed bishops, careful to state emphatically 
that their meeting would not result in the use of ecclesiastical sanctions against the royal 
                                                          
33 O’Callaghan, Learned King, 56-7. 
34 By Archbishop Juan Arias of Santiago sometime between 1259 and 1267; the date of the council held 
by Bishop Suero Pérez of Zamora at Toro is unknown; Bishop Martín Fernández of León held a council 
at León either in October 1262 or May 1267, at which sixty-seven decrees were promulgated 
(O’Callaghan, Learned King, 53). 
35 O’Callaghan, Learned King, 53.  
36 Crónica del Rey don Alfonso X, given in J. F. O’Callaghan, ‘The Ecclesiastical Estate in the Cortes of 
León-Castile, 1252-1350,’ Catholic Historical Review 67 (1981), 185-213, at 194; J.F. O’Callaghan, ‘Paths 
to Ruin: The Economic and Financial Policies of Alfonso the Learned’, in R.I. Burns, S.J. (ed.), The Worlds 
of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror: Intellect and Force in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1985), 
41-67, at 58- 59. 
37 O’Callaghan, ‘The Ecclesiastical Estate’, 202-03. 
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families of León-Castile and Portugal.38 With no tradition of collective action and little sense of 
collective identity, the attempts of the bishops within the kingdom of León-Castile to lever 
themselves into a more powerful position in relation to the king were altogether lame.39  
 
The contrast between Toledo and Tarragona in the holding of provincial councils is 
one emphasised by Peter Linehan, for Tarragona enjoyed the leadership of ‘the very 
antithesis’ of archbishop Rodrigo.40 Pedro de Albalat (1238-50) was a vigorous reformer. He 
held ten provincial councils during his archiepiscopate and only failed to hold an annual 
meeting in 1241 and 1245 when he was absent attending general councils of the Church.41  
The central feature of Pedro’s programme was the implementation of the decrees of the 
Fourth Lateran Council in general and an end to clerical concubinage and unsanctioned 
marriage within the forbidden degrees in particular, as well as his own provisions supporting 
the mendicant orders and promoting the struggle against heresy.42 He also disseminated 
throughout his province a liber sinodalis he had written with the assistance of Raymond of 
Peñafort, issued at a sede vacante synod at Barcelona in October 1241, that provided teaching 
on the Sacraments and the instruction of the faithful.43 As well as providing for pastoral 
reform, however, the regular meeting of councils provided the Tarragonese episcopate with 
some sense of their collective weight. In 1250, a meeting of the province’s prelates was 
convened at Alcañiz in response to the treatment dealt out to Bishop Pedro Ximénez of 
Pamplona by the king of Navarre, which resulted in a decision to pronounce sentence of 
excommunication against the king.44 This sort of collective action allowed the province to 
defend its interests in the face of pressure from the king of Aragon too, protecting its 
endowments in the newly-conquered territory.45  
 
Too much emphasis on the archiepiscopate of Pedro de Albalat is misleading, 
however, since his twelve year archiepiscopate was an island in a sea of apathy. Pedro’s 
predecessor, archbishop Sparago (1215-33) had not even attended the Fourth Lateran 
Council and displayed little interest in reform until he was berated by the legate, Jean of 
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Abbeville.46 Although he had ‘allowed himself to be dragooned into action by the legate’, the 
resulting provincial council held in 1230 attracted the attendance of only four of his eleven 
suffragans.47 After Sparago’s death a five year election dispute left the Tarragonese Church 
leaderless until the election of Pedro.48 Archbishop Benito de Rocaberti, Pedro’s successor, 
was equally lax, earning a strong reprimand from Alexander IV in May 1252. In the words of 
Peter Linehan, it ‘was a negative achievement of no small order to have presided over the 
spiritual shipwreck of the Aragonese Church and to have reduced it to the state of that of 
Castile, and all within a decade of the death of Pedro de Albalat.’49 Even if Pedro’s energy had 
created some nascent feeling of collective identity among the Tarragonese episcopate and a 
notion of its united strength, it would starve without regular feeding. The Tarragonese Church 
needed a succession of Pedros in order to continue the process of improving its position in 
relation to the king. This was something that the Church of Canterbury provided in England 
with the succession of Langton, Edmund of Abingdon and Boniface of Savoy. This the Iberian 
provinces signally lacked. 
 
The utilisation of episcopal unity  
Regular meetings of the episcopate created a collective consciousness that would dictate the 
role of the episcopate in regnal affairs. This collective consciousness encompassed the 
episcopal desire for a strong monarch who would rule justly in the interests of Church and 
kingdom, who could be corrected by the episcopate if he erred or, if that was not possible, 
removed from power. Episcopates in England and the Iberian peninsula directed their energy 
towards several sorts of action in service of these interests, at times under archiepiscopal 
command or, if that was lacking, legatine leadership.  
 
The need for a strong king and peaceful kingdom was paramount, since the clergy 
needed a monarch who was capable of acting as the secular arm for the enforcement of 
ecclesiastical decrees as well as protecting ecclesiastical rights and property from the 
encroachment of lay magnates. This much was made explicit in the English coronation, when 
the archbishop would present regalia and anoint the would-be monarch after the latter swore 
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to defend the Church and her clergy.50 The provision of strong monarchy had been a demand 
of many early medieval regnal Church synods, as at Hohenaltheim in 916 when the episcopate 
legislated ‘for the strength of our kings’ (de robore nostrorum regum) in an attempt to bolster 
their defences against infringements by lay magnates as well as ‘a more general fragmentation 
of authority’ that could undermine their position.51  
 
Similar action was a feature of episcopal activity at several moments of uncertainty in 
England and the Iberian peninsula in the twelfth and thirteenth century, sometimes resulting 
from an insular initiative and other times under the direction of the papacy. Two instances 
when episcopates acted under legatine direction for the strengthening of the king and royal 
power occurred in royal minorities: in Aragon, in 1214, and England, in 1216-17. Both realms 
were papal fiefs and so both young kings came under papal protection.52 Pedro II had 
renewed the subjection of Aragon to the papacy in 1204 and, in 1213 with a five-year-old King 
James in the custody of Simon de Montfort at Carcassonne, a delegation of Catalan nobles had 
conceded wardship to the pope.53 In his Llibre dels Fets, James fondly remembered Innocent 
III as his saviour, for he ‘was the best pope, so much so that from the time that we compose 
this book going back a hundred years there has not been so good a  pope in the Church of 
Rome... And he sent such forceful letters and such forceful envoys to Count Simon that he had 
to agree to return us [the young James] to our people.’54 James did not recall in his auto-
biography the leading role played by the papal legate dispatched by Innocent, Pierre de Douai, 
who arranged the regency and summoned a great council of Aragonese and Catalan prelates, 
barons and townsmen to Lérida in 1214. Pierre imposed revised statutes of the ‘Peace of 
Catalonia’, to which all men above the age of fourteen had to swear.55 The older James did 
recall, however, the prominent part played by Aspàreg de la Barca, the bishop of Pamplona 
(1212-15) and later Archbishop of Tarragona (1215-31), his kinsmen, at this crucial point in 
                                                          
50 See the twelfth-century coronation ordo, given by Schulz, ‘Bracton on Kingship’, 137; also the 
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51 Nelson, ‘National Synods’, 44, 48. 
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the assembly. The bishop held the boy king in the crook of his arm, lifting him up to display 
him to the assembled crowd, at which point ‘they all swore to us that they would defend our 
body and our members and our land, and that they would defend us in all things and above all 
things.’56 For Thomas Bisson, this event was crucial to the salvation of the kingdom, for it was 
‘of transcendent social solemnity, the liminal phase of a historic rite de passage. Some of the 
men convoked were in revolt, many were disgruntled, yet all were exalted through 
deliberately refashioned ritual to a new level of political solidarity’.57 The actions of the legate 
and bishop of Pamplona at the assembly at Lérida were crucial in securing the kingdom for 
the young James. 
 
A similar role was played in England by Guala Biccieri during the first two years of 
Henry III’s minority. Like Aragon, England was a papal fief, having been granted to the papacy 
by King John in 1213. Like the Catalan nobles who realised they needed all the help they could 
get, John had asked the pope to protect the underage heir.58 Like Pierre de Douai, Guala took 
the lead in bolstering the young king’s position symbolically with the help of the local 
episcopate, in this case presiding over Henry’s coronation at Gloucester, where he probably 
had the bishop of Winchester crown the king in the absence of the archbishop of Canterbury.59 
With Stephen Langton abroad at the papal court, Guala led the English episcopate; seven 
bishops at least were with him at the coronation while eleven joined the council called at 
Bristol a month later.60 The rallying of the English episcopate under Guala’s leadership 
doubtless was due in part to the sentence of excommunication pronounced by the papacy 
against Louis’s invading army;61 though the comparison with Aragon, as well as the Synod of 
Segovia discussed below, does show how keenly episcopates felt the threat posed to the 
kingdom as a whole, as well as to the rights and property of the Church, by civil war. Peace, 
stability and a strong king were inestimably preferable to civil disturbance and, confronted 
with this sort of threat, bishops were prepared to rally for concerted action.  
 
 In the Iberian peninsula, the only significant demonstration of episcopal action in 
support of royal power came before the period in consideration, at the Synod of Segovia in 
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1166. Like the instances in Aragon and England in the early thirteenth century, the Synod of 
Segovia represented the coming together of the bishops of a threatened kingdom to bolster a 
young, vulnerable king. Unlike those assemblies held in the early days of the reigns of James I 
and Henry III, however,  this one was not summoned by a papal legate but was convened on 
the initiative of the native episcopate. With the accession of a two-year old Alfonso VIII, Castile 
was threatened by the ambitions of the young king’s uncle, the incursions of Fernando II of 
León (who held Toledo through  Fernando Rodríguez de Castro), the unrest of Castilian nobles 
and a possible invasion by the Almohads.62 Faced with such dire prospects for king and 
kingdom, the bishops of the kingdom of Castile were stirred to action. Led by Jean de 
Castellmorum, archbishop of Toledo (1152-66), the bishops of Burgos, Calahorra, Osma, Ávila, 
Segovia and Sigüenza assembled at Segovia in mid-March 1166.63 The measures they took 
were extraordinary. Using threat of excommunication and interdict, the bishops ordered all 
men holding an honour of the king to appear before the octaves of the coming Easter to do 
homage to him. Absolution could only be given for those failing to comply on the say-so of the 
king or the archbishop of Toledo. Strikingly, not only those holding honours of the king but all 
men of the kingdom were compelled, again under threat of excommunication and interdict, to 
appear in defence of the king and kingdom if invasion threatened. Whoever did appear would 
enjoy the remittance of enjoined penance as if he were going to Jerusalem. Meanwhile, anyone 
making war within the kingdom was to be excommunicated and denied Christian burial.64  
 
Much about the Synod of Segovia is remarkable, not least the unified action of an 
episcopate which, for the one and only time in this period, can be called ‘Castilian’. Collective 
action, as we have seen, was not a conspicuous feature of the bishops of Toledo, yet here it 
was applied to forceful effect. Describing  themselves emphatically as ‘bishops of the kingdom 
of King Alfonso’, the bishops confronted what they had clearly identified as a regnal crisis and 
‘momentarily played a role in national affairs unparalleled since before 711’.65 They were not 
to do so again, perhaps because the circumstances never warranted it, for in 1166 the 
Castilian monarch faced an unusually potent threat. It is perhaps significant, though, that the 
Toledan bishops seem to have retained no memory of the event (Rodrigo of Toledo, when 
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writing his History in the 1240s, was apparently unaware of it).66 This flash of episcopal unity 
soon faded into obscurity. 
 
The comparable use of ecclesiastical sanctions and proffer of crusade indulgences in 
England testifies to the readiness of regnal episcopates (if only temporarily ‘regnal’ in the case 
of Castile) to respond vigorously when faced with the prospect of a kingdom in complete 
turmoil. In England in the first turbulent years of Henry III’s minority, the legate Guala had 
applied the papal sentence of excommunication against the invading army and also turned the 
war against prince Louis into a crusade. Exceeding his mandate from Honorius III to suspend 
the crusading vows of the young king’s supporters, he granted them remission of their sins 
and signed them with the cross. There was no doubt (at least in the mind of the ‘Barnwell’ 
chronicler) that this was a crusade and that Louis’ supporters were legitimate targets, 
meaning  that ‘those who once called themselves the army of God, and boasted that they 
fought for the liberties of the Church and the kingdom, were reputed to be the sons of Belial 
and compared to infidels.’67 If Guala’s actions here had not provoked fresh desertions from 
Louis’s camp, they had at least ‘stimulated the morale of the Henricians... [and] confirmed and 
strengthened... the decision to desert Louis.’68 Sentence of excommunication was also used 
again in England after the legate’s departure to strengthen the position of the king, this time 
by the archbishop of Canterbury. In 1222, Stephen Langton responded to rumours of plots to 
break the peace of the kingdom and the prospect of the justiciar’s armed response by 
summoning a great council. Moved to act (so one chronicler records) by his pity for the youth 
and weakness of the king, in concert with his suffragans he threatened excommunication 
against those threatening the peace.69 Three months later, Langton used the statutes of his 
provincial council at Oxford to pronounce sentence of excommunication against breakers of 
the peace.70 Episcopal unity and the concerted action it produced to strengthen royal power 
was a powerful weapon in times of crisis.  
 
However, as well as being utilised to strengthen the king in turbulent periods, 
episcopal unity could also be directed towards his correction when it was royal behaviour 
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that caused unrest in the kingdom. The mutually supportive nature of these directives 
developed in early medieval synods, for  ‘when kings were weak, bishops rallied to their 
support – but with their own idea of how kings should function. National synods provided the 
organization and operation means, synodal statements the ideology, which underpinned 
episcopal attempts to capture the commanding heights of the political structure.’71 As 
discussed in chapter one, in addition to the Scriptural precedent for clerical oversight of 
kingship the involvement of the episcopate in royal anointing provided grounds for the 
bishops’ correction of the king. For the ‘liturgical affinity of royal anointing was with the 
Christian initiation... The purpose of royal anointing too was to ‘make a new man’ of the 
unworthy candidate... The aim of the anointers was not simply to exalt the king, but at the 
same time to condition and, when necessary, to control his action’.72 As a bishop was subject 
to the ‘fatherly correctio’ of his consecrators, so the king would be subject to the episcopate.73  
 
The role of anointing as the constitutive act of royal coronation was therefore 
significant in the relationship between episcopates and kings across early medieval Europe. In 
Chapter One, we saw how English bishops in the thirteenth century intervened when the king 
transgressed, drawing on the symbolic capital provided by their role as consecrators to 
‘remake’ the king. This resource was simply not available to Iberian bishops as a tool for 
correcting royal behaviour, for in the thirteenth century at least Iberian kings were not 
anointed. In Castile, in fact, apart from the single recorded act of anointing in the fourteenth 
century (at the coronation of Alfonso XI in 1332), there was only one recorded act of 
coronation following that of the emperor Alfonso VII: that of Sancho IV in 1284.74 Even in the 
coronation the ‘function [of churchmen was] essentially decorative’.75 According to the 
account of Rodrigo of Toledo, who witnessed events in 1214 and 1217, the constitutive acts of 
king-making for Enrique I and Fernando III were acclamation, homage and fealty.76 Alfonso X 
(1252-84) seems to have been considered ‘dei gratia rex’  through hereditary right from the 
moment of his accession, without the need for any sort of coronation, let alone anointing.77 It 
is unlikely that coronation and anointing took place and went unrecorded, since the lack of 
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such ceremony was even noticed and remarked upon by Gerald of Wales: ‘Yet the rulers of the 
Scots, who are called kings, just as the rulers of Spain are so called, are not by custom crowned 
or anointed.’78 In contrast, all English rulers since the Conquest had not been considered king 
until crowned and anointed in Westminster Abbey. This custom continued until 1272, when 
necessity dictated that custom be broken. By arrangement made prior to his departure on 
crusade, the lord Edward was considered king immediately following his father’s death, even 
though he was absent from the kingdom.79  
 
Although, as Gerald of Wales noted, neither the kings of Spain and the kings of 
Scotland were crowned or anointed, only the latter sought to establish anointing as part of 
king-making.80 The kings of Castile were content without it and, indeed, probably encouraged 
the implication that they were unbeholden to clerical power. The possibility of anointing and 
the episcopal involvement it entailed does not seem to have occurred to the Castilian bishops. 
When Rodrigo of Toledo was writing his History and supplying details of past events where no 
record was available to him, he inevitably ‘opted for something secular’.81 In describing the 
accession of Sancho II in 1072, for instance, he made the would-be king crown himself, before 
being acclaimed and receiving homage, whilst, according to Rodrigo, Alfonso VI simply 
‘accepted the crown of empire’.82 Even given the opportunity to promote the historic role of 
his own office in king-making, the archbishop of Toledo did not grasp the opportunity. Neither 
he, nor in León the archbishop of Compostela, possessed anything like the same role in king-
making as the primates of England.  
 
The same was true of the archbishop of Tarragona and his suffragans in respect to the 
kings of Navarre and Aragon. The former, according to the custom set out in the Fuero general 
de Navarra of 1238 were ‘raised’ on a shield. When Theobald of Champagne, unappreciative of 
local custom, in 1257 submitted a request to the pope that he be made king of Navarre by 
                                                          
78‘Scotorum autem principes, qui et reges dicuntur, sicut et Hispaniae principes, qui nec coronari tamen 
consueverant nec inungi, bonos quidem et sanctos fuisse fama praedicat’ (De principis instructione, given 
by Linehan, History and the Historians, 390 n.19). 
79 Henry III died on 16 Novemeber 1272 and on the following day Edward’s peace was proclaimed in 
Westminster Hall. The magnates of the kingdom swore allegiance to Edward as king during the course 
of Henry’s funeral (M. Morris, A Great and Terrible King: Edward I and the Forging of Britain (London, 
2008), 103-04).  
80 D. Broun, Scottish Independence and the Idea of Britain: From the Picts to Alexander III (Edinburgh, 
2007), 1-2.  
81 Linehan, History and the Historians, 398. 
82 Linehan, History and the Historians, 398. 
100 
 
anointing and crowning, it provoked outrage from his subjects who insisted that ‘raising’ 
remain the constitutive act. Even here, there was only a small role for churchmen.83 It seemed 
at one point that the practice of anointing might be adopted in Aragon when, in 1204, Pedro II 
renewed the subjection of his kingdom to the papacy and, apparently by his own request, was 
anointed by a cardinal and crowned and knighted by the pope.84 At this point Innocent III 
ordered that in future kings of Aragon should be crowned and anointed by the archbishop of 
Tarragona, but the decree was never fulfilled.85 When Pedro’s son, James I, sought support for 
his proposed conquest of Mallorca at the cortes of Barcelona in 1228, he based his claim to 
power and the loyalty of his subjects on the divine grace that facilitated his conception (his 
parents were not fond of each other) and highlighted his position as the sole heir to the 
kingdom, appealing to the bond of ‘natural lordship’ that existed between him and his 
people.86 The concept of ‘natural lordship’ was also important in justifying the rule of kings of 
Castile, where it was stressed in the works produced at the court of Alfonso X, perhaps again 
emphasising the king’s freedom from dependence on ecclesiastics .87 In none of these 
kingdoms did churchmen play a regular or important role in the investment of royal power.  
 
Similarly, Portugal had no tradition of anointing or crowning, though this is perhaps 
not surprising since the royal office was instituted so recently. Although  Afonso Henriques 
had assumed the royal title in 1139, he did not secure papal recognition until 1179.88 Like the 
kings of Castile and Aragon, the Portuguese kings drew authority from their role as leaders of 
crusades. In Portugal, though, displays of strenuitas did not serve merely to amplify royal 
authority by demonstrating that the king was Dei gratia rex (as in Castile and, perhaps, 
Aragon).89 In Portugal, strenuitas was the very foundation of the royal office. In the bull 
Manifestis probatum, Alexander III made it clear that he had awarded Afonso Henriques the 
right to bear the title of king because it ‘has been clearly demonstrated that through military 
action and strenuous effort you have been an intrepid destroyer of the enemies of the name of 
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Christ and a diligent supporter of the Christian faith.’90  When Sancho II failed to prosecute the 
crusade he lost the support of the papacy, with devastating results, as will be discussed below. 
The reconquest allowed Iberian kings the opportunity to renew their authority by 
demonstrating streunitas in their deeds. For the most part, thirteenth-century Iberian 
monarchs were very successful in doing so. The ‘good works’ celebrated by James I in his 
Llibre del Feyts thus not only improved his worth in the eyes of God but also in the eyes of 
men. Just as James recognised that ‘although the circumstances of our birth were good, there 
was need for improvement in our actions’, his position as king by the grace of God through 
hereditary right would need to be continually reinforced through his deeds.91 Although such 
actions needed the support of the episcopate (and, in the case of Castile, a vast amount of 
financial support), ultimate responsibility for their execution resided with the king. With the 
king, then, lay the capacity to create and renew royal power. This meant that Iberian bishops 
were largely excluded from its creation. They did not possess anything like the symbolic 
capital of the archbishop of Canterbury and his suffragans, who were able to draw from their 
unique position as anointers of English king to correct his transgressions and make him anew. 
Consequently the Iberian bishops lacked a powerful tool to check or remake the king.   
 
Drastic action 
With no way of justifying a corrective role, Iberian bishops could only turn to more drastic 
forms of action if a king fell short of expectations. The council of Lyons in 1245 was a hotbed 
of such activity. There, Iberian bishops acted collectively in a way that was not possible within 
the peninsula. Sancho II of Portugal was one of their victims. Accused of infringing 
ecclesiastical liberties and of failing to prosecute the crusade, Sancho was pronounced rex 
inutilis by Innocent IV at Lyons.92 This was the result of sustained pressure exerted by a group 
of bishops from Portugal, who probably began their campaign in 1240 when a few managed to 
escape Frederick II’s agents and reach Rome, where they remained for some time. With the 
Iberian bishops gathered together at Lyons in 1245, the time came for action.93 Between 
February and July 1245, Innocent IV issued at least four letters to Portugal, each one a step to 
removing Sancho from power.94  The last of these, Grandi, decreed that Sancho was to be 
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detached from royal power and his brother Afonso, Count of Boulogne, appointed ‘curator’ of 
the kingdom. Innocent noted in Grandi how the Portuguese prelates had appealed to his 
predecessors for help against their king after finding Sancho unmoved by ecclesiastical 
censure:  
‘and although he was warned diligently by the aforesaid prelates, to correct the 
aforesaid things and several other impious deeds, the serious narrative of which 
provokes loathing... yet still... he did not undertake to change anything; on account of 
which we were stirred by the clamouring accusations and lamentations of the bishops, 
abbots, priors, and other religious and secular clergy of the kingdom, and we diligently 
commanded the king through our letters to correct the aforesaid things’95   
It was the leadership of Innocent IV, though, willing to take decisive action against the 
Portuguese king, rather than the direct power of the bishops, that was crucial. So too was the 
papal court in providing a secure environment for episcopal activity.  
 
At Lyons the Iberian bishops also turned on Frederick II. Although they were not 
under his rule, many had suffered at the hands of the emperor when they were intercepted by 
his fleet en route to the council of 1241.96 Perhaps, as Peter Linehan suggests, they had their 
own rulers in mind when they attacked Frederick, so like the Iberian kings in his 
objectionable behaviour towards the Church, for Theobald I of Navarre and Sancho II of 
Portugal had both offended churchmen in their kingdoms and violated ecclesiastical 
liberties.97 Writing to the pope to offer their full support for the action against Frederick, the 
Iberian bishops ‘made no pretence of their fear that, if he were not thoroughly chastised, other 
princes would soon follow his ‘exemplum et audaciam’.98 Whatever their reasons, their intent 
was clear: 
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them with great vigour. The bishops asked the pope to proceed harshly against this great tyrant, since 
otherwise the Church could never live in peace during his reign, as other princes would follow his 
example (Quadro Elementar das Relaçoes políticas e Diplomaticas de Portugal com as diversas potencias 
do mundo, eds. Visconde da Santarém and Rebello da Silva (18 vols., Paris, 1842-1976), IX, 141-2). 
97 Linehan, Spanish Church,  161. 
98 Linehan, Spanish Church, 160. 
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‘the archbishop of Spain rose up, who greatly roused the lord pope to proceed against 
the emperor, by reporting the many things he had done against the Church, and how 
his whole purpose was to suppress the Church as far as he could, promising that he 
himself and all the prelates of Spain, who had come to the council more magnificently 
and in greater numbers than any other nation, would assist the lord pope  in body and 
goods according to the pleasure of their will.’99 
In his letters to the prelates and nobles of England, Frederick singled out Pedro de Albalat, 
archbishop of Tarragona, and John Arias Suares, archbishop of Compostella, as ringleaders of 
the action against him,100 though it was a larger group, including the bishops of Astorga, 
Orense, Salamanca, Plasencia and Porto who wrote jointly to the pope offering their full 
support against Frederick.101 Here, certainly, was collective episcopal action under the 
leadership of archbishops to effect change in the operation of royal government. Yet it was of 
an entirely different sort to that undertaken by the English bishops in the thirteenth century. 
The episcopal action against Sancho and Frederick was only possible within the sphere of the 
papal court. The Spanish bishops were clearly not able or willing to meet  within the Iberian 
peninsula to unite in action against the rulers of their kingdoms. Combined with the fact that, 
unlike the bishops of England under the archbishop of Canterbury, they were in no position to 
intervene effectively in person with the king when royal policy overstepped the mark, this 
meant that the only course of action remaining was extreme. There was no possibility of 
‘remaking’ the erring king, only the alternatives of suffering his policies or deposing him. 
 
Collective episcopal action within Castile: the Cortes of Valladolid, 1282 
There was, in fact, one significant instance of collective episcopal action against the Castilian 
king, though its features serve more  to underline than undermine this picture of episcopal 
powerlessness. This came in 1282, when a number of bishops in León-Castile came out in 
support of the Infante Sancho, who was in rebellion against his father, Alfonso X. Their 
motivation was likely to have been the years of financial oppression they had suffered at the 
hands of the king,102 compounded by the royal failure to redress grievances set before 
Nicholas III in 1279. Six bishops from León and two from Castile (as well as fifty-seven abbots 
                                                          
99 ‘Postmodum surrexit archiepiscopus de Yspania, qui multum dominum papam animavit ad 
procedendum contra imperatorem, referendo plurima que contra ecclesiam fecerat, et quomodo tota sua 
fuerat intentio ut deprimeret ecclesiam iuxta posse, promittens quod ipse ac alii prelati Yspanie, qui 
multum magnifice ac generaliter melius quam alia natio ad concilium venerant, domino pape assisterent 
in personis et rebus iuxta sue beneplacitum voluntatis’ (Relatio de Concilio Lugdunensi, given by Linehan, 
Spanish Church, 161 n. 1). 
100CM, IV, 538-44, esp. 540. 
101 Linehan, Spanish Church, 160. 
102 Linehan, ‘Gravamina 1262-3’, 741-2. 
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of Benedictine, Cistercian, and Premonstratensian monasteries identified by name) attended 
the Infante’s ‘cortes’ at Valladolid in April 1282, where many of them formed ‘hermandades’ in 
support of Sancho.103 The plan discussed by the infantes was, in effect, to depose Alfonso, 
keeping him as a titular ruler but handing over the reins of government to his eldest son.  
However, the formation of these hermandades belies the fractures running through the 
episcopate. The archbishops of Toledo and Seville remained loyal to Alfonso and refused to 
attend the cortes, whilst the archbishop of Compostela was also absent (though because he 
was in exile following an earlier conflict with the king).104 It is worth considering how the lack 
of archiepiscopal leadership could have weakened the assembled bishops, for the formation of 
these hermandades might not so much represent an empowered episcopate relishing the 
opportunity to unite against a tyrannous king but the desperate attempts of a threatened, 
leaderless group to defend itself. An eye-witness account of the cortes is given by bishops 
Fernando of Burgos and Juan of Palencia, who provided written testimony in order to 
disassociate themselves from activities they considered illegal and unjust. Having been called 
to Valladolid, the bishops had been in their rooms with several others when the infantes Peter 
and John, Sancho’s younger brothers, had rushed in unexpectedly. The bishops were told they 
were to accompany the infantes to Sancho’s presence, where with other knights, barons and 
citizens, they would pronounce a sentence. The proposed sentence was that king Alfonso 
should no longer be allowed to administer justice, manage royal income and expenditure, or 
have custody of castles and cities. Instead, these powers were to be handed to Sancho. The 
astonished bishops of Burgos and Palencia responded that such action would be extremely 
difficult – it required great counsel and careful deliberation. This could not be done, they said, 
since the bishops had not been summoned to the Cortes on the premise of discussing this 
matter and, in any case, the proposed action seemed unjust. Sancho and his supporters, 
though, would not take no for an answer and the Infante and other nobles pressed the bishops 
incessantly, issuing them with death threats and proffering harsh words. In fear of their lives, 
the bishops were brought into a room with Sancho and other barons, knights and prelates. 
The doors were closed. The sentence against Alfonso was read out and the fearful bishops 
were forced to affix their seals. The doors were then opened, at which point the bishops made 
a run for it before the sentence was published. Any support they appeared to give to the 
infantes’ scheme, they later insisted, was given out of fear for their lives, as was any 
                                                          
103 O’Callaghan, Learned King, 260. 
104 O’Callaghan, Learned King, 260. 
105 
 
participation in a hermandad or any oath or act of homage that had involved, for the bishops 
had never consented to the sentence made against Alfonso, nor would they. 105 
  
The manner in which these events played out does not invite comparison with 
assemblies involving English bishops.  True, in 1234 the English bishops led by Edmund of 
Abingdon, like their Spanish counterparts at Valladolid in 1282, took action against a king 
whose behaviour was deemed unacceptable. However, Edmund and his suffragans had taken 
the initiative on that occasion and had worked within the bounds of law, in the words of 
Bracton, to ‘put a bridle on the king’.106 The bishops at Valladolid clearly did not take the 
initiative. The authors of the account make it clear that the plans for deposition were laid by 
the infantes, nor is it clear whether any of their colleagues were willing accomplices, given the 
possibility that it was not only the bishops of Burgos and Palencia who were coerced. The 
actions of those who formed the Valladolid hermandades bear greater resemblance to the 
support given to the English reformers by the Montfortian bishops. The latter, like those at 
Valladolid, overstepped what most considered the boundaries of legitimate action in their 
move against the king. In England, however, there was no hint that any bishop was coerced 
into action. All five bishops suspended in 1266 were not only willing supporters but 
protagonists in Montfortian action between 1263 and 1265. If we might compare the 
parliaments of Westminster and Oxford in 1258 with the Valladolid Cortes, in that plots were 
hatched at the English assemblies, held in a volatile atmosphere punctuated by shows of 
armed force,107 the majority of  bishops chose to withdraw lest they incur the anger of the 
king.108 There was no hint that the reformers tried to force their support.  
 
There is, however, one English assembly that bears remarkable resemblance to the 
Valladolid cortes: the Council of Clarendon in January 1164. The menacing atmosphere of this 
meeting, revealed by Anne Duggan,109 forced the English bishops under Becket to capitulate to 
the king’s demands. Like the bishops of Burgos and Palencia (and perhaps others), the English 
bishops were shut away whilst in ‘an atmosphere of threat and intimidation, the bishops’ 
unanimity began to weaken.’ Like those at Valladolid, they were threatened by various nobles 
                                                          
105 Memorial Histórico Español: colección de documentos, opúsculos y antigüedades que publica la Real 
academia de la historia (50 vols., Madrid, 1851-1963), II, 59-63. 
106 Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction’, 41. 
107 D. A. Carpenter, ‘What happened in 1258?’, in his Reign of Henry III, 183–97, at 187-97. 
108 Carpenter, ‘1258’, 187. 
109 A. J. Duggan, Thomas Becket (London, 2004), 44-5. 
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with the consequences of resistance. Four of the bishops warned Becket that he would be 
killed if he continued to disobey the king. Threatened and bullied, Becket and his suffragans, 
like the Valladolid bishops, agreed to the royal demands. Becket, however, had balked at the 
prospect of affixing his seal to a written version of the Constitutions and had managed to 
extract himself.110 The bishops of Burgos and Palencia were forced to affix their seals to the 
sentence promulgated by the infantes and, on their escape, were at great pains to disassociate 
themselves from it. The Council of Clarendon was arguably the lowest nadir of episcopal 
power in Medieval England. Viewed from this perspective, events at Valladolid in 1282, far 
from demonstrating the strength of Iberian bishops in relation to royal power, only serve to 
underscore episcopal weakness.  
 
Conclusions  
What does this comparison between England and the Iberian kingdoms demonstrate? Firstly, 
the unusual power of English bishops in relation to the crown. This power was based on a 
strong collective identity forged over regular meetings, convened often on a regnal scale to 
consider issues of regnal importance. Whether these were provincial assemblies convened by 
archbishops or ‘regnal’ ecclesiastical assemblies convened by the king to consider royal 
requests  for taxation, there was little distinction in effect. This collective episcopal identity 
involved a sense of common interests and an awareness of the bishops’ collective power. Led 
by the archbishop of Canterbury, the English bishops utilised this power, drawing on their 
symbolic capital as historic anointers of English kings, to intervene in the operation of royal 
power when the king transgressed, by calling him to account and remaking him. This 
provided considerable scope for English bishops to effect change in the operation of royal 
power within the bounds of acceptable, legitimate action. Rebellion would always have been 
an unpalatable option, exposing Church property and rights to the perils of civil war. With the 
episcopal capacity to intervene with the king, rebellion was seldom necessary. The allegiance 
of several  bishops to the Montfortian cause did not come about because there was no other 
way of confronting Henry III about his policies; this could at least have been attempted at 
Westminster or Oxford in 1258, if not later. The Montfortian bishops were as active 
protagonists in episcopal-royal power politics as any of their predecessors but chose to 
pursue their objectives outside of the historically-sanctioned framework. When viewed 
alongside their counterparts in the Iberian peninsula, the scope of the English episcopate to 
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effect change in the king and the operation of royal power is quite astounding and, therefore, 
the choices of the Montfortian bishops all the more controversial.  
 
Secondly, the comparison demonstrates that what really made the English bishops 
unusual was their objectives. Without exception, all action taken against Iberian kings was 
premised on royal assaults upon ecclesiastical liberties. The campaign to have Sancho II of 
Portugal proclaimed rex inutilis; the excommunication of the king of Navarre by Pedro de 
Albalat and his suffragans; the rebellion against Alfonso X of Castile in 1282; all of these 
actions were justified by the respective kings’ attacks on the persons or property of the 
Church. English bishops were certainly concerned with ecclesiastical liberties, as the 
numerous schedules of complaints against Henry III’s treatment of the Church show. 
However, what is remarkable is how consistently they stepped forward to protect the 
interests of the kingdom at large, whether to strengthen the king in times of crisis, reform him 
when he ruled badly, or rebel against him in the case of the Montfortians. The evidence 
reveals not only the extent of English episcopal interest in kingship per se, and in the 
operation of government, but also the willingness to act: Langton’s exegesis and quaestiones  
and  his use of excommunication to enforce Magna Carta, the Charter of the Forests and the 
peace of the kingdom; the lengthy speech of Edmund of Abingdon to Henry III in 1234, 
chastising him for his treatment of his barons; the letter of the Montfortian bishops to the 
papal legate in 1264, appealing to the precedents of the divine ordering of the universe, papal 
government and scripture to argue that kings must rule with the help of councillors 
(discussed in chapter seven). When compared to the evidence of the interests of their 






Robert Grosseteste’s Writing on Kingship: its place in 




On Friday 13 May 1250, Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, stood before Pope Innocent IV 
and the college of cardinals at the papal court at Lyons. Grosseteste had identified several 
abuses that were damaging to the Church and posed a danger to souls. His chief complaint 
was against the archbishop of Canterbury, Boniface of Savoy, who was attempting to levy 
uncustomary procurations. When it was put to Grosseteste by some of the cardinals that 
Boniface was entitled to the procurations by canon law, the bishop appealed to Aristotle’s 
distinction between kingship and tyranny, as set out in Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics, a 
work which Grosseteste had been responsible for translating into Latin for the first time in its 
entirety for the benefit of a western audience.1 The bishop had also written a commentary for 
Book VIII2 and it is from this commentary, as well as Aristotle’s own words, that Grosseteste 
drew to make his case against Boniface, arguing that the archbishop, rather than burdening 
his subjects financially, should use his own extensive wealth to conduct the visitation.3 
 
On his return to England Grosseteste had Richard Gravesend, the archdeacon of 
Oxford who had accompanied him to Lyonss, write up his whole case as a memorandum to be 
sent back to the cardinals.4 Grosseteste also, however, sent an ‘abbreviatio’ – the section of the 
memorandum dealing with kingship and tyranny – to his friend and disciple, Simon de 
                                                          
1 A pre-existing translation of the Nicomachean Ethics survived in fragmentary form. Grosseteste’s 
achievement was to translate the work into Latin in its entirety, together with a collection of 
commentaries from various ancient and Byzantine sources that had been compiled anonymously in the 
twelfth century. For the most part, Grosseteste’s own additions to the commentaries are confined to 
philological glosses (J. McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 2000), 119). 
2 Grosseteste translated the second-century commentary on Book VIII by Aspasius but found that the 
text broke off around chapter eight, only surviving in fragments for the rest of the book.  Grosseteste 
undertook to write the commentary for this missing section himself, so that the part of the commentary 
running from chapter eight until the end of Book VIII is almost all Grosseteste’s work (McEvoy, 
‘Grosseteste's Reflections’, 149-50). Grosseteste’s contribution to the commentary is identified by 
Mercken in his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics (Mercken, 38). Mercken marks Grosseteste’s 
additions to the Aspasius commentary in parentheses (Mercken, 145-95).  
3 Gieben, 375-9. 
4 Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’, 254-5.  
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Montfort, earl of Leicester.5 The transmission of the abbreviatio has long been known and has 
understandably drawn comment, given Montfort’s leading role in the turbulent period that 
began five years after his mentor’s death in 1253. In 1258, Montfort took part in a coup that 
seized the reins of government from Henry III and transferred power to a baronial council. In 
1264, Montfort led a victorious army against Henry at Lewes, took the king prisoner and put 
in place a council that aimed to wield royal powers on a long-term basis. Is it possible that 
Grosseteste’s abbreviatio on kingship and tyranny influenced Montfort and the political action 
he took against Henry? Given Grosseteste’s prominent place in the English episcopate and his 
connections with some of the bishops who were to join the earl, is it possible that his 
arguments justified episcopal involvement in the revolutionary action of the period 1258-65? 
 
Since Grosseteste’s memorandum was identified in 1940, this possibility has been 
raised several times. Sir Maurice Powicke, seemingly moved more by his remarkable instinct 
than by any particular analysis of Grosseteste’s work, boldly proclaimed Grosseteste’s 
posthumous influence over his ‘strange disciple’: Montfort ‘had drunk of the cup held out to 
him by the strongest and subtlest visionary of his age, and the draught had gone to his head.’6 
William Pantin, though, having examined the memorandum, dismissed the possibility that it 
had influenced  the earl, arguing that Grosseteste’s case focused on ecclesiastical rather than 
secular politics.7 Reginald Treharne, who had clearly hoped that the memorandum would 
reveal a connection between Grosseteste’s ‘ideas on constitutional reform’ and the earl’s later 
actions, pronounced it ‘an almost complete disappointment’ on similar grounds. 8 It was left to 
John Maddicott, in his biography of the earl, to address  seriously the question of how the 
ideas expressed in Grosseteste’s writing might have shaped Montfort’s actions in the period of 
reform and rebellion. Dedicating an entire chapter to the earl’s ‘Religion and Virtue’, 
Maddicott shows how Grosseteste and his circle played an important part in Montfort’s 
spiritual education. He detects, in many of the reforming measures introduced by the baronial 
council in 1258-9, the ‘attitude’ of Grosseteste that can be found in the guides produced by the 
bishop for the management of his diocesan estate.9 Yet, whilst showing that Grosseteste’s 
writings on the treatment of tenants and the management of officials might well have 
influenced certain aspects of the reform programme, Maddicott left open the question of 
                                                          
5 The Letters of Adam Marsh, ed. and trans. C.H. Lawrence, Vol. I, OMT (Oxford, 2006), 57.  
6 Powicke, Henry III, 390-91.  
7 Pantin, ‘Grosseteste's Relations’, at 205.  
8 Treharne, ‘The Personal Role of Simon de Montfort’, 80-81.  
9 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort , 167-9.  
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Grosseteste’s views on kingship and royal power, expressed in the memorandum, 
commentary and elsewhere, and how these relate to the baronial seizure of royal power and 
the reform programme.10  
 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to chart Grosseteste’s views on kingship and royal 
power, to ask what influence they might have had on Montfort and the reforming council and 
how far they justified the involvement of the Montfortian bishops. The findings do not reveal 
Grosseteste to be the archetypal Montfortian. The bishop took a remarkably positive attitude 
to monarchy and argued that subjects should not take aggressive action against kings or 
appropriate royal powers. His views on kingship did not support a revolutionary political 
programme like that of 1258, let alone Montfort’s regime of 1264-5.  However, his Aristotelian 
emphasis on the need for kings to draw from their vast personal wealth in order to rule justly 
without burdening their subjects might have influenced certain financial reforms undertaken 
by the baronial council and may, therefore, have opened the door for Montfortian action.  
 
The sources available for addressing these questions are rich. Grosseteste’s 
contribution to the commentary on Book VIII of the Ethics is substantial, running to 
approximately fifty printed pages.11 The Lyonss memorandum, from which the abbreviatio 
sent to Montfort was drawn, is also an extensive work and particularly useful since is shows 
how Grosseteste applied Aristotle’s arguments in practice. Grosseteste’s letter collection 
contains 132 letters, many of which offer an insight into Grosseteste’s understanding of 
monarchical power.12 These works have attracted some attention for what they reveal of 
Grosseteste’s theology, his approach to pastoral care and his attitude to the papacy.13 They 
have not, though, been examined in depth for their insights into the bishop’s political thought.  
Meanwhile, a model for analysing how scholarly occupations could interact with and impact 
on political action ‘on the ground’ has been provided by studies of the quaestiones and biblical 
exegisis of Stephen Langton, Paris scholar and archbishop of Canterbury 1206-28, by Philippe 
                                                          
10 John Maddicott suggests that the influence exerted on Montfort by scholastic teaching in general, 
including Grosseteste’s memorandum, might have been ‘substantial’ though he does not seek to 
determine it precisely (Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 355).  
11 Mercken, 145-95.  
12 Grosseteste Letters. 
13 For a discussion of Grosseteste’s commentary, see: McEvoy, ‘Grosseteste's Reflections’; McEvoy, 
Grosseteste, 113-21. For discussion of the memorandum, see: Pantin, ‘Grosseteste’s Relations’, 209-15; 
Southern, Grosseteste, 257-60, 287-9; Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’. 
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Buc, John Baldwin and David d’Avray.14  These have demonstrated how Langton and other 
medieval theologians viewed politics and the proper operation of government as a theological 
concern. The modern distinction between theology, philosophy and political ideas is not one 
that Langton, or indeed Grosseteste, would have recognised.  Although such research has not 
closed the debate on Langton’s role in the production of Magna Carta in 1215,15 David d’Avray 
has shown how Langton’s scholarly writing on kingship justified his role in the issue of the 
Charter during Henry III’s minority and the responsibility  he assumed for enforcing the 
Charter by sentence of excommunication in 1225.16 Langton’s actions set a compelling 
precedent and the bishops who came after him – Grosseteste among them – followed his lead 
in upholding Magna Carta.17 Grosseteste’s writings show that he was as concerned as Langton 
with understanding the origins of kingship, the extent of monarchical power and the ethics of 
government.  Grosseteste did not live to see the baronial coup of 1258 so, unlike Langton, did 
not have the opportunity to put his ideas into practice. Yet, his thoughts on kingship – 
whether distilled in the memorandum or expanded in his commentary and letters –survived 
him in the memory of Simon de Montfort and his circle.   
 
Kingship and Natural Law 
‘It is as natural,’ wrote Aristotle, ‘for a father to rule his children... as for a king to rule his 
subjects’.18 In his commentary on Book VIII of the Ethics, Grosseteste explained this statement 
by arguing that kingship originated in natural law.  It is important to note that in promoting 
this view, the bishop was swimming against the academic tide. The view that kingship was of 
divine provenance had been current in learned circles since at least the early eleventh 
century.19 As the research of Philippe Buc has revealed, the late twelfth-century Parisian 
school led by Stephen Langton and Peter the Chanter had even inferred from the Old 
Testament that the origins of kingship lay in the punishment rather than the reward of 
mankind. They had deduced this from the book of Kings, which recalls the Israelites’ rejection 
of divine rule, their demands for a king and the Lord’s reluctant agreement.20 From these 
                                                          
14 Buc, ‘Princely Power’; Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’; d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’.  
15 See, for instance: Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’. 
16 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 432-3.  
17 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 433-4. For Grosseteste’s role in pushing for the reissue of Magna Carta in 
1252, enforcing the Charter by sentence of excommunication in 1253 and ensuring that it would be 
enforced in his diocese, see: CM, V, 324-8, 373-8.  
18 McEvoy, ‘Grosseteste’s Reflections’, 157.  
19 Buc, ‘Princely Power’, 314-16. 
20 I Samuel: 8. 
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events Langton and the Chanter were able to demonstrate that God had never commanded 
the institution of kingship; He had allowed it and selected Saul as king, though He had done so 
grudgingly.21 This understanding complemented the idea, in circulation since at least the early 
eleventh century and recycled by Langton and the Chanter, that ‘by nature all human beings 
are equal’ and that only ‘the Fall put one above another; at the end of time all power shall 
cease.’22 The existence of kingship as a form of government was impermanent, since kingship 
was not part of the divine plan. 
 
Grosseteste’s position on the origins of kingship was far more positive. In his 
commentary, the bishop recited the argument that the kingship was instituted by man and not 
God and proceeded to demonstrate its invalidity.23 Taking Aristotle’s point that ‘it is as natural 
for a father to rule his children... as for a king to rule his subjects’ as his starting point, 
Grosseteste argued that kingship was, in fact, in the very nature of things: 
‘just as in an individual man reason governs the sensitive and animal powers not in 
virtue of any human enactment but in the nature of things, so too the king governs his 
people in the nature of things. For the king, to the extent that he really is a king, 
follows reason alone and employs it alone in all his dealings with the people, whereas 
the common people follow rather their own animal and sensual movements. So it is 
that the king relates to his people as the reason, rightly ordered, in an individual man 
relates to his animal and sense components. That is why it was given to the first man 
to rule, not over other men but over the beasts of the earth and the fish of the sea and 
the birds of the air (Gen 1:28).’24 
A king was made to govern his people, just as in the book of Genesis the first man was given to 
rule over the beasts of the earth and just as reason in a human being was designed to govern 
animal instincts. The Parisian view encouraged suspicions of royal government, while 
Grosseteste’s explanation invested the institution with unambiguous moral value. By locating 
its origins in natural law, he showed how kingship was part of God’s plan for humanity and 




                                                          
21 Buc, ‘Princely Power’, 321-2.  
22 Buc, ‘Princely Power’, 317.  
23 ‘But does kingship come from natural law? The instinct of nature teaches fathers to rule their 
offspring, but it appears that kingship has come about by human enactment (constitutio). For by nature 
all things are in common to all men and all men are naturally equal; wherefore kings were established 
not by nature but by the will of men.’ Mercken, 166.35-39; translation from McEvoy, ‘Grosseteste’s 
Reflections’, 157.  
24 Mercken, 166.39-47; translation from McEvoy, ‘Grosseteste’s Reflections’, 157. 
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Grosseteste and pastoral  kingship  
The belief that kingship originated in natural law enabled an abstract understanding of the 
institution: the term ‘king’ could describe any person who was the sole ruler of his dominion, 
whether secular monarch, pope or bishop. As Grosseteste explained to the cardinals at Lyonss, 
this is how he was able to apply Aristotle’s concept of secular kingship to ecclesiastical 
rulership, to the pope as head of the Church or the bishop as head of his diocese, since 
‘according to sacred Scripture royal power... is the type and shape of the power of ruling 
souls’.25 This approach was facilitated by Aristotle’s emphasis on kingship as an intrinsically 
paternal and pastoral office:  
‘the association between father and son has the form of kingship, that is, it has a likeness 
and parallel. Indeed the care of the father for his children is of the same sort as the care 
of the king for the kingdom and the subjects. Whence Homer calls Jove ‘father’, 
meaning that he governs his subjects by means of the paternal affection he holds for 
them. Indeed kingship, that is royal government, wishes, that is reasonably desires, to 
be paternal rule, so that clearly the subjects are ruled by the king by means of such an 
affection that he holds for them, as sons are ruled by a father.’26 
Grosseteste understands Aristotle’s allusion to fatherhood not just as a simple presentation of 
a ‘likeness and parallel’ of kingship but as an indication that fatherhood and kingship were 
essentially ‘of the same sort’, that is, essentially good and nurturing. Aristotle’s next analogy, 
describing the pastoral responsibility of the ruler, was understood by Grosseteste in the same 
way. Aristotle likens the concern of a king for his subjects’ welfare to that of a shepherd for his 
flock, elaborated by reference to Agamemnon’s Homeric epithet, ‘the shepherd of his 
people.’27 This allusion invited Grosseteste to identify the Aristotelian ideal of kingship with 
the Christian ideal of the Good Shepherd. He was moved in his commentary to an impassioned 
elaboration of the theme, clearly drawn from his famous sense of personal responsibility for 
the souls under his care: 
‘And so that he [Aristotle] may show more clearly what the care and concern of the 
king for his subjects is, he compares him to a shepherd of sheep. Indeed just as the 
shepherd cares for the health of his sheep, bearing whatever labours and works he can 
for the health of his sheep and for their defence from lions, facing off against bears and 
                                                          
25 ‘Cum itaque secundum sacram Scripturam regia potestas, regitiva plurimorum, sit typus et figura 
potestatis regitivae animarum’ (Gieben, 378).  
26 ‘patris ad filios communicatio habet regni figuram,id est similitudinem et exemplum.  Filiorum enim 
talis est cura patri qualis est cura regni et subditorum regi. Unde et Homerus appellat Iovem patrem, eo 
quod paterno affectu sibi subditos gubernabat. Regnum enim, id est regia gubernatio,  vult, id est 
rationabiliter desiderat, esse principatus paternus, ut videlicet tali affectu regantur a rege sibi subditi, 
quali a patre filii’ (Mercken, 162.32-163.38).  
27 Mercken, 153.74-5. Grosseteste does not mention the reference to Agamemnon in his commentary. 
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wolves and, if necessary, fighting even to the point of death, thus the king acts for the 
health and defence of the people.’28 
It is clear how Aristotle’s emphasis on the pastoral nature of kingship could support 
Grosseteste’s view that ‘royal power... is the type and shape of the power of ruling souls’.29  
 
A definition of kingship in which the pastoral responsibility of the ruler was essential 
accorded with Grosseteste’s work in other areas of scholarship. His understanding of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, drawn from the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, emphasised the 
responsibility of office-holders for those below them in the hierarchy. In fact, the provision of 
support for those beneath the hierarch was the justification for the conferral of power. 
Grosseteste’s application of his hierarchical world-view is summarised by the recent editors 
of his letters: 
‘The hierarch’s task, whether he was the parish priest, the abbot or prior, the 
archpriest or archdeacon, or the bishop himself, was to offer encouragement, 
direction, and support for those who were under his care. The bishop’s pastoral staff 
of office, the crozier or baculus, was a popular image representing these 
responsibilities. The crook or curved end was to be used to gather in those sheep who 
wandered away from the flock, while the pointed end, the stimulus, was both for 
goading reluctant sheep along the right path and for protecting the flock, and its 
prelates, from attack by those who would carry them off or harm them.’30 
 
Thus the pastoral nature of kingship described by Aristotle would have reaffirmed 
Grosseteste’s view that pastoral concern for those in one’s charge was part of the essential 
nature of rulership, whether the ruler in question ‘was the parish priest, the abbot or prior... 
or the bishop himself’ or even the pope or a secular king. This is what Grosseteste explained to 
Henry III in 1246, when the bishop responded to the king’s request for an explanation of what 
the sacrament of anointing added to the royal dignity. Grosseteste was keen to frame the gifts 
of the Holy Spirit conferred by unction not in terms of additions to otherwise non-anointed 
royal power but as an amplification of the responsibility to care for his subjects. This duty was 
especially incumbent on the anointed monarch: 
‘the anointing of a king is the sign of the privilege of receiving the sevenfold gift of the 
most holy Spirit. It is this gift that binds an anointed king to a degree far surpassing 
unanointed kings to direct all his actions as king and those of his government toward 
                                                          
28  ‘Et ut manifestius ostendat qualis est boni regis cura et sollicitudo de subditis, assimulat eum pastori 
ovium. Sicut enim pastor salutem curat ovium, quidquid potest operis et laboris pro ovium sustinens 
salute et pro defensione earum leonibus, ursis et lupis se obiiciens et, si necesse est, etiam usque ad mortem 
dimicans, sic et rex agit pro salute et defensione populorum’ (Mercken, 165.113-118).  
29 Gieben, 378. 
30Grosseteste Letters, 20.  
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specific goals: because of the gift of fear he will, not in any ordinary sense, but 
eminently and heroically, restrain first himself and then, as much as he can, those 
subject to his governance from doing anything unlawful; because of the gift of piety he 
will defend, help, and cause to be helped, the widow, the orphan, and every oppressed 
person without distinction...’31 
The signification of the crozier was as important here in the bishop’s advice to Henry III as in 
Grosseteste’s understanding of his own responsibilities. The Pseudo-Dionysian concept of 
subsidium; the part of his commentary describing so vividly the pastoral king, facing off 
against lions, bears and wolves in defence of his flock; the gifts, or rather responsibilities, 
conferred on the king by unction: all are mutually-reinforcing expressions of Grosseteste’s 
view of pastoral kingship.   
 
The rights of the subject in relation to royal power 
Grosseteste’s understanding of the institution of kingship, then, was unambiguously positive. 
Yet the realities of political life meant that Grosseteste would be confronted more than once 
with royal commands or policies he found disagreeable. What action could a subject take if he 
disapproved of a royal decision? This was a topic that Stephen Langton explored in some 
depth and his conclusions are worth discussing, since they provide an important context for 
Grosseteste’s opinions. John Baldwin summarises Langton’s approach:  
‘The general rule is submission to a prince even when his actions are unjust... Yet 
[there were]... important exceptions. If the injustice of a particular condemnation is 
common knowledge, the executioner may refuse to obey the prince’s command. If the 
king commands a mortal sin, one has the right to resist... if someone has been 
condemned without a judicial sentence, the people are allowed to free the victim. Or if 
a war has been declared without a decision of the court, the people can resist and an 
individual knight can abstain from active service... The absence of the judicial process 
became his [Langton’s] principal justification for political resistance.’32 
 
As Baldwin shows, Langton was adamant that the absence of a legal judgement (by 
court) in the royal decision-making process justified a subject in mounting ‘political 
resistance’. The term ‘political resistance’ might, though, be a little misleading. The examples 
given by Langton are generally forms of passive resistance, such as refusing to obey a 
command. He was not suggesting that a subject take any sort of offensive action against the 
king.  The ‘resistance’ he had in mind would be an ad hoc measure directed against the illegal 
command, rather than against the one giving it. Baldwin uses Langton’s belief in the 
importance of ‘judgement by court’ to argue for Langton’s revolutionary activities between 
                                                          
31Grosseteste Letters, 368. 
32 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 819-20. 
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1213 and 1215,33 yet these same passages would seem to show that such a proactive 
campaign against the king was incompatible with Langton’s world-view. In fact, it has recently 
been suggested by David Carpenter that Langton’s scruples are reflected in the drafting of 
Magna Carta 1215, which shows the archbishop’s concern that the Charter had been extracted 
from the king by force.34 Clause 61 of the 1215 Charter (the ‘security clause’) was also highly 
problematic, since it empowered a group of barons to ‘distrain and distress’ the king ‘in every 
way they can, namely by seizing castles, lands and possessions’ in order to force the king to 
make good his transgressions.35 That the security clause protected the royal person from 
baronial recriminations did not disguise the fact that it advocated the aggressive confiscation 
of the physical bases of royal power. It was not until 1225, when a new version of the Charter 
was issued freely by the king as part of a mutual bargain with his subjects, that Langton felt 
able to support the Charter wholeheartedly.36 His solution for the enforcement of the Charter 
allowed for the use of excommunication against the king but did not threaten the 
fundamentals of royal power. 
 
An unwillingness to take forceful action against kings would, in fact, be perfectly 
compatible with the precedents provided in the Books of Kings, with which Langton was so 
much concerned. True, the reprehensible action of many Old Testament kings served to justify 
God’s warning to the Israelites – that kings would only bring them oppression and 
unhappiness – and necessitated their chastisement at the hands of the prophets, from whose 
example Langton might have drawn.37 Yet, the Old Testament kings were anointed, just like 
their medieval English counterparts, and the anointing of Saul and David had been 
commanded by God.38 The protected status this conferred was made clear when, on two 
occasions, David refused the opportunity to kill Saul because he was the anointed king.39 
There could be no clearer instruction on the illegality of raising a hand to the Lord’s anointed 
than David’s execution of the Amalekite, who had freely admitted to helping Saul end his life.40 
David’s last words to the criminal resounded with condemnation both for the deed itself and 
                                                          
33 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 827-30. 
34 Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1052-3. 
35 Holt, Magna Carta, 471. 
36 Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1055. 
37 I Samuel 13: 11-14; I Samuel 15: 17-19, 22-23; I Samuel 28: 16-19; II Samuel 12: 1-10; I Kings 14: 7-9; 
I Kings 18: 18; I Kings 21: 19-20. 
38 I Samuel 9: 15-17; I Samuel 16: 1, 3.  
39 I Samuel 24: 5-8; I Samuel 26: 9-11. 
40 II Samuel 1: 6-16. 
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the shameful pride with which the man had boasted of it: ‘Why did you not fear to put out 
your hand to kill the Lord's anointed?... Your blood be upon your own head: for your own 
mouth has spoken against you, saying: I have slain the Lord's anointed.’41 No matter what 
injustices Saul had committed, to take violent action against an anointed king was profoundly 
sinful.  
 
There were times when the refusal to obey an illegal royal command was insufficient 
to prevent the implementation of an illegal royal policy, yet violent or aggressive action 
against the king was still unacceptable. This is demonstrated by the events of 1234 already 
outlined in Chapter One, when Henry’s actions precipitated the rebellion of Richard Marshal 
and forced Edmund of Abingdon, archbishop of Canterbury, and his suffragans to confront the 
king directly, demanding the dismissal of Peter des Roches and his allies and threatening the 
king himself with excommunication should he fail to amend his ways. 42 Henry was forced to 
admit that the disseisins had been made de voluntate sua and not according to judgement; des 
Roches was sent back to his bishopric and the manor of Upavon, along with others taken 
unjustly, was restored.43 
 
William Ralegh, the chief justice called in to oversee the restorations, probably used 
the events of 1234 as a template when discussing the right of subjects to take action against 
unjust royal decisions in the law book known as Bracton:44 
‘The king has a superior, namely God. Also the law by which he is made king. Also his 
curia, namely the earls and barons, because if he is without bridle, that is without law, 
they ought to put the bridle on him.’45 
As Ralegh’s use of the case in Bracton makes clear, the actions of the magnates and prelates in 
1234 constituted an exemplum of legitimate resistance. Importantly, this shows that the sort 
of resistance deemed laudable was essentially passive and which did not threaten either the 
king or royal power. The public reproach made to the king by Edmund of Abingdon and the 
rebellion of Richard Marshal served to confront the king’s actions, but the objective of such 
reproaches – putting a bridle on the king – was the rectification of an illegal decision and the 
restoration of good and lawful kingship. In this way Edmund’s measures accord with 
Langton’s scenarios. Langton had sought to prevent the execution of an illegal decision, whilst 
                                                          
41 II Samuel 1: 14-16. 
42 CM, III, 272.  
43 CM, III, 272; Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction’, 38-40.  
44 Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction’, 41.  
45 Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction’, 41.  
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the magnates and prelates in 1234 sought to rectify an illegal act which had already been 
committed.  
 
Grosseteste on the subject’s right to oppose royal power  
An appreciation of these views helps to contextualise Grosseteste’s discussion of kingship and 
tyranny, particularly in light of his possible influence on Montfortian political reform, which 
embodied the permanent or semi-permanent coercion of the king and the alienation of royal 
powers. Not even Langton, from a school that has been called ‘anti-monarchical’,46 could have 
justified such measures. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Grosseteste in his various 
works did not advocate any form of aggressive action against a monarch. His view of 
monarchy was far more positive than that of the Paris school. Hence he was even less likely 
than Langton and his circle to warrant offensive action against a king.  
 
Grosseteste, in fact, explained in detail why a subject’s attack on royal power – the sort 
of action later taken by the Montfortians – was unsupportable. His detailed case is set out in 
letter 127 of his letter collection, in which he compared the power exercised by a ruler with 
that exercised by the ruler’s subordinates.47 This treatise is probably a formal record of the 
case presented by Grosseteste to the papacy in 1245, in which the bishop dismantled the 
claims of the dean and chapter of Lincoln to powers rivalling those of their bishop.48 
Appealing to the evidence of Scripture and the natural world, Grosseteste demonstrated how 
it is contrary to reason for subordinates to obstruct, attack or alienate monarchical power. 
 
Grosseteste opened his case by recounting the appointment made by Moses of judges 
to support him in his duties, described in Exodus 18. These judges ‘would refer to Moses 
himself any more important case and decide for themselves only minor matters. In this way 
Moses’s own burden would be lighter, since he would share it with others (Ex 18:19-22).’49 Thus 
it is clear, argued Grosseteste, that the power to judge, correct and reform the whole people, 
as well as individuals, belonged originally to Moses. Moses had appointed helpers to share his 
burden, since he could not accomplish everything himself, but ‘by this action he deprived 
                                                          
46 Philippe Buc cited by Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 813.  
47 Grosseteste Letters, 374-431.  
48 Grosseteste Letters, 375 n.1.  
49 Grosseteste Letters, 375.  
119 
 
himself of none of the power he had received [from God] but instead retained the fullness of 
that power.’50  
 
The purpose of subordinates was to support the ruler, helping to shoulder the burden 
of office. This meant that subordinates were only supposed to exercise lesser power in a 
lesser function. There was no alternative to this structure since the ruler himself (Moses, in 
this case, and by extension Grosseteste in the diocese of Lincoln or any ‘monarch’ in the 
abstract sense) was the source of all power wielded by his inferiors, meaning that their power 
could never equal or surpass his own. The logical conclusion was that for a subordinate to 
strike against the power of his ruler was contrary to reason, for ‘what is more unnatural than 
for someone to rebel against himself, or to impede or diminish himself, or even to remove 
himself? This is doubtless what happens when an inferior power opposes a superior’s power 
or strives to annul it, since... the power of an inferior is nothing but that of his superior.’ Any 
such attempt, in fact, would amount to the suicidal destruction of the subordinate’s own 
power, since ‘once the bubbling spring of a source has been reduced in size or drained dry, it 
follows that the stream, too, must suffer the same fate.’51 
 
For a subordinate to act to diminish his ruler’s power was unnatural, or physically 
impossible. Lest his audience should hesitate to concede the point, Grosseteste struck out with 
one of his most powerful metaphors. Here, he explained the distribution of power between 
ruler and subordinates (that is, between the pope and his cardinals and bishops, as well as 
between the bishop and his chapter) by likening it to that between the sun, the moon and 
stars: 
‘Because the sun cannot by immediate presence shine everywhere on earth at one and 
the same time... [it] illuminates the moon and stars from the fullness of its own light, 
without any loss thereby to itself, so that when it is absent they may shine in the vault 
of heaven (Gn 1:17) and shed light upon the earth. And when the sun itself returns and 
shows its presence to the earth, those lesser luminaries are hidden by the rays of the 
sun and yield to the sunlight.’52 
This is no simple analogy but rather evidence per se of the very nature of power. Crucially, it 
explains how the natural properties of power dictate the possibilities for its distribution. The 
force of the example for Grosseteste’s argument is immediately clear:  
                                                          
50 Grosseteste Letters, 376.  
51 Grosseteste Letters, 378.  
52 Grosseteste Letters, 401.  
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‘It would be astonishing and utterly detrimental to the perfection of the earth’s plants 
and animals if, at the sun’s rising over the earth, the moon and stars were to attempt 
to obstruct its rays... Suppose the moon and stars were to say of their obstruction: 
‘Because we have light to illuminate the earth, that task is no longer yours.’ Would 
they not be taking, to the full extent of their ability, the power of growth from the 
earth’s plants, life from animals, and the full development and perfection of both?’53  
 
Comparing these strictures to the actions of Grosseteste’s disciples, it is clear that the 
bishop’s arguments, far from constituting a framework for Montfortian revolution, are an 
unqualified rejection of everything it represented. The reforming council set up in 1258 
embodied a fundamental alienation of Henry III’s power. The council was to appoint the king’s 
ministers and to allocate his castles, as well as to implement the Provisions of Oxford for the 
reform of the realm. The king could not rule without the consent of this council; in fact, as 
Henry was to complain later, the council even ruled without consulting him.54 In 1264 the 
Montfortians put in place a new council, modelled on that of 1258 but with a clearly defined 
elective system and decision-making procedure that aimed to support the operation of the 
council in the long term.55 Both forms of council were a clear diminution of royal power, a 
transfer of royal powers to a conciliar body at the king’s expense. The implications for the 
hypothesis of Grosseteste’s influence on Montfortian political action are clear. The bishop’s 
emphatic endorsement of kingship and vigorous insistence on the preservation of royal 
power intact were fundamental elements of his world-view, inextricable from his 
understanding of the natural world and divine power. Grosseteste’s concept of royal power 
could never countenance this regime – only render it more scandalous. 
 
This facet of the bishop’s writing might seem at odds with the more familiar 
impression of Grosseteste, who did not hesitate to criticise both pope and king when he 
detected error and to disobey commands he deemed improper. Yet his insistence on the 
divine origins of kingship and his prohibition of aggressive action against monarchical power, 
on the one hand, and his willingness to criticise erring monarchs and disobey flawed 
commands, on the other, were mutually supporting – indeed inseparable – aspects of 
Grosseteste’s world-view. This is demonstrated by Grosseteste’s determination to explain his 
own disobedience. In 1253, the bishop wrote to two papal agents explaining his refusal to 
obey a mandate from Innocent IV.  The pope, seeking a canonry for his nephew, had asked 
                                                          
53 Grosseteste Letters., 402.  
54 For Henry’s complaints about the council, see: DBM, 210-239, especially at 214-15.  
55 DBM, 294-301.  
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Grosseteste to provide one in the diocese of Lincoln. Since the nephew did not intend to reside 
in his benefice, Innocent was effectively inviting the bishop’s complicity in ‘cheating [the 
people of Lincoln] of a pastor’s office and ministry’, an offence that would ‘bring death and 
damnation.... to souls that should be given life and salvation by the office and ministry of the 
pastoral care’. In Grosseteste’s mind, ‘there is not, nor can there be, another kind of sin so 
opposed and contrary to the teaching of the apostles and of the gospel, and to the Lord Jesus 
Christ himself so hateful, detestable, and abominable, and to the human race so destructive.’56 
Grosseteste’s justification for his refusal was not founded on his moral objection to the 
command but rather on the premise that the nature of papal power did not permit any pope 
to issue damaging orders. For Christ had invested the papal office with the power only to 
construct, not to destroy, so that for any pope to issue a command that entailed a destructive 
effect was impossible, since it ‘would obviously be a failure, or a corruption, or an abuse of its 
most holy and plenary power.’57 The implications of this ruling were clear to Grosseteste:  
‘because of my obligation to be obedient and loyal, an obligation that binds me, as to 
both my parents, to the most holy apostolic see, and because of my love of union with 
it in the body of Christ, as a Catholic, a proper son, and one who owes obedience, I 
disobey, I oppose, and I rebel against the things contained in that letter... In your 
discretion you can take no harsh measures against me because of my stand, for my 
every word and deed in this matter is neither opposition nor rebellion, but rather a 
demonstration of the filial respect due by God’s command to one’s father and 
mother.’58 
 
Grosseteste’s insistence that a loyal subject should refuse to obey destructive orders 
complemented, rather than contradicted, his insistence that subordinates could not alienate 
monarchical power. Grosseteste was not opposing the pope’s power to grant benefices, nor 
was he suggesting that such power be taken away from the papacy and transferred to a 
committee of subordinates (as the Lincoln dean and chapter seemed to claim by analogy). He 
was arguing that a subject could, on a case-by-case basis, refuse to obey an order that lay 
beyond the scope of his monarch’s power. In fact, for a subject loyal to the papal office, the 
disobedience of a destructive command issued by an individual pope was an imperative, since 
it served to uphold the integrity of the apostolic see itself. As such, the very act of ‘rebellion’ at 
once affirmed the legitimacy of the papal office and signalled a deep affection for it.59 
                                                          
56 Grosseteste Letters, 444-5.  
57 Grosseteste Letters, 446; Pantin, ‘Grosseteste’s Relations’, 190.  
58 Grosseteste Letters, 446.  
59 For a fuller discussion of Grosseteste’s loyalty to the papal office, see: Pantin, ‘Grosseteste’s 
Relations’, 187-91.  
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That Grosseteste here refers to papal, not secular, monarchy in no way undermines 
the relevance of these passages to a reconstruction of his views on worldly kingship. As we 
have seen, Grosseteste himself made no distinction in essentials between spiritual and secular 
power. As Grosseteste had explained to the cardinals at Lyonss, he was able to use Aristotle’s 
words on secular kingship to expound his case against the archbishop of Canterbury because 
‘according to sacred Scripture, royal power... is the type and shape of the power of ruling 
souls’.60 This is no comment upon the jurisdiction of spiritual and secular power but upon 
Grosseteste’s understanding of power itself, drawn from Christian tradition and supported by 
his own work on the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. Divine power can only be constructive since 
God, in His goodness, can only produce good. Because all power on earth emanates from God 
and imitates divine power, earthly power, by its very definition, is similarly creative and 
generative. This meant that the motivating principle of Grosseteste’s objection to Innocent’s 
mandate – that divinely instituted power was purely constructive – applied equally to secular 
monarchy as to spiritual. Grosseteste, in fact, had directed the same point about the purely 
constructive nature of power to Henry III, when he criticised the king over his destructive 
interference in a dispute over the abbacy of Bardney. To Grosseteste, it was 
‘unbelievable that these commands ever originated in the conscience of a king. For 
royal power is such that a king can command only what is right (rectum), since a king 
(rex, regis) is so called from the words meaning ‘right rule’ (rectum regimen).  
Favouring children who rebel against their father, are contumacious and disobedient, 
over those who are submissive and obedient – what is this but a preference for 
darkness over light, bitter over sweet, and evil over good [Is 5:20]?’61 
 
Kingship and Tyranny 
Grosseteste’s provision for selective disobedience of  royal commands, therefore, only serves 
to support his prohibition of aggressive action against monarchical power. Does his 
Aristotelian scholarship, though, provide any grounds for circumventing these strictures that 
might allow for the barons’ seizure of power? At first sight it seems possible, since 
Grosseteste, in his commentary and memorandum, defines true kingship by the monarch’s 
ability to finance his government. According to this understanding, Henry III, continuously 
strapped for cash, might not be a ‘true’ king at all.   
 
                                                          
60 Gieben, 378.  
61 Grosseteste Letters, 326; Pantin, ‘Grosseteste’s Relations’, 190.  
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In his commentary on Book Eight of the Nicomachean Ethics, Grosseteste describes 
how there are three types of political fellowship: monarchy, aristocracy and timocracy. Of 
these, monarchy, the rule of one leader alone, is the best. For the goal of government is the 
peace and concord of the subjects, and this is best achieved under one ruler, since it is natural 
that the community, as a single body, should prosper best under a single head. Tyranny, 
however, is the transgression of royal power. Grosseteste explains Aristotle’s essential 
distinction between kingship and tyranny:  a tyrant misuses royal power and exerts himself 
for his own advantage, whilst the king exerts himself for the common advantage of all who are 
subject to him.62 Of course, Grosseteste admits, one could argue that many who bear the name 
of king exert themselves for their own advantage, seizing goods from their subjects because 
their own property is not enough to sustain royal pomp and magnificence. Aristotle, though, 
goes on to explain that, in fact, a king ought to be self-sufficient. He should never need to take 
the property of another, since he should have a superabundance of wealth. Only vast personal 
resources will enable a king to fulfil the duties of his office without recourse to the goods of 
his subjects. A king, thus equipped, is able to exert himself for the common advantage of his 
people.63  
 
The ruler who does not fit this description is not really a king at all but rather a 
clerotes, a Greek term which Grosseteste understands to mean a man drawn by lot to act as 
ruler. Such a man thus holds the power and position of a king only by chance.64 What is the 
difference, then, Grosseteste asks, between a clerotes and a tyrant? He explains that, although 
they both lack sufficient wealth to support their office, the tyrant can be distinguished by his 
actions, by the habit of doing the opposite of what is proper for a king, the clerotes by his 
                                                          
62 Mercken, 160.54-60.  
63 ‘Sed quia posset aliquis dicere quod quo dicuntur reges plerumque intendunt propriam utilitatem, velut 
cum capiunt a suis subditis, cum non sufficiant illis sua propria ad regalem pompam seu magnificentiam 
sustinendum, obviat auctor dicens quod oportet vere dictum regem sibi sufficere et non alterius bonis in 
sustentationem regalis officii indigere, sed magis in omnibus bonis necessariis ad officium regale 
peragendum superabundare et superexcellere, ut non indigeat de alieno quidquam capere, sed libere 
possit et plene de propriorum copia ministerium regale complere non quaerens quae sibi ipsi sed quae sibi 
subditis utilia’ (Mercken, 160.60-69). 
64 ‘Qui enim non talis, id est intendens utilitatem subditorum communem et per se sufficiens et omnibus 
bonis superexcellens, magis utique erit clerotes quam rex. ‘Clerotes’ autem dicitur a ‘cleros’, quod est sors 
vel possessio vel locus vel substantia. Unde clerotes dici potest qui praedicta regis propria non habens, 
quasi sorte et fortuito casu locum tenet regis et potestatem’ (Mercken, 160.71-161.77).  
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denial of all things appropriate to a king.65 A king who lacks the wealth to fulfil his office 
becomes a clerotes and thus is no better than an ordinary man who had kingship thrust upon 
him. Such a man cannot exercise the duties of kingship without placing financial burdens on 
his subjects and is thus driven to rule in his own interest rather than for the benefit of his 
people. This is how, Grosseteste explains, the best sort of ruler (the king) becomes the worst 
sort (the tyrant).66 It should be noted at this point that Grosseteste does not offer a solution 
for subjects ruled by a clerotes or tyrant, choosing not to explore the question of what action 
might or might not be taken by to restore lawful rule.  
 
At Lyons, Grosseteste put his argument about royal wealth  in context by showing how 
it applied to Boniface of Savoy. The archbishop of Canterbury was the monarch, the single 
ruler, of his archdiocese. Like a true king, Boniface had a superabundance of wealth from his 
richly endowed archbishopric, wealth quite sufficient to exercise the duties of his office. He 
had no need, then, to exact procurations from his subjects, the clergy, in order to carry out a 
visitation.67 Grosseteste presents himself for comparison. When he became bishop of Lincoln 
he introduced a new sort of visitation, unprecedented in scale. He had, though, taken care that 
the visitation be sustained entirely at his own expense and not that of his subjects, a feat made 
possible by the ‘superabundance’ of wealth with which the diocese of Lincoln was endowed.68  
 
Kingship and royal wealth  
Aristotle’s insistence that superabundant royal wealth was a precondition for true kingship 
supported Grosseteste’s understanding of kingship as a positive force, whether applied to a 
secular or spiritual ruler. It also once again differentiated Grosseteste’s understanding of 
kingship from that of the Paris school. Peter the Chanter and Stephen Langton (among others) 
had focused on the ius regis, the privileges or rights of a king laid out by God in His attempt to 
disabuse the Israelites of their misguided trust in royal rule: 
                                                          
65 ‘Sed numquid idem est clerotes et tyrannus? Vel forte non secundum rationem idem sunt, sed dicitur 
clerotes a negatione eorum quae regi conveniunt, tyrannus autem ab habitu contrariorum his quae regi 
conveniunt’ (Mercken, 161.83-6).  
66 ‘Rex itaque, cum regia potestate non recte utitur, rex esse desinit et a non utendo recte regia potestate 
fit clerotes, sic transiens in pravum usum regiae potestatis, et sic fit tyrannus. Transit igitur et 
transgreditur quis ex regno in tyrannidem, cum non possit non recte uti potestate regia aliquamdiu, nisi 
et prave utatur. Pravitas enim est monarchiae tyrannis; ex quo sequitur quod malus rex fit tyrannus. Sic 
itaque fit transmutatio politiae optimae, quae regnum est, in pessimam, quae est tyrannis’ (Mercken, 
161.86-93).  
67 Gieben, 373-4, 378-9; Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’, 264-5.  
68 Gieben, 375-7 Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’, 264-5.  
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‘he shall seize your sons and... make them his horsemen... he shall turn your daughters 
into his ointment-makers, his cooks, and his bread-makers. He shall seize your fields, 
your vineyards, and your best olive-groves... As for your crops and the produce of your 
vineyards, he shall tithe them to give to his eunuchs and members of his familiar... He 
shall also levy a tithe on your flocks, and you shall be his serfs. And on that day you 
shall clamor and shrink away from the face of that king whom you have elected, but 
God shall not hear you, since you asked for a king (I Kings 8: 11-18).’ 
In the words of Philippe Buc, ‘for the majority of twelfth-century exegetes the ius regis did not 
describe the absolute prerogatives of a fully legitimate authority, but rather the excesses in 
taxation and lordship (exactionem et dominationem) to which a kingship created against God’s 
will was naturally prone.’69 Kingship, because of its sinful origins, naturally entailed financial 
oppression. For Stephen Langton, both ius regis and contemporary evidence demonstrated 
that the inherent rapacity of kings put them at dire risk. Commenting on Deuteronomy 17, 
where God outlines His expectations of the future king of the Israelites and forbids him from 
having immense weights of gold and silver, Langton argues that this is,  
‘plainly, against modern kings, who collect treasure not in order that they may sustain 
necessity but to satiate their cupidity. And note that the temporal possession of riches 
is well called a weight, because it is more of a burden to man than a support or a help. 
And so it is good that riches are signified by the name ‘weight’, because they are heavy, 
and drag down the man who carries them... to the lowest point of hell... And note that 
he says: immense, that is, beyond the measure of necessity: therefore, whatever goes 
further, that is, beyond necessity, is from evil, that is, it is evil and a sin.’70  
 
Both Langton and Grosseteste would allow that kings might lawfully levy some taxes, 
according to ‘necessity’. Langton had enabled Henry III to levy such a tax in 1225, as discussed 
in chapter two, and Grosseteste also recognised that the king might be owed certain aids and 
services, as discussed below. Grosseteste would also agree with Langton that taxation beyond 
necessity was sinful; after all, his purpose at Lyonss was to argue that the archbishop of 
Canterbury’s procurations were unnecessary and unjust. Langton’s point, though, was not just 
that royal wealth was sinful if it was ‘immense’ (and so ‘beyond necessity’), but that vast 
temporal wealth was morally dangerous ‘because it is more of a burden to man than a support 
or a help’ and imperilled his soul. Grosseteste would not agree that immense royal wealth was 
sinful per se. In fact, it could indeed be considered a ‘support or help’ in that a 
superabundance of royal wealth was just what enabled a king to execute the duties of his 
office.  Only a ruler who possessed this magnitude of wealth could truly be called a king. This 
is why, as Grosseteste demonstrated by reference to his own example, a king ‘to the extent 
                                                          
69 Buc, ‘Princely Power’, 322. 
70 d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 427.  
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that he really is a king’ (as Grosseteste puts it) has no need to place financial burdens on his 
subjects. Kingship, in fact, is not inherently oppressive but inherently non-oppressive. This is 
some distance from the Parisian focus on the ius regis.  
Identifying tyranny 
Grosseteste’s Aristotelian distinction between kingship and tyranny, based on the 
requirement of superabundant royal wealth, was rather different to that better known to 
contemporaries, though it was compatible. The standard distinction was summarised by John 
of Salisbury in his Policraticus:  
‘there is wholly or mainly this difference between the tyrant and the prince: that the 
latter is obedient to law, and rules his people... under the guidance of law... he should 
be someone who does not fear the penalties of law but someone who loves justice, 
cherishes equity, procures the utility of the republic, and in all matters prefers the 
advantage of others to his private will.’71 
This definition combined the broad requirement that the king act for the general interest of 
the realm with the more specific demand that he rule according to law. The idea that one 
could only act against another according to law and due legal judgement was widespread and 
deep-rooted.72 It lay at the heart of the English common law and, in 1215, clauses 39 of Magna 
Carta, ‘probably the charter’s most cherished clause’,73 ensured that the same principle should 
govern the actions of the king: ‘No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or 
outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the 
lawful judgement of his peers or be the law of the land.’ Scholarly thinking mirrored practice. 
John Baldwin has argued that Stephen Langton’s insistence that royal decisions must be made 
according to law, in the specific sense of a judgement in court, was his ‘personal signature.’74  
 
For a subject in receipt of a royal command, this distinction provided a simple test.  
Using as his guide the definition of John of Salisbury, or the principles of the Common Law, or 
clause 39 of Magna Carta 1215, or the quaestiones of Stephen Langton, he would only need ask 
a straightforward question: had the king made the decision justly and according to judgement, 
or not? As John Baldwin has shown, Langton demonstrated, through numerous examples, how 
this thought process might work:  
                                                          
71 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, trans. C.J. Nederman (Cambridge, 1990), 28, 30. 
72 Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton’, 1043.  
73 Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction’, 37. 
74 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 829. This statement could be taken to mean that judgment by 
court was the ‘personal signature’ of Langton among the theologians at Paris rather than (as Baldwin 
seems to imply) something unique to Langton generally, which is unlikely (Carpenter, ‘Archbishop 
Langton’,1043). The importance the requirement held for Langton still stands.  
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‘If a king unjustly wages war and the people know the injustice, are they held to obey 
him? The response was succinct but clear: If the matter was judged through sentence 
by a court, even though the court was partial to the prince, and even though the 
sentence was unjust, the people must accept, obey and not discuss the sentence.’75  
Again, the importance of due legal judgement is demonstrated by the example of a castle 
siege. According to Langton, ‘If the siege has been adjudicated by a sentence of the court, no 
matter how unjust, the people cannot discuss the decision. But if the king has acted on his own 
will (proprio motu) to besiege the castle wrongly and without a legal judgement, the people 
will not be disobedient if they refuse to follow him.’76 It was the absence of legal judgement in 
court, then, which for Langton rendered a royal command illegitimate.  
 
Although this was a principle that Grosseteste indubitably supported, his Aristotelian 
definition of kingship does not include the requirement that a king make decisions by legal 
judgement in court.  His distinction agrees with the general principle that the king should 
govern for the common good and is congruent with the demand that the king should rule 
according to law but, importantly, makes royal wealth the fundamental precondition for 
lawful rule. If a king has insufficient income to prosecute his policies without imposing on his 
subjects, he cannot be counted as a king in the true sense. He is driven to rule oppressively 
and so transgresses into tyranny.  
 
Grosseteste and epeikeia  
Unlike Langton’s discussion, which uses helpful real-life scenarios that the reader could 
almost use as a checklist for identifying illegitimate royal action, Grosseteste’s distinction 
between kingship and tyranny demands more of the reader. Firstly, he leaves many questions 
unanswered. What, exactly, comprised the king’s ‘own goods’ – the resources from which he 
could draw in order to govern? Grosseteste notes that: ‘the king is not said to seize the 
property of others, if he receives military services owed to the king or moneys owed to him or 
other things by some means or other owed to the royal office.’77 What exactly was ‘owed’ to 
the king on account of his office?  Grosseteste only specifies military service. If, as seems 
possible, he is thinking about feudal incidents (with the English model in mind) could scutage, 
relief, the profits of justice or the collection of revenues during ecclesiastical vacancies be 
included in this category? As customary components of English royal income, this would seem 
                                                          
75 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 817-18. 
76 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 818.  
77 ‘Non autem dicitur rex aliena capere, si regi debita servitia militaria seu pecunias sibi debitas seu alia 
aliqua regio debita officio recipiat’ (Mercken, 160.69-71). 
128 
 
possible. The difficulty lay in the ambiguity surrounding precisely what some of these 
payments entailed. Magna Carta had ensured that relief would be fixed according to the 
‘ancient’ level, at £100 for an earl’s barony and 100s. for a knight’s fee: that much at least was 
certain. However, the level of other feudal incidents and the manner of their exaction was a 
continual source of contention among the king’s greater subjects in assemblies and 
parliaments.78  Could scutage, for instance, be levied for a royal campaign overseas? Could the 
rate be raised above the usual £1 per fee or, more controversially, was general consent 
actually required for the levy of scutage?79 How often could it be levied? These were all 
questions debated by king John’s magnates.80 Whilst the limits placed on royal money-making 
ventures by Magna Carta, and Henry’s subsequent resort to general taxation, made certain 
questions less contentious after 1215, there was still much to be resolved. For instance, ‘in 
England the link between service and exemption was no more than haphazard and 
occasional’, so that whether or not service implied exemption from scutage was still 
debateable at the end of the thirteenth century.81 Feudal incidents aside, could it be said that 
taxation was owed the king if it was of proven necessity?82 Considering Henry’s would-be 
reliance on taxation, granted along the lines set out in Magna Carta, could common consent be 
taken as an acceptance that such a tax was ‘owed’ to the king?  
 
Grosseteste’s definition of what was ‘owed’ to the king as part of the resources 
belonging to his office was loose and open to interpretation. Arguably this was his intention. 
According to the rationale of Aristotle, there would be no advantage in pronouncing a strict 
set of legal definitions about what exactly was ‘owed’ to the king. This is because Aristotle was 
wary of positive (man-made) law:  
                                                          
78 Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 402 and n. 107.  
79 Magna Carta 1215 placed scutage in the same category as general aids in requiring common consent 
through an assembly, though the demand that this applied to scutage was left out of subsequent issues. 
It was understood, and shown on several instances during Henry’s reign, that scutage only required the 
consent of the tenants in chief (Carpenter, ‘Beginnings of Parliament’, 399). 
80 Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 127-28. 
81 Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 422-3.  
82 ‘According to Roman law, a ruler could appeal to the necessity to defend the common good, which 
was often a military necessity, in order to justify exceptional demands on his subjects. Provided that 
they acknowledge the necessity, his subjects could not deny his claim; but the need for them to make 
that acknowledgement opened the way for debate and for a sort of consent. They had the right to 
question the ruler’s plea of necessity, but once it had been recognized they had no right to deny him the 
consequent tax’ (Maddicott, Origins of Parliament, 122). For Langton’s insistence on ‘necessity’ for 
deciding the level of taxation, see: d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 427.  
129 
 
‘there are some things about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general 
terms; therefore in cases where it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but 
impossible to do so rightly, the law takes account of the majority of cases, though not 
unaware that in this way errors are made. And the law is none the less right; because 
the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the case; for the 
raw material of human behaviour is essentially of this kind.’83  
In the Aristotelian spirit, Grosseteste might well have been cautious of specifying exactly what 
subjects ‘owed’ the king. What would be the point of defining, for instance, how often scutage 
could be levied or at what level when demand for it could vary so markedly from one period 
to the next? Equally, there would be no point in specifying a standard level for the rate of 
taxation, when at one time a fifteenth might be required and at another only a twentieth. In 
such instances, strict legal parameters would be unhelpful. 
 
How, then, was the subject to judge what was ‘owed’ the king? Aristotle explains:  
‘So when the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is exceptional, 
then it is right, where the legislator owing to the generality of his language has erred 
in not covering that case, to correct the omission by a ruling such as the legislator 
himself would have given if he had been present there, and as he would have enacted 
if he had been aware of the circumstances.’84 
The person called upon to make the judgement, in the absence of a specific ruling, must keep 
in mind the telos or end goal (what the original law had been supposed to achieve) and make a 
decision that best serves that goal. The tool to be used for aiding this judgement was epeikeia, 
equity: 
‘the essential nature of equity... is a rectification of law in so far as law is defective on 
account of its generality. This in fact is also the reason why everything is not regulated 
by law: it is because there are some cases that no law can be framed to cover, so that 
they require a special ordinance.’85 
 
Grosseteste advised the cardinals at Lyons that epeikeia should be used to correct 
positive law, which was deficient due to its failure to take account of all circumstances, 
arguing that the ruler (Boniface) should use epeikeia in deciding what to extract from his 
subjects. The cardinals had pointed out that Boniface was entitled to procurations by canon 
law but, Grosseteste argued, that did not mean that he should exact them, for canon law is 
positive law, not natural law. Natural or divine law, so we are told both by Scripture and by 
the Dionysian De ecclesiastica hierarchia, should always have priority over positive law.86 
                                                          
83 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thompson (Penguin Classics, 2004), 140.  
84 Nicomachean Ethics, 5.10. 
85 Nicomachean Ethics, 5.10. 
86 Gieben, 380-85; Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’, 266. 
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Grosseteste explained to the cardinals that natural law is always equitable, whilst positive law 
is not, since it cannot take account of all possible circumstances. Positive law, then, cannot be 
applied in blanket fashion to all cases. The ruler, as Aristotle tells us, should exercise the 
virtue of equity, epeikeia, in making judgements according to each case.87 If Boniface exercised 
epeikeia, he would see that his proposed procurations were not just.88 Aristotle was clear 
‘what the equitable man is. He is one who chooses and does equitable acts, and is not unduly 
insistent upon his rights, but accepts less than his share, although he has the law on his side.’89 
Grosseteste’s point was that Boniface might technically be entitled to procurations according 
to canon law but that, instead of insisting on his rights, he should take the good of his subjects 
as his end goal and exercise epeikeia in order to judge what course best served that telos. 
 
Grosseteste might well, then, have expected the reader of his commentary to 
understand the point about the exercise of epeikeia when reading his loose definition of what 
was ‘owed’ to the king. The king (whether the archbishop, bishop or king of England) was 
expected to keep the end goal of royal government in mind (the good of his subjects) and use 
epeikeia to judge what course of action best served that goal, what amount he could justly levy 
from his subjects on account of his office. A subject could, in turn, apply the same principle 
when adjudicating royal requests for money. Just as Grosseteste, in effect, put himself in his 
superior’s shoes in order to test whether or not Boniface’s request was equitable, so the 
subject of a secular king could ask whether the royal judgement served the end goal of the 
good of the kingdom.  
 
This method of arriving at a judgement, though framed by Grosseteste in Aristotelian 
terms, would have been familiar to the cardinals at Lyonss. As David d’Avray has shown, 
Aristotle’s principle of the use of epeikeia to decide what judgement would best serve a stated 
goal was congruent with aspects of ecclesiastical law.90 In effect, it was the same principle of 
equity that provided for the dispensation system. Monastic rules, for instance ‘were 
instrumentally rational devices serving values, rather than values in and of themselves.’91 
Thus if a situation arose when a particular rule was not working effectively in service of the 
                                                          
87 Gieben, 385-6; Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’, 266-7.  
88 Gieben, 386-7; Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal Curia’, 267.  
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given value, then the pope could grant a dispensation to correct the error.92 The same 
principle applied to the granting of dispensations in order to allow a marriage within the 
forbidden degrees of consanguinity.93 Although some of the references used by Grosseteste at 
Lyons might have been unfamiliar, the principle was not. The same might be said in fact in the 
context of English politics, where the debates of assemblies and parliaments which aimed to 
decide what political decision best served the ‘common good’ could be understood in a similar 
framework.  
 
Grosseteste’s views on royal wealth and Henry III 
Grosseteste’s concept of kingship, based on a superabundance of royal wealth that prevented 
the king needing to burden his subjects financially, had particular resonance in the reign of 
Henry III. The bishop’s pronouncement that hard-up rulers were unfit to bear the name of 
king might well have pricked the ears of Henry’s subjects. Inflation had eroded much of the 
financial basis of royal government. At about £24,000, Henry’s annual income in 1230 might 
have been the same as that recorded in Henry I’s surviving pipe roll of 1130 but, in real terms, 
that money was now worth between two and three times less than it had been a hundred 
years previously.94 More of that income also came from contested sources, rather than from 
‘politically inoffensive’ royal domain, a lot of which had been given away over the years to 
provide patronage.95 Increasingly Henry sought general taxation which, in line with the 
principles of Magna Carta, could only be granted by common consent in an assembly. This 
meant that Henry’s government, particularly its finances, was regularly placed under scrutiny 
and subjected to vociferous criticism in assemblies and parliaments.96 The fact that magnates 
and prelates met so regularly during Henry’s reign to debate the need to raise royal revenue 
meant that they would be acutely aware of the deficiency of royal income.  
 
Whilst a good part of Henry’s financial difficulties resulted, therefore, from a chronic 
shortage of resources, the king appeared to compound his problems by lavishing precious 
funds on his Poitevin  half-brothers, the sons of Isabella of Angoulême by her second marriage 
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to Hugues (X) count of La Marche, who had arrived in England  in 1247. 97 This complaint was 
voiced prominently by the Montfortians, in 1258 and again in January 1264, when they 
submitted their case against Henry’s government to the king of France for arbitration. They 
protested against the ‘immense and uncontrolled liberalities and donations of the lord king... 
who, entirely without reason, gave away to many undeserving people... all that he should use 
to replenish his treasury’.98 The result was that  
‘little or nothing was left in the treasury for the use of the king, so that, his store of 
money being utterly spent, having not the wherewithal to pay for his daily food, the 
lord king had to turn to seizing bread, wine, and other things for the maintenance of 
his household... whereby many of his English subjects were pauperized and 
beggared...’99 
These complaints about Henry’s financial mismanagement are suffused with the spirit of 
Grosseteste’s memorandum. In portraying an empty-pocketed Henry III who was a burden on 
his subjects, the Montfortians echoed Grosseteste’s warnings about the monarch whose funds 
were ‘not sufficient to sustain royal pomp and magnificence’, leading him to seize the 
resources of his people. Moreover, in describing Henry as the architect of his own insolvency, 
the barons identified a clear opportunity for reform. If Grosseteste’s view of kingship made 
the proper management of resources a moral imperative, Henry’s culpability meant that this 
objective was achievable if the barons could only prevent his ‘immense and uncontrolled 
liberalities and donations.’  
 
The reforms undertaken by the barons on this front echo Grosseteste’s warnings 
about the clerotes. Between 1258 and 1261, the reformers pursued three objectives, if with 
only limited success:  to control and limit royal spending, particularly Henry's generosity to 
his relatives; to introduce greater efficiency into the administration, cutting waste and 
corruption; and to ensure that the collection of revenue at the local level was fair, putting an 
end to oppression and extortion.100 Further diminishment of royal resources was to be 
prevented by the chancellor’s oath that he would not ‘seal any grant of a greater wardship, or 
of a large sum of money, or of escheats, without the consent of the great council or of the 
majority thereof’.101 The councillors were also to swear that they would not accept any grant 
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from the royal demesne without conciliar authorisation.  Meanwhile, lest the councillors 
themselves follow the same path as the king, burdening their subjects in the execution of their 
office, ‘it was provided that they should be men who had sufficient means of their own to be 
able to bear the burden of the expenses of this duty.’102  
 
The reformers also moved to rebuild royal resources. It is in the steps taken by the 
reformers on this front or, at the very least, the spirit in which they were taken, that 
Grosseteste’s spirit is most palpable. The barons decided to appoint ‘someone of approved 
fidelity and industry... to undertake the care of the treasure and to keep it faithfully for the use 
of the king’.103 The man appointed, on 2 November 1258, was John Crakehall, archdeacon of 
Bedford.104 The choice of Crakehall for this particular task is arguably significant, for he had 
been close to Grosseteste. It is true that Crakehall would likely also have been friendly with 
Montfort and his appointment provided a treasurer more sympathetic to the earl’s long-held 
financial claims against Henry.105 From another point of view, however, Montfort and his 
confederates had deliberately made an altruistic choice. Crakehall was intimately familiar 
with Grosseteste’s ideas on the moral importance of sufficient resources and sound financial 
management as the basis for government. Crakehall had not only been Grosseteste’s steward, 
in charge of managing the estates of the huge diocese of Lincoln but had also, like Gravesend, 
accompanied Grosseteste to Lyonss. 106 He would, therefore, have been familiar with the great 
bishop’s view of the Aristotelian arguments about royal solvency. As Adrian Jobson has 
shown, Crakehall presided over a series of reforms that aimed to restore royal finances, from 
the selling of wardships to an investigation of the mints and a revision of accounting 
procedure.107 Recent research by Richard Cassidy has also revealed how the reformers moved 
to control the payment of fines in gold, which Henry had been taking into the wardrobe in 
order to build up a gold reserve, first for his Sicilian expedition and then for the launch of a 
gold currency.108 The reformers ensured that these fines would be channelled through the 
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exchequer so that the money could be properly audited and spent only in ways authorised by 
the baronial council.109  
 
John Maddicott has suggested how the influence of Grosseteste might have permeated 
the baronial reform programme, encouraging the involvement of churchmen like Crakehall 
who had been part of Grosseteste’s circle and influencing the reforming measures that sought 
to provide justice to inferiors. This  influence was manifested in the restraints placed on royal 
officials as well as the ‘principal of baronial self-denial’ that characterised many of the 
reforms, which echoed the strictures for the good conduct of estate officials set out in 
Grosseteste’s Rules.110 Ultimately, perhaps, ‘it was an attitude, rather than any specific 
proposals for action, which linked Grosseteste with the reforms of 1258.’111 Yet the attitude 
towards royal wealth espoused in Grosseteste’s memorandum and commentary arguably 
called for action. At the very least, the financial reforms undertaken by John Crakehall in an 
attempt to restore royal resources could be amply justified by Grosseteste’s Aristotelian 
scholarship. Financial reform was a practical necessity, to be sure, but the arguments of 
Grosseteste made it a moral necessity too. Few would have understood this better than John 
Crakehall.112  
   
Is it possible, then, that Grosseteste would have agreed with the reformers, who at 
Amiens justified their seizure of the royal purse by arguing that they would restore royal 
resources? After all, these measures would, if successful, in effect have restored the clerotes to 
the status of king and thus allowed Henry to rule for the benefit of his people. There is some 
reason for thinking so, for Grosseteste himself made similar arguments to those put forward 
by the Montfortians about Henry’s impositions on his subjects. He seems, moreover, to have 
framed these arguments in Aristotelian terms that implied Henry was a clerotes. The Burton 
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annalist attributes to Grosseteste one of the numerous schedules of complaint drawn up at the 
ecclesiastical synods of the 1250s, in which Henry’s financial demands on the Church and 
kingdom and the generally oppressive nature of his rule were lamented. The Burton schedule, 
which has been dated to January 1253, contains a clause that criticised the king for imposing 
on the hospitality of religious houses.113 Although it is written (so the complaint goes) that a 
king, if indeed he is good, does not exert himself for his own benefit but for the advantage of 
his subjects, doing good for them and encircling them with paternal affection, caring for them 
as a father does for his sons, the lord king frequently tours religious houses, enjoying their 
hospitality at their expense and burdening them greatly.114 Although this complaint was not 
unique to Grosseteste, its particular expression here appears to drawn upon his commentary 
on the Nicomachean Ethics.115 Grosseteste, then, might well have endorsed the complaints 
made at Amiens about Henry’s seizure of victuals for the maintenance of the royal household. 
He would also, perhaps, have approved of the sheriffs’ oath of 1258 that set out, in emphatic 
fashion, strict limits on the hospitality that sheriffs could expect from religious houses.116  
 
Like the reformers, Grosseteste was of the view that the greater part of Henry’s 
miserable financial situation was of his own construction. In 1252, Grosseteste led the 
episcopate in opposing Henry’s demand for an aid in support of a proposed crusade to the 
Holy Land. According to Matthew Paris, the bishops regarded Henry’s taking the cross as a 
ruse to extort cash from the Church, necessary because everything he had already wrung from 
his people he had spent prodigally, to the loss of his kingdom and the peril of his faithful 
subjects.117  
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frequenter circumiens per domos religiosas, hospitatur in eis earum sumptibus eas quamplurimum 
gravando. Nec excusat quod ab earum prelatis quandoque rogatur, quia non amor set timor huiusmodi 
rogatus est stimulus’ (Burton, 424; C&S, 471). 
115 For instance: ‘Ait itaque quod patris ad filios communicatio habet regni figuram, id est similitudinem 
et exemplum. Filiorum enim talis est cura patri qualis est cura regni et subditorum regi. Unde et Homerus 
appellat Iovem patrem, eo quod paterno affectu sibi subditos gubernabat. Regnum enim, id est regia 
gubernatio, vult, id est rationabiliter desiderat, esse principatus paternus, ut videlicet tali affectu 
regantur a rege sibi subditi, quali a patre filii’ (Mercken, 162.32- 63.38); ‘Si enim est vere rex et non 
tyrannus, bene facit subditis, et non qualitercumque sed optimo beneficio, quod est curam et 
sollicitudinem ipsorum gerere, ut ipsi mediante suo regimine bene operentur, id est secundum virtutem 
operentur et sic fiant felices’ (Mercken, 165.109-113). 
116 DBM, 120-21. I am grateful to Richard Cassidy for drawing this point to my attention.  
117 CM, V, 325-8.                 
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Considering his attitude towards Henry’s plan to crusade in the Holy Land, what might 
Grosseteste have made of the cherished plan of the English king to conquer Sicily? In 1254 
Henry accepted the throne of Sicily on behalf of his second son, Edmund, and agreed to lead 
an army against the island’s Hohenstaufen occupants, promising to pay the pope 135,541 
marks for the privilege.118 This was, so everyone knew, a total waste of money. In any case this 
was what the clergy told Henry in 1257, when he requested their financial support for the 
venture.  The scheme had also, they said, been undertaken without consent, required the 
diversion of the Church’s resources from the poor they were bound to support and, 
furthermore, was a burden the like of which the whole of England would be insufficient to 
support, even if earth were made into gold.119 Was the Sicilian venture, like Henry’s 
indulgence of the Poitevins, not also an unnecessary policy for which royal resources were 
completely insufficient, the pursuit of which would ead to the financial oppression of the 
king’s subjects? Perhaps the prospect of provisioning Henry’s Sicilian campaign would have 
been sufficient provocation to claim Grosseteste’s support for the baronial coup in 1258, if 
only to take royal finances in hand. 
 
It is doubtful, however, whether Grosseteste would have been persuaded that the ends 
justified the means. At no point in his commentary or memorandum does Grosseteste 
entertain the possibility of taking action against the clerotes or tyrant. This might be because 
Aristotle himself did not discuss the subject in the Ethics and Grosseteste did not wish to stray 
too far off-piste. However, his own actions offer no suggestion that he would have 
countenanced radical measures.  Faced with the invitation to approve the tax for Henry’s 
crusade in 1252, the appropriate course of action in Grosseteste’s view was to refuse, asking 
the king to have a care for his soul and cease his demands. Whether or not Henry’s financial 
demands stemmed from a fundamental lack of resources that rendered him a clerotes was a 
moot point. Crucially, Grosseteste never attempted to reconcile his Aristotelian concept of 
clerotes and tyrant with his fundamental understanding of monarchical power, nor was there 
any clear way of doing so. He treated Henry’s claim to the ecclesiastical aid in the same way as 
Innocent IV’s request for his nephew’s canonry, as a destructive command, entailing damage 
to the Church, which was thus to be disobeyed. Whether the ruler in question was a clerotes or 
                                                          
118 Lunt, Financial Relations, 266. 
119 Burton, 390-1; C&S, 526 
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simply a true king issuing a destructive order, Grosseteste’s resistance was confined within a 
single set of parameters.  
 
Conclusions 
If one were to hypothesise, therefore, as to what path Grosseteste might have taken at 
Westminster in 1258, there is only one course of action that can be projected from his 
previous endeavours: the disobedience of destructive royal demands for taxation 
accompanied by impassioned lectures on the dangers of current royal policy.  Grosseteste’s 
concept of the nature of power and his consequent determination that subordinates could not 
strike to cut off or diminish monarchical power were an integral part of his core beliefs.120 Any 
decisions he made would be built on these foundations. Of course, it is impossible to say with 
absolute certainty that Grosseteste would not have supported Simon de Montfort, particularly 
since several bishops were later moved to follow the earl, first in 1258 and then between 
1263 and 1265. As will be discussed in chapter six, these bishops were drawn by the charisma 
of Montfort, amidst the turbulent atmosphere of political crisis and civil unrest, into pursuing 
a course of action that transcended the accepted limits of action against kings. Perhaps this 
would have been true of Grosseteste as well. It should be recognised, though, that this would 
have required a fundamental shift in his values.  
 
It is likely that some of those ecclesiastics who did join Montfort carried the marks of 
Grosseteste’s influence. Prominent among them was Richard Gravesend. Elected to the see of 
Lincoln in the autumn of 1258, he did not hesitate to join the baronial party and was to remain 
one of Montfort’s most committed supporters.121 Gravesend had been part of Grosseteste’s 
circle and was likely close to Montfort.122 Like Montfort and Crakehall, though, he was also 
familiar with Grosseteste’s arguments on royal wealth. Along with Crakehall, he had 
accompanied Grosseteste to Lyonss and had witnessed for himself Grosseteste’s 
demonstration of how Aristotelian philosophy could be applied to discussions of the ethics of 
government in his own day.  It was Gravesend, moreover, who had drawn up the 
                                                          
120 Pantin makes this point forcefully in relation to Grosseteste’s understanding of the pope’s plenitudo 
potestatis (Pantin, ‘Grosseteste’s Relations’, 188).  
121 Dunstable, 211; a papal letter addressed to Gravesend in 1267, accusing him of consorting with the 
king’s enemies overseas, suggests that he was unusually loyal to the Montfortian cause (CPL, 421).  
122 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 81-2; Letters of Adam Marsh,  xx, xxvii-xxviii, 184-91, 206-15. 
Gravesend was close enough to Montfort to be named as an executor of his will in 1259 (Maddicott, 
Simon de Montfort, 177). 
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memorandum which summarised the case, from which the abbreviatio sent to Montfort was 
drawn.123 Gravesend’s involvement in the baronial party, like that of Crakehall and Montfort 
himself, thus provided another medium by which Grosseteste’s arguments on royal wealth 
might well have been fed into the reform programme. Whilst Grosseteste’s understanding of 
kingship and royal power could not support the baronial regime, the posthumous influence of 
his arguments on royal wealth helps to explain the tenacious support given the earl by 
Gravesend and his ecclesiastical colleagues.124 Perhaps Gravesend, like Montfort, had ‘drunk 
of the cup’ presented by Grosseteste and, like the earl too, ‘the draft had gone to his head.’125 
 
From the evidence of Grosseteste’s writings, it is clear that he and the reformers 
agreed on two important points: that Henry’s impoverishment was self-inflicted, and that it 
led to the oppression of his subjects. Given the shape and force of the arguments Grosseteste 
brought to Montfort’s attention it seems quite possible that the bishop might have provided 
the impetus for certain measures undertaken by the baronial council in 1258, particularly 
financial reform. Perhaps too the same arguments and the memory of the great man who had 
made them encouraged Gravesend and the other Montfortian bishops in support of the earl. 
Grosseteste’s writing on kingship encouraged an intensely moral approach to assessing royal 
financial management that might well have opened the door for the condemnation of Henry 
III’s rule used to justify the coup of 1258. There are indeed hints that the earl and his 
supporters felt that they were following the path laid out for them by Grosseteste. This notion 
appears strongly, for instance, in the ‘Song on the Death of Simon de Montfort’ identified by 
Maitland, a poem probably written in the immediate aftermath of Evesham and preserved in a 
collection belonging to one Walter de Hyde, a cleric with degrees in the arts and canon law 
who might have been associated with Stephen Berksted, the Montfortian bishop of 
Chichester.126 The poet writes that Montfort followed Robert [Grosseteste] ‘whose life was 
commended through certain miracles’; Montfort ‘obeys his words; Robert speaks, Simon 
believes, concerning such statutes: if you confess the truth, and die for the words, you will 
                                                          
123 This connection has gone largely unnoticed as both Pantin and Gieben mistakenly attributed the 
compilation to Richard Marsh. The mistake is corrected by Goering (Goering, ‘Grosseteste at the Papal 
Curia’, 254 n. 13).  
124 It is also possible that Henry of Sandwich (the Montfortian bishop of London elected in 1262), John 
de Cheam (the bishop of Glasgow who offered Montfort some support) and Thomas Cantilupe (Walter 
Cantilupe’s nephew and Montfortian) had known Grosseteste too, since they had all held livings in his 
diocese. It is possible, then, ‘that the outlook of these three had been influenced by the example and 
ideals of their one-time diocesan’ (Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 251-2).  
125 Powicke, Henry III, 391. 
126 F. W. Maitland, ‘A Song on the Death of Simon de Montfort’, EHR, 11 (1896),  314-18, at 314-15. 
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earn great rewards. It is amply proved that the just man suffers and is tried through great 
thunder.’127 It is not hard to see how the memory of Grosseteste’s passionate speeches and 
writings could have supported this sort of belief. Everything we know of Grosseteste, though, 
argues that even if he would have been sympathetic to certain baronial objectives, he would 
have objected in the most strident terms to the fundamentals of the Montfortian constitution.  
                                                          
127 Maitland, ‘Song’, 318. It is not clear exactly where Grosseteste’s speech finishes (Maitland, ‘Song’, 










In chapter one, we saw how at crucial moments of civil unrest in 1213 and 1234 the place of 
the archbishop of Canterbury and his suffragans as the nexus of interlocking loyalties had 
authorised and encouraged the English bishops to make peace between the ruler and his 
magnates. As discussed in chapter four, such action was buttressed by the writings of 
theologians like Langton and Grosseteste that upheld royal power and shunned aggressive 
action against kings. In 1266, five English bishops were excommunicated for being 
confederates of the rebel Simon de Montfort, having repudiated their loyalty to the king and 
joined the baronial party in defiance of English episcopal norms. How did this change from 
peacemaker to partisan come about? This chapter will examine a significant period in the 
story of this shift in episcopal behaviour: the reforming parliaments of Westminster and 
Oxford in 1258. This will be done through a narrative of episcopal activity between April and 
June 1258, as well as a more detailed examination of the experiences of three prelates – the 
archbishop of Canterbury and the bishops of London and Worcester – who, each in his own 
way, demonstrated how the web of loyalties that had underpinned the episcopal agenda in 
politics up to this point could unravel. The conclusion produced by this analysis is that, whilst 
individual prelates did involve themselves in events, the English episcopate as a whole had 
little to do with baronial reform. This was essentially because the actions taken to divert royal 
power into the reforming council were, for most prelates, far too radical to countenance. This 
makes ecclesiastical involvement in baronial reform very different both in nature and extent 
to the roles taken earlier by the likes of Stephen Langton, Edmund of Abingdon, Robert 
Grosseteste and others in ensuring just government through the enforcement of Magna Carta 
and the Charter of the Forest through sentence of excommunication. The events of 1258 did 
not, however, mean that the bishops were presented with an ultimatum either to join the 
royal or baronial party or else to distance themselves entirely. The archbishop of Canterbury 
and his suffragans could, like Stephen Langton and Edmund of Abingdon, have stepped in to 
resolve the dispute before it came to blows, yet they chose not to do so. The consequences for 
the course of English politics were severe. 
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The bishops at the parliaments of Westminster and Oxford 
Chronicle accounts of the ecclesiastical meetings of 1258 are somewhat confused but, when 
combined with other sources, a tentative  narrative of episcopal activity can be constructed. 
Magnates and prelates gathered together at Westminster shortly after 7 April 1258 to discuss 
the business of the kingdom, especially that of Sicily.1 Fulk Basset, bishop of London, and 
Walter de Cantilupe, bishop of Worcester, were present both as members of the episcopate 
and as members of the royal council. Both had probably been sacked from the king’s council in 
1255 after they had led the bishops in vociferous opposition to the Sicilian project. On that 
occasion, both had declared (according to Matthew Paris) that they would die before the 
English Church was subjected to ruin.2  Both had been reinstated to the council in 1257 and 
now, during the days of the Westminster parliament, were busy witnessing charters along 
with other curiales, joined occasionally by the bishops of Salisbury, Norwich, and Coventry 
and Lichfield.3 On 19 April, the archbishop of Canterbury, Boniface of Savoy, sent out a 
summons to the higher clergy of all England to meet at Merton on 6 June. 4 The purpose of the 
meeting was to consider further the grievances against lay treatment of the Church that had 
been the subject of so much discussion over the previous few years. It is likely that further 
discussion of Henry’s Sicilian ambitions during the Westminster parliament, together with the 
anticipation of the inevitable renewal of royal demands for financial aid from the Church, 
stirred Boniface to muster his troops. No doubt the archbishop hoped to utilise the corporate 
solidarity continually recreated and maintained during the numerous  ecclesiastical meetings 
of Henry’s reign in order to strengthen the position of the English Church in respect to Henry’s 
demands. Meanwhile, on 28 April, the king put his request for an aid to fund his Sicilian 
venture to the parliament. The magnates agreed to respond within three days. The 
Tewkesbury annalist records that at this point the bishops withdrew, not wishing to incur the 
anger of the king.5 Whether or not the bishops of London and Worcester withdrew with the 
other prelates or remained as members of the royal council is uncertain, though they did not 
witness any charters between 27 April and the Oxford parliament in June. On the third day 
                                                          
1 DBM, 72-75; Carpenter, ‘1258’, 183. 
2 CM, V, 525. 
3 Both Basset and Cantilupe were appointed to the king’s council in 1257. Their appointment and oath 
are recorded in the Burton annals (Burton, 395-7); Carpenter suggests Cantilupe’s sacking from the 
council in 1255 from his reappointment in 1257 (Carpenter, ‘Thomas Cantilupe’, 297 and n.22). In 1258 
Basset and Cantilupe witnessed a charter together on 12 April, Cantilupe witnessed again together with 
the bishops of Bath and Wells and Coventry and Lichfield on 17 April and the bishop of Salisbury on 19 
April 1258; on 19 April Basset and Cantilupe also witnessed another charter together (RCWL, 117). 
4 C&S, 571-2. 
5 Tewkesbury,163; Carpenter, ‘1258’, 187. 
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following Henry’s request, as promised, a response was given. A band of earls, barons and 
knights, led by the earl of Norfolk, marched into Westminster Hall. They demanded the 
expulsion of the Poitevins and that the king should abide by the decisions of a council of 
twenty-four, without whose consent no tax could be imposed. The royal seal was also to be 
handed to a man provided by the twenty-four.6 Faced with such a demonstration of force, the 
king capitulated.7 The barons promised in return to do their best to influence the community 
regarding the grant of an aid for Sicily, providing the pope would soften the terms of the 
agreement.8 The following day, on 2 May, it was announced that another parliament would be 
held at Oxford on 9 June to take the matter further.9  
 
In the meantime, shortly before the magnates began to gather at Oxford, prelates of 
both provinces gathered at Merton on 6 June in response to the summons of the archbishop of 
Canterbury. The precise composition of the assembly is unknown, though cathedral deans, 
abbots, priors and archdeacons  had been summoned as well as bishops.10 The archbishop of 
York had died in May, and his suffragans seem to have been absent.11 Like the ecclesiastical 
assemblies of previous years it was a self-consciously regnal assembly, as the scope of the 
provisions  and the final clause, stating that the provisions had been made in a solemn 
assembly of the prelates and clergy of the English Church, shows.12 The assembly lasted only 
two days (the provisions are dated 8 June); prolonged discussion was obviously unnecessary, 
since the grievances of the English Church had been discussed frequently over the past few 
years that most of the prelates probably knew them by heart. What was important, though, 
was the fact of meeting in a regnal assembly with the sharing of common interests, ensuring 
the renewal of the corporate solidarity that had been established over many years. At this 
critical juncture in the politics of the kingdom, the prelates remained a united body. For some 
reason, they decamped to Westminster in time for the final session of the assembly on 8 June. 
There, the prelates put their seal to what amounted to a series of proposals; rather than 
                                                          
6 Tewkesbury,163-4; Carpenter, ‘1258’, 187-8. 
7 Carpenter, ‘1258’, 187-8. 
8 DBM, 72-3.  
9 DBM, 74-77. 
10 C&S, 571-2. 
11 C&S, 568. 
12 C&S, 585.  
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issuing their schedule in the form of official statutes, the possibility of their amendment was 
left open.13  
 
About three days later, around 11 June, the lay parliament opened at Oxford. There, 
twenty-four councillors were elected, twelve to represent the king (already chosen before the 
parliament opened) and twelve to represent the barons, to provide for the reform of the 
realm.14 The parliament lasted about a fortnight, during which a series of reforms were drawn 
up and some implemented, including the establishment of a council of fifteen that would 
effectively govern the kingdom. The Lusignans, refusing to swear an oath to uphold the 
reform programme, were chased from the country by Simon de Montfort and others.15 The 
extent of episcopal involvement in the Oxford parliament is debateable, since the sources 
disagree substantially with one another.  The result is a divergence between those accounts 
that posit a decisive role for the bishops in the promotion of the reform programme and those 
arguing that they distanced themselves from baronial activity in the spring and summer of 
1258. Sir Maurice Powicke and Christopher Cheney were confident that the prelates remained 
distant from the parliament,16 as was Reginald Treharne.17 Clive Knowles, in his entry for 
Boniface in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, whilst allowing for a limited 
involvement by Boniface, suggests that most of the clergy stayed away from the Oxford 
parliament.18 John Maddicott, meanwhile, is confident that the bishops transformed the 
closing of the Oxford parliament into ‘a great spiritual drama’, as Boniface and nine other 
bishops pronounced a sentence of excommunication in support of the reform programme. 
The bishops’ involvement was of great significance, he argues, for their actions ‘presented the 
Provisions as a religious enterprise, something “holy and virtuous”, as the barons afterwards 
termed them, intended to provide for all the justice which the king had failed to provide.’19 For 
the bishops to have leant their spiritual muscle to the reform movement in such emphatic 
terms would not only have signalled their support for a revolutionary agenda but would also 
have represented a coming together of baronial and ecclesiastical efforts on a scale 
comparable to the enforcement of Magna Carta. The evidence, therefore, is worth reviewing.  
                                                          
13 C&S, 569-70, 572-85. 
14 DBM, 100-01. 
15 Carpenter, ‘1258’, 196-7; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 160-61, 163. 
16 C&S, 570. 
17 R.F. Treharne, The Baronial Plan of Reform, 1258-1263 (2nd ed., Manchester, 1971), 57-8. 
18 Knowles, ‘Savoy, Boniface’. 
19 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 162.  
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When in January 1264 the Montfortians put their case to Louis IX for arbitration at 
Amiens, they claimed that Henry had not only sworn to abide by the decisions of the twenty-
four and proclaimed that anyone opposing the Provisions would be deemed a capital enemy 
but that ‘he caused all those who might attempt to infringe these ordinances or provisions, or 
in any way to oppose them, to be publicly and solemnly excommunicated by the lord 
archbishop of Canterbury and several of his suffragans before a great assembly of men, he 
himself being present and holding a candle in his hand.’20 This claim is supported by several 
other sources. A version of the Flores Historiarum records that all the archbishops and bishops 
pronounced sentence of excommunication against ‘rebels’ – presumably those refusing to take 
the oath – and the Waverley annalist agrees that the bishops excommunicated all those who 
contravened the oath to abide by the reforms.21 The chronicle of Walter of Guisborough states 
that nine bishops excommunicated all those who contradicted the oath and notes that the king 
was holding a lighted candle.22 An anonymous poem, De provisione Oxonie, recorded in a later 
thirteenth-century hand, similarly states that: ‘Our king of England/Through the counsel of 
his people/Would set up a new law/And summoned a great parliament/All came there, the 
bishops/And the barons together,/ And all that were there swore an oath/And held lighted 
tapers’.23 It is the chronicle of Robert of Gloucester that gives the fullest description of a 
sentence of excommunication. The author describes the making and sealing of a ‘charter’ by 
the king and barons and how the bishops pronounced sentence of excommunication against 
all who were against the charter or broke its terms, the bishops and king holding lighted 
tapers which they cast down to seal the sentence.24 
 
In its description of the ritualised pronouncement of the sentence, this account sounds 
plausible. It is similar, for instance, to the account given by Matthew Paris of the sentence of 
excommunication pronounced against infringers of Magna Carta, when it was confirmed in 
1253. The sentence was made in Westminster hall in the presence of a number of earls and 
                                                          
20 DBM, 259. 
21 Flores Historiarum, III, 254; Waverley, 355. The Flores account is at least misinformed in claiming that 
the sentence was pronounced ‘ab ominus archiepiscopis et episcopis regni’, since the archbishop of York 
had died in May and the archiepiscopal see remained vacant until September. This statement mirrors 
the chronicler’s spurious claim that the oath was provided ‘ab universis et singulis aliis praelatis, 
comitibus, et baronibus’ (Flores Historiarum, III, 254). 
22 Guisborough, 186. 
23 Cambridge St John’s College, MS 112. The poem appears among a collection of Latin notes in the last 
seven leaves of the manuscript, written in a late thirteenth-century hand. I am grateful to Jennifer 
Jahner for drawing this to my attention.  
24The Metrical Chronicle of Robert of Gloucester, ed. W.A. Wright (2 vols., Rolls ser., 1885), ii, 734. 
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nobles by the archbishop of Canterbury and an impressive contingent of thirteen bishops, 
who threw down their candles to seal the sentence.25 On that occasion, however, Henry had 
refused to hold a candle himself, saying that it was not fitting for him to hold a candle since he 
was not a priest.26 If there was a sentence of excommunication pronounced in 1258, perhaps 
Henry had changed his mind, since the account of Robert of Gloucester and the Montfortian 
testimony at Amiens agree that Henry held a candle himself.  
 
This version of events, though, is not without its difficulties. All sources attesting to 
the sentence of excommunication were written some time after 1258. The first, contained in 
the reformers’ case put to Louis IX at Amiens, might have been a deliberate or accidental 
misdirection, intended to imbue the Provisions of Oxford with an air of sacrality and invest 
them with the same authority as the Charters. The Flores account for 1258 was drawn up after 
Evesham, at Merton priory, whilst Robert of Gloucester’s account comes from the late 
thirteenth century and describes a scene so similar to that of 1253 that one suspects the 
author might be confusing the two.27 The Waverley account was written retrospectively to 
explain events leading up to the battle of Lewes, whilst the account in Walter of Guisborough 
was written in the early fourteenth century. It is possible, too, that some of these accounts 
confused the events of 1258 with those of the Hilary parliament of 1265. There, in an 
assembly at Westminster composed of a highly partisan body, consisting of a relatively small 
number of Montfortian magnates, together with over one hundred ecclesiastics as well as 
knights and burgesses from the localities,28 nine bishops holding lighted candles pronounced 
sentence of excommunication against ‘all those who dared to do anything against the Charters 
of liberties and forest or against the [Montfortian] statutes that were provided the previous 
year.’29 That Walter of Guisborough gives the number of bishops pronouncing 
excommunication against breakers of the oath at Oxford in 1258 as nine, the same number as 
given in the Cronica Maiorum et Vicecomitum Londoniarum as pronouncing sentence in the 
Hilary parliament of 1265, suggests that Guisborough conflated the two events.  It is possible 
that the bishops’ pronouncement in 1265, made later and in very different circumstances to 
                                                          
25 CM, V, 375-7. 
26 CM, V, 377. 
27 Robert of Gloucester’s reference to a charter being made and sealed in 1258 also suggests that the 
author was conflating this event with the confirmation of Magna Carta in 1253, since the reform 
programme was not drawn up in a charter at the reforming parliaments.  
28 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 317. 
29 Cronica Maiorum, 71.  
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those of 1258, when Montfort enjoyed extensive ecclesiastical support, and the Provisions of 
Westminster had been published in the counties,30 might have been superimposed 
retrospectively on to the original reform parliaments.  
 
Moreover, such an enthusiastic endorsement of the reform programme in its initial 
stages would seem incongruent with episcopal activity up to this point. At Westminster the 
prelates had steered away from directly supporting the baronial agenda directly. As we have 
seen, according to the Tewkesbury annalist the bishops had withdrawn from the Westminster 
parliament, after the king’s request for an aid had been put but before the march on the king’s 
hall, ‘lest they incur the anger of the king’.  Given their evident desire to distance themselves 
from baronial action at this point, their support for the baronial programme at Oxford would 
seem out of place. The prelates had also met separately from the lay parliament at Oxford in 
June, at least initially. Although it would have been possible for the them to join the barons at 
some point during the Oxford parliament following their own meeting at Merton and 
Westminster, the account of the Tewkesbury annalist claims that they declined to do so. The 
annalist states that the prelates and clergy did not attend the Oxford parliament, taking a 
cautious attitude since they had met so recently to discuss the state of the Church but had not 
made any provisions.31 Powicke and Cheney suggested that this is why the prelates did not 
publish their provisions: Boniface and his suffragans were awaiting the outcome of the Oxford 
parliament in order to see which way the wind was blowing before making their next move.32 
Such caution was understandable. The prelates would have been aware that the magnates 
were gathering at Oxford with horses and arms. Although it was claimed that the armed 
muster was in preparation for a campaign in Wales, Matthew Paris recognised it as a 
                                                          
30 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 227-8, 314. 
31 The order in which the Tewkesbury annalist presents the parliaments is out of sequence. He states 
that, following the demands put by master Arlot the papal nuncio for the delivery of the money 
promised to the pope for Sicily on 23 April, all the magnates of the kingdom met at Oxford, although the 
bishops and clergy were absent, ‘forte aliqua cautela mediante’, since they had only recently held a 
discussion at Merton concerning the state, oppression and restoration of the English Church, but 
nothing had been accomplished (Tewkesbury, 163). This is then followed immediately by what appears 
to be first hand testimony of the dramatic conclusion of the Westminster parliament – the king’s 
request for an aid on 28 April and the march on the king’s hall three days later (Carpenter, ‘1258’, 188). 
This account includes the withdrawal of the bishops after the king’s request for an aid. The annalist’s 
account of the Oxford parliament that includes the absence of the bishops sounds plausible, since he 
knew about the prelates’ meeting at Merton and felt able to offer their possible motivations for their 
absence at Oxford. Presumably after writing his brief account of the Oxford parliament he received the 
newsletter about the Westminster parliament.  
32 C&S, 570. 
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preliminary for civil war between the Lusignans and their adversaries.33 Presumably he was 
not the only one to see through the deception and, if the prelates had recognised the danger, 
they would have been wise to steer clear of Oxford.  
 
The royal charter witness lists would seem to confirm the absence of almost all of the 
bishops from Oxford in June. The only prelates witnessing charters issued during this 
parliament, between 12 and 20 June, were Fulk Basset and Walter de Cantilupe.34 Both had 
been members of the king’s council; now they were both elected to the council of twenty-four  
to discuss provision for the reform of the realm. Whilst Fulk Basset joined on the king’s side, 
Walter de Cantilupe had joined as one of the baronial twelve. Boniface of Savoy might also 
have been present at the parliament as a member of the council of fifteen, though the absence 
of his name from the charter witness lists would suggest otherwise. He is recorded at South 
Malling (Sussex) from the 20 June so, at the least, he cannot have stayed for the duration of 
the parliament.35  Other councillors, Roger Mortimer and Humphrey de Bohun, had also been 
appointed even though they were absent.36 Therefore the only bishops involved in the 
construction of the reform programme during the Oxford parliament, who might have 
pronounced the sentence of excommunication, were Walter de Cantilupe and Fulk Basset.37 It 
seems unlikely, then, that Boniface led the bishops in issuing a sentence against those 
obstructing the reform programme.  
 
If any bishops had sought to uphold the reform programme by sentence of 
excommunication, then they were stepping well beyond the boundaries of precedent. Whilst 
the use of ecclesiastical censure to enforce Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests had 
become an important part of episcopal identity, the use of this sanction to enforce the 
programme of reform in 1258 was a different matter entirely. There were, for instance, 
practical problems with the application of such a sentence. Unlike Magna Carta, the series of 
measures that later came to be known as the Provisions of Oxford were never published. Even 
if the sentence of excommunication was proclaimed in front of a large crowd at Oxford in 
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1258, it is not clear how it would have worked in practice when most people were unaware of 
the contents of the reform programme. Even Matthew Paris, well-informed in other respects, 
knew nothing of the council of fifteen or its powers, and complained about the barons’ 
decision not to publish their reforms.38 Only those privy to the details would know if 
somebody had contravened or inhibited the measures of the reformers. This still allowed 
those individuals present to police their own actions by searching their consciences for any 
activities that would automatically incur the sentence. Those prelates pronouncing the 
sentence, as long as they had an understanding of the reform programme, would also have 
been able to pronounce judgement if they were called in future to judge whether a person had 
contravened the reforms. One possibility is that the sentence could have been used 
specifically to enforce the oath taken by those at the Oxford parliament to abide by the 
measures imposed by the council,  so that its remit was intended to be limited to those 
present who knew of the reform programme. Yet, if the bishops had deployed a sentence with 
such narrow scope, enforceable only by a small circle of senior clergy, their actions were 
highly anomalous. The contents of Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests were widely 
known, or at least were intended to be. Each re-issue was distributed to the counties and both 
Charters, on these occasions, were to be read by the sheriff in the county court in the 
vernaculars: ‘every step was taken to make sure that the texts were known.’39 In 1253, the 
bishops had made special efforts to publish the sentence of excommunication that upheld the 
Charters.40 The sentence was widely published, read out in parish churches across England 
accompanied by lighted candles and the ringing of bells on Sundays and feastdays.41 In the 
dioceses of Lincoln and London the sentence was read in public meeting places, in the county,  
hundred and other secular courts, by priests with crosses and handbells.42 The result was that 
the sentence was ‘impressed indelibly on the hearts of all.’43 According to Matthew Paris, 
Grosseteste had ensured that the sentence made the ears of the listeners ring and their hearts 
fearful.44 In 1255, the sentence was republished by order of Innocent IV in response to a 
request for its confirmation by the English bishops. The deans of London and Lincoln were 
charged with executing the papal mandate and sent letters promulgating the sentence across 
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England to all bishops and their officials, archdeacons, deans and other diocesan officials.45 
These men were to publish the sentence ‘distinctly and lucidly’ in English and French 
wherever and whenever they deemed expedient.46 A transcript of the sentence with its 
confirmation was sent to them ‘so that you may have a copy of it, and may cause others to 
have a copy of it, so that it may come to the notice of all, lest anyone wishes to excuse himself 
on account of ignorance.’ In addition, the deans of London and Lincoln also dispatched copies 
of Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests for the recipients to transcribe, so that the 
Charters could be distributed or in other ways brought to public attention in the same manner 
as the confirmation of the sentence, ‘lest reproach envelop unknowing people through 
ignorance.’47  
 
The point was that all subjects would be aware of the contents of the Charters and that 
a sentence of excommunication would befall them if they contravened them. In the case of 
latae sententiae, in which sentence automatically fell upon a person when they committed a 
sinful act, without the need for any legal judgement pronounced in the church courts or in the 
confessional,48 all at risk would need to be aware of those offences that would bring the 
sentence down upon them. This would hopefully act to discourage them from committing the 
offence in the first place, but, failing that, would at least provide them with the opportunity, in 
recognising their culpability, to submit to the sentence and seek absolution. It was the 
contumacy implied in ignoring one’s sentence that imperilled the soul,49 a result that would 
seem more than likely if latae sententiae were not advertised sufficiently to those at risk. Since 
the 1258 reforms were not published, it seems doubtful whether all present at the Oxford 
parliament outside the inner circle of reformers would have been fully advised of the 
programme of reform. Even if the sentence was used specifically to uphold the oath to abide 
by the reforms, this would still mean that many would be at risk, since, if they were not fully 
apprised of the content of the reform programme, they might break their oath inadvertently 
and thus bring the sentence down upon themselves. More generally, to deploy a lata sententia 
in such a limited fashion would be highly unusual. The parliament at Oxford had drawn a 
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sizeable crowd – potentially 137 tenants-in-chief accompanied by their knightly retinues.50 
Yet even if the sentence had been proclaimed to an audience consisting of most of the 
assembled nobles – the ‘great assembly of men’ recalled in the Montfortian case at Amiens – 
this was nothing compared to the dissemination of the sentence of excommunication applied 
to enforce Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests. Only a relatively small contingent 
familar with the contents of the reform programme would know if its measures had been 
infringed. Only those assembled at Oxford had taken the oath to adhere to the reforms and 
only a few members of the senior clergy would be able to adjudicate the sentence. This would 
rather take the ‘lata’ out of the ‘sententia’. This does not mean that so such sentence was 
pronounced but it does make it highly unlikely.  
 
Even if a sentence was pronounced, it did not necessarily signal a wholehearted 
episcopal endorsement of the reform agenda. If Boniface and some of his suffragans had 
wished to enforce the reforms effectively on a larger scale, as they had with Magna Carta and 
the Forest Charter, they might have done so in October, when a letter was sent out in Henry’s 
name ‘to all his faithful subjects, clergy and laity’, proclaiming a commitment to abide by the 
decisions of the council and ordering all subjects to swear to do the same, lest they be 
considered mortal enemies.51 The act was intended ‘to be firm and enduring’ and so copies 
were sent in English, French and Latin ‘to every county to remain there in its archives.’52 The 
letter was witnessed by the council of fifteen (minus John Mansel and plus Hugh Despenser 
and Roger de Queincy), including Boniface of Savoy and Walter de Cantilupe.53 If the bishops 
had pronounced sentence of excommunication in support of the oath or the reform 
programme in June, this would have been the time to mention it. It would also have been the 
moment, had the bishops so wished, to publish the sentence in parish churches and public 
places across England, with handbells and raised crosses, as had been done to advertise the 
sentence used to enforce the Charters in 1253. It is just possible, if one accepts doubtful 
evidence and allows for ill-considered or haphazard actions undertaken in the heat of political 
crisis, that a small number of bishops did seek to enforce the reform programme initially in 
June. It can be stated with certainty, though, that given the opportunity once the dust had 
settled to commit themselves to the reform programme, they chose not to do so.  
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Boniface of Savoy 
Events at Westminster need not have presented the bishops with a stark alternative between 
joining either the baronial faction or the royal party, on the one hand, or  withdrawing 
altogether from affairs on the other. There had been an alternate course open to Boniface of 
Savoy at Westminster in April and, if he had taken it, the situation might never have escalated 
in such a way at the Oxford parliament. In 1213 and 1234, the archbishop of Canterbury had 
stepped in when disputes between king and barons threatened the peace of the realm. Using 
their unique power as primate of England, Langton and then Edmund had called the king to 
account for his wayward actions and remade him symbolically, transforming him into a pious 
king fit to rule in the interests of the kingdom. In 1258, Boniface of Savoy could have imitated 
the actions of Langton and Edmund. The time to have done this might have been during the 
Westminster parliament, either after the king had refused to hear the complaint of John fitz 
Geoffrey concerning Aymer de Valence or, at the very latest, when Henry issued his request 
for an aid on 28 April.54 It was at this point, however, that the bishops withdrew ‘lest they 
incur the anger of the king.’55 It seems unlikely, given the bishops’ vociferous resistance to 
royal taxation over the preceding few years, that their withdrawal at Westminster was due to 
their timidity in refusing the royal request. They might well have sensed that trouble was 
afoot, since the atmosphere of the Westminster parliament was extremely tense. The king’s 
refusal to hear John fitz Geoffrey had sparked resentment about Henry’s protection of his 
unruly half-brothers.56 Insults had been exchanged between the Lusignans and the earls of 
Gloucester and Leicester; Montfort had launched himself at William de Valence, and a brawl 
had only been prevented by the bodily intervention of the king himself.57 Although the 
atmosphere was hostile, this would have been the very moment to intervene, as Langton and 
Edmund had done in similarly difficult situations. Edmund’s actions in particular would have 
provided a significant precedent, since the demands he put to the king included the removal of 
untrustworthy counsellors who, it was said, were turning the soul of the king from the love of 
his people and the hearts of the people from the king.58 On that occasion, Henry had 
responded positively by dismissing Peter des Roches and Peter de Rivallis. Even if Henry’s 
affection for his half-brothers was far greater than that which he had held for his ministers in 
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1234, he might still have been willing to listen to advice when framed in a suitable fashion by 
the archbishop of Canterbury.  
Yet Boniface declined to take any such action.  The obvious explanation is that he 
recognised in the baronial agenda an opportunity to move against the Lusignans. Boniface, 
like John fitz Geoffrey, had been the victim of Lusignan banditry. In 1252, Aymer de Valance, 
the bishop-elect of Winchester and one of Boniface’s own suffragans, in league with his 
brother William and others, had launched an attack on the archbishop’s palace at Lambeth.  
Money and valuables had been stolen and the archbishop’s servants carried off to Farnham 
Castle.59 Aymer, protected by the king, was let off scot free. Boniface would have sympathised 
heartily with John fitz Geoffrey. If he was forewarned of the demand that the group of barons 
were to put to the king in Westminster Hall on 1 May – the removal of the Lusignans – he 
might well have decided to turn a blind eye. In so doing, moreover, Boniface as a member of 
the Savoyard party would have had more than personal reasons for ousting the king’s half-
brothers. The queen and her Savoyard relatives had for several years been seeking to protect 
the lord Edward’s patrimony from the king’s enthusiastic patronage of the Lusignans.60 Yet, in 
the months before the Westminster parliament, Edward turned to the Lusignans for cash to 
finance a campaign against the Welsh, and began to fall under their influence.61  Among the 
reformers in 1258 were several of Edward’s councillors, like Peter de Montfort and John fitz 
Geoffrey, who had been injured by the Lusignans and saw Edward’s allegiance to them as ‘the 
last straw.’62 Peter of Savoy, the queen’s uncle and Boniface’s brother, was in fact one of the 
sworn confederates who on 12 April at Westminster, as hostilities boiled between the curial 
barons John fitz Geoffrey, the earl of Gloucester and the earl of Leicester, on the one hand, and 
the Lusignans on the other, promised to give mutual aid. In all likelihood this was a precaution 
against further Lusignan threats.63 Even the queen, according to the Waverley annalist, had 
welcomed the reforms of 1258 because they meant the exclusion of the Lusignans from 
court.64 Boniface took full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the baronial coup to 
take action against his adversaries, obtaining reddress from the council of fifteen for the 
disseisin of a fee in Preston (Kent) which William de Valence had perpetrated against him in 
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1255.65 The archbishop took his place on the council of fifteen, therefore, at least partly as a 
representative of a faction that leant tacit support to the reform programme, if only in order 
to purse the limited agenda of the expulsion of the Lusignans. 
 
There was, perhaps, another reason for the failure of Boniface to intervene in 1258 in 
the manner of his predecessors. This was the archbishop’s pursuit of an ecclesiastical agenda 
even to the detriment of the king’s position. As discussed in chapter two, prelates had met 
regularly over the course of the 1250s in response to Henry’s demands for financial aid and 
had been forged into a self-confident corporate unit with a strong conception of its rights and 
interests. Boniface had been absent abroad from several of these meetings, pursuing family 
interests in Savoy from May 1254 to November 1256.66 Still, the actions of Boniface in 1257 
and 1261 show how, on his return, the archbishop increasingly interpreted his role as leader 
of this group as a fearless and determined defender of ecclesiastical liberties, the successor of 
Becket and Edmund of Abingdon.  
 
In August 1257, Boniface showed his determination to lead the prelates in the fight for 
ecclesiastical liberties, even though his stance threatened to undermine the peace and 
security of the kingdom. Boniface had summoned a provincial council to meet in August 1257 
at London.67 Henry III, busy in campaign against the Welsh, had strictly forbidden the council 
from being held in his absence. The prelates, as tenants-in-chief, had been summoned to 
provide service for the royal army. The king pointed out that the prelates’ absence could bring 
danger to king and kingdom.68 The agenda for the council set out by Boniface shows that the 
archbishop, far from submitting to the king’s order automatically, thought a debate was 
needed as to  
‘whether it is right and proper and expedient for the prelates to discuss the business 
of the Church in a convocation of this sort, or rather to submit to the prohibition of the 
king; especially since the lord archbishop presents himself to pursue personally the 
cause of the Church in the aforementioned [grievances] and in all other matters, if it is 
necessary, wishing to spare no losses or expenses whatsoever, provided that the 
suffragans and clergy of his province wish to stand by him harmoniously in defence of 
the aforesaid rights by providing counsel and aid.’69 
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The response he received from his prelates was that the English clergy should remain firm in 
their purpose.70 The prelates met as planned, in defiance of the royal prohibition, and 
discussed a series of proposals for the protection of ecclesiastical liberties.71  
 
Looking forward to 1261, the actions of Boniface show again that he was willing to 
pursue his ecclesiastical agenda committedly, even at the expense of the kingdom’s peace. The 
collapse of the baronial council in November 1260, and the rebuilding of the royal court in 
December, allowed Henry, for the first time, to give his account of events to the pope. The 
impression created by the barons for Alexander IV in 1258 had been of a penitent king 
renouncing the evil counsel of the Lusignans and gratefully accepting the assistance of the 
new baronial council for the reform of the realm.72 This illusion could now be dispelled. Henry 
dispatched John Mansel Junior to the papal court at the end of January 1261.73 Alexander’s 
responses, sent over the course of April and May 1261, show that he now understood the 
reality of the events of 1258. The Provisions of Oxford had been set up in the king’s name by 
certain prelates and magnates, he had heard, ‘under the pretext of reforming the state of the 
realm’, but in reality to diminish Henry’s power. The oaths provided by Henry and the royal 
family to uphold the Provisions had been extracted ‘by a kind of compulsion’.74  Whether 
Alexander knew even now the full extent of baronial activities in 1258 is uncertain, for this 
hazy reference to ‘compulsion’ hardly does justice to the march of ‘noble and vigorous men’ 
on Westminster Hall that left Henry cowering in trepidation, or the confiscation of royal 
castles that left him at the mercy of the baronial reformers.75 Indeed Alexander’s letter, 
addressed to Henry and dated 13 April 1261, had made no mention of coercion. The pope’s 
initial grasp of events was shaky; he only knew that Henry, ‘induced some time ago by some 
sort of tumult among the magnates and men of [his] realm’, had sworn to observe ‘certain 
statutes’ that diminished his power.76 By the time a second papal letter was written on 29 
April, Alexander could state that certain magnates and prelates had bound themselves by an 
oath to uphold these statutes and that these men had somehow coerced members of the royal 
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family into providing their own oaths.77  Even if this picture was incomplete, Alexander by this 
point at least had the gist of the situation. Henry had not willingly provided his oath and the 
Provisions of Oxford diminished his power. This was all the information that the pope needed 
to quash the Provisions and annul all oaths that upheld them.  
 
Rightfully confident that Alexander would respond supportively to this news, in early 
May Henry set about securing the south-east for John Mansel’s return.78 At the very moment, 
however, that he expected his position to be buttressed by the support of the papacy, the 
archbishop of Canterbury and his suffragans appeared to be undermining his position. A 
council of the province of Canterbury assembled at Lambeth on 8 May, once again whilst the 
king was absent, this time in Canterbury.79 It was held in obedience, apparently, to papal 
orders that sought to procure financial support in response to the Mongol invasion of 
Hungary.80 If this matter was discussed, it can only have been in the most cursory terms, for 
during the week or so of the council there seems to have been only one real topic of 
discussion. This was the resurrection of the complaints about royal attacks on ecclesiastical 
liberty that had dominated the ecclesiastical meetings of the 1250s, discussed in chapter two. 
Although several amendments had been made to the detail, so that they represented more 
than just the publication of the earlier schedules,81 the essentials of the complaints were the 
same. The king violated all manner of ecclesiastical liberties. He summoned clerks to appear 
before secular courts and distrained bishops through their lay fees, forcing them to compel 
their clerks to attend. Those Church lands in his care during vacancies he despoiled and 
diocesan visitations were hindered because Henry forbade bishops from taking oaths from 
their subjects.82  
 
In some sense, the Constitutions of Lambeth were uncontroversial. Their claims 
accorded with canon law, many were generations old and had last been voiced only three 
years previously, so that their content should not have come as a shock. Certainly, when 
Urban IV read through them in 1263, he could only see that they ‘maintained justice and 
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honour’.83 Yet to Henry they represented a stab in the back. The letter of complaint he 
directed to Urban was indignant: 
‘although publicly it was believed by all that he [the archbishop] wished principally to 
provide a subsidy [to aid the cause against the Mongols], since this was specially 
demanded of him through the providence of your paternity,  putting on a show of 
obedience,  holding us and our magnates of our kingdom in contempt and excluding 
us,  he ordained, constituted and decreed many things to be observed under the 
commination of anathema by the authority of the aforesaid council, to the diminution 
of the status of our crown  and our dignity, and to the subversion of our rights and the 
laws, liberties and customs of our kingdom’84  
This claim is understandable from Henry’s point of view. After all, the schedules of complaint 
of the 1250s had been drawn up for his consideration as part of negotiations between the king 
and the Church. In contrast, he and his men had not been invited to the Council of Lambeth. 
Indeed, they had been excluded, giving the impression of a fait accompli.85 Moreover, the 
publication of the Church’s complaints as official statutes,86 to be enforced by the threat of 
anathema,87 must have looked like a serious attempt to inhibit what Henry saw as the normal 
and lawful operation of royal government. The timing of the council, moreover, was 
significant. As Henry saw it, perhaps understandably, the bishops had taken advantage of the 
papal order regarding the Mongol threat to meet and plot an attack on the Crown.88 Crucially, 
the Constitutions came at the very time that Henry was working to rebuild his position, when 
any concerted opposition would look like a deliberate attack against him. More upsetting even 
than the sinister timing of the council was the pivotal role played by the archbishop of 
Canterbury.  Henry must have expected Boniface to join his kinsmen Peter of Savoy and 
Richard of Cornwall in the vanguard of the royal revanche. Instead of aligning himself with the 
royal party, however, Boniface set himself up as a critic of royal policy.  
 
Coming at a time when Henry’s position was so precarious, the king understandably 
interpreted the Constitutions as a painful treachery. It was also, however, a potentially serious 
threat to his plan to restore himself to full power. Having recently sent to the pope, he would 
have been relying on Boniface to publish the forthcoming bulls dissolving all oaths to the 
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Provisions of Oxford. The archbishop’s activities at Lambeth must have raised serious doubts 
about his reliability. Henry wrote furiously and repeatedly to the pope to protest against 
Boniface’s behaviour. The king requested that the pope refrain from confirming the 
Constitutions of Lambeth.89 
 
In reality, Boniface probably never intended to pose a serious threat to Henry’s 
recovery of power. Although when Urban IV wrote in 1262 to confirm Alexander’s ruling he 
had noted that Boniface had failed to proceed with the execution of his predecessor’s mandate 
(owing, he understood, to Alexander’s death),90 Boniface had actually made efforts to act on 
Alexander’s orders. The archbishop wrote in August 1261 to John Mansel, reciting the papal 
bull that ordered them both to dissolve the reforming oaths and coerce the magnates into 
obedience. Mansel was to command Hugh Bigod, by threat of ecclesiastical censure, to release 
the castles of Scarborough and Pickering to the king.91 This action evidently failed to appease 
Henry who, still furious about Boniface’s actions at Lambeth, continued to direct complaints 
about the archbishop and his suffragans to the pope, writing at the end of October 1261 and 
again in January 1262.92 Clearly, in Henry’s view, Boniface’s commitment to the royal 
restoration was suspect.  
 
Significantly, the Constitutions of Lambeth show how Boniface played out what he felt 
to be his allotted role as archbishop of Canterbury. He took the first opportunity that 
presented itself – the papal call to meet the Mongol threat – to reinvigorate his pursuit of 
ecclesiastical liberties. This was part of a self-conscious, cultivated identity based on the 
heritage of his office. In the carefully crafted preamble to the Constitutions, the archbishop 
deliberately placed himself in the line of archbishops of Canterbury, including Saint Edmund, 
who had taken up the struggle against kings who had sought to trample on the liberty of the 
Church.93 He recounted how archbishops of Canterbury and their suffragans, past and present, 
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had approached the king and his counsellors, warning them of the danger to their souls and 
the honour of the kingdom that resulted from attacking ecclesiastical liberties, reminding 
them how the Egyptians had been struck down by many plagues because they had confined 
God’s people, the Israelites, the forerunners of the Christian priesthood, to servitude in clay 
and brick,94 subjecting them undeservedly to slavery, against the precept of God and the 
privilege of natural law.95 The bishops’ efforts, though, had drawn no response.96 Soaked in 
righteous indignation, Boniface’s identification of  Henry with Pharaoh and, by extension of 
himself with Moses,  elaborated his sense of occupational responsibility.  
 
However, as much as Boniface sought to align himself with Edmund of Abingdon, the 
very fact that he held such a meeting at a time of regnal crisis shows that his attitude was 
fundamentally out of line with that of his sainted predecessor. Whilst both might have shared 
an interest in ecclesiastical liberty, the actions of Boniface in 1257, 1258 and 1261 
represented a very different mindset to those of his predecessor. Stephen Langton and 
Edmund of Abingdon had approached the king to confront him with his transgressions, 
carefully maintaining their loyalty to him and facilitating a transformation in his actions. They 
had worked with the king to achieve their goals. Boniface, meanwhile, had excluded the king 
from his considerations and acted independently. At Lambeth, rather than presenting 
gravamina to Henry as a loyal subject and inviting him to amend his ways, Boniface used them 
to label the king – in a set of legal clauses – as a transgressor of ecclesiastical liberties. Whilst 
the actions of Langton and Edmund had ultimately been intended to strengthen the king and 
secure the peace of the realm, those of Boniface undermined Henry’s position when the peace 
of the kingdom was under threat. Boniface showed, therefore, in 1257, 1258 and 1261, how 
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he was prepared to privilege other agendas – whether they were those of the Savoyard party 
or of the English Church – before the king and the realm. Whilst the preamble to the 
Constitutions suggests that Boniface took no small pride in his actions, the precedents of 1213 
and 1234 indicate that Langton and Edmund would have taken a dim view of their successor’s 
activities. Under the direction of a different leader, the English bishops in 1258 and 1261 
might well have taken a firmer eirenic hand.  
 
The dilemma presented by baronial reform  
Boniface’s privileging of the cause of libertas ecclesiae and Savoyard interest over the 
protection of royal power might go some way to explaining the general lack of episcopal 
involvement in the events of 1258. Whilst Fulk Basset was a member of the king’s twelve, 
almost all of the bishops declined to participate on one side or another. Only one, Walter de 
Cantilupe, joined the baronial party in its initial stages. The divergence of the paths taken by 
Basset and de Cantilupe, colleagues and erstwhile allies, highlights how unusual de 
Cantilupe’s actions were. In 1255, the two bishops had led the episcopate in opposing Henry’s 
demand for a clerical aid to support his Sicilian venture. According to Matthew Paris, when 
Rostand, the papal nuncio, had set out the pope’s demands, Fulk Basset had replied: ‘I will 
surely be beheaded before I can consent to the servitude and injury and intolerable 
oppression of the Church’. De Cantilupe rushed to support his colleague: ‘I will be condemned 
to hanging before the holy Church is exposed to ruin’. Inspired by their example, the others 
present ‘promised firmly that they would follow the footsteps of the blessed martyr Thomas, 
who permitted himself to be struck dead for the liberty of the Church.’97 It was Fulk Basset 
who, according to Paris, went furthest in opposing Henry’s demands in 1255, rallying the 
English clergy to resist Rostand’s demands and, when consequently faced with the wrath and 
threats of the king, dared Henry to do his worst.98 Both Basset and de Cantilupe had been 
suspended from the king’s council in 1255 for their opposition. The two had also, perhaps, 
shared a similar attitude to diocesan responsibilities since Basset, like de Cantilupe, moved in 
the same circles as de Cantilupe as a correspondent of Adam Marsh and, like de Cantilupe, was 
a vigorous defender of diocesan rights.99 In 1258, however, they took very different paths. 
Although, unlike the other bishops, they both remained at the heart of political events and 
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attended the Oxford parliament, Basset did so as one of the twelve selected by the king to 
represent royal interests in the council of twenty-four.100 Matthew Paris, who had 
wholeheartedly approved of Basset’s attitude in 1255, framed the bishop of London’s  stance 
in 1258 as a desertion:  
‘Yet in this difficult affair and most happy renewal and arrangement of the whole 
kingdom, Fulk bishop of London was lukewarm and remiss more than was fitting or 
expedient, he who in this business blackened his reputation more [than the other 
bishops], since he was of nobler birth than the others. And thus in his lap rested the 
hope of the barons; and several of them were moved to anger at this change of 
direction, since they had trusted in him to justify the king with the people.’101  
Yet Paris’ assessment of the situation is arguably deceptive. In expecting Basset to support the 
reformers, Paris implicitly connected the defence of ecclesiastical liberty promoted by Basset 
and de Cantilupe in the 1250s with the cause of baronial reform, and presented Basset’s 
refusal to participate in the reform programme as unusual and disappointing. In fact, since de 
Cantilupe was the only bishop to support the reformers in the parliaments of 1258, and to 
participate in the coercion of the king, it was his actions that were anomalous.  
 
Why, then, did most bishops refuse to join the reformers? One of the few modern 
authorities to comment on the episcopate’s lack of involvement in the baronial plan of reform 
in 1258 is Reginald Treharne. For him, the explanation was simple. Henry III had a significant 
hold over the episcopate: he had interfered so effectively in elections that by 1258 the 
archbishopric of Canterbury and six bishoprics were held by his own nominees; the 
remainder of the bishops ‘were nearly all timid, peace-loving men, incapable of emulating 
Grosseteste’s resistance to royal tyranny’. Meanwhile, ‘the Church was tending increasingly 
during this period to a policy of separation and isolation from the laity in all political 
matters.’102 Yet Treharne’s explanation is unconvincing. No matter how many candidates 
Henry had successfully put forward, he still held a minority share in the episcopate. In any 
case, royal nomination or support in election did not necessarily preclude significant 
opposition to the king. Boniface of Savoy, as we have seen, did not allow his position as the 
king’s chosen archbishop or the queen’s uncle from undermining Henry’s bid for recovery in 
1261. Moreover, the English bishops were hardly ‘timid and peace-loving men’. In 1255, 
according to Matthew Paris, they had followed the lead of Fulk Basset and Walter de Cantilupe 
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in pronouncing themselves prepared to follow the footsteps of Thomas Becket and die for the 
liberty of the Church.103  
 
Treharne’s point that the bishops were uninterested in secular matters seems to echo 
the sentiments of Sir Maurice Powicke:  
‘Most writers take the view that the prelates, with selfish folly, withdrew from the field 
and missed a great opportunity. This view depends at bottom upon a conception of a 
national Church and of a canonical system inconsistent with the trend of recent 
developments. In any case, Henry’s determination to use the wealth of the clergy in a 
papal enterprise which had the sanction of ecclesiastical penalties had cut the ground 
from under their feet. Langton had quite different emergencies to face. Grosseteste, as 
we have seen, could not avoid the dilemma between acquiescence and rebellion in the 
name of the true plenitude of papal power. St. Edmund of Abingdon had realized how 
the ecclesiastical world was changing, when he retired to Pontigny during the legation 
of the cardinal Otto. St. Edmund took St. Thomas of Canterbury as his model, but he 
was far more remote than St. Thomas was from the considerations which guided papal 
action.’104  
If Powicke was suggesting that the growing alliance of the papacy with the English king came 
to exclude the episcopate from taking an interest in governmental policy, lest their 
disobedience be taken for rebellion against the pope, then this explanation seems misplaced. 
Firstly, as discussed in chapters one, two and three, there was indeed a concept of a ‘national’ 
or regnal Church, in the sense that the English episcopate had in the past taken a leading role 
in regnal affairs and acted concertedly in the interests of the kingdom and the community of 
the realm. Secondly, the alliance of pope and king in the Sicilian business did not hamstring 
the episcopate but provoked them into concerted and unified resistance. In their meetings of 
the 1250s, the bishops showed themselves willing to face royal anger and papal disapproval  
by obstructing the Sicilian venture to the best of their ability, within the boundaries of 
legitimate action, even if it meant pushing those boundaries as far as they dared.  
 
Nor was there any great divide between the bishops and magnates that would have 
prohibited the bishops from supporting the reform of government. The conceptualisation of 
‘Church’ and ‘State’ as separate entities with discrete interests would have made little sense to 
bishops at the time. The weight of research into the scholarly writings of Stephen Langton by 
John Baldwin, Phillipe Buc and David d’Avray, as well as the work of Robert Grosseteste 
surveyed in chapter four, shows how secular power was conceptualised in scriptural terms, 
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and how keenly the English bishops felt their responsibility, set out in divine instruction, to 
oversee government. In 1225, 1232, 1237, 1239, and as recently as 1253, the English bishops 
had demonstrated their sense of responsibility for ensuring the good government of the 
kingdom by enforcing Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests with sentences of 
excommunication. The bishops, in their gravamina, sought to protect ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions that often conflicted with those of the lay power but this did not necessarily 
debar them from membership of the broader political community, especially when there was 
so much at stake for the government of the kingdom. In fact, as John Maddicott has recently 
argued, ‘within parliament the relationship between magnates and prelates was one of 
growing cooperation in the fact of external threats.’105 Faced with Henry’s incessant demands 
for taxation, the magnates and prelates pursued ‘a conscious policy of strength through unity, 
and a response not only to Henry’s importunings but to his attempts to break down resistance 
by negotiating separately with individuals or small groups.’106 Grosseteste himself ‘summed 
up both motives and trends’ when, in 1244, he responded to Henry’s demand for tax: ‘Let us 
not separate ourselves from common counsel... For it is written: “If we are divided we shall 
immediately die.”’107 Even when the issue at stake were primarily ecclesiastical, the lay 
magnates could unite behind the bishops, particularly over the issues of papal provision and 
the Sicilian Business.108  
 
It is true that in the 1250s, as prelates met regularly in response to Henry’s demands 
for taxation, their corporate identity was remoulded by a strong sense of grievance against 
royal treatment of the Church, both in terms of the financial burdens imposed by the king and 
the numerous jurisdictional infringements of the lay power on ecclesiastical business. As 
discussed above, Boniface acted in 1257 and 1261 to privilege the agenda of ecclesiastical 
liberties above that of the realm. This aggrieved atmosphere was fuelled by the archbishop’s 
inherited sense of righteous indignation, worn as a badge of office, and his identification with 
Becket and Edmund, with whom he claimed to be languishing under Pharaoh. These attitudes 
in turn fuelled the collective feeling of his suffragans. This did not mean, however, that a 
chasm had opened between ecclesiastical and secular interests. If some breach had been 
opened, it was not at all insuperable. Those bishops who were to join Montfort around 1263 
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did so not in the cause of ecclesiastical liberties but for what they saw as the interest of the 
kingdom.  
 
That Montfort’s episcopal supporters set aside the agenda of the 1250s (resurrected in 
1261), in which the cause of ecclesiastical liberty was pursued committedly, can be seen in the 
fact that they joined the revolution even though ecclesiastical interests in Church liberties 
were barely represented in the reform programme. It was the Montfortians who later 
attempted to claim Henry’s treatment of the Church as a motivation for reform, when they 
drafted the baronial case at the end of 1263 for submission to Louis IX at Amiens. These 
assertions appear at the top and tail of what Treharne and Sanders classified as document C of 
the Mise of Amiens. As Robert Stacey has shown, document C is in fact the first part of the 
baronial case, listing the burdens placed on the kingdom. The remedies put in place by the 
reformers are then set out in document B.109 The first complaint is of the king’s intrusion into 
the liberties of the kingdom contrary to the Charters, yet framed specifically as contraventions 
of ecclesiastical liberties: the wasting of resources during vacancies and even the illicit 
appropriation of tithes. The king, moreover, interfered in elections and intruded his own, 
unworthy, candidates.110 The final complaint of the schedule moves on to the Sicilian business:  
the kingdom had been duped; many had taken the cross in aid of the Holy Land, only to find 
that Henry had apparently converted his vow and theirs towards the conquest of Sicily – a 
crusade against fellow Christians. Furthermore, ‘to the greater confusion of the kingdom’ the 
ecclesiastical tenth had brought churches to the point of impoverishment, as had the forced 
redemption of vows impoverished laymen,  ‘many thousands of marks having been collected 
in spoils of this kind, with enormous harm to the churches and the whole community, only to 
be thrown away in vain. In the end it all came to nothing...’  If this were not enough, the bishop 
of Hereford and Robert Walerand had named various monasteries as pledges for loans to fund 
the expedition, without their knowledge.111  
 
Yet whilst document C, which deals with grievances against Henry’s rule, condemns 
royal treatment of the Church and the Sicilian business in some detail, document B,  which 
deals with the baronial remedies to Henry’s misgovernment, makes no mention of either. This 
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was because no action had been taken by the reformers on these matters. The barons had 
complained to the pope in 1258 that they had not consented to the Sicilian venture but only 
on their own behalf, not that of the English Church, which had been suffering the financial 
burden of the Sicilian  venture for some time before the barons had marched on the king’s hall 
at Westminster.112 The clause in the Provisions of Oxford referring to ecclesiastical interest 
seems at best a token effort: ‘be it noted that the state of the holy Church should be amended 
by the twenty-four chosen to reform the state of the realm of England, as soon as they can find 
time and occasion’. 113 Since there was so little ecclesiastical involvement in the reform 
programme, there was no pressure on the barons to incorporate any of the Church’s 
grievances into the baronial agenda. The reformers might have included complaints about 
Henry’s treatment of the Church in their case to Louis IX, in an effort to amplify the 
righteousness of their cause. Yet, when the Montfortians had the opportunity to justify their 
regime more fully in the Song of Lewes, the defence of ecclesiastical liberty played no part in 
their case. The Montfortian bishops, therefore, did not join the rebellion in response to the 
reformers’ concern to defend ecclesiastical rights against Henry’s encroachments, for there 
was no such cause included in the reform programme. Instead they were moved to join 
Montfort by concern for the government of the realm.  
 
If, therefore, most bishops declined to participate in the reform programme in 1258, it 
was not because they were fundamentally shut off from the politics of the kingdom.  In fact, 
the bishops had important reasons not to support the reformers. They had supported Magna 
Carta and the Charter of the Forests wholeheartedly but there was a crucial difference 
between upholding the Charters and supporting the formation of the reforming council in 
1258. Magna Carta had bound the king to act within the law but did not seek to control central 
government, while the council of 1258 had effectively taken the reins of government from the 
king’s hands. Whilst Boniface might have been willing to condone the reformers’ actions to a 
certain extent in order to rid himself of the Lusignans, most bishops were probably not 
prepared to sanction an attack on royal power on such an unprecedented scale. It had been an 
intimidating display of armed force that had made Henry capitulate to baronial demands at 
Westminster, and an impressive display of baronial military power gathered at Oxford that 
had forced him to agree by oath to the formation of a council of fifteen. The powers that the 
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new council was to wield under the Provisions of Oxford ‘came near to putting the Crown into 
commission.’114 This council would appoint his ministers and allocate his castles as well as 
implement the programme for the reform of the realm. The king could not rule without the 
consent of this council; in fact, as Henry was to complain later, the council even ruled without 
consulting him.115 As we saw in chapter four, the arguments set out by Langton did not 
support any significant resistance to the king. He never advocated an attack on royal powers. 
Moreover, Old Testament precedents suggested that Henry as an anointed king should not be 
the victim of violence, or perhaps even the threat of violence, as David had made clear when 
he refused the opportunity to attack Saul.116  Langton had allowed for the subject’s right to 
make reactive decisions to obey or disobey royal commands on a case by case basis, but he 
had never encouraged positive action against royal power. Grosseteste, in fact, had explicitly 
forbidden any attempt of subjects to alienate royal powers for themselves. As members of this 
thought-world, the bishops of 1258 were confined by the same scruples. When Matthew Paris 
despaired of Fulk Basset’s apparent failure to join the reformers, what he did not know, or 
more likely did not admit, was the aggressive way in which the reform programme had been 
imposed (felicissima would be a peculiar choice to describe the business if he had been 
aware).117 In choosing to distance himself from the baronial agenda and support the king, 
Basset was acting in a manner congruent with the ideas and actions of his predecessors.  
 
In many ways, it was a wonder that any bishops supported the reform programme at 
all. This was certainly the view of  one chronicler, the author of the Merton Flores Historiarum 
who, reviewing the period of the barons’ war, commented that:  
‘the old bishop of Worcester, and certain other prelates, fathers and judges of 
consciences, freely provided consent to the subversion of royal power, which is not 
without wonder; since they had provided a corporal oath concerning earthly honour 
to serve the said king and his heirs, whom, by arranging that they [the king and his 
heirs] should not rule, but that they would always be ruled by others, the bishops 
served badly. If indeed the prodigality of the lord king was an intolerable defect it 
would hardly exclude the work of government, when nowhere this is stipulated in 
divine or human law, because when the fault or defect ceased, the penalty would pass 
                                                          
114 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 158. 
115 For the Provisions of Oxford, see DBM, 96–113; and for the Provisions of Westminster (which also 
came under the banner of the Provisions of Oxford), see DBM, 136–57. For Henry’s complaints about 
the council, see DBM, 210–39, especially at 215, where Henry complains that the councillors ‘hold their 
discussions and meetings at various places without the king’s knowledge, not asking the king to attend 
them, nor summoning him to the council any more than the least person of his kingdom’. 
116 I Samuel 24: 5-8; I Samuel 26: 9-11. 




on to the heirs, lest the son of the father be touched by iniquity, lest a further penalty 
comes about than the [original] fault.’118  
Clearly, in the view of contemporaries, the Montfortian bishops should have known better 
that the reformers’ actions were incongruent with ‘divine and human law’. In 1258, all but ‘ille 
senex’ the bishop of Worcester probably did. 
 
It should be remembered, in any case, that choosing a side or withdrawing altogether 
were not the only options available. The situation that Treharne and Powicke felt required an 
explanation – the lack of episcopal involvement in the baronial reforms of 1258 – in fact was 
no wonder at all. What was shocking, in fact, was not that the bishops refused to support the 
subversion of royal power but rather that they did not step in to prevent the conflict between 
king and barons from escalating to the point of a baronial coup. Boniface interpreted his role 
as archbishop of Canterbury as committed defender of ecclesiastical liberties in the mould of 
Edmund of Abingdon. It is perhaps fair to say that this was not an interpretation with which 
Edmund himself would have been comfortable. In similar circumstances in 1234, when the 
malign influence of dislikeable counsellors had produced an unpopular royal policy, 
provoking the opposition of the magnates and threatening the peace of the realm, Edmund 
had stepped in to reform the king, redirecting royal power for the good government of the 
kingdom and, in so doing, upholding it. This was how Edmund understood the role he had 
inherited from Langton. Had Boniface followed in these footsteps in 1258, or even in 1261, he 
could have led the bishops in a bid to confront and reform the king. If this had been done, the 
bishops could have supported the king in the reform of the realm rather than stepping back 
and allowing reform to be imposed upon him by force.  
 
                                                          











In 1266,  five English bishops were suspended from office by Clement IV for ‘supplying aid, 
counsel and favour to the earl Simon against the king and honour of the kingdom’ in the 
rebellion against Henry III: John Gervase of Winchester, Stephen Berksted of Chichester, 
Walter de Cantilupe of Worcester, Richard of Gravesend of Lincoln and Henry of Sandwich of 
London.1 Not merely complicit in the baronial agenda but protagonists in the usurpation of 
royal power, the actions of these bishops was as open to condemnation as that of any other 
leading Montfortian. The bishop of Chichester was one of the three electors set up by the 
Form of Peace after Lewes, and the bishop of London and Thomas de Cantilupe, Walter de 
Cantilupe’s nephew, were two of the nine who formed the new council, whose task was to 
govern the realm in the king’s name.2 They had also undertaken the task of justifying the 
regime to its critics, a role that will be examined in the next chapter. Their actions were 
controversial, in the sense that those of the lay Montfortians were controversial, but even 
more so, since these were men steeped  in a learned discourse of royal power that railed 
against such action as contrary to the natural order. More than this, they had violated a 
fundamental prerequisite to English episcopal identity, renouncing their loyalty to the king 
and abandoning their status as hinge-persons, and so had abdicated the long-standing 
episcopal role of peacemaker in favour of that of Montfortian partisan. This was a rupture of 
seismic proportions, that was predicated on the wrenching of the bishops away from one 
world-view and towards another. This chapter will examine how this took place – the 
renunciation of loyalty to the king – and why. It will also examine how the discomfort caused 
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The renunciation of loyalty to the king  
Whilst Walter de Cantilupe had been an active member of the reform programme since its 
inception in the summer of 1258, and Richard Gravesend could be found in the service of the 
reform party from the moment of his consecration in the autumn of the same year, the other 
three of the five suspended in 1266 only appear to have joined the movement after their 
consecrations in 1262 and 1263. All five, though, were certainly confirmed Montfortians 
before the earl’s victory at the Battle of Lewes confirmed divine approval of the reform 
agenda. The earliest point at which the bishops of Chichester, Winchester and London were 
likely to have joined the Montfortian party was April 1263, when Simon de Montfort returned 
to England and began a campaign to re-impose the Provisions of Oxford.  The bishop of 
London had certainly committed himself in time to put his seal to the baronial case submitted 
to Louis IX for arbitration on 13 December 1263.3 The bishops of Winchester and Chichester 
publicly declared their allegiance to Montfort in March 1264, at a critical point in hostilities. 
The manner in which they did so, ostentatious in its public display of partisanship, could 
almost have been calibrated for maximum impact.  
 
On 6 March 1264, Henry III sent a summons to all magnates and prelates who were 
not against the king to arrive at Oxford at mid-Lent with horses and arms to go against 
Llewelyn.4 Royal and baronial parties now stood toe to toe; Louis IX had decreed in the Mise 
of Amiens in January that the Provisions of Oxford should be quashed but this judgment had 
been rejected by the barons, the Londoners, the Cinque Ports and ‘almost all the middling 
people of the kingdom’.5 Montfort had renewed his alliance with Llewelyn and the army 
mustering at Oxford was probably intended to combat the earl as much as it was the Welsh 
prince. Henry’s summons was as good as an ultimatum to those sympathetic to the 
Montfortian cause: either to turn out for the king to make war on Montfort or not and, in 
refusal, testify to a converted allegiance. As a Close Roll entry of 3 April shows, John Gervase 
of Winchester and Richard Gravesend of Lincoln (along with several others) chose the latter; 
they were ‘unwilling’ to respond and perform the service they owed the king. Therefore all the 
lands they held in chief were to be seized unless they made immediate satisfaction for these 
transgressions.6 The refusal of military service constituted  the breaking of their oath of 
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homage to the king. There could hardly have been a clearer demonstration that the bishops 
had withdrawn their loyalty. This action represented a fundamental change in status, from 
hinge-person,  with loyalty divided between king and barons, to party member.   
 
Faced with the confiscation of their lands, both Gervase and Gravesend offered 
satisfaction to Henry through the proffer of fines. These fines do not appear in the Fine Rolls 
for 1263-4 or 1264-5.7 Their content is known through mentions in the Patent Rolls in the 
summer of 1264. It is in this context that the bishops’ failure to obey Henry is shown in 
contrast to their vigorous support of Montfort. In two entries of 10 July and 20 August, 
Montfort (now back in control of the chancery after his victory at Lewes) pardoned Gravesend 
and Gervase 500 and 600 marks respectively for the fines they had offered the king for the 
‘remission of the king’s rancour’ against them for their failure to perform military service. In 
return, as the Patent Roll entries make clear, Gravesend had lent the king (in reality Montfort) 
£100 for ‘his urgent affairs’, whilst Gervase had lent 120 marks.8 Around the same time, the 
bishop of London (in conjunction with Richard de Mopham, archdeacon of Oxford) had lent 
200 marks.9 The bishop of Worcester had already, in September 1263, leant 400 marks to 
bolster the reformers’ regime.10 On 7 July 1264 he contracted a loan of 200 marks from 
Florentine merchants in London, perhaps in order to provide further financial support for the 
earl.11 He certainly, though, made a further loan in December, this time of £40 to support the 
King’s (or Montfort’s) household.12 The Patent Rolls record that the whole of Gravesend’s loan 
went in to the wardrobe, along with part of that offered by Gervase (the rest the bishop of 
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Winchester had paid directly to a merchant for the king’s wine). The only other record of 
these loans is in the surviving wardrobe accounts, which contain a vague reference to money 
received from various prelates and others.13   
 
The unusual nature of these transactions is matched by the desperate circumstances 
in which they were undertaken. Although Montfort had won a military victory at Lewes in 
May, his position was in no way secure. Queen Eleanor had gathered a sizeable mercenary 
army and was poised in France to recapture the throne for her husband. Montfort responded 
with a call to arms that showcased his significant demagogic talents.14 The result was ‘such a 
multitude gathered together against the aliens that you would not have believed so many men 
equipped for war existed in England’.15 It was arguably to fund this massive undertaking that 
Montfort elicited the financial support of the bishops.  
 
Whilst, unlike de Cantilupe, Gervase was not a long-standing Montfortian, this does 
not necessarily mean that he was a ‘lukewarm supporter of the rebellion’.16 In fact, the 
contrast between his background and his eventual actions in 1264 suggest that he had been 
ripped from the course of his previous world-view more violently from most. Before his 
promotion to the episcopate, Gervase was a royal clerk and had even been with Henry III in 
Gascony in 1254.17 Although he had not been Henry’s candidate for the see of Winchester, 
Gervase’ prior service seems to have made him a happy alternative when he was provided by 
the pope in June 1263. Certainly before 1264 Gervase seems to have been in favour with the 
king; when an epidemic struck the royal court in France in September 1263, it was Gervase, 
along with the bishop of Salisbury, who the King insisted should celebrate the feast of Edward 
the Confessor in his absence.18 The timing of the letter suggests that the bishop of Winchester 
had not yet joined the Montfortian party in the autumn of 1263 or, at least, that the king did 
not yet know of his changed allegiance. Henry, it seems, had every reason to expect Gervase’s 
positive response to his call to appear at Oxford at mid-Lent 1264. Whilst Gervase did appear 
                                                          
13 E 372/113 Rot.2, m.1 (wardrobe roll 1261-64): ‘Et de .M.C.L.xv. li. .xiiij. s. .v. d. ob. de dono 
archiepiscopi Ebor’ et quorundam episcoporum, abbatum, priorum, civium, burgensium et aliorum 
quorum nomina continentur in predicto rotulo de particulis’.  
14 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 290-91. 
15 Flores Historiarum, II, 499; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 290. 
16 N. C. Vincent, ‘The Politics of Church and State as Reflected in the Winchester Pipe Rolls, 1208 – 
1280’, in R. Britnell (ed.), The Winchester Pipe Roll and Medieval English Society, (Woodbridge, 2003), 
157-81, at 175. 
17 CLR 1251-60, 177. 
18 CR 1261-1264, 174. 
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at Oxford, it was not with horses and arms to join the royalist force but as a representative of 
the baronial party, alongside de Cantilupe, Sandwich and Stephen Berksted, bishop of 
Chichester, insisting that the king should remove all aliens and govern through natives.19 This 
was the moment when Gervase hoisted his Montfortian colours, in a very public way. The loan 
that the bishop made soon afterwards sealed his commitment to the Montfortian regime. 
Within a few months he was in Boulogne along with de Cantilupe and Sandwich insisting to 
the papal legate that it was right that the king’s councillors should be chosen for him, and that 
these councillors should be English.20 Gervase had not only abandoned his loyalty to the king 
but sacrificed royal favour. His betrayal of the king – for that is certainly how Henry saw it – 
was all the greater because it tore through so many  layers of loyalty.   
 
Charisma 
The refusal of John Gervase and Richard Gravesend to provide military service, and their 
approach to the king along with the bishops of Worcester, London and Chichester as 
representatives of the baronial party, was a public declaration of Montfortian loyalty. 21 Still, 
that Gervase and Gravesend proffered fines to the king in recompense for their failure to 
provide service shows that, although they had allied themselves to Montfort’s cause, they did 
not necessarily expect that relations between the two sides would deteriorate to the point of 
open battle. It was, after all, as a negotiator for peace that Gervase acted at Oxford in March. 
Presumably the bishops had no reason to assume that the king would lose control of 
government and hoped that some sort of compromise might be reached. Although they were 
unwilling to offer the king military aid against Montfort, they offered fines to Henry because 
they believed that his threat of the confiscation of their lands was a very real one. The 
outcome of the Battle of Lewes was to change this belief fundamentally.  As the author of the 
Song of Lewes was to write, God had provided victory to Montfort: the earl’s ‘deeds test him 
and prove him truthful’.1 This was the most adamant encouragement possible to their support 
of the earl, after which they plunged into the depths of rebellion with remarkable 
commitment.  
 
In so doing, the Montfortian bishops forsook what had been a central component of 
episcopal identity in England since at least the days of Langton. Previously, bishops had 
                                                          
19 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 265-66. 
20 Heidemann, 238. 
21 Annales Londoniensis, 61. 
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cultivated the role of peacemaker, maintaining divided loyalties in disputes between king and 
barons. Now the Montfortians renounced their loyalty to the king and sided with the rebels. In 
earlier times, values presented by leading members of the episcopate, in the writings and 
actions of Langton, Edmund and Grosseteste, had supported royal power, ensuring that it 
operated justly, for the sake of regnal peace. Now, the Montfortians helped to impose a 
programme of political reform that robbed the king of royal power and provoked civil war. 
These two courses were based on world-views that were virtually irreconcilable. 
 
It took a powerful force to pull the bishops from the path laid out for them by their 
predecessors. This force was their belief in the divine inspiration of Simon de Montfort: 
‘Neither fraud nor falsehood moved the Earl, but the divine grace which knows whom it may 
help’.22 This theme echoes through the Song of Lewes, written most likely by a friar in the 
household of Stephen Berksted, the Montfortian bishop of Chichester. The poet, if he may be 
taken as representative of Montfort’s clerical supporters, testifies to the earl’s charisma: that 
‘quality [according to Max Weber] deemed to be extraordinary... of a personality, on account 
of which this person is judged to be endowed with supernatural or superhuman or at least 
specifically extraordinary powers or properties, which are not accessible to everyone else, or 
as sent by God, or as an outstanding model and consequently a ‘Leader’.23 Charisma is one 
force powerful enough to pull groups away from their core values, to relocate and rebuild the 
very foundation on which all their subsequent decisions will be built. It is ‘the great 
revolutionary power in epochs that are in the grip of tradition.... charisma can be a 
transformation from the inside, which, born of necessity or enthusiasm, means a fundamental 
change in the direction of central convictions and actions with a completely new orientation 
of all attitudes to all specific forms of life and to “the World” generally.24 
 
This is not to pronounce on the objective reality of the leader’s qualities. Central to 
Weber’s idea of charismatic leadership is ‘the way in which those who are being ruled or led 
appropriate, internalise and experience’ notions of the leader’s special qualities.25 Montfort’s 
                                                          
22 Song of Lewes, ll. 349-50. 
23 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. J. Winckelmann, 3 vols. (5th edn., Tübingen, 1976), Vol. I, 
140, translated in d’Avray, Religious Rationalities, 80. 
24 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vol. I, 142, translated in D. L. d’Avray, Rationalities in History: A 
Weberian Essay in Comparison (Cambridge, 2010), 104-05. 
25 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vol. II, 658, translated in d’Avray, Rationalities in History, 105.  
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charisma, therefore, is to be gauged by the beliefs of his followers.26 It is evidence for  just this 
sort of feeling that is preserved in the Song of Lewes. In the Song, indeed, lies evidence of both 
the cause and effect of the ‘conversion’ of these churchmen. Split roughly in two, the first half 
praises Montfort whilst the second seeks to justify his imposition of the baronial council. It is 
not the ‘constitutional’ case of the second half of the Song that explains the motivations of 
Montfort’s episcopal supporters – as Chapter Four shows, these arguments were incompatible 
with the pre-existing values of their milieu. Instead, it is the adulation for Montfort proclaimed 
in the first half of the Song, celebrating the zenith of Montfort’s charismatic leadership, that 
explains the bishops’ conversion to his cause. It was this conversion that, in forcing the 
bishops to abandon their earlier values, necessitated the formation of a new set of arguments 
in support of the earl and, thus, required the second half of the Song.  
 
Montfort’s charisma, then, manifests itself in the author’s presentation of the earl as  
an outstanding model of virtue with Christ-like qualities. Central to this theme is the earl’s 
adherence to the oath upholding the Provisions of Oxford. His refusal to apostatize, as he saw 
it, is well recorded27 and, as the Song shows, was greatly admired by his followers: 
‘Hence can they, who readily swear and hesitate little to reject what they swear... and 
render not wholly their promises to God, estimate with how great care they ought to 
preserve their oath, when they see a man flee neither torment nor death, for the sake 
of his oath... Behold! Simon obedient scorns the loss of property, subjecting himself to 
penalties, that he may not let go the truth... Woe to the wretched perjurers, who fear 
not God, denying Him for the hope of earthly reward, or fear of prison or of a light 
penalty; the new guide of the journey teaches us to bear whatever the world may have 
inflicted for the sake of truth, which is able to give perfect liberty.’ 28 
Montfort is elevated as model of fidelity and fearless integrity, illuminating the shameful 
behaviour of those who had abandoned their oath, those ‘wretched perjurers’. He is also, 
though, an exemplum to his followers, teaching them to suffer persecution for the sake of 
truth. The author determinedly ignores an uncomfortable reality: the pope had in fact 
pronounced the oath that upheld the Provisions invalid, since the royal family had been 
compelled to provide it and since it ravaged royal power, and had absolved all from their 
obligation to maintain it.29 Instead, the author brazenly claims that Montfort, ever respectful 
                                                          
26 d’Avray, Rationalities in History, 105-06. 
27 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 79, 161-2, 170, 214, 363. 
28 Song of Lewes, ll. 207-226. 
29 Papal bulls dissolving the oaths had been issued first by Alexander IV and were published in England 
on 12 June 1261. His successor, Urban IV, issued confirmations of Alexander’s decrees on 25 Feb. 1262 
and 23 Aug. 1263 (DBM, 248–51 n. 1). 
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of ecclesiastical authority, would indeed be willing to accede to the dissolution of his oath, if 
such an order were given:  
‘because he had sworn [to uphold the Provisions], they were to be stoutly maintained, 
unless the most perfect teachers of the faith should say, that those takers of an oath 
could be absolved, who had previously offered such an oath, and that what they had 
sworn was not to be attended to.’ 30 
One might say that if the pope himself did not count as one of the ‘perfect teachers of the faith’ 
in Montfort’s eyes, it is hard to see whom the earl considered of sufficient authority to 
dissolve the oath. Yet Montfort’s readiness to adhere to learned, pious counsel is evidently 
important to the author, since it is presented elsewhere in the Song. Montfort, in briefing 
Stephen Berksted on his embassy to the king before the battle, had offered Henry a solution to 
the conflict:  
‘Choose the best men, whose faith is lively, who have read canon law, or have 
becomingly taught theology, and sacred philosophy, and who know how to rule the 
Christian faith; and whatever such men shall not fear through wholesome doctrine to 
counsel, or whatever they shall not fear to decide, what they shall say, that shall they 
find us ready to adopt; in such manner that we may not know the brand of perjury, but 
as sons of God may hold faith.’ 31 
Whilst there might appear to be a tension between the author’s omission of the oath’s 
dissolution by the pope and his admiration for Montfort’s proposal to adhere to the 
judgement of nominated ecclesiastics, this could be reconciled by the Montfortian belief that 
the pope, in making his judgement, had not been in full possession of the facts and that his 
ruling was subsequently flawed. Other judges, fully apprised of the situation, and ‘whose faith 
is lively... and who know how to rule the Christian faith’ would be in a stronger position to rule 
fairly on the Provisions. There were such men available, of course,  Stephen Berksted amongst 
them, since they had come to Lewes to support Montfort. Whilst objectively Montfort’s 
respect for ecclesiastical authority and the wisdom of learned churchmen therefore reflects 
the politician as much as the pious son of the Church, what is important is the vivid 
admiration his gesture inspires in the author. So too is the contrast this invites with the hubris 
of the royal party, proclaimed in the scorning of the earl’s laudable offer (“See! now is a knight 
subjected to the sayings of clerks. Knighthood put under clerks has become of little esteem”).32 
Montfort is thus made to take on the role of the righteous victim of persecution (‘thus was the 
wisdom of the Earl despised... even the devotion of the Earl is derided’).33  
 
                                                          
30 Song of Lewes, ll. 238-42. 
31 Song of Lewes, ll. 198-206. 
32 Song of Lewes, ll. 246-47. 
33 Song of Lewes, ll. 248, 259. 
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The author goes on to present Montfort as an exemplum of selflessness. Accusations of 
his self-interest, clearly in the air, are indubitably unfounded: 
‘If it was his own advantage which had moved the Earl, he would have had no other 
zeal, nor would he have sought with his whole intent for the reformation of the realm, 
but a designing for lordship would seek its own advancement alone, and he would set 
before him the advancement of his own friends, would aim at the enrichment of his 
sons, and would neglect the safety of the community, and would veil the poison of 
falsehood with the cloak of duplicity; thus he would abandon the faith of Christianity, 
and would subject himself to the law of a terrible penalty, nor would he escape the 
weight of the storm. And who is able to believe that he would give himself to death, 
would be willing to ruin his friends, that he might thus exalt himself?’34 
Accusations that Montfort was pursuing personal profit would arguably have resonated with 
the earl and his circle, making their rejection of particular importance. As we saw in chapter 
four, Robert Grosseteste’s writing on kingship, drawn from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 
had posited an ideal of kingship based on selfless, fatherly benevolence:  ‘For the tyrant exerts 
himself for his own advantage, the king for that of his subjects... tyranny is contrary to kingship: 
[since the tyrant] pursues his own advantage... royal rule wishes to be paternal.’35 It was this 
message that opened the abbreviatio sent by Grosseteste to Montfort. Richard Gravesend was 
also familiar with the work, having drawn up the memorandum from which the abbreviatio 
was drawn, and it is possible that he and Montfort might have shared the sentiment with 
others of their circle. From the perspective of Grosseteste’s disciples, to accuse Montfort of 
pursuing personal profit was tantamount to accusing him of tyranny. As such, its rejection 
would have been top priority. As the author of the Song makes clear, selfish action on 
Montfort’s part would amount to his abandonment of Christian principles; putting his life at 
risk on the battlefield in such a state would jeopardise his soul.  The ultimate testament to the 
truth of the author’s claim was, of course, Montfort’s victory at Lewes: ‘They call Simon a 
misleader and deceiver, but his deeds test him and prove him truthful.’36  
 
Montfort’s willingness to risk his life on the battlefield is presented as the ultimate 
selfless act. Others seek worldly honour and avoid death, but ‘not so does the venerable Simon 
de Montfort, who, like unto Christ, gives himself to death for the many; Isaac dies not when he 
                                                          
34 Song of Lewes, ll. 325-38. 
35 ‘Tyrannus enim sibi ipsi conferens intendit, rex autem quod subditorum. Et paulo post: Tyrannis autem 
ex contrarietate regno: sibi autem bonum persequitur... Et iterum post pauca ait: Paternus principatus 
vult regnum esse’ (Gieben, 378); cf. Mercken, 152.31-3, 152.36-7, 153.53-4, 160.59-60, 161.78-9, 
163.36-7. 
36 Song of Lewes, ll. 79-80. 
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is ready to die, the ram is delivered to death, Isaac to honour.’37 The comparison with Christ, 
laying down his life for his friends, and Isaac, the sacrificial victim spared by God’s mercy, are 
perhaps some of the strongest indications of the belief that Montfort’s virtue was of 
uncommon proportions. However, also telling is the particular manner in which the author 
develops the comparison between Montfort and Christ. The royal party’s rejection of 
Montfort’s proposed peace before the battle provokes an allusion to Psalm 117: 22 (‘The 
stone which the builders rejected; the same has become the head of the corner’): ‘The stone 
long refused by the enemy, was afterwards fitted to the two side-walls. The division of 
desolation of England was on our borders; but for  a defence against division was present a 
corner-stone, the wholly singular religion of Simon.’38 As the image of Montfort as cornerstone 
suggests, the author is clear that the whole movement rests on his shoulders: ‘the faith and 
fidelity of Simon alone is become the security of the peace of all England.’39 The critical power 
of Montfort’s leadership is attested elsewhere in the Song: ‘by [the earl’s] confusion the most 
of the people would be confounded, and the greatest part of the realm would be put in peril; 
most grievous ruin would at once follow, which would not be repaired by the longest delay.’40 
Nowhere more vividly is Montfort revealed as the life-giving source of the movement, 
invested with an epic quantity of faith. 
 
Perceptions of Montfort’s divinely inspired leadership were buttressed by his 
association with the most popular of English saints. Thomas Becket, in resisting arbitrary 
royal actions and suffering persecution as a result, provided a model of English sanctity to 
thirteenth-century England. As André Vauchez has shown, several bishops in the thirteenth 
century were deemed to have followed his path, figuratively if not literally martyred, which 
‘was all that was necessary for them to be identified with the man who had become the 
prototype and obligatory reference for all sainthood in England, Thomas Becket’.41 The Song 
does not identify Montfort with this model explicitly, though the theme of the upright 
opponent of the king suffering royal persecution is certainly present.42 However, other 
                                                          
37 Song of Lewes, ll. 345-8. 
38 Song of Lewes, ll. 261-5. 
39 Song of Lewes, ll. 267-8. 
40 Song of Lewes, ll. 189-92. 
41 Vauchez, Sainthood, 167-70.  
42 After Montfort’s death at Evesham, the comparison was made explicitly, for instance : Maitland, ‘Song 
on the Death of Simon de Montfort’, 317, verses 28 and 30; see also the second hymn of an office 
composed for Montfort after Evesham, given in: G. W. Prothero, The Life of Simon de Montfort Earl of 
Leicester with Special Reference to the Parliamentary History of His Time (London, 1877), 389. 
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sources do attest a belief that Becket himself was a Montfortian. The Dover chronicle reports 
that some who were present at Lewes sighted Becket on the battlefield; the martyr had 
appeared, in pontifical garb, to bless the baronial army. Around the same time, the chronicler 
continues, a boy in Canterbury had a vision of Becket in his sleep. The boy, seeing Becket 
rising from his bier, asked the archbishop what he was doing (the boy had thought Becket to 
be dead) and why he was rising from his tomb. Becket responded ‘I was not dead, but I rested 
in peace; but now by necessity I have to rise and fight for my country of England.’43 Although 
these acccounts provide no direct evidence of clerical opinion, they do suggest a popular 
association of Becket with the reform movement and a general climate of feeling that 
Montfort’s actions were divinely endorsed.  
 
The Montfortian reference to Langtonian ritual 
The result of Montfort’s charismatic power was that the bishops were drawn from the 
familiarity of an established episcopal identity into the unsettling unknown  of rebellion. The 
was bound to cause moral and intellectual discomfort . In order to cover over the fissures in 
their experience and wrap themselves with a comforting veil of legitimacy, they turned to the 
apparent safety of precedent as formed by their illustrious predecessors, Stephen Langton 
and Edmund of Abingdon. At the Oxford muster in March 1264, they appropriated the 
language of eirenic episcopal ritual to articulate their approach to Henry III. Their attempts, 
however, precipitated their rancorous expulsion from the royal presence.  
 
An account of their endeavours is recorded in the so-called Annales Londoniensis. 
Although large parts of this chronicle are taken from the Flores Historiarum, the account for 
1264 is not, being derived from an independent source that has since been lost.44  
‘With a parliament established at Oxford on 30 March1264, and with all called with 
horses and arms who wished to adhere to the lord king with counsel and aid, solemn 
messengers were sent there on the part of the barons, namely the bishops of London, 
Winchester, Worcester, Chester45 and Chichester; asking the king humbly and 
devotedly, that if he at the least would give way on one article – namely that, with 
aliens removed from England, the country would be governed through natives –  they 
(the Montfortians) would assent to all statutes, provisions and ordinances of the king 
of France.  To whom the abrupt response was given, that the king would in no way 
withdraw from the ordinance of the king of France: but would hold his (Louis’) 
statutes firmly and steadily forever for the sake of his (Henry’s) power. Moreover it 
                                                          
43 Gervase, 238. Becket was accompanied by St George, who appeared armed, carrying a banner.  
44Annales Londoniensis, xvii. 
45 [Possibly a mistake]. 
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was demanded from the aforesaid bishops that they withdraw speedily from court not 
to return nor treat of peace, unless subsequently they had a special mandate on this 
from the lord king. Yet before their withdrawal, in the presence of the king of Germany 
and the lord Edward, in the church of the Friars Preacher of Oxford, they placed all 
violators of ecclesiastical peace under sentence of excommunication.’46 
The Montfortian bishops’ emulation of the Langtonian ritual is clear. The context of unrest 
between the king and his barons; the responsibility felt by the bishops to act in the role of 
peacemaker; the approach to the king made by a group of bishops acting in unison; their 
speech to the king made with demonstrable humility and devotion; the terms for the reform 
of his rule offered in the interest of the kingdom; the pronouncement of sentence of 
excommunication against disturbers of the peace. Yet this time the king was not transformed, 
or remade, in the form set out by the bishops and the ritual failed. Rather than responding 
humbly and accepting the criticism, complying with the episcopal terms and setting out 
restitutions, the king responded abruptly and repudiated all criticism of his behaviour.  
 
The reasons for the failure of this ritual in 1264 are not difficult to determine. Without 
the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishops lacked the office-charisma necessary to ‘remake’ 
the king. Moreover, for all that the bishops in 1264 appeared ‘humbly and devotedly’ with all 
the trappings of fidelity, their attitude was a brittle veneer. As the chronicler noted, the 
bishops came ‘ex parte baronum’. The mendacity of their appearance as ‘hinge-persons’ was 
obvious to all, since the bishops had proclaimed their loyalty to the Montfortian barons in the 
most public and demonstrative way possible: a refusal of military service that violated their 
oath of homage to the king. The contrast with Matthew Paris’ presentation of the bishop of 
Chester at the colloquium of 1234, outraged at the suggestion of ‘excessive familiarity’ with 
the rebels that threatened to compromise his prised mediatory position, could not be clearer. 
The bishops in 1264 were manifestly guilty of ‘excessive familiarity’ with the rebels who had 
threatened the king. The presentation of their authority to act as peacemakers was recognised 
by the king for what it was: a transparent charade. As such, it merited the bishops’ expulsion 
from the royal presence and the king’s prohibition of any future attempt on their part to treat 
for peace.  
 
That the Montfortian bishops adopted the language of Langtonian ritual to frame their 
actions in 1264 is symptomatic of their attempts to locate their own, radical, actions within a 
socially and historically legitimate framework. Perhaps this was a cynical attempt to mask 
                                                          
46 Annales Londoniensis, 61. 
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their treachery from the glare of an audience they hoped to persuade. In identifying their own 
role with that of Langton and Edmund, as representing the interests of the king’s subjects to 
the king, the bishops might have hoped to borrow some of the authority of their distinguished 
predecessors for their own cause, imbuing the Montfortian demands with the legal weight of 
Langton and prestige the of Edmund’s sanctity. A connection with the actions of Langton and 
Edmund might have appealed, too, on another level. Langton and Edmund, in their 
approaches to the king, had represented the community, vocally through the criticisms made 
on behalf of a suffering kingdom and symbolically by emulating the role they played in 
coronations. The claim to be representing the interests of the community underpinned the 
Montfortian cause. It was voiced consistently from 1258 onwards, in order to invest the 
movement with an authority otherwise denied by the narrow base of support for the original 
coup and the barons’ compulsion of the king. The point would be more important than ever at 
this pivotal moment, when both sides were mustering support. The Montfortian bishops’ 
emulation of the ritual could, therefore, have been intended as a powerful symbolic statement 
in support of the Montfortian claim to be acting in the interest of the community of the 
kingdom.  
 
On the other hand, one could view their act sympathetically, as testimony to a heartfelt 
commitment to the Montfortian cause, and a genuine belief that the earl represented the 
regnal community.47 The contradictions in their self-presentation, far from exposing any 
cynicism in their actions, might well be the mark of something more complex. Like the 
arguments drawn up to appease their critics to be discussed in chapter seven, the approach to 
the king in 1264 might well reveal the ambivalence with which they viewed their own actions, 
the profound unease created by the confrontation between new ideals and loyalties set 
against the authority of tradition. These conflicts were engraved in their actions, as in their 
written output, with the gaps between actual and professed intentions visible to all. Just as the 
papal legate, when faced later in 1264 with justifications for the radical Montfortian regime, 
stripped the Montfortian clergy of the appeal to precedent that was their safety-blanket, 
Henry denied the bishops the ideological security that this ritual exhibition of episcopal 
tradition would represent.  
 
 
                                                          
47 Carpenter, Struggle for Mastery, 380.  
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The Consequences of Conversion 
In choosing to kindle rebellion rather than quench it, the Montfortian bishops had subverted 
the expectations inherent in their office. The result was a self-contradiction manifest in their 
actions between 1263 and 1265, as they in turn fuelled the violence and sought to contain it. 
The consequences of the bishops’ abandonment of their eirenic responsibilities were severe, 
both for the kingdom and their relationship with the papacy.  
 
Montfort’s return to England in April 1263 had been accompanied by widespread 
disorder, as the earl’s supporters targeted enemies of the Provisions of Oxford. Many of the 
victims were alien churchmen, most notably Peter d’Aigueblanche, bishop of Hereford, seized 
in his cathedral and carried off to captivity. Whilst a gang of marcher barons had been the 
perpetrators of that particular attack, the ringleader of several others – if reports made to the 
pope are to be believed – was none other than Richard Gravesend, the Montfortian bishop of 
Lincoln. It was reported that ‘at his instigation, homicides have been perpetrated on the 
persons of papal officials... [he] has molested papal notaries by opposing their pensions and 
benefices in their diocese, and other parts of England, has grievously offended cardinals, and 
has committed other faults’.48 This was not the first time violent attacks on alien clergy had 
been known in England. A letter of Gravesend’s mentor, Robert Grosseteste, written between 
1231 and 1232 during his time as archdeacon of Leicester, tells how the young Grosseteste 
had wanted to go on pilgrimage but his bishop, taking counsel with the bishop of Bath and 
others, had told him that he 'was to wait until it was better known what the outcome would be 
of the disturbance that had arisen from the plundering and capture of some Romans and - or 
so it is said - the murder of some of them.'49 It was an entirely different matter, however, when 
the bishop of Lincoln himself stood accused of fermenting anti-Roman violence. 
 
In July 1264, Walter de Cantilupe stood up as proctor of the English bishops to make a 
speech to the assembly of magnates and prelates gathered at St Paul’s.  He protested that the 
bishops were doing their best to stop the disturbances. Recounting the violent attacks against 
ecclesiastical property and persons, de Cantilupe explained how the bishops had convened in 
London to address the matter and had denounced all those committing such crimes. The 
                                                          
48 CPL, 400–1. Gravesend was suspended from office by the pope on 2 June 1264 for contumacy, having 
failed to appear before him to answer accusations about these offences. On the balance of probability, 
the alleged attacks took place in the summer or autumn of 1263 during the rebellion that broke out 
with Montfort’s return to England. 
49 Grosseteste Letters, 55 (referring to the Wither/Tweng riots of 1232). 
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perpetrators had fallen under the broad sentence of excommunication levelled at those 
raising their hands against clerks and the guilty were to make satisfaction on pain of 
ecclesiastical censure. Having pronounced this sentence, however, the bishops had been 
unable to proceed, for as much as the deeds were clear to all, the identity of those committing 
them was not. The bishops had thus begun inquiries in their dioceses but, at the same time, 
the disturbances had only grown worse. The bishops’ diligence should not be in doubt, 
however, and at the meeting in London the great men of the realm had promised satisfaction 
for any spoliations they had committed. De Cantilupe, therefore, on behalf of his fellow 
bishops, appealed  to the apostolic see against any sentence of excommunication issued by the 
papal legate (who was currently waiting in France for permission to enter England) on 
account of attacks on ecclesiastical liberty and the failure to punish wrongdoers, claiming that 
peace was now settled and that he and the other bishops had the matter in hand and would 
pursue wrongdoers.50  
 
Henry of Sandwich indeed took immediate action in his diocese of London, inducing 
the council to order the mayor and sheriffs of London that they remove all lay force currently 
occupying and wasting the prebend of Walter of Merton in Finsbury. The letter, dated 9 
August, was authorised by the king and the bishops of London, Worcester, Lincoln, Salisbury, 
Winchester, Exeter and Chichester and other bishops who were present.51 At the end of 
October, a panel of three bishops was set up, to whom full power was given by the barons to 
inquire about and correct all injuries done to the Church in England from Easter 1263 until 
the present time.52 The three bishops appointed were the archbishop of York, the bishop of 
London and the bishop of Lincoln.53 Anyone not cooperating with the bishops’ enquiry would 
be excommunicated and would be compelled by the lay power to make satisfaction.54 The 
bishop of London, together with Richard of Mopham archdeacon of Oxford, was also 
authorised by the council to collect and deposit at Canterbury the issues of the church of 
Canterbury that, with the archbishop absent abroad, were currently being despoiled. They 
were also ordered to collect the issue of those benefices belonging to alien clerks ‘and other 
clerks adversaries of the king and his realm’ under the jurisdiction of the diocese of 
Canterbury who were resident abroad, and to lay them up in Christchurch. Although the 
                                                          
50 Gervase, 239-42. 
51 CR 1261-64, 402. 
52 Cronica Maiorum, 70. 
53 CPR 1258-66, 393. 
54 Cronica Maiorum, 70. 
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mandate was supposedly made out of concern for ecclesiastical liberty, the benefice holders 
targeted as ‘adversaries of the king and his realm’ were those that had stood against the 
Provisions of Oxford.55 Whilst this measure protected ecclesiastical revenues from lay attack, 
it also prevented royalist foreigners enjoying the revenues of their benefices. As in the actions 
and arguments of the bishops throughout the period, the historical role of peacemaker and 
current one of partisan rebel were caught in a fractious, and ultimately untenable, 
coexistence. The events of 1264 show, moreover, what the failure of the bishops to act as 
peacemakers in their historical role as hinge-persons meant for the political community, the 
Church and the kingdom. The endemic violence of 1263 and 1264 was one of the most 
significant consequences of the reform movement. The bishops’ allegiance to Montfortian 
reform meant that the kingdom was denied a cohort of peacemakers who could have acted to 
prevent the outbreak of violence. The ugly results of their partisanship were unintential, of 
course, but hardly unforeseen.  
  
Another consequence was the bishops’ conflict with the papacy. This might not have 
been sought but necessarily followed the establishment of the Montfortian constitution after 
Lewes. The exclusion of the papal legate from England was as much a priority for the bishops 
as the barons, as Walter de Cantilupe’s rather desperate protestations at the London assembly 
showed. This act, though essential for the survival of the Provisions, constituted no less than 
the greatest assault on papal authority to have issued from England in a hundred years. The 
Montfortian case for Foulquois’ exclusion was put by the earl to the legate in writing in 
unambiguously offensive terms. It was based on the claim that ‘no legate should be sent into 
this kingdom by the Apostolic See against the privilege of the kingdom, unless he is specially 
called or asked’.56 This, of course, was a long-standing claim peculiar to English kings, held to 
be a privilege conceded by former popes.57 Its origins can be traced to the time of William I, 
who imposed restriction on papal access to England in the face of increasing attempts by 
Gregory VII to make the supremacy of papal authority a reality.58 It continued to be claimed as 
a privilege by William’s successors, so long as they had the power to enforce it, and was 
                                                          
55 CPR 1258-66, 344; Cronica Maiorum, 70. 
56 ‘quod contra regni privilegium legatus nullus a sede apostolica in regnum ipsum mitti debeat, nisi 
vocatus specialiter vel rogatus hos’ (Heidemann, 200). 
57 Brooke, English Church, 217. The claim that this privilege was in fact conceded by the papacy, as 
Brooke points outs, ‘sounds almost incredible’; Eadmer claimed that Calixtus II conceded it to Henry I in 
1119, when the king had presented it as an English custom (Brooke, English Church, 168-9).  Foulquois 
clearly believed this to be unlikely. 
58 Brooke, English Church, 137. 
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claimed by Henry II as one of the ‘customs of [his] ancestors’. It escaped dismissal at the 
Compromise of Avranches, probably because Henry II was able to claim that it was not a 
custom introduced in his time.59 Henry III, despite a more harmonious relationship with the 
papacy, continued to view this as a royal prerogative, admonishing  the papal nuncio Master 
Martin in 1244 with the words ‘we cannot tolerate your attempt to upset our realm... You 
must know perfectly well that legates only come here when we ask the apostolic see to send 
them’.60  
 
The appeal to English custom was continued by the Montfortians in 1264, as they 
insisted that no prelate would leave England unless the legate would first agree not to enjoin 
on them any sentence to be published against anyone in the kingdom.61 This Montfortian 
stipulation echoed clause four of the Constitutions of Clarendon of 1164, which stated that no 
prelate should depart from the realm without the king’s leave, as well as the decrees added by 
Henry II in 1169, which stated that anyone bearing letters of interdict was to be seized and 
held in captivity.62 This custom also survived the Compromise of Avranches. Henry III, for 
instance, in July 1260 wrote to the barons of Dover ordering them to investigate whether 
anyone had landed at the port carrying papal bulls prejudicial to the king or the realm and 
ordering them to arrest any such person.63 
 
The nature of these rights was given a radical spin by the barons, however, who 
remodelled them according to the programme of reform and the new situation created by the 
baronial victory at Lewes, transforming what had hitherto been represented as royal rights 
into the rights of the community of England. Their claims not only replaced royal interests 
with those of the community of the realm but were a slap in the face to the legate’s authority. 
The explained that they had held communal deliberation in a parliament at London regarding 
the legation and, as a result, were able to uphold the claim that no legate should enter England 
                                                          
59 A. J. Duggan, ‘Henry II, the English Church and the Papacy, 1154-1176’, in C. Harper-Bill and N. 
Vincent (eds.) Henry II: New Interpretations (Woodbridge, 2007), 154-83, at 177. 
60 CR 1242-47, 259, cited by Powicke,  Henry III, 354. 
61 ‘Ceterum si ad tractatum ipsum praelatos aliquos reputaveritis magis opportunos, hanc pro constanti 
concordem totius communitatis sciatis esse voluntatem, quod nullum ex eis Angliam exire permittimus, 
nisi prius de ipsis liberis et absolutis in praefigendo eis ad haec termino in eodem statu, quo venerint, 
remittendis et quod nihil omnino contra regnum aut regnicolas in genere vel singulares personas vel 
minores in specie exequendum aut publicandum eis iniungetur tam a vobis quam a praelatis ipsis per 
sufficientem et idoneum cautionem nobis plene prospiciatur’ (Heidemann, 201). 
62 EHD, II, 720; Duggan, ‘Henry II’, 174. 
63 DBM, 192-3. 
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unless he was asked because ‘we do not wish to receive any of your messengers or else to 
consent here to your entry in any way’.64 They went on to propose a meeting with the legate in 
France based on the fact that ‘it is believed communally by all on account of many reasons… 
that a prosperous meeting’ would be better held outside the kingdom than within it.65 
Furthermore, the refusal to allow prelates to leave without the legate’s assurance that he 
would not enjoin sentences on them was made because it ‘is the concordant and resolute will 
of the whole community’.66   
 
Although the barons’ claims to custom and common consent were the stepping stones 
of their argument, the most striking aspect of their letter is the force with which it was 
written. The standard etiquette of  letter writing was ignored by the barons. For instance, one 
would expect a letter written to a superior to be punctuated by the use of the captatio 
benevolentiae, the device used to secure the recipient’s goodwill by conveying respect for their 
position. The use of any such device is, here, noticeably lacking after the formal address. In 
fact, the only part of the letter that comes close to displaying respect is far from convincing: 
‘and when they (the baronial representatives) have come to you and have made known to you 
fully the truth of our act, faith and devotion, which we have always had and still do have for 
the apostolic see, they will uncover the path to you, through which past turbulences might be 
put to rest and corrected in a straightforward way’.67 Respect is not conveyed in the letter but 
is made conditional on the legate’s acceptance of the baronial conditions for negotiations. 
Even this dubious hint of reverence is undermined by the barons’ earlier statement that they 
had refused the legate entry to England ‘foreseeing that danger could easily threaten us and 
the kingdom... if our business were to be handled not from faith but under the appearance of 
false love’.68 This was not the first time that the legate had aspersions cast on his motives. 
                                                          
64 ‘De adventu vestro... communem super hoc ad invicem in parlamento Londoniis habuimus 
deliberationem... nuntios vestros quoscumque in conductum recipere aut etiam in vestrum hac vice 
nolumus consentire [ingressum quoque modo]’ (Heidemann, 200-01). 
65 ‘creditur autem communiter ab omnibus propter multas rationes, quas in praesenti subticemus, quod 
tractatus huius sinodi extra regnum Angliae facilius et melius, quam in regno ipso, prosperum perduci 
valeat ad effectum’ (Heidemann, 200-01).  
66 ‘hanc pro constanti concordem totius communitatis sciatis esse voluntatem’ (Heidemann, 201). 
67 ‘et cum ad vos venerint et facti nostri veritatem, fidem et devotionem, quam erga sedem apostolicam 
semper habuimus et habemus, ad plenum cognoscere facient’ (Heidemann, 200).  
68 ‘vicinum de facile nobis et regno Angliae posse prospicientes imminere periculum, si nostra, verisimiliter 
timemus de praeteritis coniecturam colligentes ad futura, non ex fide sed sub fictae caritatis imagine 
negotia tractarentur’ (Heidemann, 200).  
185 
 
Henry de Montfort had told Foulquois’ messenger that the legate would be more likely to 
impede peace than to aid it, by favouring one side and depriving the other.69  
 
Foulquois’ response was a resilient defence of papal authority and condemnation of 
the Montfortian attempts to undermine it.  He set out the responsibilities owed by the English 
kingdom to the papacy and reminded the Montfortians of the papacy’s dominion over their 
kingdom. Appealing to gens Anglorum, Foulquois did not stress the papacy’s relationship with 
the king of England but rather with the entire people. This ‘people is the particular, most 
pleasing nation and treasure’ of the papacy, chosen for conversion by Gregory the Great. The 
papacy’s agency in converting the English was a long-standing component in the papal claim 
to authority over the kingdom.70 King John’s submission of England to the papacy as papal fief 
might also have served to emphasise the legate’s authority, yet Foulquois’ appeal to the 
loyalty of the nation as a whole demonstrated  that the king’s removal from power did not in 
any way alter the papacy’s authority over the kingdom of England. 
 
Foulquois developed the theme of this special relationship by stressing that the 
papacy’s authority over England was not only that of a lord but that of a mother. It had as 
much right to protect the kingdom, to nurture it, as to rule over it. He outlined, therefore, the 
kingdom’s moral obligation to pay obedience to the apostolic see and denounced the 
ingratitude of the English in slighting the pope’s legate irreverently. The maternal side of the 
papacy’s concern for England went hand in hand with its lordly concern;  it was ‘to look after 
the heath and honour of that same people’ that the papacy had rescued the nation from the 
king of France in Henry III’s minority, which had been done through the ‘prudence and power’ 
of a legate. England, then, owed a double obedience to the pope as ‘mother and lord’.71  
 
It was, Foulquois announced, therefore ‘an amazing harshness and detestable cruelty 
to deny to a mother that which is not denied to Tartars, pagans, schismatics and infidels, 
                                                          
69 Heidemann, 199. 
70 Brooke, English Church, 177-8. 
71 [gentem Anglorum]... ab inclitae memoriae domino Lodovico, patre domini regis Francorum, qui nunc 
regnat, ex parte maxima tunc subactum per legati sui prudentiam pariter et potentiam de manu liberavit 
eiusdem, et ut gentis eiusdem saluti consuleret et honori... Miretur igitur terra et coeli desuper 
obstupescant ad hanc ingratitudinem Angliam nunc delapsam, ut in matris et domini manifestam 
iniuriam legatum suum non quemlibet, sed corporis sui partem et si non merito, saltem officio 




whose legates are admitted courteously by all kingdoms and courts.’72 Moreover, to slight the 
pope’s legate was to slight the papacy, as a legate was ‘not just anyone, but part of the body [of 
the Holy See] and… ought to be revered on account of his office’.73 Whether or not the 
privilege of granting or denying a legate entry into the kingdom was claimed on behalf of the 
king or the community of the realm, Foulquois instructed the Montfortians that no such 
privilege could exist: ‘God forbid, that the Roman Church would have bound itself by a 
particular law, so that it would not be able to visit other places… nor is any pope able to 
impose a law on his successor, since an equal among equals does not have this power, nor is a 
coming pope the heir of his predecessors, but their successor’.74  
 
At this point, Foulquois still focused his recriminations on the small group of barons 
who had put their seals to the initial letter denying him right of entry: ‘you – noble men and 
heads of the people – write to us, that you have ordained and asserted by common counsel in 
London that your privilege is that a legate who has not been asked for should not come to 
you’.75 Before long, however, he could have had been in little doubt concerning the bishops’ 
collusion in this attack on papal jurisdiction. When the bishops wrote to Foulquois supporting 
the Montfortian constitution, in a letter to be discussed further in chapter seven, they 
confirmed their allegiance to the rebels. Later, as pope Clement IV, Foulquois was to condemn 
their actions as active participants in the subversion of royal power, as well as their disregard 
for papal authority. As members of the Montfortian council, he pointed out, the bishops of 
London and Chichester were as culpable as the barons. He also complained that the bishops 
had failed to publish his sentences of excommunication against the rebels and had ‘treated the 
orders with contempt.’76 During the interdict pronounced by the legate, they had continued to 
celebrate the divine offices.77  Throughout these turbulent years, the rift between the 
Montfortian bishops and the pope was as significant for those concerned as that between the 
                                                          
72 ‘Mira siquidem ruditas et detestanda crudelitas negare matri, quod tartaris paganis schismaticis et 
penitus infidelibus non negatur, quorum legati ab omnibus regnis et curiis curialiter admittuntur’ 
(Heidemann, 203). 
73 ‘legatum suum non quemlibet, sed corporis sui partem et si non merito, saltem officio reverendum’ 
(Heidemann, 203). 
74 ‘Sed absit, ut Romana ecclesia lege propria se arctaverit, ne possit per alios visitare, quorum 
visitationem praesentialiter nequit adimplere, nec potuit aliquis summus pontifex legem ponere 
successori, quia non habet imperium par in parem, nec papa veniens praedecessoris haeres est sed 
successor’ (Heidemann, 203). 
75 Those who put their seal to the letter forbidding the legate entry were Simon de Montfort, Peter de 
Montfort, Gilbert de Clare and Roger Bigod (Heidemann, 201 n.1). 
76 CPL, 419. 
77 CPL, 441. 
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lay and clerical Montfortians and the king. The conversion of these bishops from peacemakers 
to partisans had not only failed to prevent the kingdom from succumbing to civil turmoil but 
had precipitated an undesired, though hardly unexpected, ecclesiastical civil war.  
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Chapter Seven  
 
 





Having joined the Montfortian party, the earl’s ecclesiastical supporters undertook the task of 
justifying the reform movement to its critics. The arguments they produced are contained in 
three documents: the case put to Louis IX of France for an arbitration in January 1264, known 
as the Mise of Amiens;1 the letters contained in the register of the papal legate, Gui Foulquois, 
cardinal bishop of Sabina, who conducted negotiations with the rebels in the summer of 
1264;2 and the Song of Lewes, written after Montfort’s victory of May 1264.3 The Mise and the 
Song, though well known, have not been analysed in this context before, while the legatine 
register has received little attention.4 Brought together, these documents demonstrate how 
the bishops formed their arguments and how, in contrast to the shaping of ideas that 
influenced ecclesiastical support of Magna Carta, those arguments were developed not in the 
ivory tower of the schoolroom but in their immediate political context and marked 
fundamentally by considerations for the audience at which they were directed.  
 
The group of curial barons who marched on Henry III’s hall at Westminster in 1258 
had put in place a council intended to provide a solution to what, as far as the barons were 
concerned, was the king’s favouritism and liberality towards his half-brothers, as well as his 
                                                          
1 DBM, 252–79.  
2 Heidemann.  
3 Song of Lewes. 
4 Robert Stacey has offered the only substantial analysis of the case put by the reformers to Louis at 
Amiens. He does not consider the Mise in relation to the other Montfortian productions dealt with in 
the present chapter, instead considering the influence of Thomas Cantilupe and the bishops in the 
representation of Henry III’s apparent abandonment of a crusade to the Holy Land in favour of a 
conquest of Sicily in the Mise (Stacey, ‘Crusades’, 143). John Maddicott also provides discussion of the 
Mise (Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 258–63). Maddicott makes use of Gui Foulquois’s register in his 
biography of Montfort in order to reconstruct the chronology of events in 1264, though does not deal 
with the arguments of the bishops contained therein (Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 291–306). 
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ill-advised and expensive schemes for Sicily.5 The king was forced to agree by oath to the 
formation of a council of fifteen. This council would appoint his ministers and allocate his 
castles as well as implement a general series of measures for the reform of the realm, which 
came to be known as the Provisions of Oxford.6 The king could not rule without the consent of 
this council; in fact, as Henry was to complain later, the council even ruled without consulting 
him.7 Although by 1261 Henry III had persuaded the pope to dissolve the oath that upheld the 
Provisions and regained much of his power,8 the Provisions were imposed once again, albeit 
temporarily, in the summer of 1263 when Montfort led a violent campaign against the 
royalists.9 The victory of Montfortian forces at the battle of Lewes in May 1264 allowed for the 
implementation of a new form of conciliar government, the Form of Peace, modelled on that of 
1258. The new council was to be made up of nine men, appointed by three electors, who 
would make decisions according to the judgement of a two-thirds majority. Like the council of 
1258, that of 1264 would have authority to decide the allocation of castles and the 
appointment of royal officers and minsters, as well as ‘all other affairs of the realm’. Conciliar 
decisions were to be binding; it was now made explicit that ‘the lord king shall do all these 
things by the counsel of the nine in this form, or they shall do them in place and on the 
authority of the lord king’. Unless some other settlement was agreed (which was unlikely) this 
system was to last through the lifetime of both Henry and his heir, the lord Edward.10 The 
council of 1264 had been imposed not just by threat but by the use of military force and was 
intended, explicitly, to cripple royal power in favour of conciliar government on a semi-
permanent basis. 
 
The group that assumed the task of justifying these measures was made up of five 
bishops – Walter de Cantilupe of Worcester, Richard of Gravesend of Lincoln, Stephen of 
                                                          
5 For an examination of the baronial complaints of 1258 about Henry’s favouritism towards the 
Lusignans and the argument that Henry III treated his barons relatively well, see Carpenter, ‘King, 
Magnates and Society’. 
6 Carpenter, ‘1258’, 187–8.  
7 For the Provisions of Oxford, see DBM, 96–113; and for the Provisions of Westminster (which also 
came under the banner of the Provisions of Oxford), see DBM, 136–57. For Henry’s complaints about 
the council, see DBM, 211–39, especially at 215, where Henry complains that the councillors ‘hold their 
discussions and meetings at various places without the king’s knowledge, not asking the king to attend 
them, nor summoning him to the council any more than the least person of his kingdom’.  
8 Papal bulls dissolving the oaths had been issued first by Alexander IV and were published in England 
on 12 June 1261. His successor, Urban IV, issued confirmations of Alexander’s decrees on 25 Feb. 1262 
and 23 Aug. 1263 (DBM, 248–51 n. 1).  
9 Carpenter, Struggle for Mastery, 374–6. 
10 DBM, 294–301. 
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Berksted of Chichester, John Gervase of Winchester and Henry of Sandwich of London11 – as 
well as Thomas de Cantilupe, Walter’s nephew, a distinguished scholar of Paris and Oxford 
who was later to become bishop of Hereford.12 Only the first two, Worcester and Lincoln, had 
demonstrable links to Montfort before this period, through the network of friendships that 
encompassed the earl, the Franciscan scholar Adam Marsh and Robert Grosseteste, bishop of 
Lincoln from 1235 to 1253.13 Both Worcester and Lincoln had been part of the reform 
movement from 1258.14 The backgrounds of the bishops of Chichester and London are 
relatively obscure, as is that of the bishop of Winchester, except that he had previously served 
Henry III as a royal clerk and his desertion to the rebel camp had provoked outrage in the 
king.15 The bishops of Chichester, Winchester and London probably only joined the reform 
movement after their respective promotions to the episcopate, in 1262 and 1263. With 
Montfort’s victory at the battle of Lewes in 1264, these men became complicit in the captivity 
of the king and actively involved in the attempt permanently to restrict his power. The bishop 
of Chichester was one of the three electors appointed by the Form of Peace and the bishop of 
London and Thomas de Cantilupe were two of the nine who formed the new council.16 The 
attempt to defend the Montfortian regime was, therefore, not taken on by sympathetic 
observers but by active protagonists. The need to defend their own actions as much as those 
of Montfort and their baronial allies was to add an element of urgency to their case.  
                                                          
11 Richard Gravesend was in all likelihood involved in the construction of these arguments but does not 
appear by name in any of the 1264 documents of justification dealt with here, probably because he was 
persona non grata. He was suspended from office by the pope on 2 June 1264 for contumacy, having 
failed to appear before him to answer accusations about alleged offences committed against clerks 
provided by the papacy. On the balance of probability, the alleged attacks took place in the summer or 
autumn of 1263 during the rebellion that broke out with Montfort’s return to England (CPL, 400–1). 
Gravesend does, however, appear as witness to the Form of Peace (DBM, 298–9).  
12 Thomas had attained an M.A. at Paris and completed his studies in canon law at Oxford around 1255, 
where he incepted as doctor and was elected chancellor of the university in 1261. He was appointed by 
the reforming council as chancellor, keeping the king’s seal between 25 Feb. and 7 May 1265. Thomas 
received the king’s forgiveness for his part in the rebellion as early as Feb. 1266, though he soon left for 
Paris to continue his studies. He returned to royal service with the accession of Edward I (R. C. 
Finucane, ‘Cantilupe, Thomas de [St. Thomas of Hereford] (c.1220–82)’, ODNB (2004), available online 
at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4570;  Carpenter, ‘Thomas Cantilupe’, 294–6, 299; 
Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 259).  
13 For Adam’s letters to Walter Cantilupe, see Letters of Adam Marsh, 172-5, 175-7; and for his letters to 
Gravesend see Letters of Adam Marsh, 184-91, 206-15. For a discussion of this network, see Letters of 
Adam Marsh, xviii–xxx, xxxvii–xliii; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 79–84.  
14 DBM, 100–1, 104–5; Richard Gravesend was not elected as bishop of Lincoln until 30 Sept. 1258, after 
the reforming parliaments of Westminster and Oxford, but joined the reformers immediately, travelling 
to France with Simon de Montfort and the earl of Gloucester to negotiate the peace with the king of 
France (Dunstable, 211). 
15 CLR 1251–60, 177; CR 1261–4, 174, 382–3.  
16 DBM, 295 n. 4, 5.  
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In some sense, the action taken by the Montfortians and the grounds on which the 
bishops might have built their case were based on deep-rooted concepts that were not unique 
to England or new in the thirteenth century. The general understandings that informed the 
focus of baronial demands in 1258 and in the later rebellion were long-held across Europe: 
government rested on a mutual relationship between a king and his subjects in which the 
former would consult the latter and rule justly.17 In England, in particular, the established and 
important role played by the great men of the kingdom in providing counsel for the king and 
consenting to royal policy can be traced back to at least the tenth century, while the belief that 
barons had not just the duty but the right to provide counsel, which the king had ‘at least a 
moral obligation to follow’, had begun to emerge by the turn of the thirteenth century.18 In 
this sense, the Montfortians, in advocating the importance of baronial counsel, were building 
on an ancient and widespread tradition. To some extent, moreover, the actions of the barons 
in 1258 and 1264 rested on the ‘accepted view’ that, should royal government fail to uphold 
the customary rights of its subjects, those subjects were entitled to take forceful action against 
the king under the leadership of the great men of the realm.19  
 
In some sense, too, the bishops might have felt able to justify the reform of royal 
government and their role in its oversight by appealing to the precedent of their predecessors. 
English bishops had long been accustomed to chastising kings when they transgressed. As set 
out in Chapter One, it was a role modelled on the actions of Old Testament prophets and 
justified by Stephen Langton in his biblical exegisis, confirmed by the status of bishops as 
consecrators of kings. More than a right, the episcopal correction of wayward monarchs was 
an obligation. In the thirteenth century this had manifested itself in the actions of Langton in 
1213, Edmund of Abingdon in 1234 and, amongst the episcopate more generally, in the 
enforcement of successive issues and reissues of Magna Carta by sentence of 
excommunication. As recently as 1253, the bishops had demonstrated their commitment to 
the charters and their duty to uphold them through the extensive publication of the general 
sentence of excommunication issued against those infringing the charters’ liberties.  
 
There was, however, a crucial difference between upholding Magna Carta and 
supporting the Montfortian constitution of 1264. Magna Carta did not seek to control central 
                                                          
17 Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, xlviii. 
18 J. R. Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament 924-1327 (Oxford, 2010), 23–32, 119. 
19Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, xlviii. 
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government, while the council of 1258 had effectively taken the reins of government from the 
king’s hands. The 1264 regime under Montfort’s leadership went even further, cementing its 
power in the long term not only (as in 1258) by taking possession of the Henry’s military 
assets but by taking possession of the king himself. In supporting their claims and 
participating in this type of action against the king, the Montfortian bishops went far beyond 
precedent. This becomes clear through a direct comparison of baronial action with the 
thought-world of Stephen Langton and Robert Grosseteste. It will be argued that no previous 
bishop came near to anticipating the views developed by the bishops in the crucible of the 
crisis of 1263–4.  
 
As John Baldwin has shown, Langton’s interest in the right of the subject to oppose the 
king if the ruler made a decision unjustly or without judgement was extensive. Writing 
probably in Paris, at the end of the twelfth century, Langton examined numerous 
contemporary scenarios to demonstrate that if a king made a decision without the judgement 
of his court then a subject could legitimately refuse to obey that decision and, indeed, was 
bound to do so.20 A generation later, Robert Grosseteste wrote about the right to oppose a 
command when he discussed papal monarchy. There was, he believed, only a certain amount 
of power inherent in the pope’s office and this was a constructive power, the power to do 
good: 
‘the most holy apostolic see, to whom power of every kind has been given ... for 
building up and not for tearing down [2 Corinthians 10: 8], cannot either command or 
enjoin anything that verges on this kind of [destructive] sin ... For this would obviously 
be a failure, or a corruption, or an abuse of its most holy and plenary power ... And one 
who is a faithful subject of the same apostolic see ... cannot submit to commands or 
instructions of this kind ... He is instead obliged to oppose them and rebel against them 
with all his strength ...’21  
Grosseteste was adamant that a subject could disobey a monarch who overstepped the mark, 
yet it is important to note that his argument was predicated on the belief in the (constructive) 
power of the ruler’s office. Disobedience to individual holders of that office was justified only 
for the sake of upholding the office itself above all else. Crucially, then, like Langton, he 
assumed that a subject would make a decision to obey or disobey a ruler who acted contrary 
to the tenets of this office on a case by case basis. The ruler might give an order one day which 
was unjust or illegal and so demand disobedience but tomorrow might still be ruler and might 
make a good decision, or even a wrong decision made justly, in which case the subject would 
                                                          
20 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 815–20, 823. 
21 Grosseteste Letters, 446.  
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be obliged to obey. These sorts of ideas made Langton and Grosseteste strong supporters of 
Magna Carta, which had bound the king to act within the law.22 Magna Carta, however, had not 
taken control of government from the king’s hands. Neither Langton’s nor Grosseteste’s ideas 
offered justification for the 1258 revolution or the 1264 Form of Peace.  
 
Grosseteste had, in fact, considered the idea of conciliar power but only to argue 
against it. He set out his objections in his analogy of papal government: 
‘Because the sun cannot by immediate presence shine everywhere on earth at one and 
the same time ... [it] illuminates the moon and stars [i.e., the cardinals and bishops] 
from the fullness of its own light, without any loss thereby to itself, so that when it is 
absent ... [they] shed light upon the earth. And when the sun itself returns and shows 
its presence to the earth, those lesser luminaries are hidden by the rays of the sun and 
yield to the sunlight … It would be astonishing and utterly detrimental to the 
perfection of the earth’s plants and animals if, at the sun’s rising over the earth, the 
moon and stars were to attempt to obstruct its rays, so that it could not give light to 
the earth...’23 
In Grosseteste’s view, the idea of inferiors opposing a superior in an attempt to diminish his 
power was contrary to the natural order. In fact the same could be said, Grosseteste argued, if 
the ruler himself has voluntarily diminished his own power, since ‘in Ecclesiasticus it is stated 
that one should not so entrust his power to another that he would diminish it for himself [Sir 
33:19-24], especially if the power is such that it may be entrusted to another and still be 
retained in full ... How would anyone not blemish his glory if he diminished the power 
bestowed upon him from above?’24 Grosseteste’s view echoed canon law arguments on the 
inalienability of royal power which held that, because a king was but a temporary custodian of 
the royal office, he was obliged to pass on all the powers of that office to his successors 
intact.25 These arguments had been invoked by the papacy to protect royal power, most 
notably in the bull Intellecto of 1220 made in favour of the king of Hungary, but also to protect 
Henry III himself in the twelve-thirties.26 The intellectual tide, in fact, was against any move 
that inhibited the scope of the royal office, especially in a way that would affect future office-
holders, as the Form of Peace had done by providing for the conciliar control of government 
throughout the reign of Henry and his heir.  
 
                                                          
22 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, 829; d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 432–4. 
23 Grosseteste Letters, 401–02. 
24 Grosseteste Letters, 385. 
25 P. N. Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought (New York, 1956), 3. 
26 Riesenberg, Inalienability, 48, 113–14, 120–1.  
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If the Montfortian bishops could not find the authority for their case in works closely 
associated with their milieu there was, potentially, at least one other line that they might have 
pursued in order to justify the curtailment of Henry III’s power. The barons and bishops of 
Portugal had as recently as 1245 been successful in convincing the pope to detach their king 
from royal power on the grounds that he was rex inutilis, meaning that Sancho II was deemed 
insufficiens as a king. At least one of the Montfortian circle, Thomas de Cantilupe, was present 
at Lyons in 1245, where he might have witnessed Innocent IV’s action against Sancho.27 Even 
if the Montfortian bishops were not familiar with Sancho’s case, the theory was founded on 
canon law relating to the episcopal office, with which they were likely to be familiar.28  
 
The potential viability of such a course of action by the Montfortians is suggested by 
similarities in the complaints made against both rulers. Sancho’s actions were never 
considered tyrannical; instead his subjects alleged that it was his negligence and idleness that 
led him to follow the evil counsel of unscrupulous characters and violate ecclesiastical 
liberties.29 One of the accusations made by the English Church in 1256 had been that Henry’s 
simplicitas (a key characteristic of any rex inutilis) had laid him open to the suggestions of 
treacherous counsellors and that the kingdom had suffered as a result.30 Complaints against 
Henry’s attitude towards ecclesiastical liberties and resources were prominent in the various 
schedules drawn up at meetings of the English clergy throughout the twelve-fifties.31 In 1264, 
moreover, the Montfortian bishops insisted that they still regarded Henry as their prince and 
that the members of his council were merely supposed to assist the king in the performance of 
his duties.32 This view appears to echo canon law, which stated that rex inutilis – as opposed to 
                                                          
770 Acta Sanctorum: Octobris, Vol. i (Antwerp-Brussels, 1643), 545. 
28 Peters, Shadow King, 131–2. 
29 Peters, Shadow King, 138–9.  
30 Burton, 361; C&S, 508. 
31 C&S, 467–72, 501–9, 524–48, 568–85. 
32 ‘videre non possumus nec intendimus, quod regiam [forma pacis] evacuet aliquatenus potestatem, 
maxime cum omnes regnicolae sine exceptione quacumque ipsum regem nostrum agnoscant ut dominum 
et agnoscere sicut antea velint in posterum et tamquam principem revereri, nec ipsos praedicti domini 
regis ministros et consiliarios praecipuos, quos reges vocatis, volumus regem esse, nec imposita eis 
laboriosa sollicitudo et labor sollicitus interpretationem huiusmodi nominis patiuntur, cum magis servi 
quam domini, magis milites quam principes inspecto fine officii sui iure debeant nominari’ (Heidemann, 
226–7). That the reformers were faithful subjects of the king and never intended to diminish his status 
was a determined and consistent claim from the beginning of the movement (see, for instance: CM, V, 
706; Burton, 464; DBM, 222–5). 
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a tyrant – could not be deposed, but would retain the royal dignity and be given a coadjutor to 
fulfil the administrative functions of the office, as had happened in the Portuguese case.33  
 
There were several factors, however, that meant that the rex inutilis theory could not 
easily be applied by the Montfortians. The papacy had only recognized Portugal as a kingdom 
in its own right in 1179, at which point Alexander III had made clear that the purpose of 
Portuguese kingship was to prosecute the crusade in the Iberian peninsula. Portuguese kings 
– expected to be ‘intrepid destroyer[s] of the enemies of the name of Christ’ – could thus be 
judged against fairly clear criteria.34 English kingship, on the other hand, was based on a much 
more complex array of responsibilities. This meant that its image was more flexible and, 
consequently, so were its criteria for success. Moreover, unlike Sancho, Henry III was a 
crowned and anointed king whose office reached far back into the distant past, so that he was 
protected both by the sacrality and durability of his office. Importantly too, canon law clearly 
placed the pope at the centre of any such action against the alleged insufficiens king; even if 
opinion among canon lawyers was divided as to whether it was necessary for the pope to 
remove the king from power himself or whether the barons and clergy could act with papal 
approval,35 the precedent provided by the Portuguese case would suggest that the English 
would need to petition the pope for Henry’s removal before making any move. This could not 
be done for two reasons. First, while Sancho’s removal from power was the result of several 
years of concerted action by the barons and bishops of Portugal,36 the coup of 1258 was a 
more or less spontaneous reaction produced by a charged political atmosphere.37 Second, the 
papacy was not likely to take such drastic action against Henry III, a papal vassal whom the 
papacy had long protected and who until recently had been the chief hope of papal ambitions 
in Sicily, until thwarted by his subjects’ reluctance to offer financial support. Moreover, 
Henry’s interests at the papal court might be protected by the lobby he had built up there in 
the preceding years.38 Even if the papacy’s disapproval of action against Henry could not be 
predicted in 1258, it would become clear when successive popes pronounced the Provisions 
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37 Carpenter, ‘1258’, 190-5. 
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of Oxford invalid and the oath that upheld them illegal.39 Action against an alleged rex inutilis 
was predicated on papal authority and such a case against Henry could not be made without 
the pope.  
 
So while some regions of the bishops’ intellectual landscape provided the backdrop for 
the Montfortian case, the normative discourse of royal power simply did not permit any clear 
justification for the type of action taken against Henry III. The result was that, first, the 
Montfortian bishops needed to construct new arguments in 1264 and, second, in so doing 
they had to contend with a considerable level of intellectual discomfort. This meant that the 
process by which they formed their arguments was entirely different from that of earlier 
episcopal proponents of governmental reform. For instance, almost all of Langton’s writings 
on political ethics were completed in all probability during his time in Paris. The biblical 
exegesis which encompassed his argument that the king should carry with him a written 
volume of the law by which he must abide was finished long before Langton was insisting on 
the issue of Magna Carta in 1225 and pronouncing excommunication on those who violated 
it.40 In contrast, the Montfortian bishops did not begin with pre-established ideas about the 
permanent limitation of the king’s power through the medium of conciliar government. The 
point of departure in this case was the decision to act. The bishops only began to map out 
their arguments later, and then only because they were forced to justify themselves as a result 
of the opposition of various parties. What can be seen here is the ad hoc working out of ideas, 
not a coherent philosophy.  
 
The arguments composed by the Montfortian religious milieu were all produced in a 
period of civil war amid intense pressure. It was this context that shaped their form. The 
material incorporated into the Mise of Amiens and the letters to the papal legate is not 
entirely representative of Montfortian thinking. Instead it is a highly selective case fashioned 
for a particular audience. Unlike Langton, who had worked out his ideas relatively free from 
                                                          
39 DBM, 238–47, 248–51. 
40 This work was probably completed 1187–93 (d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 424–8, 432-3). Similarly, 
Edmund of Abingdon, in issuing an ultimatum to Henry III in 1234 whereby he threatened the king with 
excommunication if he would not expel malicious counsellors, provide justice and observe the 
principles embodied in Magna Carta, had the thought of Langton, his mentor and predecessor, as well 
as the precedent of Langton’s involvement in the reissue of Magna Carta in 1225, from which to draw 
(CM, III, 272). It is possible that Edmund actually studied under Langton in Paris, although in any case 
he had ‘shown himself a fearless critic of government in the Langtonian tradition’ (Lawrence, St 
Edmund of Abingdon, 122, 158; d’Avray, ‘Magna Carta’, 433). 
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constraint, in Paris, with no sense that they were part of an immediate political battle, the 
Montfortian authors were restricted to a great extent by what they knew to be acceptable to 
their audience. Since this included, at different stages, the king of France and the papal legate, 
the authors had to skirt over, or even conceal, some of the trickier points. Although the Song of 
Lewes, seemingly intended for a wider and more sympathetic audience, comes closer to 
revealing the range of justifications to which the Montfortian bishops were able to turn, the 
lack of scriptural or scholarly authority cited in support of the imposition of the conciliar 
government hints at a discomfort with the more controversial aspects of Montfortian action 
and highlights the precariousness of the bishops’ case. It is not possible, then, to offer a simple 
correlation between the ideas put forward in these arguments and the actions of these 
bishops. What is possible, however, is to offer some explanation of this process of justification, 
of how and for what purpose these arguments about conciliar government were selected and 
developed.  
 
This process began when both the Montfortians and the royal party submitted their 
cases to the judgement of the king of France at Amiens in January 1264. Both parties had 
compiled their arguments in document form, with the Montfortian case probably drawn up by 
Thomas de Cantilupe.41 Knowing that so much might depend on the result, the reformers’ case 
represents the most comprehensive and self-conscious attempt at justifying their actions 
hitherto attempted. The case put by the king in December 1263, with which Thomas and his 
colleagues had to contend, was straightforward.42 Henry’s objection to the restrictions placed 
upon him was based largely on custom. The barons, as Louis was told, had made sure that 
Henry’s ministers and officers were chosen by the baronial council, whereas the king and his 
ancestors had been accustomed to appoint and remove officers at their pleasure.43 Henry’s 
case was underpinned by a final note, which stated that this argument was valid because ‘the 
lord king cannot do or grant the aforesaid things against his oath which he took at his 
coronation’.44 Here Henry apparently referred to that part of the coronation oath which bound 
the king to preserve the laws and customs of the realm and to revoke illegal alienations of 
royal rights.45 The implication was that Henry was thus obliged to maintain the king’s right to 
appoint his own ministers. As we have seen, this argument could be supported both by canon 
                                                          
41 DBM, 252–79; Stacey, ‘Crusades’, 143.  
42 Stacey, ‘Crusades’, 141.  
43 DBM, 252-3.  
44 DBM, 257.  
45 DBM, 256–7 n. 8; H. G. Richardson, ‘The English Coronation Oath’, Speculum 24 (1949), 44–75, at 51.  
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law and by contemporary theological arguments. Moreover, as much as the coronation oath 
was binding, the oath to uphold the Provisions of Oxford was not, as Henry pointed out, since 
the pope had annulled it and all who adhered to that oath were excommunicate.46 Henry’s 
case lacked eloquence or flare but it was legally sound and in its insistence that the rights of 
the crown be preserved undiminished it was sure to appeal to Louis IX.  
 
The reformers’ case was far more extensive than Henry’s. This was a detailed attack 
on Henrician rule: the king had breached Magna Carta; his administration was riddled with 
abuse and his government corrupted by foreign favourites; royal revenue was diminished and 
justice denied.47 For these reasons and others, ‘it was necessary to find a remedy ... to choose 
certain prudent and trustworthy men to advise the lord king, who alone, no matter how wise 
he might be, could not suffice to deal with all those things which are involved in the 
administration of his kingdom’.48 The emphasis was thus on the sharing of the burden of royal 
government not to diminish the king’s status but ‘for the honour of the lord king and for the 
common advantage of his kingdom’.49 This action was necessary because as ‘human malice 
grows this purpose [of reforming the realm] could be achieved in no other way’.50 The 
Montfortians adhered to the line (used initially in 1258) that the king had consented to the 
establishment of the council, which ‘it pleased him to grant to the leading men and the 
magnates of his kingdom’ and which he had ‘promised ... in good faith by an oath sworn upon 
his soul’.51  
 
By concentrating on complaints about corrupt government and the urgent need for 
reform, the Montfortians no doubt intended to strike a chord with Louis IX, who was engaged 
in his own campaign of reform in France.52 Knowing, though, that Louis would not approve of 
                                                          
46 DBM, 256-7.  
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49 DBM, 265.  
50 DBM, 265.  
51 DBM, 257.  
52 For the programme of reform of royal government enacted by Louis IX on his return from crusade, 
John of Joinville, ‘The life of Saint Louis’, in Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades 
(Penguin Classics, 2008), 320–3; J. le Goff, Saint Louis, trans. G. E. Gollrad (Paris, 2009), 157–61. The 
suggestion that certain aspects of the Montfortian case outlined in the Mise – that sheriffs would be 
appointed on an annual basis and would have to give an account of their stewardship and that there 
should be provisions preventing the bribery of councillors – are reminiscent of Louis’s programme is 
made by Stacey, ‘Crusades’, 141. That is not to say, however, that the many of the reforming measures 
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the diminishment of royal power, especially by force, the Montfortian arguments concerning 
the establishment of the council, its binding powers and its ability to choose ministers rested 
entirely on the consent of the king and the oath he had provided. If this line was intended, as it 
surely was, to obscure the fact that Henry had not in fact given his consent willingly in 1258,53 
it would be negated by the king’s testimony, supported by the pope’s dissolution of the oath 
on the grounds that it was extracted under duress and was therefore illegal.54 There was also 
the matter of the continuing and institutionalized coercion embodied in the Montfortian form 
of conciliar government whereby, as Henry complained and the Montfortian case freely 
admitted, royal castles would be held only by men appointed by the council and could only be 
delivered to the king by conciliar authority, thus leaving him utterly unable to defend himself 
against the reformers.55 The claim that the king was sharing his power voluntarily was clearly 
false though, in any case, it could not be upheld given that canon law insisted on the 
inalienability of royal power. 
 
Louis’s judgement – perhaps not unsurprisingly – came down on the side of Henry.56 
The Provisions of Oxford, as he saw it, had ‘greatly harmed’ the ‘rights and honour’ of the king. 
The king of France added his force to the pope’s decree that the statutes should be quashed, 
all oaths pertaining to them dissolved and the king of England restored to his full power. 
Moreover, Louis cracked down on the crucial matter of the reformers’ coercion of the English 
king, decreeing that all castles held by the reformers should be restored and that Henry must 
be able to appoint his own ministers.57  
 
As matters transpired, Louis’s judgement was only a temporary blow to the reformers’ 
ambitions, as within four months Montfort had defeated royal forces at Lewes and had taken 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of the Provisions of Oxford were not genuinely inspired by Louis’s programme, as Maddicott suggests 
(Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 169). 
53 Carpenter, ‘1258’, 187–8.  
54 The royal family, according to Urban IV, had provided their oaths to the Provisions ‘under the 
compulsion of a certain pressure from their barons ... to the diminution of the power of the king and to 
the depression of royal liberty’ (DBM, 249).  
55 DBM, 254-5, 258-9.  
56 For an evaluation of different explanations of why the Montfortians agreed to submit to Louis’s 
arbitration, see Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 258. As Maddicott suggests, their agreement might well 
have been the result of over-confidence, given the expectation that Montfort would be present to 
convince Louis in person. This plan was disrupted when Montfort broke his leg: ‘In keeping him at 
home, Montfort’s broken leg, like the length of Cleopatra’s nose, may have been one of those 
contingencies which change the course of history’ (Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 259–60).  
57 DBM, 286–9.  
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the king captive. Over the course of the summer and autumn of 1264, though, the Montfortian 
bishops were faced with the challenge of justifying the new regime to the papal legate, Gui 
Foulquois, who had been sent to ensure Henry’s restoration. Foulquois had been carefully 
chosen by Urban IV because he had previously been a member of Louis’s council and was still 
on good terms with the French king.58 The pope clearly intended that the two join forces to 
restore Henry, and even empowered Foulquois to preach a crusade for their purpose across 
Europe, which Louis would potentially lead.59 In the summer of 1264, this must have 
appeared to the Montfortians as a very real threat, with Henry’s wife, Queen Eleanor, 
supported by Louis, mustering an army on the French coast.60 The Montfortian bishops were 
in a difficult situation. Since the barons had refused the legate entry to England, Foulquois had 
turned to the bishops, pressuring them to coerce the barons into obedience. The resulting 
tussle is recorded in Foulquois’s register, which provides not only the arguments put by both 
sides for and against the Form of Peace but the context that is crucial to understanding their 
production. 
 
Refusing to accept the bishops’ excuses that the barons were preventing them from 
visiting him in France, Foulquois confronted them about their endorsement of the Form of 
Peace. The legate wrote that he was amazed that the bishops had agreed to the Peace since it 
‘empties the liberty of royal power’, effectively deposing the king and elevating three kings 
(the three electors) in his stead. This not only left the kingdom open to factional divisions but 
undermined the authority of the pope (who had already annulled the oath that upheld the 
Provisions of Oxford and supported Louis’s judgement at Amiens) and confounded customary 
law. The bishops had requested that the legate urge the king of France to promote the Peace; 
at this Foulquois was amazed (as well he might be), since Louis had already pronounced 
                                                          
58 CPL, 396. From an aristocratic family of St. Gilles, Gui had studied law but had joined the Church only 
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59 CPL, 396–400.  
60 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 282; Carpenter, Struggle for Mastery, 377.  
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against everything it stood for. Foulquois urged the bishops to come to him at Boulogne and 
explain their position.61 
 
Despite his evident misgivings, however, Foulquois responded to baronial complaints 
that he had dismissed the Form of Peace without good cause,62 pointing out that in fact he had 
not made any definite pronouncement on the matter. While he did not believe the Form of 
Peace to be equitable, he would willingly hear any evidence to the contrary if only the 
reformers would meet him and offer it. Foulquois was, therefore, amazed (once again) that 
the barons had apparently forbidden the bishops to visit him. The barons had no right to do 
this and in any case their actions were counterproductive, since they would neither let the 
legate enter England nor allow the bishops to come to France, when the legate was in need of 
their counsel. Foulquois told the barons that if they should continue in this vein they would 
incur excommunication.63 
 
The Montfortian bishops were in a precarious position. If they went to meet the legate, 
he might order them to issue sentences of excommunication and interdict against the 
reformers in England. If they continued to avoid the legate’s summons, both they and the 
barons would face excommunication. Yet they would not abandon reform. One path alone lay 
open to them, by which the bishops might reconcile their loyalties, avoid spiritual 
punishments and dissuade the legate from supporting Queen Eleanor’s military action. The 
                                                          
61 ‘mirari possumus et debemus assensisse vos paci, quae libertatem regiae potestatis evacuat, quae uno 
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62 ‘intelleximus per eosdem [nuncios] vos pacem quandam inter dominum nostrum regem et nos provide et 
non sine magna deliberatione ordinatam ac a domino rege, praelatis et procivibus omnibus ac 
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excommunicationis sententiam, quam in prohibentes tulimus, incurratis. In hoc etiam utilitati propriae 
manifeste videmini contraire, cum nec regnum nos ingredi patiamini nec ad nos praelatos accedere, 
quorum consiliis tam in pace quam aliis regni negotiis indigemus’ (Heidemann, 225).  
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legate had written that he would willingly hear any evidence they could offer to justify the 
Form of Peace. Could he be persuaded?  
 
If the bishops were to succeed, they would have to abandon the previous lines of 
argument put forward for conciliar government. A long list of grievances and the simple 
pretence of consent had not persuaded Louis at Amiens and so clearly would not succeed now 
after Lewes and with a legate who was working in partnership with the French king. The 
reformers had always been on sticky ground because they were proposing novelties in the 
face of custom. In such a debate, custom would always be given the benefit of the doubt. One 
way of tackling this would be to argue that the custom in question was a bad one and so 
should not stand. Though any (hypothetical) argument that the custom of the king heading a 
kingdom’s government was a bad one in principle lay far beyond the bounds of the bishops’ 
mental landscape. The alternative approach, and one suited to their academic backgrounds, 
was to supply authoritative precedents in order to demonstrate that what appeared to be 
novelty was not actually novelty at all. This is the path that the Montfortian bishops took. 
Mindful that their audience was a papal legate, their response was a three-fold appeal to 
precedents provided by the highest authorities: God’s ordering of the universe, papal 
government and the Bible. If they could show that God or the pope had provided for conciliar 
government, they could not only justify the system itself but also their own involvement, as 
churchmen, in upholding it.  
 
The supreme ruler of the universe, as the bishops wrote to the legate at the end of 
August, provided heaven with a mover – the chief angel – who ordered and directed the 
universe. God had also created the stars and choir of heaven for the same purpose: the 
governance of the world below. Furthermore, the legate was told, one might turn to the 
example of the pope’s government of Christendom in conjunction with the bishops and college 
of cardinals. Did the pope not delegate his power to his brothers, making them his coadjutors, 
allowing them to pass judgement in his name? This delegation, argued the bishops, provided a 
significant degree of power to judges-delegate, yet nobody would claim (as the legate had by 
comparison) that it created multiple popes. Finally, the bishops argued, one could read in the 
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Bible that Moses himself instructed that wise and noble men be appointed as princes, chosen 
by the people of their tribe, without any detriment to his mastery. 64 
 
All three appeals to precedent emphasized the initiative of the ruler – the equivalent of 
the king – in setting up a council or body to assist him and thus to share in his power. The 
implication of the bishops’ argument was that if the king was merely delegating his power and 
doing so freely then there could be no damage to royal power per se. This would support the 
bishop’s insistence – stated here in support of their argument – that they could not see how 
the Form of Peace emptied royal power and did not intend that it should do so, because the 
whole kingdom recognized the king as lord and wished to acknowledge him as prince in the 
future as it had before. Nor, the bishops avowed, should those ministers and counsellors of the 
king, whom the legate called kings, be thus named. They should be called servants rather than 
lords, knights rather than princes, when the limit of their office was justly considered.65  
 
To the uninformed observer, this might have seemed fair. After all, as Grosseteste had 
shown, those deputed by the pope drew their power from him for the sake of the governance 
of a realm that was too large for one man to manage alone. In an echo of the arguments made 
at Amiens, the emphasis was thus placed on the sharing of the burden of government, in itself 
a necessary and natural objective, as demonstrated by the example of Moses, to which the 
bishops now turned, who had pleaded with God to ease his burden of the leadership of the 
Israelites.66 These arguments, though, again concealed the uncomfortable reality that Henry 
                                                          
64 ‘Et super constitutione ministrorum huiusmodi tam de summis quam de infimis sumamus exempla, ecce 
rectorem universitatis altissimum coelo scimus dedisse motorem, qui sub ipso inferiora dat cuncta moveri 
luciferumque vesperumque pleiades et stellas ceteras coelique concentum similiter ordinasse ad 
inferiorum naturale regnum eorundem. Summus pontifex etiam nos, sicut et ceteros sanctae Romanae 
ecclesiae cardinales sibi ut fratres et coniudices facit in proferendis iudiciis assidere vel ad ipsa etiam 
proferenda delegat; et tamen plures deos aut papes penitus abnegamus, licet praemissa sub eis non 
minimam habeant, sicut praediximus, potestatem. Populi insuper Israelitici Moysem ducem et rectorem 
electos per ipsos de suis tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles absque sui magisterii detrimento constituere 
principes legimus praecepisse’ (Heidemann, 227).  
65 Heidemann, 226–7. 
66 Numbers XI:10–17. That the creation of Moses’s council was divinely ordained must have helped to 
recommend this passage to the bishops. To the biblical account the bishops made their own addition, 
however, in which the 70 elders of Israel were chosen or elected by the tribes themselves. In fact, God 
had commanded Moses to gather 70 men whom he (Moses) knew to be ‘senes’ and ‘magistri populi’. The 
version of Exodus XVIII:13–26 emphasizes Moses’s role in the choosing of his helpers, but still provides 
no basis for the bishops’ claims that the helpers were chosen by the people of their tribe. This seems a 
rather muddled attempt to fit the biblical example to the Form of Peace, in which the author seeks to 
present the agency of the king in ordaining the formation of the council and the barons in electing its 
members. It little seems to fit with the other two appeals to precedent: the human race has no say over 
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III had not in fact consented to the formation of the council. Moreover, the Montfortian council 
had diminished royal power permanently or semi-permanently, which could not be allowed 
under canon law even if the king had consented. For the bishops, there was just no clear way 
of resolving these problems, at least not in a way that might prove acceptable to the legate.  
 
In response, Foulquois struck at the heart of these arguments. Writing to the bishops, 
the legate pointed out that while it was indeed true that the pope enjoyed the counsel of the 
cardinals, in fact he was not bound by that counsel. If two-thirds of the cardinals consented in 
any matter, Foulquois asked, was the pope compelled to acquiesce to their sentences? The 
very thought was clearly shocking to the legate, who underlined his point with the insistence 
that the pope’s liberty was his highest honour.67 There was also an irreconcilable problem, in 
Foulquois’s view, in comparing the relationship between the king and the council to that 
between God and the angels. God might have appointed a deputy and shared some of His 
power but nobody could bind God to retain that deputy. God’s choice was unconstrained and 
reversible but in fact He alone, if He wished, was able to make a permanent decision about the 
sharing of His power, because in His infinite knowledge He knew which angels were good and 
which were bad as well as all events in the future which might affect His choice of ministers. 
The king, though, was human and did not have this knowledge; times and situations changed 
and what had at first been a good appointment could turn out to be a bad one. The king, then, 
needed to be able to change his ministers according to circumstances and to his needs and, 
thus, to impose his counsellors on him was an unacceptable limitation on his liberty.68  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
which angels are appointed in Heaven and it is the pope, ultimately, who appoints judges delegate. This 
remoulding of the biblical account cannot have done the bishops’ case many favours. In fact, in his 
answer the legate ignored the example of Moses altogether. The author is grateful to Mike Clasby for his 
suggestions on the biblical passages.  
67 ‘Quid de Christi vicario nobis obicitis! habet utique cardinales et eorum consiliis utitur, non ligatur; 
numquid enim si duae partes consentiant cardinalium in re aliqua, papa cogitur eorum sententiis 
acquiescere? Absit hoc, absit a venerabili coetu nostro, ut sub obtentu necessitatis urgentis hoc nobis 
privilegium defendamus. Eius enim libertatem in summo supremum reputamus honorem’ (Heidemann, 
229).  
68 ‘Si coeli rector et conditor ... cum motore ab eodem, ut dicitis, ad motum primi mobilis deputato ... si, 
inquam, dominus omnium infallibili providentia cuncta disponens ad singula ministeria novit utique, quos 
elegit, nec purgato semel illo spirituum supernorum collegio in suis electis angelis reperit postea 
pravitatem talemque coeli motorem constituit ... quem utique ab aeterno providerat sibi creditum 
ministerium prudenter atque fideliter impleturum, talem tamen praefecit huic officio, ut nulla se lege 
constrinxerit, quin proprio posset arbitrio committere illud alii; sed eum, cui credidit, talem fecit, ut alium 
non oporteat subrogari; certe reges, qui ex hominibus assumuntur, quorum incertae sunt providentiae, 
quibus omnia in futurum servantur incerta nec, quos eligunt, tales habent, nec sua sic possunt stabilire 
consilia, quin pro diversitate temporis et varietate causarum absque nota qualibet inconstantiae ipsa 




Foulquois had demonstrated that the precedents supplied by the bishops did not work 
in support of the Form of Peace because they concealed its fundamental purpose: the 
permanent alienation of royal power in favour of a council. By discrediting these arguments, 
Foulquois successfully dismissed any justification the bishops had for supporting the Form of 
Peace (or, at least, any justification that they were prepared to present to him). The bishops 
now knew that they might face the broad sentence of excommunication that the legate had 
pronounced on the rebels and their supporters.69 Moreover, since they had admitted their 
complicity with the barons, the legate would hardly believe their excuse that the barons were 
preventing them from leaving England to visit him. 
 
They decided to face the legate. The bishops of London, Worcester and Winchester, 
accompanied by Hugh Despenser and Peter de Montfort, met Foulquois in France at the end of 
September. The Montfortian delegation brought the proposal of a compromise, in which the 
king’s counsellors might now be chosen by a committee comprising the archbishop of Rouen, 
the bishop of London, Peter the Chamberlain, Hugh Despenser and the legate himself. No 
attempt was made to define the power of these councillors: the king, quite simply, should 
make use of their counsel and trust them in giving justice.70 This rather opaque statement 
perhaps invited more questions than it answered and, while the legate deliberated on the 
compromise, he seized the opportunity to pin the bishops down on his primary objection to 
the Montfortian conciliar government: the freedom of the king to make decisions. It was the 
removal of this freedom against which Louis had railed at Amiens and that the bishops had 
sought to conceal. Foulquois put it to them: would the bishops agree with the barons that the 
king of England should be forced to have certain counsellors and to follow their counsel 
precisely? There was no room now for prevarication: each one in turn responded, simply, 
‘Yes’.71 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
personarum consilio, cum sit necessitas semper contraria libertati, prout civili cautum est sanctione’ 
(Heidemann, 229).  
69 The legate voiced his suspicions and warned the bishops to examine their consciences on the matter 
(Heidemann, 228). 
70 ‘Potestas consiliariorum in his consistet: In primis utatur rex eorum consilio et eis credat rex in iustitia 
singulis sine exceptione personarum exhibenda’ (Heidemann, 237).  
71 ‘Interrogavit episcopos Angliae supradictos, an ipsi consentirent cum baronibus, quod rex Angliae ad 
certos habendos consiliarios et eorum praecise sequendum consilium arctaretur. Et responderunt 
sigillatim, quod sic’ (Heidemann, 238).  
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Possibly around the same time that the Montfortian bishops were making their 
argument to the legate, another version of the Montfortian case was under construction in the 
form of the Song of Lewes. This poem was probably written by a friar in the household of 
Stephen Berksted, the bishop of Chichester, and so is highly likely to reflect the views of the 
episcopal circle surrounding Montfort.72 It was probably intended to convince the clerical or 
lay elite who were either sympathetic to reform or still sitting on the fence, whose support 
would help to stabilize the new regime. Unlike Louis IX and the papal legate, this audience was 
neither openly hostile to the Montfortians nor had any real power to damage them if it 
disagreed with their arguments. Such a context gave the author far more room in which to 
make the Montfortian case. Moreover, even given the understanding that Montfort’s 
impressive victory signified divine approval for the reformers,73 the fact that the king had 
been defeated in battle and was held captive by the Montfortians meant that there could now 
be no pretence that the king had consented to the formation of a council.  
 
That this line of argument had been removed from the Montfortian case forced the 
author of the Song to embrace a new approach. He outlines the king’s complaint that the 
barons themselves were able to choose their own officers and distribute their castles and 
lands as they saw fit: ‘Why is the prince made of worse condition, if the affairs of a baron, a 
knight and a freeman are thus managed?’74 The author, though, argues that a king cannot be 
compared to a baron. The actions of the king’s duplicitous foreign counsellors had a 
detrimental effect on the entire kingdom, not just on the king: ‘for it concerns the community 
that wretched men be not made guides of the royal dignity, but the best and chosen men and 
the most approved who can be found. For since the governance of the realm is the safety or 
ruin of all, it matters much whose is the guardianship of the realm’.75  
 
This line might echo the Roman law maxim that ‘what touches all must be decided by 
all’ and the traditional idea that a king should govern for the good of the community. What is 
new here, though, is the way in which these beliefs are applied to justify permanent 
                                                          
72 The authorship of the Song is suggested by the fact that Stephen Berksted is the only Montfortian 
mentioned by name and is given a prominent place in the poem (Song of Lewes, ll. 193–252); P. Hoskin, 
‘Holy bishops and political exiles: St. Richard’s cult and political protest in the late 13th century’, in P. 
Foster (ed.), Richard of Chichester: Bishop 1245–1253: Canonized 1262 (Chichester, 2009), 22–37, at 30.  
73 Song of Lewes, ll. 79–184. 
74 Song of Lewes, ll. 505–13.  
75 Song of Lewes, ll. 805–11.  
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restrictions on the king’s power. It was the barons’ responsibility to purge the land of error,76 
so clearly, the author argues, 
‘how would it not be lawful for them to take foresight lest any evil happen which 
might be harmful; which, after it may have happened, they ought to remove... Thus 
that none of the aforesaid things may come about, which may impede the forming of 
peace or good customs; but that the zeal of the skilled may come in, which may be 
more expedient to the interest of the many; why should not improvement be admitted 
wherein no corruption is mingled?’ 77 
In other words, it was ‘lawful’ for the barons to coerce the king and take over government. 
This was an important development, made possible by the relative freedom of the author of 
the Song: the explanation of why the reformers had the right to act and why they had to 
restrict the king’s power permanently by means of a council, rather than just correcting past 
abuses on an ad hoc basis and protesting against individual acts of injustice.  
 
Whether by direct influence or not, the sorts of arguments in favour of Montfortian 
action contained in the Song seem to have found a sympathetic audience at Oxford. This is 
suggested from apparent allusions to the earl made by Thomas Docking, Franciscan lector at 
Oxford between 1262 and 1264, in his commentaries on the Pauline Epistles: ‘It seems to me 
... that if some man who is prudent and well fitted for the business of rule, seeing God’s people 
endangered by defect of government, should aspire to the dignity of ruling solely for the love 
of God and the benefit of his subjects, his aim is good and he desires to do a good work’.78 
Significantly, Docking’s musings are similar to the case put forward in the Song in that both 
are characterized by the belief in the virtue of Montfort’s motives. Although the Song is 
littered with scriptural references, none is cited in support of the imposition of a conciliar 
government. Like Docking’s statement, it lacks the scriptural or scholastic authority that one 
would expect a scholarly apologist to provide in support of an argument. Both, perhaps, are 
more expressions of sentiment than rigorous exposition.  
 
Another Oxford scholar whose writings show that he might have been supportive of 
the reform movement was John of Wales, lector of the Oxford Franciscans before Docking, 
between 1259 and 1262.79 In his Communiloquium, probably written between 1260 and 1270, 
John wrote about kingship and tyranny, drawing not only from scholars like John of Salisbury 
                                                          
76 Song of Lewes, ll. 595–6.  
77 Song of Lewes, ll. 599–608.  
78 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 254.  




but also from a strong interest in ancient Greece and Rome. Jenny Swanson has pointed out 
that some of John’s views echo arguments in the Song of Lewes, on the need for the king to 
take counsel from virtuous counsellors, as well as the danger posed by dishonest or flattering 
counsellors who, John writes, should be expelled from court.80 John also took a hard line on 
tyranny, arguing that it is justifiable to kill a monarch who does not obey the law and thus 
becomes a tyrant. However, the latter view does not necessarily imply support for the 
Montfortian regime (as Swanson suggests).81 The Song of Lewes, a work seemingly written to 
convince scholars like John,  does not denounce Henry III as a tyrant. Its author speaks in 
grand tones about the importance of the law in the government of the kingdom and criticises 
the lord Edward’s disregard for the law. He also writes about the qualities of good kingship in 
general terms.82 These were the sorts of arguments that many would feel able to endorse but 
they are, in some ways, a sleight of hand, since they distract from the author’s failure to 
criticise Henry by name or too directly. The author presents Henry’s claim to rule according to 
his will in terms of the king’s freedom to appoint ministers and allocate castles, lands and 
revenues to whom he chooses.83 The author is thus criticising a particular argument on the 
king’s right to exercise his will in certain matters, rather than any claim that the king should 
be able to make rulings without judgement in contravention of the law. The strongest 
criticism of Henry’s government in the Song is reserved for the king’s flattering and deceitful 
counsellors.84 As discussed in chapter one, although Henry, in the early years of his personal 
rule, had certainly been guilty of ruling according to his will and of making disseisins without 
judgement, he was accused in 1258 of delaying or denying justice (in contravention of clause 
40 of Magna Carta 1215) but not of ruling arbitrarily.85 John of Wales’s endorsement of 
tyrannicide cannot, therefore, be taken as a clear approval of Montfortian action. John also, in 
fact, argues that monarchy is the natural form of law, a view that would seem to contradict the 
reformers’ claims in the Song on the need for conciliar government.86 Whilst scholars like John 
might well have been  sympathetic to the reformers’ complaints about Henry’s rule, the 
Montfortian solution remained problematic. The whole enterprise might have been viewed by 
some scholars with ambivalence.  
                                                          
80 Swanson, John of Wales, 83, 88-9. 
81 Swanson, John of Wales, 81-2. 
82 Song of Lewes, ll. 848-90, 417-84; 701-58. 
83 Song of Lewes, ll. 489-526. 
84 Song of Lewes, ll. 547-86. 
85 Carpenter, ‘Justice and Jurisdiction’, 38-39; Carpenter, ‘King, Magnates and Society’, 76-85. 




This very fact helps to highlight how the stimulus for the arguments produced by 
Montfort’s ecclesiastical supporters – the heat of political upheaval – was so different from 
that of other writers on political ethics. While pre-existing ideas might have provided the 
springboard, the Montfortian bishops had taken a huge leap in supporting the earl in 1264, for 
Montfortian policy on the ground had moved radically beyond the boundaries of permissible 
action. This leap forced the production of new intellectual justifications from the bishops. The 
Montfortian case is important in demonstrating that ideas about political ethics were not 
always generated in the schoolroom but, as here, forged in the crucible of political action and 
catalysed by urgent necessity. It is also important, though, in revealing how the pressure of 
generating intellectual justifications in the midst of civil war inevitably dictated the direction 
of the bishops’ arguments. Their insistence to the legate that they did not intend to overthrow 
Henry III might well be transparent; the bishops never fully intended to subvert royal power. 
Instead they attempted to rationalize what was in reality highly subversive action and the 
intellectual conflict that this created left its trace in their arguments. While their justifications 
are not coherent as a political theory, they articulate fluently the effect on the production of 










Urban IV died on 2 October 1264, and, at some point during the protracted discussions over 
who should succeed him, the cardinals recalled Gui Foulquois, doggedly pursuing his legation 
in the face of Montfortian attempts to frustrate his endeavours.1 Foulquois was elected pope 
at Perugia on 5 February 1265 and was crowned as Pope Clement IV little more than two 
weeks later. The rise of this particular cardinal to the highest office was, to say the least, an 
unfortunate turn of events for the Montfortian party. Clement’s treatment as legate at the 
hands of the rebellious barons and bishops was a grievous offence about which he was to 
complain bitterly.2 To some, the result was that the aggrieved pope ‘despised the English, 
because at the time of his legation he was not able to obtain entry to England; for that reason 
he persecuted the bishops and barons of England as long as he lived.’3 Although Foulquois 
issued sentences of excommunication against the rebels, this statement was arguably unfair. 
As the memorial sermon for John Gervase discussed later in this chapter shows, Clement took 
a moderate line towards the penitent rebels, whilst the legate he dispatched to England, 
cardinal Ottobuono Fieschi, counselled peace and reconciliation. 
 
With his first hand knowledge of the personnel involved in the rebellion and the 
extent of their capabilities and determination, Clement was well equipped to make provision 
for a new legation. In March 1265, he received envoys from the king and queen of England.4 
That Clement’s reply was addressed to Eleanor, and not to Henry, suggests that it was she who 
had initiated a request for papal intervention, for her husband and eldest son were still in the 
custody of the barons. Her attempt to recover power for her husband by military force had 
failed the previous autumn due to lack of funds and her plot to have Edward freed from 
                                                          
1 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 306. 
2 CPL, 419. 
3 Gervase, 242. 
4 CPL, 419. 
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captivity around the same time had been foiled.5 It seems she now made another attempt to 
regain her family’s position. 
 
Clement wrote back to Eleanor explaining that he intended to delay a month before 
sending a legate, hoping that the rebels would ‘come to a better mind’ in the meantime and 
cease the sort of resistance to papal intervention that he himself had experienced as legate.6 
On 4 May, having decided to proceed, Clement commissioned Ottobuono, cardinal of St 
Adrian’s, to act as papal legate in England.7 The barring of his access to the kingdom was 
anticipated; even in this event, he was to pursue his legation and was authorised to collect 
troops to march against those who would oppose his mission.8 He was permitted to preach a 
crusade against the rebels across the British Isles, Scandinavia, Germany and various 
territories in France.9 The new legate moved first to Savoy, from where he wrote to Henry III, 
requesting that Henry secure him safe entry into the kingdom. 10 By 29 August, he had reached 
King Louis at Paris.11 There he would have heard of the death of Simon de Montfort at 
Evesham on 4 August. This removed the immediate obstacle to the legate’s entry into England. 
Having consulted with Louis, Ottobuono sent messengers to King Henry, Richard king of the 
Romans and the lord Edward. The legate received letters from the princes providing safe 
conduct and giving instructions as to how he might secure entry into England.12 Ottobuono 
did not reach England until 29 October when he landed at Dover with Eleanor.13  
 
Now, wasting no time, on 1 November Ottobuono sent out a summons for all the 
prelates of England to assemble at London for 1 December to discuss ‘the reformation of the 
kingdom that would be pleasing to God and useful to the kingdom.’14 At the council, the 
bishops of London, Lincoln, Winchester and Chichester were ‘publicly and gravely accused of 
supplying aid, counsel and favour to the earl Simon against the king and honour of the 
                                                          
5 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 306-07. 
6 CPL, 419. 
7 CPL, 426. 
8 CPL, 426. 
9 CPL, 427-8. 
10 Ottobuono’s letters are published in R. Graham, ‘The Letters of Cardinal Ottoboni’, EHR 15 (1900), 87 
– 120, at 89. 
11 Graham, ‘Letters of Ottoboni’, 89. It is possible that the legate’s journey had been slowed by illness, 
for when he wrote the college of cardinals from Paris he complained that he had been struggling ‘cum 
corporalis egritudinis molestiis’ (Graham, ‘Letters of Ottoboni’, 89). 
12 Graham, ‘Letters of Ottoboni’, 89-90. 
13 Gervase, 243 
14 C&S, II, 726. 
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kingdom’ and of helping the barons the previous year in keeping the legate, Gui Foulquois, out 
of England. 15 Ottobuono then fixed a date in March 1266 for the bishops to appear before him 
again.16 Before the March council could be held, though, Richard Gravesend, bishop of Lincoln, 
decided to admit his culpability and appeal for absolution from the legate.17 By 17 February he 
had proffered a fine of 500 marks to the king for ‘remission of the king’s indignation and 
rancour’. John Gervase was also forced to proffer a fine of 1000 marks for the king’s 
goodwill.18 Entries in the Close Rolls show that both bishops began almost immediately to pay 
off these fines, delivering the money into the king’s wardrobe.19 This was not an end to 
Henry’s recriminations, however, and the bishops were also now made to pay the fines they 
had offered in 1264 for their failure to perform military service.20 Montfort’s pardons, of 
course, now counted for nothing. Gravesend’s 1264 fine of 500 marks is recorded in the Pipe 
Roll for 1264-65, where a later addition, made when Nicholas de Leukenor was custodian of 
the wardrobe (and after Evesham), shows that the bishop paid the full 500 marks into the 
wardrobe. Gervase, however, only managed to pay 20 marks of the 1264 fine at this time and 
still owed the remaining 580 marks as late as 1267 (although he had paid half of his new 1000 
mark fine by March 1266).21 Their punishment was severe for, as the fines and loans made in 
1264 show, they had set themselves apart as rebels and invested as much, if not more, in the 
Montfortian regime as any of the earl’s lay supporters. Including his loan to Montfort and his 
fines, Gervase had laid out almost £1150 (although he might not have finished paying his 
fines); Gravesend had definitely spent £700. For these bishops, support for the Montfortian 
enterprise had been hugely expensive. 
 
Walter de Cantilupe, meanwhile, had parted in tears from Simon de Montfort on the 
morning of the battle of Evesham for his manor at Blockley, where he died on 12 February 
1266.22 The Flores Historiarum reports that, on his deathbed, de Cantilupe had sent letters to 
the legate renouncing his support for the earl, on account of which the legate absolved him.23 
                                                          
15 Osney 180-2; Dunstable, 240. 
16 Dunsatble, 240. 
17 Flores Historiarum, III, 9. 
18 PR 1258-66, 555; CR 1264-68, 176. 
19CR 1264-68, 176, 186. The surviving wardrobe accounts for this period include only a general receipt: 
‘Et de .M.M.M.C.L.xxiij. li. .iiij. s. et .iiij. d. receptis de finibus diversorum pro bona voluntate Regis habenda 
sicut continetur in predictis rotulis de particulis’ E372/115, Rot. 1d, m.2 
20 For Gravesend, see E372/109, m.10d; for Gervase, see E372/109, m. 12. 
21 E372/111, m.14d, CR 1264-68, 176. 
22 de Laborderie, Maddicott, Carpenter, ‘Last Hours’, 410. 
23 Flores Historiarum, III, 9. 
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The Dover chronicler reports the contrary, however, stating that, appealing for his position, 
the bishops continued manfully in his purpose.24 If de Cantilupe had indeed recanted his 
allegiance to Montfort, it would have represented a resounding volte-face, for de Cantilupe 
was one of the earl’s oldest and greatest friends and had been a committed servant of the 
reforming regime since its infancy. In this light, the account of the Dover chronicle seems 
more convincing than that of the Flores, though it is near impossible to be certain. 
 
When the legatine council met in March, the bishops of Winchester, Chichester and 
London were suspended from office but appealed against the sentence. The legate then 
instructed them to present themselves before the pope within the space of three months.25 All 
three travelled to the curia, though none of them managed to reach the apostolic see within 
three months of Ottobuono’s order. John Gervase reached Viterbo by January 1268, managing 
to obtain absolution before he died there. Henry of Sandwich obtained an apostolic letter 
announcing his absolution, dated 31 May 1272, having ‘come to Rome, and shown his humility 
and devotion’, supported by a petition from the lord Edward ‘that most gentle and forgiving of 
men’. He was allowed to resume the exercise of his office.26 Stephen Berksted received his 
absolution on 26 November 1272 on similar terms, though this came only after Henry’s death 
and he apparently received no royal endorsement.27 Richard Gravesend, meanwhile, did not 
continue in the penitent demeanour he had shown to the king and legate. Already by May 
1267 he was being reproved by Clement IV for ‘going to France and joining the enemies of the 
lord king of England, disclosing to them his secrets, and allowing them to use his servants to 
communicate with England.’28 Gravesend had left England shortly after 17 December 1266, 
when he appointed John of Lindsey and Master John of Oundle to act as his diocesan deputies, 
and had returned by mid October 1267.29 The bishop had seemingly been conspiring with 
Montfortian exiles, though he seems to have heeded Clement’s order to ‘return to his church, 
and give aid to his king and the cause of peace.’30 
The view of Clement IV 
                                                          
24 Gervase, 243. 
25 Flores Historiarum, III, 9. 
26 CPL, 441. 
27 CPL, 443. 
28 CPL, 421. 
29 CPR 1266-72, 9-10 (dated 20 November 1266); the appointment recorded in Gravesend’s register is 
dated 17 December. My thanks to Aaron Hope for his transcription of this entry.  
30 CPL, 421. 
214 
 
‘There is a path that seems just to a man, but the ends of it lead to death’.31 With this citation 
from the book of Proverbs, cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux began his memorial sermon on 
John Gervase, the late bishop of Winchester, at the papal court early in 1268.32 The path in 
question was Gervase’s rebellion against King Henry III of England, in alliance with Simon de 
Montfort earl of Leicester, and his resistance to the apostolic mandates that had ordered 
Gervase and his confederates to abandon rebellion and to help restore King Henry to power. 
Having been suspended from office and ordered to present himself to the pope, Gervase 
managed to reach the papal court at Viterbo and obtain absolution before he died there, on 19 
or 20 January 1268.33 By this time, that same papal legate whom John had defied in 1264, Gui 
Foulquois, had been made pope and now, as Clement IV, likely sat listening to John’s memorial 
sermon at the bishop’s funeral.  Much of the preceding discussion has shown how Gervase and 
his colleagues, as Eudes’ opening words suggest, had declined to take the path of peace, laid 
out by their predecessors, and had chosen instead the path of rebellion. Eudes’ sermon offers 
a remarkable insight into how members of the papal court, including those who had first hand 
experience of the bishops’ activities and attitudes, comprehended their actions. 
 
Whilst this memorial sermon was guided by the conventions of its genre, it was born 
of unusual circumstances. The functions of memorial sermons were, generally, threefold: to 
present the life of the deceased as an example from which the audience could draw; to teach 
the audience something of the nature of death or bring home to it the fragility of life, so as to 
induce its members to improve themselves; and to elicit the prayers of the living for the soul 
of the deceased.34 More often than not, these aims would be achieved by commending the 
deceased through a description of his virtues. Eudes’ sermon on Gervase is unusual. Because 
Gervase died among people who probably knew him best for his reprehensible behaviour, any 
account of Gervase’s virtues was probably beyond Eudes’ reach. The cardinal’s main source 
for his description of Gervase was undoubtedly the former legate, Clement IV, who probably 
                                                          
31 Prov. 14: 12. 
32 MS Arras, Bibliothèque Municipale 876, fo. 163va (ends fo. 165 ra); the sermon is transcribed in A. 
Charansonnet, L’université, l’Eglise et l’Etat dans les sermons de cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux (1190?-
1273), (University of Lyons PhD Thesis, 2001), 875-80 (the references given here relate to the PDF 
version of Charansonnet’s thesis, available online at http://theses.univ-
Lyons2.fr/documents/Lyons2/2001/charansonnet_a/info); for discussion on this sermon, see 
Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 528-32; D.L. d’Avray, Death and the Prince: Memorial Preaching 
before 1350 (Oxford, 1994). 38-9.  
33 C. L. Kingsford, ‘Gervase, John (d. 1268)’, rev. N. C. Vincent, ODNB (2004), available online at 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14854. 
34 d’Avray, Death and the Prince, 63-65.  
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provided testimony based on his own – largely negative – experience of Gervase during the 
rebellion. But Eudes also seems to draw on Clement’s account of his conversation with 
Gervase at the papal court early in 1268, when the late bishop had asked the pope for 
absolution. 35  In other words, the bishop’s own testimony forms a partial base for Eudes’ 
sermon.  
 
Eudes’ interpretation and presentation of this material might have been influenced by 
considerations of his present audience. Eudes, like other exponents of the genre, was more 
accustomed to delivering memorial sermons to the family, friends and colleagues of his 
subjects and hence to the restrictions on criticism of the deceased that such an audience might 
entail. Because Gervase died far from home at Viterbo, Eudes was relatively free to explore the 
faults of his subject. But the composition of this particular audience, here at the papal court, 
also invited Eudes to utilise his discussion of Gervase to provide a more tailored lesson than 
would be the case if the audience were a group of mixed status. He could target his warnings 
about the transgressions to which a highly-educated and powerful ecclesiastic might be 
susceptible to an audience composed of highly-educated and powerful ecclesiastics. We 
should also bear in mind that the sermon was not only intended for the immediate audience 
listening at John’s funeral; it was preserved for posterity in Eudes’ records so that at some 
point in the future a preacher encumbered with a similarly tricky subject might use it as a 
foundation for his own  sermon. So whilst Eudes’ discussion had an immediate purpose of 
illuminating the rebellion of John Gervase in the 1260s, it was also intended to serve as a 
framework for understanding rebellion in general and ecclesiastical rebellion in particular.  
 
Given these considerations, how was Eudes to interpret Gervase’s actions and fulfil the 
threefold purpose of the memorial sermon? He builds on his opening citation from the book of 
Proverbs by developing the theme of a crossroads, taken from Jeremiah: ‘thus says the Lord: 
Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of death.’36  Eudes does not dwell on the 
nature of the path of life, either in terms of general episcopal virtues or in the more specific 
context of John’s career and the papacy’s expectations of episcopal behaviour in times of 
political crisis. It would have been obvious to Eudes and his audience that any bishop was 
expected to obey the pope, which in Gervase’s case meant that he should never have become 
                                                          
35 Or the account John had provided to the canonist Hostiensis, whom Clement had put in charge of 
examining the late bishop’s case (Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 879). 
36 Jer. 21, 8; Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 876. 
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involved in the rebellion and, rather, should have assisted the papacy in restoring King Henry 
to power. Instead, Eudes’s sermon covers three broad questions: why Gervase chose the way 
of death, why God had allowed him to err, and how Gervase could be saved from damnation.  
 
A man at a crossroads can choose the path of life that leads to eternal life, or the path 
of death that leads to damnation. Why would a man choose the path of death? Because, says 
Eudes, it seems to him to be just, as we heard in the opening citation from the book of 
Proverbs: ‘there is a path that seems just to a man, but the ends of it lead to death.’37 This can be 
confirmed, says Eudes, by the words of Aristotle: ‘good is what is sought by all things, and 
nothing is sought unless because it is good or because it appears good.’38 ‘Therefore’, Eudes 
pronounces, ‘the path that leads to death is not sought nor is it chosen by anyone unless it 
seems good and just.’ 39 This was true in the case of John Gervase who, as Eudes points out, 
believed that he was defending the rights of the Church and defending other people’s rights.40 
This account of Gervase’s motives is likely based on the late bishop’s own testimony in 1268.  
 
Although Eudes allows that Gervase believed he was doing the right thing, he points 
out that the bishop  
‘did not rightly consider that, in resisting apostolic mandates and not obeying he who 
ought to be honoured on account of this matter, in order to restore the Church and 
also the whole kingdom to a good state, not only was he not in this way defending 
ecclesiastical liberty, but he was entirely destroying it in those parts, and the English 
Church, indeed the entire kingdom, he overthrew.’41 
 Given that this was the case, Eudes needed to account for the fact that the bishop’s path – the 
path of rebellion, the path that leads to damnation - had seemed to him to be just. Citing 
Rabanus Maurus, Eudes explains that this path seems just because ‘sometimes men are 
burdened by the weight of corruption, while they are striving for good things, and under the 
appearance of good they rush towards bad things whilst all the while they are longing for good 
things, and they are ignorant as to where they ought to go.’42 In order, then, both to account for 
his subject’s decision and to warn his audience, Eudes describes the sort of corruption that 
burdened John. This was, Eudes believed, twofold: an unhealthy infatuation with learning and 
a misguided zeal for justice.  
                                                          
37 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 878. 
38 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 878 n. 4239. 
39 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 878. 
40 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 879. 
41 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 879-80. 




Although all men, learned and unlearned, could be burdened by corruption, Eudes 
points out that it is often the learned who are particularly at risk, since ‘the corruptible body is 
a load upon the soul  and the earthly habitation presses down the mind that muses upon many 
things’.43 A learned man might dedicate his mind to many matters, but often too little to his 
own failings. While ‘the unlearned as much as the learned rush toward evil under the 
appearance of good’, it is the learned who ‘cover evils with their empty reasoning with the 
appearance of good, just as they clothe falsehoods sophistically with the appearance of truth, 
by means of sophistical proofs’.44 This means that the learned man can ‘obscure evil through 
flattery and make others believe good, just as if whitewashing with stibium’. Thus the prophet 
Jeremiah said that ‘every man has become a fool for his knowledge’,45 in the same way, Eudes 
suggests, ‘as a lecher is made a fool by his mistress’ when ‘he loves her too much, trusts her 
too much and cleaves to her too much’. Indeed, says Eudes, ‘among all other things that he has, 
man loves his knowledge most of all’. As Aristotle said in his Metaphysics, ‘All men naturally 
desire to know’.46 Eudes explains evocatively that this blinding happens in the same way as it 
does for those who attempt to observe an eclipse of the sun: their eyes are weakened and 
confounded when they look up to the skies.47 
 
This is not an attack against learning in general. Gervase, like many of his peers, had 
been trained at university in Oxford, and is known to have been a Master of Arts.48 In his time 
he might well have been a distinguished scholar, although none of his work is known to have 
survived.49 However Eudes, Clement IV, and probably many of the audience were products of 
the universities too. This is a specific, and uncommonly powerful, attack against an infatuation 
with learning and particularly its misuse for the purpose of deception. It is here that Eudes 
seems to be drawing from the experiences of Clement IV and his dealings with Gervase during 
the rebellion, experiences with which many members of the audience, as part of Clement’s 
                                                          
43 Sap. 9:15; Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 878. 
44 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 878. 
45 Jer. 10: 14. 
46 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 878 n. 4244. 
47 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 879. 
48 John incepted as Master of Arts at Oxford in 1234; he was in Paris around 1251: A. B. Emden, , A 
Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500 (3 vols., Oxford, 1957-9), ii, 757. He is 
described in one papal letter, dated 1248, as ‘learned in the physical sciences’(CPL, 241).  
49 The chronicle of Gervase of Canterbury describes John’s collation to the see of Winchester, recording 
that the ‘bishop on account of his most great scholarship (litteratura) was believed by all to have come 
through divine providence for the honour of that bishopric’ (Gervase, II, 219). 
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circle, were probably familiar. The register that Clement kept as papal legate, which records 
the correspondence that passed between him and the rebels in 1264, helps to illuminate 
Eudes’ account. As discussed in chapter seven, the Montfortian bishops (Gervase included) 
had written to Foulquois in an attempt to justify the form of conciliar government instituted 
by the Montfortians. As Foulquois was well aware, this regime had been imposed by military 
force and had virtually stripped King Henry and his heirs of all power. Whilst protesting that 
they and the rebel barons were faithful subjects who still revered the king as their prince, the 
bishops put forward an audacious but ultimately untenable case, in which they claimed that 
there was precedent for their conciliar government in the celestial hierarchy, papal 
government, and the Bible.50 Foulquois had viewed their arguments with disdain and had 
wasted no time in demolishing them.51 Perhaps the desperate justifications of Gervase and his 
confederates were what Eudes had in mind when he complained about the sophistry 
employed by the learned to mask misdeeds.52 The criticism is focused on John’s misuse of his 
learning to justify his support of armed rebellion and disobedience to papal orders. Eudes 
seemingly blames this on the fact that learning and intelligence had gone to John’s head: he 
goes on to say that perhaps John’s knowledge had ‘raised him above himself’ (in other words, 
that he had got too big for his boots).53  
 
As well as a love of knowledge, Eudes points out, ‘a zeal for justice can make a fool of a 
man, which he believes he has, or pretends he has, or wishes to be seen to have’.54 Eudes’ 
rather cynical reading of Gervase’s motives can perhaps be understood in the light of 
Montfortian propaganda, and the reported statements of Montfort himself, which abound 
with self-confident proclamations of the movement’s righteousness. 55 Clement himself was 
exposed to such rhetoric in his dealings with the rebels in 1264, and Eudes is probably 
reflecting the pope’s opinion when he suggests that such zeal can often be misdirected: as St 
Paul says, those ‘having a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge err from the truth’.56 
                                                          
50 Heidemann, 227. 
51 Heidemann, 229.  
52 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 878. 
53 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 880.  
54 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 879.  
55 For discussion on Montfort in particular, see index entries under ‘Montfort, Simon de, earl of 
Leicester (d.1265)’, particularly ‘silver (but barbed) tongue’ and ‘attitude to oaths’ in Maddicott, Simon 
de Montfort. For particular examples, seethe case that the reformers put to Louis IX at Amiens (DBM, 
256-79); as well as Song of Lewes, in extenso.  
56 Rom. 10:2; Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 87 
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Indeed, St Paul himself had once been led by such a misguided zeal to persecute the Church.57  
Apparently, though, an ardent zeal for justice was also a feature of Gervase’s character. Eudes 
recalls that it was said of the bishop that ‘he was hard, stern and austere in giving justice and 
excessively just.’58 Such zeal, in precluding the use of mercy to moderate judgements, was 
clearly considered not to be in keeping with the spirit of the Church. Eudes presents an 
implicit contrast between Gervase’s own attitude to the dispensation of justice and that of the 
papacy. One is led to infer that if the papacy had been guided by the same zeal for justice as 
Gervase had displayed, the bishop would hardly have found forgiveness. Returning, though, to 
Eudes’ central line of argument, it was this excessive and misdirected zeal which combined 
with Gervase’s infatuation with learning to form the weight of corruption that led him to 
choose the path that leads to damnation.  
 
Eudes acknowledges that a man’s ignorance of the weight of corruption might present 
a problem in the eyes of some, who foolishly blame God for their sins and ask why God allows 
man the freedom to choose the path that leads to damnation. In response, Eudes turns to the 
book of Ecclesiasticus: ‘I have placed water and fire before you: stretch forth your hand to 
which you will. Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be 
given him: for the wisdom of God is great and he is strong in power, seeing all things without 
pause.’59  
‘Indeed, if only good had been placed before man, or only life, then either he would not 
have free judgement or would have it for nothing.  And if he did not have free 
judgement,  he would not be able to earn merit or show himself to be undeserving. 
And as much as he would gain from the one part, so much he would lose from the 
other, and by much more, since it is a greater harm and greater injury not to be able to 
earn merit, than it is good or useful not to be able to be undeserving... Therefore God 
does not provide the cause of the error, in placing before us good and evil, the way of 
life and the way of death, but He gives to us so that through these things we can earn 
much more good than we would have, and the good that we have we will not be able 
to lose, but will be able to hold, increased, firmly in perpetuity’.60  
 
Eudes goes on to address the particular question of how a man of such learning 
leading such a life as the late bishop of Winchester was able to err so disgracefully. Given the 
well-known harshness and even arrogance of Gervase to which Eudes refers, the Lord had 
permitted him to fall so that he would be humbled, and ‘so that he would rise stronger and 
                                                          
57 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 879. 
58 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 880. 
59 Eccli. 15: 17-19; Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 877. 
60 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 877-8.  
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more cautious from the fall’, since ‘with a greater flogging the child ought to be wiser.’61 
Furthermore, with a direct appeal to the compassion of his audience, through which he might 
hope to elicit prayers for the bishop’s soul, Eudes assured his listeners that ‘nor is it 
remarkable if he [Gervase] fell, since far greater people than him have fallen before and will 
fall in the future.’ Here, Eudes cites a vernacular proverb: ‘It is not remarkable if a man falls 
who has nothing but two feet, when sometimes a horse falls who has four feet.’62  
 
Once a man has fallen, however, or chosen the path that leads to death, how might he 
find his way back to the path of life; how might Gervasebe forgiven and saved? Because he did 
what he did in ignorance, believing that he was doing the right thing. Here, Eudes presents no 
better precedent than that of St Paul, who had once persecuted the Church, believing that he 
acted well and justly and supplied God’s judgement, but had subsequently found the mercy of 
God because he acted ignorantly.63 Just like St Paul, Gervase had withdrawn from the path that 
seemed to him to be just – the path that leads to damnation – and turned back to the path of 
penitence, humility, and obedience, which is the path of life leading to life.64 Eudes returns to 
the citation from the book of Proverbs with which he began: ‘there is a path that seems just to 
a man, but the ends of it lead to death.’ This, Eudes explains, means that  
‘the path itself did not lead him to death, whence notably Solomon said that the ends of 
it, that is the path, which seems just and is not, lead to death, and he did not say that 
the path itself leads to death, since the evil path, however much it is evil, and might 
lead to death, yet still it does not lead to death unless a man perseveres in that path, 
and therefore the path does not lead [to death] but the ends of the path lead to death.’65  
So Gervase saved himself from damnation by repenting his choice and returning to the path 
which, after some time spent in purgatory, will lead him to eternal life.66 Although Eudes does 
not explain what initially prompted the bishop’s repentance, it might have been the 
overwhelming defeat of the rebels at Evesham in 1265. If Montfort’s victory over royal forces 
in 1264 was attributed to God’s approval of the rebel movement, it is possible that for some of 
the earl’s supporters the death of their leader the next year could have forced them to re-
examine their positions.67 It is certain, however, that Gervase’s repentance was catalysed by 
                                                          
61 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 880. 
62 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 880. 
63 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 879. 
64 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 880. 
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the knowledge that his own death was imminent. In Eudes’ words, God had ‘struck him with 
the rod of infirmity’, either on his way to the papal court or shortly after his arrival.68  It seems 
likely that John’s conversation with the pope was something like a death-bed confession.    
 
In both his criticism of and compassion for John, as well as his views on the merciful 
dispensation of justice, Eudes was likely reflecting the attitude of Clement IV. This outlook 
was in keeping with the tone adopted by Clement himself in dealing with the rebels in 1264. 
Faced with the violent political upheaval in England and the disobedience of the Montfortian 
bishops, Foulquois could have excommunicated the rebels outright and thrown his weight 
behind the royal military response being mounted on the continent by proclaiming a crusade, 
for such was the extent of the powers entrusted to him by the pope. Instead, he did all he 
could to promote a non-violent solution through negotiation, allowing the Montfortians every 
possible opportunity to obey papal commands and abandon rebellion, but also providing 
them the chance to explain themselves and justify their actions. The new legation that 
Foulquois commissioned when he became pope continued in a similar vein, when cardinal 
Ottobono counselled Henry III and the lord Edward against taking vengeance on the defeated 
rebels. Clement took his responsibility to restore peace and ecclesiastical unity extremely 
seriously but, in his role as legate and then as pope, he was keen to understand, slow to 
punish and quick to forgive. Consequently, Eudes’ sermon rests, fundamentally, on the 
importance of reconciliation and the rightful hope of the penitent. We have seen in earlier 
chapters how the Montfortian bishops strayed from the path of their predecessors. Eudes’ 
sermon presents a framework of how such departures from expected episcopal behaviour 
could be analysed, comprehended and forgiven.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Gravesend, the Montfortian bishop of Lincoln, was soon in trouble with Clement IV again after receiving 
absolution for his part in the rebellion, when in May 1267 he was accused of spying for the king’s 
enemies abroad (presumably the Montfortian exiles in France): CPL, 421. 







When contemporaries came to reflect on the involvement of the bishops in the Montfortian 
rebellion, they saw that their actions required special explanation. These men were different 
from the lay magnates, knights and peasants who with them had seized the reins of 
government from the king, whose involvement could be explained by contemporaries 
according to personal gain or the interests of their milieu. Montfort’s motives were of course 
the subject of much discussion, as the accusation of his self-interest recounted in the Song of 
Lewes makes clear.1 The investigations of the special eyre held between 1267 and 1272 show 
how the involvement of individual knights and peasants could be accounted for by affinity 
with rebel magnates, physical coercion or willing support for the reform programme.2 The 
bishops, though, did not gain materially from their support of the earl and, through the fines 
they proffered to the king as early as Lent 1264 and the loans they made to prop up the 
Montfortian regime, must have sacrificed more than most. Although at least two of them were 
long-term friends of the earl, none of the bishops were bound by affinity to support the rebel 
party. As the first half of this thesis has argued, they were bound by the obligations of their 
office not to take sides but, instead, to act as peacemakers.  
 
For contemporaries, then, their actions had to be explained as those of highly 
educated churchmen, as the author of the Merton Flores Historiarum recognised when he 
criticised the bishop of Worcester for joining the revolution even though it contravened divine 
and human law.3 The bishops – particularly ille senex Walter de Cantilupe – were old enough 
and supposedly wise enough to know better. That they had colluded of their own free will in 
the subversion of royal power was a source of wonder. As learned churchmen, they ought to 
have recognised how these actions were impermissible. When writing his memorial sermon 
for John Gervase, Eudes de Châteauroux assessed the involvement of the bishop of Winchester 
in similar terms – a man of such learning and leading such a life as the bishop of Winchester 
                                                          
1 Song of Lewes, ll. 325-38. 
2 D. A. Carpenter, ‘English Peasants in Politics, 1258-1267’, in his The Reign of Henry III (London, 1996), 
309-48. 
3 Flores Historiarum, III, 254. 
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who was, nevertheless, capable of falling from grace.4 The question was particularly 
important for both authors who, as churchmen learned to a greater or lesser extent in natural 
and positive law regarding royal power, struggled to explain how their subjects, made 
essentially of the same stuff, could respond so differently. Eudes, unlike the Flores author, felt 
able to offer an explanation. The problem was not that Gervase was insufficiently learned but, 
on the contrary, that he was enamoured with learning. Reading the convoluted but 
unconvincing arguments put by the bishops to Gui Foulquois in 1264, discussed in chapter 
seven, it is not difficult to see how this impression was created and how Eudes could consider 
the arguments to be sophistry. The difficulty was that, to the most distinguished scholars of 
their milieu, not least Robert Grosseteste, there was no learned way of justifying the sort of 
action taken by the Montfortians, only of condemning it. The Montfortian bishops took refuge 
in scholarly argument as a means of justifying their radicalism as much to themselves as to 
others.  
 
The bishops’ conflicted position was caused by a rupture with their episcopal heritage. 
The leading examples of episcopal conduct in the thirteenth century, Stephen Langton and 
Edmund of Abingdon, had shaped the expectations and aspirations of their milieu. Like their 
counterparts in other kingdoms, they prioritised the peace and security of the realm and 
navigated their way through political crises with this ideal as their compass. Central to the 
pursuit of this objective was the maintenance of loyalty to the king as well as his subjects. Far 
from being disinterested mediators, the bishops held serious interests on both sides that 
empowered and incentivised them to act as peacemakers. This obligation was enriched in the 
early thirteenth century by Langton’s biblical understanding of the clerical duty to ensure the 
good government of the realm. Far from establishing the bishops as combative opponents of 
royal rule, this responsibility bonded with the bishops’ eirenic duties. When kings 
transgressed, and their illegal or destructive policies caused baronial discontent that 
threatened civil peace, the bishops could step in to reform royal behaviour. With a unique 
ritual potency drawn from their status as anointers of the king, empowered to critique royal 
policy by divine instruction found in Scripture, the bishops were able to effect change in the 
king and remake him symbolically for the benefit of the realm.  
 
                                                          
4 Charansonnet, Eudes de Châteauroux, 880. 
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The manner in which this action was performed was of critical importance. Langton in 
1213 and Edmund in 1234 did not confront their kings aggressively or rudely. Although they 
threatened him with ecclesiastical censure, they did not attack the strongholds of his power. 
To have done so would have contravened biblical precedents laid out in the Books of Kings 
and would also be counterproductive, since any measures that seriously threatened royal 
power could disrupt the peace of the kingdom. For these reasons Langton was deeply 
uncomfortable with the situation of Magna Carta in 1215. The Charter had been made possible 
by rebellion and the security clause was a deeply problematic and ultimately untenable 
solution to the problem of how to control royal behaviour. The 1225 version of the Charter, 
given freely by the king as part of a mutual bargain with his subjects, with the dangerous 
security clause omitted, better represented the proper way to manage royal conduct. This was 
a relationship that the bishops could oversee. The means of its enforcement – the sentence of 
excommunication – held the king to account but would not threaten the foundations of royal 
power. The bishops’ sensitivity to the need for lawful but unimpaired royal rule was 
proclaimed most forcefully in the approach made to Henry III by Edmund of Abingdon. 
Emphasising his loyalty to king and kingdom, citing concern for Henry’s relationship with his 
subjects as motivation for the bishops’ intervention, Edmund spoke respectfully to the king. 
Ecclesiastical censure could be used to threaten the king in order to pursue the ultimate goal 
of regnal peace but the bases of royal power – the king’s castles, lands and finances – were not 
attacked.  Acting as the king’s loyal subject and advisor was the safest and most productive 
route to reforming the king for the benefit of the realm.  
 
This was the point of rupture between the Montfortian bishops and their 
predecessors. Like earlier bishops, the Montfortians took a theological view of kingship and 
exercised their duty as clergymen to ensure good government but, unlike Langton and 
Edmund, they did not retain their loyalty to the king. As partisan Montfortians, they were no 
longer qualified to act as peacemakers. Members of a regime that appropriated the bases of 
royal power and ruled in the king’s name, they had advocated measures that according to the 
view of their predecessors were illicit and dangerous, since they threatened the peace of the 
realm. The profound and deeply unsettling nature of this breach is reflected in the actions and 
arguments of the Montfortian bishops. They attempted to curtail the civil violence of 1263-5 
that they had all but invited by supporting the rebellion of Simon de Montfort. The bishops’ 
efforts betrayed discomfort at the abandonment of their role as regnal peacemakers. The 
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arguments they put forward to justify the appropriation of royal power and establishment of 
conciliar government, based on theological, papal and scriptural precedents, attempted to 
reconcile their episcopal identity with revolutionary measures that vigorously outstripped 
those taken by their predecessors to reform the exercise of royal power. An appreciation for 
the context in which these arguments and actions were produced is fundamental in 
understanding their content. Constructing their case from scratch, in the crucible of political 
crisis, the Montfortian bishops left in their arguments the trace of internal conflicts and 
external pressures. Their case provides an ideal-type for the study of political thought: 
exothermic ideology. Not the cause but the consequence of events on the ground, these ideas 
are not coherent as political theory. This does not mean, however, that they should be 
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